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2Abstract
This thesis investigates the influence of domestic institutional structures on international 
financial market sentiment during financial crises. It asks whether rationalist institutionalism 
is correct by suggesting that financial market participants make optimising rational choices 
about domestic institutions when assessing whether exchange rate commitments by national 
policymakers are consistent with domestic policy constraints.
To clarify the issue I have undertaken an empirical study of market sentiment from a 
procedural angle. I use focused structured comparison as a means of undertaking an 
investigation of the process of market decision-making during a single historical episode in 
which the credibility of currency commitments was at stake, the 1992/93 ERM crisis. This 
approach allowed for a rigorous detailed longitudinal reconstruction of how domestic 
institutional variables, which have been identified by rationalist institutionalism as critical for 
monetary policy outcomes (financial structure, wage bargaining structure, political structure), 
influenced market sentiment towards pound sterling, the French franc and the D-mark.
I conclude that, firstly, market participants took account of domestic institutional structures in 
a broadly rational fashion. But given that, in the practice of financial market trading, 
information is incomplete and the cognitive capacities of market analysts are limited, market 
rationality is bounded and not optimising. Market participants “satisfice”: they economise on 
their decision-making by stopping the process of assessment at a practically acceptable, rather 
than an optimal solution. This leads to inefficient market outcomes manifested in unstable 
expectations about institutions and lack of robustness in institutional analysis. Secondly, 
market sentiment is characterised by uncertainty about the structural underpinnings of 
political exchange rate commitments, allowing considerable room for national policy-making 
autonomy through strategic interaction between national policymakers and international 
financial markets. Thirdly, the practical nature of decision-making by financial market 
participants has not been recognised by rationalist institutionalism, explaining its theoretical 
ambiguities regarding the influence of domestic institutions on market sentiment.
3Table of Contents
Abstract 2
Table of Contents 3
List of Tables 6
List of Charts 7
List of Persons Interviewed 10
Abbreviations 11
Acknowledgements 12
Chapter 1: Introduction 13
Chapter 2: Literature Review: Domestic Institutions, Market
Rationality and Currency Crises 40
2.1. Introduction 40
2.2. Domestic Institutions, Rational Expectations and Currency
Crises 42
2.3. Theories of Currency Crises by Economists 47
2.3.1. The Role of Domestic Institutions 48
2.3.2. Market Rationality 58
2.4. The 1992/93 ERM Crisis 61
2.4.1. A Brief Historical Account 61
2.4.2. Market Rationality and Domestic Structures in the Analysis
of the ERM Crisis 69
2.5. Conclusion 80
Chapter 3: Theory and Method 81
3.1. Introduction 81
3.2. “Bounded Rationality”: An Approach to Refine Rationalist
Institutionalism 82
3.3. Qualitative “focused structured” Comparison of Britain,
France and Germany in 1992/93 94
3.4. Classical Content Analysis of Market Reports, Using Computer-
Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQD AS) 101
3.5. Conclusion 120
Chapter 4: Domestic Structures and Monetary Policy Commitments 121
4.1. Introduction 121
4.2. Domestic Interests and Monetary Policy Commitments 123
4.3. Domestic Institutions and the Time Consistency
of Monetary Policy Commitments 125
4.3.1. Financial Structure 126
44.3.1.1. Central Bank Independence 126
4.3.1.2. The Bank-Industry Relationship 139
4.3.1.3. The Monetary Transmission Mechanism 147
4.3.2. Labour Market and Wage Bargaining Structures 151
4.3.2.I. Wage Bargaining Structures in Britain, France and Germany 152
4.3.2.2. Labour Market Flexibility 160
4.3.3. Political Structures 164
4.4. Conclusion 178
Chapter 5: Sterling during the ERM Crisis 187
5.1. Introduction 187
5.2. Sterling and the ERM Crisis 189
5.2.1. Politics and the Pound in 1991/92 190
5.2.2. Periodization of the History of the Pound Sterling
in the ERM Crisis 196
5.2.3. Interpretations of the Sterling Crisis 199
5.3. Market Sentiment towards the Pound during the ERM Crisis 202
5.3.1. International Variables 206
5.3.1.1. The D-Mark/Dollar Cross and Bundesbank Interest Rate Policy 208
5.3.1.2. EMU Problems and ERM Tensions 211
5.3.2. Domestic Economic and Political Variables 216
5.3.2.I. Competitiveness Related Economic Variables 224
5.3.2.2. Political Sustainability Concerns 229
5.3.3. Domestic Structures 236
5.3.3.1. The Insignificance of Wage Bargaining Structures
and of the Bank of England 238
5.3.3.2. Government Structures 239
5.3.3.3. Financial Structures 240
5.4. Conclusion 242
Chapter 6: The French Franc during the ERM Crisis 245
6.1. Introduction 245
6.2. The French Franc in the ERM Crisis 247
6.2.1. Competitive Disinflation and the Franc Fort 250
6.2.2. Periodization of the History of the French Franc
in the ERM Crisis 256
6.2.3. Interpretations of the French Franc Crisis 262
6.3. Market Sentiment towards the French Franc during
the ERM Crisis 265
6.3.1. International Variables 269
6.3.1.1. The D-Mark-Dollar Cross and Bundesbank Monetary Policy 269
6.3.1.2. EMU Problems and ERM Tensions 275
6.3.2. Domestic Economic and Political Variables 279
6.3.2.1. Competitiveness Related Economic Variables 284
6.3.2.2. Political Sustainability Concerns 290
6.3.3. Domestic Structures 296
6.3.3.1. The Banque de France 299
6.3.3.2. Wage Bargaining Structures 300
6.3.3.3. Government Structures 302
56.3.3.4. Financial Structures 305
6.4 Conclusion 309
Chapter 7: The D-Mark during the ERM Crisis 316
7.1. Introduction 316
7.2. The D-Mark and the ERM Crisis 318
7.2.1. Global Factors: USA and Russia 320
7.2.2. German Unification and the ERM Crisis 321
7.2.3. Periodization of the History of the D-mark in the ERM Crisis 331
7.2.4. Interpretations of D-Mark Volatility 335
7.3. Market Sentiment towards the Mark during the ERM Crisis 337
7.3.1. The Bundesbank: Policy Statements 340
7.3.2. International Variables 342
7.3.2.1. The D-Mark/US Dollar Cross 342
132 .2 . EMU Problems and ERM Tensions 346
7.3.3. Domestic Variables 351
7.3.3.1. The Bundesbank: Monetary Policy, Disinflation
and Sustainability 351
7.3.3.2. Domestic Economic Variables Constraining Bundesbank
Monetary Policy 357
7.3.4. Domestic Structures 367
7.3.4.1. The Bundesbank 371
7.3.4.2. Wage Bargaining Structures 375
7.3.4.3. Government Structures 378
7.4. Conclusion 381
8. Conclusion 385
References 403
Appendix 421
Table 1: A Political Economic Chronology of the 1992/93 ERM Crisis 422
Table 2: Main Economic Indicators 426
Table 3: Index Tree 427
6List of Tables
Table 2.1: Currency crisis models 48
Table 2.2: Foreign exchange and derivatives market activity 1992 62
Table 2.3: Britain, France, Germany: Share of exports directed to the USA 69
Table 2.4: Explanations of the ERM Crisis 75
Table 3.1: Economic indicators of countries affected by currency crises 99
Table 4.1: Germany, France, UK: Comparison of central bank
independence in 1992/93 131
Table 4.2: France, Germany, UK: Financial structure in the early 1990s 141
Table 4.3: France, Germany, UK: Bank lending rate response to a change
in the official interest rate in the early 1990s 148
Table 4.4: France, Germany, UK: Numerical labour market flexibility 163
Table 4.5: France, Germany, UK: The structural sustainability of
a strong currency commitment 180
Table 5.1: Monetary policy interests in Britain in 1991/92 195
Table 5.2: Bundesbank interest rates: Expectations of an imminent
official rate cut 209
Table 5.3: Market sentiment UK: Concerns about the government’s
commitment to Sterling’s ERM parity 213
Table 6.1: Monetary policy interests in France in 1992/93 255
Table 6.2: Market sentiment France: Concern about the government’s
commitment to the Franc FortfERM parity 277
Table 6.3: Market sentiment France: Expectations of an imminent
French official interest rate cut 283
Table 7.1: The political and economic consequences of German unification 323
Table 7.2: German unification: economic indicators 326
Table 7.3: Monetary policy interests in Germany in 1992/93 330
Table 7.4: Hawkish Bundesbank statements 341
Table 7.5: Expectations of Bundesbank to stabilise the ERM 347
Table 7.6: Market sentiment Germany: Bundesbank tight monetary policy
domestically unsustainable 353
Table 7.7: Germany: Wage bargaining and industrial action 1992/1993 362
7List of Charts
Chart 2.1 Exchange rates: DM to FFr; £; Lit; US $ 64
Chart 2.2 France, Germany, UK, USA: Official interest rates 64
Chart 2.3 France, Germany, UK, USA:General government fiscal deficit 65
Chart 2.4 France, Germany, UK: Consumer price inflation 66
Chart 2.5 France, Germany, UK, Italy: Current account 66
Chart 2.6 France, Germany, UK, Italy: Real effective exchange rate 67
Chart 2.7 France, Germany, UK, USA: GDP 68
Chart 2.8 France, Germany, UK: Unemployment 68
Chart 2.9 France, West Germany, UK: Wage increases 70
Chart 5.1 Exchange rates: DM to FF; £; $ 189
Chart 5.2 Britain: short-term interest rates 190
Chart 5.3 Market sentiment UK: Economic, political, structural variables 202
Chart 5.4 Market sentiment UK: Expectations on pound sterling to
weaken in the ERM 203
Chart 5.5: Market sentiment UK: Concerns about the sustainability
of the ERM exchange rate commitment 203
Chart 5.6: Market sentiment UK: Expectations of US dollar to
weaken against the D-mark 206
Chart 5.7 Market sentiment UK: Bundesbank statements 207
Chart 5.8: Market sentiment UK: Concerns about hawkish Bundesbank
statements 207
Chart 5.9: Market sentiment UK: Expected devaluation/realignment of
sterling 212
Chart 5.10: Market sentiment UK: Expectations of official interest
rate policy 217
Chart 5.11: Market sentiment UK: Expectations of falling official interest
rates 217
Chart 5.12: Market sentiment UK: Expectations of rising official interest
rates 218
Chart 5.13: Market sentiment UK: Strengthening balance of payments
position (expectations and fact) 224
Chart 5.14: Market sentiment UK: Falling inflation (expectations and fact) 224
Chart 5.15: Market sentiment UK: Fiscal deficits and fiscal policy
(expectations and fact) 225
Chart 5.16: Market sentiment UK: Concerns about recession
(expectations and fact) 230
Chart 5.17: Market sentiment UK: Rising unemployment
(expectations and fact) 230
Chart 5.18: Market sentiment UK: Election concerns (expectations) 232
Chart 5.19: Market sentiment UK: Domestic structures: Comparative
significance 236
Chart 5.20: Market sentiment UK: Domestic structures: Government 236
Chart 5.21: Market sentiment UK: Domestic structures: Financial structures
(excluding central bank) 237
8247
248
265
266
266
270
271
271
272
275
276
280
281
286
286
287
287
288
290
290
293
296
296
297
318
319
337
Exchange rates: DM to FFr 
France: short-term interest rates
Market sentiment France: Economic, political, structural 
variables
Market sentiment France: Expectations of FFr exchange rate: 
uncertain or weakening
Market sentiment France: Concerns about the sustainability of 
the ERM exchange rate commitment
Market sentiment France: Expectations of US dollar to weaken 
against the D-mark
Market sentiment France: Expectations of the Franco-German 
axis causing the Bundesbank to stabilise the French franc 
Market sentiment France: Expectations of an imminent 
Bundesbank interest rate cut 
Market sentiment France: Concerns about hawkish 
Bundesbank statements
Market sentiment France: ERM tensions: Expected realignment 
of other ERM currencies (excluding the French franc)
Market sentiment France: ERM tensions: Expected realignment 
of the French franc
Market sentiment France: Expectations of steady or rising 
Bundesbank interest rates
Market sentiment France: Expectations of steady or rising 
French official interest rates
Market sentiment France: Sound “fundamentals” supporting 
competitiveness (expectations and fact)
Market sentiment France: Strengthening Balance of Payments 
position (expectations and fact)
Market sentiment France: Falling inflation 
(expectations and fact)
Market sentiment France: Positive assessment of wage 
bargaining (expectations and fact)
Market sentiment France: Fiscal deficits and fiscal policy 
(expectations and fact)
Market sentiment France: Concerns about recession 
(expectations and fact)
Market sentiment France: Rising unemployment 
(expectations and fact)
Market sentiment France: Election concerns 
(expectations and fact)
Market sentiment France: Domestic structures: Comparative 
significance
Market sentiment France: Domestic structures: Government 
Market sentiment France: Domestic structures: Financial 
structures (excluding central bank)
Exchange rates: DM to FF;$
France: Short-term interest rates
Market sentiment Germany: Economic, political, structural 
variables
9Chart 7.4: Market sentiment Germany: Expectations of DM exchange rate:
uncertain or weakening 338
Chart 7.5: Market sentiment Germany: Bundesbank statements 340
Chart 7.6: Market sentiment Germany: DM-$ interest rate differential:
expected narrowing 342
Chart 7.7: Market sentiment Germany: Expectations of Bundesbank to
defend the French Franc 346
Chart 7.8: Market sentiment Germany: French decoupling from DM-anchor 351
Chart 7.9: Market sentiment Germany: Expectations of recession 351
Chart 7.10: Market sentiment Germany: Rising unemployment
(expectations and fact) 352
Chart 7.11: Market sentiment Germany: Rising inflation (fact) 352
Chart 7.12: Market sentiment Germany: Fiscal deficit and fiscal policy
(expectations and fact) 358
Chart 7.13: Market sentiment Germany: Negative assessment of wage
bargaining (expectations and fact) 358
Chart 7.14: Market sentiment Germany: Election concerns
(expectations and fact) 359
Chart 7.15: Market sentiment Germany: Domestic structures: Comparative
significance 367
Chart 7.16: Market sentiment Germany: Domestic structures: Central bank 367
Chart 7.17: Market sentiment Germany: Expectations of falling official
interest rates 368
Chart 7.18: Market sentiment Germany: Domestic structures:
Wage bargaining 368
Chart 7.19: Market sentiment Germany: Domestic structures: Government 369
Chart 8.1: Market attention to domestic institutions 389
10
List of Persons Interviewed
Stanislav Gelfer, Emerging Market Analyst, Credit Suisse First Boston, London 
(17/10/2001)
Natascha Gewaltig, Eurozone Economist, IDEAglobal (Research and Consultancy 
Group), London (16/06/1999)
Dimitry Gladkov, Economist, Emerging Markets, Goldman Sachs, London 
(17/10/2001)
Tom Grant, Currency Trader, Lehman Brothers International (Europe), London 
(12/05/1999)
Phillipp M. Hildebrand, Senior Managing Director, Moore Capital Management, 
London (14/04/1999)
Jens Nordwig-Rasmussn, Economist, Global Economics Team, Goldman Sachs. 
London (17/10/2001)
Michael Saunders, Economist, Economic Research Department, Salomon Smith 
Barney, London (25/10/2001)
Katherine Stuart, Assistant, Economic Research Department, Salomon Smith Barney, 
London (25/10/2001)
Christopher Swann, Currency Correspondent, Economics Department, Financial 
Times, London (28/11/2001)
11
Abbreviations
BDB Bundesverband Deutscher Banken
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
BIS Bank of International Settlements
Buba Deutsche Bundesbank
CAQDAS Computer assisted qualitative data analysis software
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CDU Christlich Demorkatische Union Deutschlands
CFDT Confederation Fran9aise Democratique du Travail
CGT Confederation Generate du Travail
CPF Parti Communiste Fran9ais
DIHT Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag
EC European Community
ECU European Currency Unit
EMS European Monetary System
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EPLs Employment Protection Laws
ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism
EU European Union
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands
FN Front National
FO Force Ouvriere
FT Financial Times
Gesamtmetall German Engineering Industry Employers Federation
GMB Britain’s General Union for trade and services
GSDS Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der deutschen Sparer
IGMetall Industriegewerkschaft Metall
IMF International Monetary Fund
IoD Institute of Directors
IPE International Political Economy
NUD*IST Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising
Patronat Confederation Nationale du Patronat Fran9ais
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
PS Part Socialiste
RPR Rassemblement du Peuple Fran9ais (Gaullist Party)
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TGWU Transport and General Workers Union
TUC Trade Union Congress
UDF Union pour la Democratic Fran9aise
UNISON British public service union
Abbreviation of Text Samples:
FT: “Foreign Exchanges “ column in the Financial Times Companies and Market 
section
GS: “International Economics Analyst” market report by Goldman Sachs
SB: “International Market Roundup” market report by Salomon Brothers
12
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible without the support of Andrew Walter, who 
was an excellent supervisor. I am also grateful to Nilesh Dattani, Kathleen Newland 
and Junko Ishikawa.
WolfHassdorf 
London, 2002
13
Chapter 1: 
Introduction
In this thesis I ask whether, and how, financial markets take account of domestic 
institutions in today’s highly integrated international economy. It does so against the 
backdrop of the debate about national policy autonomy and market efficiency among 
proponents of the orthodox globalisation thesis and their critics from the domestic 
structures political economy point of view (see Cohen 2001). The two approaches 
take opposing views as to whether global market integration leaves room for national 
autonomy. But they arrive at different conclusions by making the same assumption 
that financial markets operate efficiently. Market participants are seen to base their 
decisions on rational utility maximising deliberations. Whereas the globalisation 
thesis asserts that the structural pressures emanating from globalisation leave 
policymakers little choice but to follow the discipline imposed by the economic logic 
of markets, rationalist institutionalists point out that domestic structural constraints 
require policymakers to assert their autonomy towards international market forces. 
This in turn suggests that rational agents will take domestic structures into account 
when assessing policymaker’s choices. Whether or not domestic institutions matter 
for the relationship between international markets and national politics depends on 
whether and how these structures influence international investors in practice. The 
following thesis is an attempt to clarify this question by investigating decision-making 
procedures in international financial markets concerning the credibility of national 
exchange rate commitments during a currency crisis, the 1992/93 ERM crisis.
The most prominent term in the discussion o f international political economy in the 
last decades is “globalisation”, used to describe the growing integration of the
14
international economy through increased openness, facilitating a rapid increase in 
cross-border trade and capital flows.1 At the heart of the globalisation hypothesis lies 
the assumption that growing interdependence has led to a transformation of the state- 
market relationship, with power having shifted from national policymakers to global 
markets. A truly global economy is claimed to have emerged, dominated by efficient 
global market forces, which makes political national economic strategies and 
management increasingly irrelevant.2
Proponents of the globalisation thesis point in particular to the internationalisation of 
capital markets to support this view (e.g. Andrews 1994a; Cemy 1993). Deregulated 
and liberalised financial markets are seen to have created a global pool of highly 
mobile liquidity constraining national policy autonomy. The last three decades have 
indeed witnessed a substantive increase in short-term capital mobility resulting from 
financial liberalisation. In the globalisation debate this mobility is usually 
demonstrated by flow figures, although it has to be pointed out that these figures are 
problematic indicators of financial integration.3 From a simple quantitative point of 
view the 1980s and 90s clearly were decades of growing cross-border capital 
mobility, with daily turnover in global foreign exchange and derivatives markets
1 For a good overview of these trends and their academic interpretation see Held (1999); Woods 
(2000).
2 E.g. Bryan & Farrell (1996). For a good review of the globalisation hypothesis by two of its critics, 
see Hirst & Thompson (1996:1).
3 Firstly, despite the remarkable increase in cross-boarder flows, global financial integration has not yet
proceeded to the point of investors allocating capital regardless of national origin. The Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle about the close relationship between national savings and investment still holds (Hirst
& Thompson 1996; see Weiss 1998). Secondly, rates of return still differ across countries (Frankel 
1993), although there is considerable evidence for the synchronisation of interest rate changes across 
national markets (Simmons 1999). Finally, gross figures overstate net capital flows after settlement. 
For a discussion of the problems of measuring capital flows and evaluating their significance, see 
Dobson & Hufbauer (2001).
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reaching $820bn in 1992.4 Annual total (short-term and long-term) capital flows 
increased by 29% from 1987 to 1993. Most of this increase was due to an explosion 
of short-term portfolio investment, with portfolio flows increasing by 403% over the 
same period, to constitute 57% of total flows in 1993, up from 15% in 1987.5 
According to the globalisation thesis not only this increase of actual capital flows, but 
also the potential for massive flows in response to national policy measures, will give 
governments an incentive to take the effect of their policies on investor sentiment into 
account (Andrews 1994a). As a result capital mobility will impose discipline on 
governments to pursue “sound” policies, dubbed by Cemy “embedded financial 
orthodoxy” (Cemy 1993). Often, what constitutes “sound” policies is left unspecified, 
though some form of monetarist orthodoxy is usually implied.
The most rigorous formulation of the globalisation argument has been put forward in 
the Capital Mobility Hypothesis (CMH) (Andrews 1994a). The CMH is based on the 
“unholy trinity” problem suggested by the Mundell-Fleming model (Cohen 1993): the 
conflict between capital account liberalisation and national monetary policy autonomy 
in the case of fixed exchange rates. According to Andrews within the unholy trinity 
“ ...international capital mobility systematically constrains state behaviour” (Andrews 
1994a: 193):
“The central claim associated with the capital mobility hypothesis is that financial integration has 
increased the costs of pursuing divergent monetary objectives, resulting in structural incentives for 
monetary adjustment.” (Andrews 1994a: 203)
Consequently Pauly, building on the CMH, concludes that:
4 BIS (2002). According to the BIS turnover increased further to $l,200bn in 2001. See also Chapter 2, 
Table 2.1. for details on foreign exchange markets turnover in the early 1990s.
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“Enjoining governments to yield to signals from the ‘global market’, the language of capital mobility 
implied that a profound shift in policy-making authority was necessarily taking place, a shift away 
from the national level. Proponents typically extolled the surrender of the retrograde idea of 
‘sovereignty’ to rational economic logic of markets beyond national control.” (1997:33)
Within the framework of the Mundell-Fleming model the economic logic of markets 
would merely constrain monetary policies. Domestic interest rates could not fall 
below international rates to facilitate domestic reflation without undermining 
exchange rate stability. Having lost monetary policy autonomy under fixed rates, 
governments would be left with the options to either use fiscal policy, or accept 
devaluation or floating exchange rates.6 But in the wider argument of the globalisation 
thesis these options do not provide much room for policy autonomy either. Firstly, 
with highly volatile cross-border portfolio flows, floating comes at the price of 
heightened exchange rate and domestic monetary instability (Andrews 1994a). Fiscal 
policy autonomy is seen to be constrained from a rational financial market 
perspective, since financial markets, which have become more efficient with 
deregulation and liberalisation, will show little tolerance of potentially inflationary 
and unsustainable fiscal deficit spending.7 As a consequence they will discipline 
social democratic governments that attempt to undertake traditional interventionist 
Keynesian-style stabilisation through fiscal expansion to offset monetary rigidity. 
(Kurzer 1993; Moses 1994; Kapstein 1996).8
5 From Griffith-Jones (1998: Table 2.), based on IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbooks, 
various.
6 Following U1 Haque and Maxfield, national governments will not always be constrained within the 
unholy trinity framework to attract international capital through tight monetary policies, since 
international liquidity conditions will vary with the level of interest rates in major developed 
economies (U1 Haque et al. 1997; Maxfield 1998b).
7 In this context it should be noted that according to the Barro-Ricardo equivalence theorem, efficient 
domestic capital markets should always have constrained profligate governments (on the theorem, see 
De Grauwe 1996).
The CMH argument sees currency crises as the moment in which capital markets 
challenge national exchange rate commitments which, in Andrews’ words, provide an 
“increasingly procrustean fit” to the economy (Andrews 1995: 162). Markets are 
interpreted as taking systematic account o f the economic sacrifices resulting from the 
government’s exchange rate commitment. If a government lacks the political will to 
sustain these sacrifices, markets will lose credibility in the exchange rate 
commitment. Markets will thus form rational expectations about the time consistency 
of a government’s monetary strategy. A devaluation crisis caused by investors selling 
the national currency will only pre-empt the inevitable and expected collapse of the 
exchange rate commitment.
The weak point of the CMH is that it does not provide for the possibility of a 
government willing and able to defend a fixed exchange rate successfully, even if  it 
provides a procrustean fit for the economy. Confirming the central tenet of the 
globalisation thesis of the loss of policy autonomy, the CMH simply states that, 
should there be a conflict between the domestic economic need for monetary 
expansion and the interest rates required by the exchange rate fix, financial markets 
will enforce devaluation or floating through crisis, denying policymakers the 
autonomy to pursue the fixed exchange rate objective at the cost of high 
unemployment and economic slump. The possibility that some governments might 
still have this autonomy, since they might be capable of imposing domestically costly 
adjustment to defend the exchange rate, has not been raised.
8 For a good discussion of the globalisation argument regarding monetary and fiscal policy constraints 
see Maxfield (1998a), Simmons (1999) and Cohen (2001).
The CMH and related arguments present financial markets as a new, powerful, 
international structural constraint imposed on national policy-making autonomy. They 
are seen as efficient, capable of using rational economic logic in a systematic 
judgement of government policies, and enforcing this economic logic through a 
currency crisis.
Critics of the globalisation thesis coming from international political economy and 
comparative political science have maintained that the perception that global 
interdependence is sweeping before it all variations in national behaviour is wrong 
(Krasner 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995; Boyer 1996; Garrett 1998; Hall 1997; 
Katzenstein et al. 1998; Hall & Soskice 2001). National politics is according to these 
views still shaped by domestic conditions, which refract and filter the reaction of 
national policymakers to the challenges of internationalisation. In particular domestic 
structures approaches maintain that variations in domestic structures, comprising 
interests, institutions and ideas, result in different national responses to international 
pressures and opportunities.9
Domestic structures approaches can be grouped into historical approaches, 
emphasising unique path-dependency and contextual embeddedness of domestic 
institutional developments in response to internationalisation (Hollingsworth & Boyer 
1997b; Radice 2000), cultural-constructivist approaches, emphasising the role of 
socially constructed ideas (Ross 1997; Ruggie 1998), historically informed 
taxonomies of the efficacy of domestic institutions in an international market context 
(Zysman 1983; Hall 1986; Henning 1994), and finally “Rationalist Institutionalism”,
9 See Hall (1997) for an excellent review of these approaches.
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the rational choice version of the domestic structures approach (Milner 1998). The 
latter, increasingly popular in recent years, suggests that national policymakers are 
involved in a strategic game at both the domestic and international level, though 
constrained by domestic structures (Milner 1997). As Milner put it, . .policy is likely 
to be the result o f a complex strategic interaction among the players as structured by 
domestic institutions” (Milner 1998:785).10
Rationalist institutionalism is particularly strong in its interpretation of the interaction 
between international finance and domestic politics in the case of exchange rate 
commitments. In parallel to the CMH, rationalist institutionalism allows for a rigorous 
conceptualisation of this interaction, but with the difference of bringing domestic 
structures back in. The interaction is seen as a strategic game, with actors engaged “in 
an effort to maximise their own utility” (Simmons 1994: 53-4). Both national 
policymakers and international financial market agents act rationally in this game, in 
the sense that they make efficient use of available information. Building on the time 
consistency problem described by economists (Barro & Gordon 1983), rationalist 
institutionalists point out the role domestic structures play in the monetary policy­
making choice of governments between honouring monetary policy commitments and 
opting for domestic economic stimulus (Hall & Franzese 1998). Similar to the CMH, 
rationalist institutionalism takes a structural approach, but instead of simply arguing 
that the international financial structure leaves policymakers no room for manoeuvre, 
governments are now faced with structural constraints from both international 
financial integration and domestic interests and institutions. Domestic institutional
10 For the rationalist conceptualisation of the interaction between internationalisation and domestic 
politics see the edited volume by Keohane & Milner (1996); Milner (1997); Milner (1998); Garrett 
(1998); Martin & Simmons (1998).
constraints and opportunities present politicians with an incentive structure that allows 
for a trade-off between the costs and benefits of sustaining a monetary policy 
commitment. They face the choice to adjust or not to adjust (Simmons 1994). If  the 
domestic regime, the domestic institutional setting, is perceived by rational forward- 
looking markets as credible, governments can succeed in maintaining an exchange 
rate commitment under conditions of full capital mobility, even at the cost of 
substantial domestic economic and social sacrifices. Since politicians have a strategic 
choice of how to respond to international market pressures, rationalist institutionalists 
maintain that policy autonomy is still intact. In the strategic game between 
policymakers and investors, domestic structures provide but also constrain domestic 
political room for manoeuvre. They limit the ability o f governments to adjust, but 
within these limits governments can exploit the freedom they also grant to make 
strategic choices.11
Currency crises, from an institutional rationalist point of view, do not result simply 
from time inconsistency due to the costs of monetary adjustment required to maintain 
parity. They happen because domestic political structures bloc effective adjustment. 
Financial market participants are thought to take these domestic structural capabilities 
into account in their decision-making on whether to attack an exchange rate peg or 
not. A currency crisis will occur because financial markets come to the conclusion 
that country-specific domestic structures cannot be trusted to sustain the sacrifices 
necessitated by the defence of the exchange rate peg.
11 See Milner 1997 on the aspect of “two-level-games” in international cooperation.
As it is the case in the CMH, rationalist institutionalism assumes market rationality. 
Rational financial markets are now not only concerned with sound macro-economic 
policies, but also with domestic structural conditions. Simmons suggest that in cases 
where the domestic institutional setting constrains national policymakers’ capability 
to resolutely defend monetary policy commitments, rational forward looking 
economic agents anticipate expansionary monetary policies and rearrange their assets 
accordingly (Simmons 1994: Ch. 3). This majority view within rationalist 
institutionalism, shared with Simmons (1994), by Garrett (1998), Leblang & Bernhard 
(2000) and Haggard (2000) implies that market agents take these domestic constraints 
into account systematically when they judge the credibility of national monetary 
policies.
Following the rationalist institutionalist argument, remaining ambiguity in market 
sentiment and the possibility of market inefficiency is caused not by market 
participant’s lack of optimising analysis of all available information, but by imperfect 
information: rational expectations about the effect of domestic institutions might 
remain ambiguous, given the limited availability of existing information and the 
contingency of future events. However, regardless of these limits to perfect 
information, the efficient market view suggests that, optimising investors will be able 
to transform uncertainty into risk by gathering and analysing all available information 
(Gibson 1996: 274-275). In a situation of uncertainty about how domestic institutions 
constrain the defence of monetary policy commitments, investors will be unable to 
make any objective predictions about the institutional robustness o f these 
commitments and consequently will be liable to subjective and fluctuating judgements 
about the effect of future events. In contrast, in the presence of institutional risk,
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established by a systematic investigation of institutions, investors can estimate the 
probability of a particular future contingency.12 Risk analysis of institutions by fully 
rational investors will thus not eliminate but reduce ambiguity about the effect future 
contingencies will have on policy outcomes and thus the likelihood that market 
euphoria or panic will occur.
A dissenting view has been put forward by Mosley (2000), who maintains that only a 
narrow range of mainly macroeconomic variables influences financial market behaviour 
systematically, excluding domestic structures. She argues that, as a rule, market 
participants take only a small set of macroeconomic variables into account 
systematically, while the domestic structures that determine the time consistency of 
monetary policy commitments are rarely perceived. Consequently markets must be 
left with a considerable degree of uncertainty as to what future policy decisions to 
expect from governments. If domestic structures are not included in systematic 
analysis by market agents, markets will not operate in a fully efficient and rational 
fashion. But, although Mosley herself points out the need to investigate investor 
behaviour over time and across countries, in order to establish variations in the 
influence of wider supply-side policies related variables on market sentiment, she 
leaves such a study as “a rich subject for future work” (Mosley 2000: 767).
It is in the very nature of the time consistency problem that the reliability of a 
government commitment cannot always be ascertained only by looking into whether 
“sound” economic fundamentals combine with decent growth and employment at a 
given point in time. Even if the macroeconomic fundamentals are “sound” today,
12 On the distinction between risk and uncertainty, see Knight (1921).
they might deteriorate in the future or might only be maintained at the costs of 
socially intolerable adjustment, giving policymakers an incentive to renege on their 
commitment. One of the strengths of the rationalist institutionalist argument is to 
point out that these future developments and the capability of national policymakers 
to sustain adjustment depend on the respective domestic institutional setting.13 
However, the possibility of a limited influence of domestic institutions on actual 
market rationality poses a severe challenge to the validity of rationalist 
institutionalism itself: if  markets were fully rational, as is assumed by the majority of 
rational institutionalists, but did not take domestic structures systematically into 
account, then the central tenet of rationalist institutionalism, that domestic structures 
matter for time consistency, must be wrong. If it turned out that limited attention to 
domestic structures is due to limited market rationality, the majority notion in 
rationalist institutionalism, that markets behave in a rational and efficient way, might 
be wrong. Only in the ideal scenario, where financial market participants take 
domestic structures fully into account, would the majority view be fully vindicated.
It is therefore important to achieve a clearer understanding of how rational markets 
are, and of exactly what role domestic institutions play in this rationality, in order to 
assess the veracity of rationalist institutionalism as an explanation for the interaction 
between domestic politics and international finance. My thesis aims to clarify this 
critical ambiguity in the rationalist institutionalist argument through a detailed study 
of market sentiment in currency crises.
13 For a detailed analysis: see Chapter 4 of this Thesis.
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The lack of clarity in the rationalist institutionalist argument about the influence of 
domestic institutions on actual market sentiment is related to the traditional approach 
rationalist institutionalist studies take to empirical evidence. As the debate about 
central bank independence has demonstrated (Posen 1993; Franzese & Hall 2000; 
Keefer & Stasavage 2000), measuring domestic structures quantitatively to allow for 
scientific testing of strategic choice models in cross-time series analysis tends to 
ignore their wider domestic setting. By suggesting that it is possible to make decisions 
about institutions without having to understand their specific social embeddedness, 
rationalist institutionalism implies the possibility of optimising rational choice by 
market participants, but at the price of decontextualising decision-making processes. 
It privileges decision-making results over decision-making procedures, at the risk of 
missing out on the effect of domestic structures in the daily practice of financial 
market trading. As a consequence, rationalist institutionalism is liable to rely on the 
ex ante assumption that market participants make optimal strategic choices, an 
assumption that is heroic when looked at from the practical reality everyday decision­
making in financial markets. What is needed to clarify the issue is to approach the 
empirical study of market sentiment from a procedural angle.
I use structured focused comparison as a means o f undertaking an investigation of the 
process of market decision-making in a single historical episode.14 This approach 
allows the investigation of the actual evolution of market sentiment in its complexity 
as to the extent and the way in which domestic structures influence international 
market actors, without a loss of systematic rigour. The systematic interpretation of 
actual representations of market sentiment in the form of historic market reports,
14 On structured focused comparison as methodological approach see George (1989)
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through longitudinal content analysis, is an essential part of this process. My thesis 
employs this approach in an analysis of the ERM crisis of 1992/93, focusing on the 
case of pound sterling, the D-mark and the French franc.
My main argument, based on the findings of this empirical study, is that rationalist 
institutionalism is correct in so far as it asserts that domestic structures shape the 
monetary policy choices open to national policymakers under conditions of 
international capital mobility. However, rationalist institutionalism is wrong when it 
suggests that markets make optimising rational choices about domestic institutions, 
implying idealistic and excessive assumptions about the comprehensiveness of market 
rationality. In reality market rationality is bounded: it takes only limited and 
unsystematic account of these domestic structural constraints. Furthermore, such 
“satisficing” matters, resulting in socially inefficient market outcomes.
How does ‘bounded’ rationality operate in financial markets?15 In the operational 
practice of financial markets it is unreasonable to attempt to come to fully rational, 
optimising and thus efficient decisions. This is because it is either impossible to 
obtain full information to reach optimal decisions due to information asymmetries or 
certain information is too costly to obtain and process.16 Furthermore, since the effect 
of institutional structures on future policy outcomes is contingent on future events, a 
complex analysis of how domestic structures pre-determine policy action might not 
remove ambiguities about these policy outcomes. Consequently such analysis might 
not be considered to be cost effective. Faced with these practical realities, market
15 The concepts of ‘bounded’ rationality have been developed in the seminal work of Simon (1982a; 
1982b; 1997), and adopted for international relations and IPE by Stein (1999) and Odell (2002), to 
name but two.
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participants, instead of optimising by means of taking all information into account 
systematically, will “satisfice”: they will limit their search and analysis to the amount 
of information sufficient to come to an assessment which is good enough to work in 
practice (Odell 2002). Only this “subset” of all available information is systematically 
analysed (Simon 1982b). What information is taken into account depends on whether 
it can be easily obtained and whether it has in practice proven to be sufficient, good 
enough, by and large, to inform successful investment strategies. Complex, in-depth 
information on domestic structures, difficult to obtain and requiring sophisticated and 
knowledgeable interpretation, does not fall within this subset.
Bounded rationality in financial markets contains elements of both systematic and 
unsystematic reasoning. Systematic reasoning is characterised by “approximate 
rationality”: “it is accomplished by substituting a simplified approximate decision 
model for the complexities of the ‘real world’.” (Simon 1982b: 396). In currency 
crises market participants will look systematically in easily obtainable and measurable 
policy decision and policy outcome variables, such as monetary policy decisions, 
inflation, budget deficits, wage settlements, growth, unemployment and elections. In 
practice these decisions and outcomes operate as substitutes for domestic structural 
variables. Simon speaks here of “information surrogates” (1982a: 237).
Given that policy decisions and outcomes are determined by underlying structural 
factors, they can in practice serve to some degree as rough proxies for the institutional 
resilience of exchange rate commitments. The strength of domestic structures 
underpinning an exchange rate commitment is indicated by the extent to which low
16 The problem here is search costs and limited computational capabilities; see Odell (2002); Simon
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inflation, moderate wage increases and control over budget deficits can be achieved 
and maintained. Structural resilience is indicated by decisive and sustained policy 
adjustment despite domestic sacrifices in defence of the exchange rate against 
speculative pressure. The most important indicators here are interest rate decisions, 
and growth and unemployment rates. In this pattern of decision-making financial 
markets look directly and systematically into policy outcomes and decisions only. 
These are in turn influenced by domestic structures. Thus, within a bounded 
rationality conceptualisation of market sentiment, domestic structures are the 
independent variable, systematically analysed policy decisions and outcomes the 
intermediate variable, and market sentiment the dependent variable.
Policy decisions and outcomes, as proxy variables for domestic institutional 
constraints, provide only a poor substitute for full rational analysis o f domestic 
structures. They have not been derived systematically from an analysis of full 
structural information, since their whole purpose is to do without such impractical 
analysis. Not only are they rough approximations, but also individual variables can 
send out conflicting signals. The possible conflict between adjustment through official 
interest rate increases, signalling the possibility of structural backing of an exchange 
rate commitment, and the costs of adjustment in terms of rising unemployment and 
falling growth, signalling the possibility of severe structural strains, are critical here. 
Thus the reliance on proxy variables cannot substitute for a rigorous structural 
analysis to gauge institutional risk. The result is latent uncertainty about the strength 
of an exchange rate commitment and future policy decisions remains high. This 
uncertainty escalates if  politicians act against the expectations markets have formed
(1982b).
on the basis of the narrow set of proxy variables. This is the case if political events, 
like elections or referenda, make extrapolations of current approximations of time 
consistency into the future difficult, and if proxy variables indicating structural stress 
look alarming over longer periods, due to a procrustean fit o f the exchange rate 
commitment and/or a stand off between speculative pressure and monetary policy 
defence. In particular in the last scenario participants are faced with a situation where 
speculative pressure turns into a practical test of a government’s exchange rate 
commitment with unpredictable outcomes, given the conflicting signals sent out by 
proxy variables. In all of the above cases, simplified substitute models fail to satisfice 
in practice.
If systematic approximation does not suffice to reach decisions as to which action to 
take, market practitioners will move to an analysis of more complex information 
outside the subset usually considered, including information on domestic institutions. 
Such analysis will be less rigorous and more ad hoc, with decision-makers generally 
unwilling and unable to undertake costly systematic investigation of these complex 
variables. Domestic institutions are taken into consideration not for their relevance as 
indicated by systematic abstract analysis, but for the opportunity costs o f institutional 
evaluation (Simon 1982b). Institutional variables are judged along readily available 
conventions, past experience or views by other market participants. But theses 
unsystematic structural deliberations remain inconclusive and can increase uncertainty 
further, instead of reducing it by robust risk analysis. Ad-hoc sentiment about 
institutional fragility has to be tested in a trail-and error fashion through speculative 
pressure. Ultimately solid views on the capacity of domestic structures to facilitate 
adjustment can only be made ex post, on the grounds of whether a speculative attack
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succeeds or is confounded by determined policy action. This means that markets form 
expectations on institutions in an adaptive way through “stochastic learning” (Simon 
1982a). Bounded rationality is thus procedural rather than substantive when it comes 
to domestic institutions.
With the unsystematic analyses of institutions unlikely to lead to strong and uniform 
conclusions among market participants, financial markets only take a clear stance on 
the credibility of an exchange rate commitment if  its vulnerability or strength is 
indicated by clear policy signals. These signals are again taken as indicators for 
structural resilience, offering a practical resolution to an indeterminate debate about 
structural factors. As my empirical study will demonstrate, when turning to 
speculative euphoria or full scale speculative attack markets make subjective ad hoc 
use of their previous structural deliberations in order to opportunistically support the 
case for speculative herding. The fact that self-fulfilling speculative attacks can be 
confounded by structural resilience demonstrates that this ad hoc use of structural 
deliberations in connection with simplified approximations cannot replace systematic 
structural risk analysis. Failed speculative attacks confirm my thesis that rationalist 
institutionalism is correct in emphasising the role of domestic institutions for 
successful adjustment, but that it fails to understand the bounded nature of market 
rationality.
The ERM crisis provides evidence for bounded rationality in financial markets. In the 
first wave of speculative attacks in September 1992, market participants took clearly 
insufficient notice of domestic structures. The resulting misjudgements constituted a 
learning process in so far as they raised the awareness in boundedly rational markets
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of structural factors in future instances of heightened uncertainty. But these factors 
where taken into account more and more over the 1992/93 period not in an 
optimising, but rather in a boundedly rational fashion, making proper institutional risk 
analysis impossible.
In the 1992 British^case^ markets side-lined weaknesses in Britain’s financial structure 
and ignored the political structure, instead relying on conventions about the strength 
of the political system, to trust for too long policy statements by a newly elected 
majority government to defend the ERM parity. Only when interest rate increases 
were not forthcoming, signalling a lack of will o f policymakers to act decisively, did 
disoriented markets take notice of structural financial strains in an ad hoc manner. 
This added to uncertainty and contributed to the final turn in market sentiment against 
sterling triggered by a weak monetary policy response to the prior devaluation of the 
Italian lira.
In the speculative attack on the French franc in September 1992, rising 
unemployment, low growth and the near rejection of the Maastricht treaty in a 
referendum were taken as indicators of an increasing likelihood o f devaluation, 
despite the determined interest rate increases undertaken by the French monetary 
authorities. Markets were surprised by the unanticipated resilience o f the French 
financial system. Markets learned from experience and acknowledged the capability 
of French banks to cope with high interest rates in the winter 1992/93 crisis, along 
with the strength of Bundesbank support, as key reasons for the survival of the franc. 
From now on the strength of Franco-German monetary cooperation became an 
indicator for the sustainability of the franc fort. Uncertainty was fuelled by doubts as
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to whether Bundesbank policies and decisive policy steps by the French authorities in 
defence of the franc could be relied upon. The latter were seen as particularly 
questionable in the face of explicit domestic dissent with the franc fort strategy in the 
context of electioneering. Markets turned to evaluate in an ad hoc fashion the possible 
fragility of France’s political structures. Again, this added to uncertainty about the 
ambiguities of France’s domestic structures, contributing to speculative market 
dynamics, rather than containing it through institutional risk assessment.
In the case of Germany and France in summer 1993, markets underestimated the 
determination of the German and French authorities to defend the strong currency 
option. In Germany market participants became uncertain about whether the 
Bundesbank was still willing and able to defend the anchor role of the D-mark in the 
ERM against an increasingly solid French franc. Its reputation for hawkishness had 
been built on the impression that it would always be able to adjust monetary policy in 
pursuit of price stability, due to its independent position in the German political 
system. When, in the first half of 1993, the Bundesbank’s monetary policy signals 
became ambiguous in this respect, markets started to pay attention to structural 
weaknesses of the German political and wage bargaining system underpinning the 
central bank’s independence. The analysis, by increasing uncertainty about future 
Bundesbank policy measures, contributed to the emerging speculative pressure on the 
D-mark anchor towards summer 1993. More consistent attention to the role of these 
key structures might, in contrast, have transformed uncertainty into less alarming risk 
calculations about the probabilities that the deeply entrenched long-term stability 
culture in the German institutional structure could be overthrown by deviations in 
exceptional circumstances.
32
The German developments contrasted with developments in France towards summer 
1993. The new French government, elected in March, signalled continued backing of 
the franc fort. But these signals stood in contrast to a year-long record of rising 
unemployment and continuous low growth as indicators for possible sustainability 
problems. As in the case of Germany, uncertain market participants turned to direct 
deliberations over the resilience of the French political system. In a further case of 
stochastic learning, markets drew lessons from the unexpected French capability to 
sustain the French Fort throughout 1992/93 and concluded that the structural 
resilience of the French political system had been underestimated. Nevertheless 
uncertainty mounted, in this case fuelled by the conflict between market participants 
open to these structural deliberations and other analysts focusing exclusively on high 
unemployment/low growth rates as proxy indicators for structural overstretch.
In June/July 1993 the confusion about structural resilience was easily dispelled by two 
policy developments: the open challenge of Bundesbank dominance in the ERM 
expressed in the French demand for lower official interest rates and the Bundesbank’s 
tough response, signalling an end to Franco-German monetary cooperation. This, in 
the market view, resolved the structural debate. Clear signals from policy decisions 
were taken as surrogate information indicating that the structural underpinnings of the 
Bundesbank were still intact, whereas in France structural political tolerance had 
reached breaking point. The result was a self-fulfilling euphoric rally behind the D- 
mark and a full-scale speculative attack on the franc. The failure of this attack is a 
direct indicator of market inefficiencies as result of bounded rationality in market 
decision-making. Fully efficient markets investigating domestic structures
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systematically might have decided to back Franco-German co-leadership of the ERM 
on the grounds of greater awareness of the long-term strategic embeddedness of the 
franc fort in France’s policy-making regime.
In conclusion, my findings suggest a need for rationalist institutionalism to pay more 
attention to decision-making procedures in financial markets. Rationalist 
institutionalism should be broadened to include what might be called “bounded 
rationality institutionalism”, implying a more procedural investigation of decision­
making in financial markets. Until now, the implicit or explicit assumption made by 
the majority of rationalist institutionalist studies that financial markets make 
optimising rational choices concerning domestic institutional constraints has avoided 
the theoretical and methodological consequences of this approach (see Mosley 2000).
Instead of attempting a systematic explanation of inconsistencies in market behaviour, 
shifts in sentiment, and outright misjudgement when it comes to domestic institutions, 
rationalist institutionalism continues to rely on the statistical analysis of the outcomes 
of market behaviour as proof that domestic institutions are significant. This approach 
leaves untapped the potential of the domestic structures paradigm for an explanation 
of market inefficiency because of limited market rationality regarding domestic 
institutions.
A possible intervention from a rationalist institutional point o f view against an 
approach which relies on the detailed investigation of historic decision-making 
processes could be that it will not lead to results of general relevance, since they lack 
scientific rigor. The systematic organisation of my empirical study demonstrates that
34
such problems can be overcome. It suggests rigorous content analysis as one possible 
way forward.
The advantages of broadening rationalist institutionalism towards a procedural 
investigation of the actual bounds of rationality when it comes to domestic institutions 
are fresh insights into the actual role played by domestic institutions in the interaction 
between international finance and domestic governments, resulting in greater 
empirical validity. The possibility of applying rationalist institutionalist insights to the 
ongoing debate in economics about the reasons for inefficient market behaviour in 
currency crises would be particularly attractive.17 “Bounded rationality 
institutionalism” may be able to show that these inefficiencies are rooted not only in a 
lack of transparency and information about the effect of domestic institutions on 
future policy outcomes, or alternatively a general tendency towards speculative 
herding, but in limitations intrinsic in the practical operation of market rationality, 
specifically in respect to domestic institutions.
The ensuing investigation will be structured as follows: Chapter Two of my thesis 
will set the assumptions of rationalist institutionalism on the importance o f domestic 
structures against the explanations of currency crises in the first and second 
generation crisis models of applied economics. It will demonstrate that rationalist 
institutionalism does indeed make a valuable contribution in so far as it brings wider 
domestic structures back into the debate about the time consistency of monetary 
policy, but also that it fails to take into account the qualifications economists have 
made for rational expectations in the face of financial market inefficiencies.
17 For an overview about the current debate in economics see Jeanne (1999)
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Consequently, I will point out the need for an intermediate, process-oriented study of 
the influence of domestic institutions on investors’ decision-making. The chapter will 
raise these issues in particular in view o f the ERM crisis and its explanations. It will 
show that the ERM crisis explanations suffer from the same lack of institutional 
attention as the broader crisis debate, while questioning the full rationality of financial 
market participants.
Chapter Three presents my theoretical-methodological framework for empirical study 
of investors’ decision-making, informed by the theory of bounded rationality, as 
means of gauging the capability of financial market participants to take domestic 
institutions into account. It will map out a research design that, in contrast to classic 
rationalist institutional comparative studies, has the aim of capturing the practice of 
daily decision-making in financial markets in respect of domestic structures. The 
research design is oriented towards the process, not simply the outcomes. The 
approach taken combines deductive and inductive elements. It is deduced from the 
theory of “bounded rationality”, since bounded rationality has emerged as a 
convincing practical critique of the rational choice assumptions underlying rationalist 
institutionalism. The design has to be inductive to take into account the complex 
context in which domestic institutional factors come into play, in order to cover the 
fullest possible range of factors influencing market sentiment. The methodological 
framework will be qualitative and focused, that is, it will be geared towards the in- 
depth study of a single historical currency crisis, the ERM crisis, as it evolves. The 
ERM crisis was chosen because it was a currency crisis without an interfering 
banking crisis, affecting countries that had established full capital mobility. Germany, 
France and Britain were selected as particularly suited for comparison because of their
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great homogeneity, representing similar size economies affected by the same systemic 
crisis. I use computer-assisted content analysis of financial market reports published 
during the crisis as an historical sample of market sentiment towards sterling, franc, 
and D-mark. The longitudinal interpretation of these reports in a controlled 
comparative study will ensure scientific rigor.
Chapter Four investigates the domestic structures of Britain, France and Germany for 
their capacity to deliver policy outcomes consistent with the strong currency 
commitment within the ERM. The chapter maps out ideal-typical institutional 
constellations in the financial, wage bargaining and government structures, three 
structures that the literature views as critical for determining inflation and exchange 
rate outcomes. The investigation applies the analysis put forward by domestic 
structures approaches, especially rationalist institutionalism. The chapter establishes 
that the respective national structures have to be evaluated realistically as part of 
distinct socio-economic regimes, with Britain representing a market-liberal pluralist 
regime, France a regulated-market Statist regime, and Germany a social-market 
corporatist regime. Each country’s regime has its advantages and disadvantages when 
it comes to the time consistency of monetary policy commitments. In 1992/93, Britain 
offered a decentralised flexible wage bargaining system and unified majority 
government, but suffered from an arms-length capital market based financial system 
and a central bank exposed to government control and partisan financial interests. 
France could rely on an administrative elite with dirigiste influence over the central 
bank and the financial system, and on its semi-presidential system to back the franc 
fort. On the other hand it also had to cope with divided government under 
cohabitation and a partially militant, although fragmented, trade union movement.
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The distinguishing feature of federal Germany was the autonomy of the Bundesbank, 
embedded in the wider German institutional structure of political checks and balances, 
close bank - export sector relations and a comprehensive wage bargaining system. 
The breakdown of the stability consensus after unification had, however, turned these 
structural features into a liability. The chapter concludes that financial market 
participants, whilst wanting to systematically take into account the complex 
institutional interconnectedness characteristic for the British, German and French 
political economy, would have faced a time-consuming task requiring a high degree 
of expertise. Furthermore they would have had to adjust their analysis to take account 
of the specific socio-political situation in each country in 1992/93. Only then would 
the information available concerning domestic structures have been analysed in an 
optimising fashion.
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven present the longitudinal analysis of the development of 
market sentiment towards pound sterling, the French franc and the D-mark to 
establish the extent to which market participants took account of and understood the 
structural features mapped out in Chapter Three. All three case studies show that the 
bounded practical reasoning of financial market reporting during 1992/93 was 
influenced by domestic structures when it came to judge political sustainability. But 
pragmatic market participants firstly took account of domestic structures if they 
seemed to constrain the authorities’ ability to defend the exchange rate, and moreover 
did so only when uncertainty about time consistency was signalled by other 
indicators. This meant that they turned their attention too late to the structural 
dimension determining the time consistency of the monetary policy commitments in 
the three countries and could then not fully grasp its complexity.
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In Britain the narrowness and ad hoc nature of structural awareness led markets to 
trust the government’s strong currency commitment for too long, resulting in a “too 
late, too much” speculative run on Black Wednesday. In the case of France, limited 
awareness of the structural embeddedness of the franc fort in the French political 
system and the consistency of the French financial system with competitive 
disinflation was too weak to prevent markets attempting a self-fulfilling speculative 
attack on the franc in July 1993. Finally, in the case of Germany, significant structural 
analysis of the wider underpinnings of Bundesbank autonomy by Germany’s political 
and wage bargaining systems could not prevent considerable volatility in the 
credibility of the D-mark. Uncertain as to whether German reunification had resulted 
in a long term structural crisis of the German political economic regime backing the 
strong currency strategy of the central bank, market participants behaved rationally by 
investigating in particular the critically important government and wage bargaining 
structures. But structural awareness failed to stabilise expectations about the 
constraints faced by the Bundesbank. Overdetermined by inconsistent policy signals 
by the central bank, structural deliberations were ad hoc and, instead of understanding 
the risks intrinsic to the specific features of the German monetary policy regime, they 
contributed to uncertainty about its time consistency. Decisive action by the 
Bundesbank immediately restored confidence, with previous structural concerns 
falling into oblivion. Ultimately it was historical experience with the German 
monetary regime, and not systematic rationalist analysis, which helped markets to 
form conclusive expectations on the consistency of Germany’s domestic structures 
with the strong currency commitment.
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Chapter Eight concludes by stating that, although market sentiment takes account of 
domestic structures in a broadly rational fashion, market rationality is bounded and 
not optimising, leading to inefficient market outcomes manifested in unstable 
institutional expectations and a lack of robustness in institutional analysis. 
Paradoxically it was because boundedly rational market participants did not analyse 
domestic institutional risks systematically as suggested by rationalist institutionalism, 
and thus were left with a substantial degree of uncertainty in their institutional 
awareness, that in practice national policymakers could gain substantial monetary 
policy autonomy through strategic interaction with international investors. However, 
this potential leeway for policy autonomy came at the price of possible speculative 
attacks that would not have been justified if market participants had formed fully 
rational expectations of domestic institutional strength. The theoretical ambiguities in 
rationalist institutionalist conceptualisations of the influence of domestic institutions 
on market sentiment are explained by the failure to recognise the practical bounded 
nature of rational decision-making by financial market participants.
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Chapter 2:
Literature Review: Domestic Institutions, Market Rationality and 
Currency Crises
2.1. Introduction
Do international financial markets take systematic account of domestic institutions in judging 
the credibility of a political commitment to exchange rate stability? Rationalist institutional 
interpretations of investors’ decision-making suggest that domestic structures matter for the 
sustainability of monetary policy commitments, and that as a consequence, rational market 
actors will take them systematically into account in their decision-making.1 However, orthodox 
currency crisis models in economics take little account of institutional factors. This will be 
demonstrated in a review of currency crises explanations, focusing on the ERM crisis, from 
‘fundamentals’ explanations towards ‘new fundamentalists’ and ‘self-fulfilling speculative 
attack’ models.2 Only recently have these models started to integrate some aspects of domestic 
structures in an attempt to come to terms with the specific characteristics of the East Asian 
financial crisis. A systematic analysis of domestic institutional variables is missing, since the 
debate revolves mainly around the broader issue of rational expectations versus speculative 
rationality.
The debate about crisis explanations in economics has nevertheless produced a new awareness 
about the imperfections of market rationality. Speculative dynamics have been recognised in 
situations where market participants face a substantial degree of uncertainty about the objective 
situation and other market participants* information. This development represents a refinement 
of the interpretation of market rationality in economic crisis explanations that is generally
1 Domestic structures can be defined as patterns of institutions, interests and ideas prevailing in a country (Hall 
1997). This thesis focuses on domestic institutions, without excluding the role played by interests and ideas in 
patterns of domestic structure.
2 Speculative irrationality models by heterodox, post-Keynesian scholars leave no room for institutional variables 
either. See for example Alves (2000).
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missing in rationalist institutionalism. However, the sophisticated currency crisis models have 
little to say on how these imperfections in market rationality relate to market attention to 
domestic institutions. As a result we are left with, on the one hand, the contributions of 
rationalist institutionalism, focusing on domestic institutions, but suffering from an idealised 
view of informational efficiency of investors’ decisions, and on the other hand economic 
currency crises models, which, while aware of the limitations of financial market rationality, 
suffer from a lack of attention to domestic institutional factors. Furthermore, both approaches 
pay little attention to how market sentiment is actually formed in the reality of foreign exchange 
trading.
This chapter will review rationalist institutional explanations of currency credibility and 
economic currency crisis models with regard to their assertions regarding market rationality and 
domestic institutions. It will conclude that this aspect has been insufficiently analysed and that 
as a consequence a more realistic, intermediate analysis of investors’ behaviour during a 
currency crisis, focusing on market rationality towards institutions, is necessary. The chapter 
will prepare the ground for such an analysis in the form of a comparative study of market 
sentiment towards specific currencies during the 1992/93 ERM crisis.
The chapter is organised as follows: the next section, section two, reviews how rationalist 
institutionalism views domestic institutional factors contributing to the credibility problems 
of fixed exchange rate commitments. Section three investigates the range o f currency crisis 
models which have been put forward in the economic debate for domestic institutional 
explanations, as well as the discussion of market rationality. Section four reviews 
explanations of the ERM crisis put forward by international political economy and applied 
economics concerning the issue of market rationality and the role o f domestic institutions. It 
starts with a brief overview of the history of the crisis. Section five concludes.
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2.2. Domestic Institutions, Rational Expectations and Currency Crises
The rationalist institutional research paradigm starts from the assertion that domestic institutions
can block and refract the effects of internationalisation on national politics, thus conditioning the 
incentives for domestic interest groups and policymakers (Milner & Keohane 1996a). 
Rationalist institutionalists assert that the ability to succeed in an open international economic 
environment through stable macroeconomic policies and low inflation is determined by the 
specific institutional context of national policy-making (Haggard 2000a). International finance is 
portrayed as creating a “new audience” that political leaders must satisfy (Keohane & Milner 
1996b: 257). Markets are though of as rational, with the credibility of national policies 
dependent on their ability to impose financial discipline and promote competitiveness. Domestic 
institutions that underpin neo-liberal policies are seen as indicators of credibility (Keohane & 
Milner 1996a:258). Geoffrey Garrett shares this rationalist approach towards the interaction 
between markets and domestic institutional factors, but challenges the conclusion that domestic 
institutions have to be compatible with neo-liberal policies. He asserts that financial markets are 
able to understand the positive long-term implications of social democratic institutions for the 
maintenance of capitalism. In his celebrated critique of the globalisation hypothesis he argues 
that “farsighted capital can be expected to understand the upside of social democratic 
corporatism” and hence forgo the temptation to opt for more market-liberal national regimes 
(Garrett 1998:10). The problem is that currency traders are notoriously short-sighted.
These rational assumptions of rationalist institutionalists about market agents’ judgements of 
domestic institutions are most explicit in their analyses of the credibility of monetary policy 
commitments. Here, modelling of the time consistency problem based on rational expectations
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by neo-classical economists is extended to include domestic structures:3 using all available 
information, rational forward looking investors will take domestic interests and institutions into 
account when judging the credibility of monetary policy. As a consequence rationalist 
institutionalism states that confidence crises in financial markets result not only from conflict 
between domestic politics and monetary commitments, but also from weak domestic structures 
which are the underlying cause for political unsustainablity (Haggard 2000a; Simmons 1994; 
Haggard & Maxfield 1996).
Simmons develops this concept clearly in respect to fixed exchange rate commitments in the 
interwar period (Simmons 1994:52-64): First, building on the Barro-Gordon model, she 
describes the interaction between domestic politics and financial markets with respect to the 
credibility of fixed exchange rate commitments in game theoretical terms: the optimal choice of 
rational policymakers is to undertake an exchange rate commitment to reduce inflationary 
expectations, but renege on their monetary commitments over time to stimulate growth through 
surprise monetary expansion inconsistent with exchange rate stability. However, as Simmons 
put it, “the government’s effort to optimize economic growth is undercut if  rational forward 
looking economic agents anticipate expansionary monetary policies and rearrange their assets 
accordingly.” The result is a strategic game between governments and markets “conceived as 
distinct sets of actors engaged in an effort to maximise their own utility” (1994: 53-4). 
Governments making stability commitments will choose strategies, like the membership of an 
exchange rate system, to enhance their credibility, whereas financial markets will use all 
available information to make their best guess about monetary policy in the near future, 
persistently questioning the credibility of the government’s strategy (1994: 55). Simmons then
3 The time-consistency of monetary policy commitments faced by rational forward-looking actors has been 
formalised in the Barro-Gordon model (Barro & Gordon 1983). Although formulated for domestic monetary 
policy commitments in a closed economy, it has been applied to fixed exchange rate commitments in an open 
economy (see de Grauwe 1996).
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goes on to emphasise the importance of information concerning domestic institutions for this 
judgement.
Bringing domestic interest and institutions back into the debate about the credibility of external 
commitments by national governments has been a critical contribution of rationalist 
institutionalism. The political trade-off between the short-term growth and employment costs of 
maintaining an exchange rate commitment, and the longer term benefits of exchange rate 
stability and financial openness is structured by what Milner calls the “domestic polity” (1998: 
785). Different domestic interests and institutions filter external market pressures, resulting in 
different policy choices across nations in this trade-off. The domestic institutional context can be 
expected to greatly influence market’s judgement on whether to hold domestically denominated 
assets (Simmons 1994:63-4).4
In this line of argument domestic institutions are important for credibility because they provide 
the structural underpinnings which determine whether a lasting combination of low inflation 
with decent growth and low unemployment can be achieved. In turn only such a combination 
will allow the fixed exchange rate to be solidly based on external equilibrium without causing 
politically unsustainable domestic dislocations. Furthermore, in case of disequilibria, domestic 
institutions are crucial in facilitating smooth and effective adjustment. Rationalist 
institutionalism identifies in particular government, financial and labour market structures as 
important in this respect.5
Firstly, strong and stable governments are expected to be more credible in financial markets 
since they are less prone to “political business cycle” behaviour (Clark & Hallerberg 2000;
4 Other examples of rationalist institutional studies emphasising the influence of domestic institutional factors 
on investors’ behaviour are MacIntyre (2000); Haggard (2000b); Leblang & Bernhard (2000).
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Leblang & Bernhard 2000). Furthermore, stable conservative governments are supposed to be 
more credible through being more capable of imposing tough and costly adjustment policies 
(Simmons 1994). Finally, institutionally mature and stable democracies are better equipped to 
push through the necessary adjustments to effectively respond in case of currency crises 
(Haggard 2000a). Strength and stability of governments in turn depend on whether national 
constitutional relationship between and within branches of legislature and executive support the 
formation of unified or divided government. (Simmons 1994; Milner 1997; Bernhard & Leblang 
1999; Haggard & MacCubbins 2001). Within the financial structure, central bank independence 
is assumed to be of pivotal importance for lowering inflationary expectations. Furthermore, 
disinflation to defend an exchange rate commitment is expected to be more likely if  monetary 
policy is depoliticised (Simmons 1994; Clark et al. 1998). The rootedness of central bank 
independence in the wider domestic structural context and especially the broader financial 
structure is of critical importance (Lohman 1998; Hall & Franzese 2000; Henning 1994; Posen 
1993). Finally, wage bargaining systems and labour union structures are important, since they 
determine whether monetary policy commitments will be underpinned by wage moderation 
(Garrett 1998; Soskice & Iverson 2000; Franzese & Hall 2000).
The rationalist view of market behaviour underlies the majority view in the rationalist research 
paradigm. A rare critical intervention arguing from within the framework of rationalist 
institutionalism has come from Mosley (2000), who has investigated how financial market 
participants evaluate government policy and concluded that their behaviour is rational, but in a 
limited sense (2000: 742). She asserts that only a narrow range of domestic variables influence 
financial market behaviour, but that the impact of these variables is strong (740). Domestic 
institutions in general do not fall within this range. Instead, financial markets rely mainly on a 
small number of macroeconomic indicators to assess currency risk: government deficits,
5 For a detailed review and discussion of the following arguments by rationalist institutionalism see Chapter 4.
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inflation, the current account position and exchange rate developments. Furthermore, the 
response to this narrow set of indicators is strong, reinforcing their importance. Although 
financial market participants speak strongly of the importance of structural reform, only in 
situations of heightened tension will they consider microeconomic supply-side factors such as 
the distribution of government spending, education, labour market systems or infrastructure. 
These structural variables are in general only taken into account if  a developing country is at risk 
of default, but not in the case of ‘simple* currency crises like the ERM crisis. Markets are only 
concerned with political systems of industrial democracies and their stability if  elections herald 
the possibility of a major shift in policy outcomes. In general, the higher the perceived risk of 
the government reneging on its commitments, the wider the range of information financial 
markets will take into account. Mosley supports her “strong but narrow” hypothesis by an 
analysis of market behaviour. In practice rational herding by market participants and 
“information shortcuts” leave little room for in-depth institutional analysis (2000: 43). These 
qualifications of market rationality, expanded on in the next chapter, underline the need for 
an intermediate view on investor behaviour.
A striking feature of the ERM crisis is that there have been significant differences in the timing 
and extent of speculative pressure for individual ERM member countries. Only a limited number 
of countries faced massive speculative attack, although almost all currencies became the target 
of speculative pressure at some point. If the assumptions of rationalist institutionalism are 
correct, differences between domestic institutions among countries should partly explain 
differences in market behaviour towards ERM currencies. In particular, institutional weaknesses 
in the respective national government, financial and labour market structures have to be 
investigated with regard to their explanation of not only severe confidence crisis faced by 
currencies like pound sterling in 1992, or the French franc in 1993, but also the sudden 
weakness of the most credible currency, the D-mark.
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2.3. Theories of Currency Crises by Economists
The 1992/93 ERM crisis was the first of the major currency crises witnessed by the 
international financial system over the last decade. It was followed by the Mexican crisis in 
1994/95, which spilled over to Argentina in 1995, the Asian crisis affecting Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea in 1997/98, which spread to the Russian 
default, the Brazilian devaluation in 1999, the Turkish crisis of 2000/1 and most recently the 
Argentine crisis of 2001/26. As a result the academic debate has seen a mushrooming in crisis 
explanations, with often inconclusive results. As Rose puts it:
‘The crisis literature is in crisis. As a profession we simply do not have a very good understanding of what 
causes crises (especially currency crisis).”7
As a rule the debate assumes rational behaviour by market participants and leaves room for 
domestic political and institutional variables, but the nature of market rationality is contested 
and the institutional analysis weak. More recent crisis interpretations severely qualify the 
rational expectations view of market sentiment by emphasising rational herding (Krugman 
1998a; Radelet & Sachs 1998; Irwin & Vines 1999). Domestic institutional factors have been 
neglected for economic variables, but in the wake of the Asian crisis structural weaknesses in 
the political and financial system of “Asian Capitalism” have been highlighted (Krugman 
1998c). The following discussion is based on a classification of economic currency crisis 
theories represented by Table 2.1.
6 The Argentine currency crisis is still evolving at the moment of writing, with an ongoing academic discussion 
of its causes. It will therefore not been covered in the following review of currency crisis explanations.
7 In Bordo et al. (2001:75)
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Table 2.1:
Currency crisis models
Crisis Model DomesticFactors
International
Factors
Domestic
Institutional
Factors
Market
Dynamics
Market
Rationality
1st Generation Model
Classic
Fundamentalists Model
Competitiveness
indicators
Trade 
contagion, 
Terms of Trade
None None
Rational
expectations,
efficient
market
hypothesis
New Fundamentalists 
Model
Domestic moral 
hazard:
overinvestment
IMF bail-outs: 
international 
moral hazard
Government
bail-out:
Financial
structure
Crisis 
feedback- 
loop due to 
transfer 
problem
Rational
expectations.
Socially
inefficient
2nd Generation Model
Classic “Multiple 
Equilibria ” Model
Political 
sustainability 
Indicators: 
Calculation of 
Zone of 
Vulnerability.
Contagion:
capital
account,
informational,
political
Vulnerability of
financial/banking
system
Self-
fulfilling
speculative
attack,
rational
herding
Rational
expectations,
plus:
Rational
speculation.
Socially
inefficient
Information 
Asymmetry/Limitations 
“Multiple Equilibria ” 
Model
Political
sustainability
indicators:
Uncertainty
about zone of
vulnerability
Contagion:
Capital
account,
informational,
political;
plus:
Information 
cascades in 
situation of 
uncertainty 
(lead investors)
Vulnerability of
financial/banking
system
Self-
fulfilling
speculative
attack,
rumours,
bank-run
behaviour
“Bounded
rationality”
plus:
Speculation 
in situation 
of
uncertainty.
Socially
inefficient
Post-Keynesian -  Structuralist Model
“Casino Capitalism ” 
Model Random events
Random
events;
Psychological 
contagion 
(mood swings).
None
Endogenous
reflexive
speculative
behaviour
Irrational:
Fads,
gambling.
Socially
inefficient
2.3.1. The Role of Domestic Institutions
I shall first consider the importance of institutional factors in the economic crisis literature: 
the debate has centred around the discussion of two crisis models, the so called “first 
generation” and “second generation” models and their variations. 8 Both approaches are
8 Krugman (1996; 1998a); Eichengreen et al. (1998); Flood & Marion (1998). The terminology was introduced 
by Eichengreen et al. (1995). For recent refinement of the second generation model see Irwin & Vines (1999); 
Jeanne (1999); (Krugman 2000). For a good introductory survey of the models relating to the ERM crisis see 
Buiter et al. (1998) and Gros & Thygesen (1998).
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rooted in the Mundell-Fleming model, stating that with capital account liberalisation and 
massive cross-border capital flows the autonomy of governments to set monetary policies has 
been severely constrained for countries which have committed themselves to a fixed 
exchange rate. They differ however in their analysis of why and when markets will challenge 
such a peg in a currency crisis.
In simple terms the first generation “fundamentals” model starts from an excessive expansion of 
domestic credit to finance budget deficits This forces the central bank to run down reserves in 
order to defend the exchange rate. An exchange rate crisis is inevitable as soon as reserves run 
out (Krugman 1979). Fully informed markets will attack the currency as soon as money supply 
expansion becomes inconsistent with the longer run sustainability of the exchange rate, 
anticipating the inevitable balance of payments crisis. The crisis is caused by unsound 
fundamentals, i.e. inflationary fiscal and monetary policies. It can be explained fully by rational 
expectations of fundamentals, without having to turn to self-fulfilling market dynamics. 
“Currency crisis will occur as soon as a speculative attack can succeed. The range of 
indeterminacy -  the range over which an attack would succeed if  it occurred, but seemingly 
need not occur -  is eliminated by reasoning backward from the known eventual collapse of the 
exchange rate regime” (Krugman 1996: 349, emphasis in the original). Government monetary 
policy choices to defend the exchange rate other than by using reserves do not enter into the 
picture. The first generation “fundamentals” or “competitiveness” interpretation can be thought 
of essentially as modelling a current account crisis (Eichengreen 2000). Market rationality in this 
view only takes competitiveness related economic fundamentals indicators into account, i.e. the 
current account, real exchange rate, excess budget deficits and related inflation. Markets are 
portrayed as basing their reasoning on a simple calculation of the limits of reserves available for 
intervention.
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More sophisticated applications of the first generation approach acknowledge that 
competitiveness problems either stem from “unsound” domestic politics or external 
developments causing real appreciation.9 Examples of unsustainable domestic policies are 
excessive public borrowing in Italy (1992) or Mexico (1994/5), or private overborrowing as a 
result of “crony capitalism” in Asia. Examples for external causes are the devaluation of major 
competitors, as in the case of Korea in 1997/8, or the appreciation of the key currency as result 
of monetary policy decisions in the anchor currency country, as in the case of Germany in the 
ERM in 1992/3. Furthermore, balance of payments related devaluations in one country triggered 
by speculative attacks can spread current account problems to other countries through trade 
contagion (Gerlach & Smets 1995; Glick & Rose 1998).
Basically the first generation crisis model is not concerned with domestic structural factors 
underlying the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances inconsistent with the exchange rate 
peg. In the wake of the Asian crisis however, the model has been augmented by a structural 
dimension, dubbed by Haggard (2000b) as the “new fundamentalism”. It asserts that continued 
lending by forward-looking domestic and international investors can be explained by moral 
hazard. Although aware of mounting short-term external debt and deteriorating competitiveness, 
financial markets took the calculated risk of further exposure because of the guarantee implicit 
in domestic financial systems of a bailout of commercial banks by national governments, 
financing overinvestment and asset price inflation (Dooley 1997; Krugman 1998c; Goldstein et 
al. 2000).10 Given moral hazard, the belated response to deteriorating fundamentals in financial 
markets becomes rational. Furthermore a “negative feedback-loop”, aggravating the crisis, is 
possible in these models (Krugman 1999): the deterioration of corporate balance sheets due to
9 See Krugman (1996,1998c); Edwards (1998). For an overview of fundamentals arguments including external 
factors for the Asian crisis see Radelet & Sachs (1998), and Haggard (2000b).
10 The argument has equally been made for the international financial structure, regarding the role of the IMF in 
international moral hazard. See Radelet and Sachs (1998).
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the massive increase in US-dollar denominated debt caused by a confidence crisis and 
consequent depreciation of the national currencies will lead to a further rational collapse in 
investor confidence and depreciation.
Thus the new fundamentalist version adds capital account considerations to the original first 
generation model. In doing so, it brings in structural variables related to moral hazard: on the 
domestic side the close govemment-banking-industry relations in the credit-based financial 
systems of East Asia, and on the international side features of the international financial 
architecture, centred around the IMF crisis management regime. Financial markets are portrayed 
as taking these implicit guarantees into account, suggesting structural awareness. Although this 
represents an extension of the assumptions of rational expectations to include structural features 
of the domestic and international financial system, the extension is limited to bail-out 
mechanisms. The new fundamentalist model does not indicate whether financial markets were 
aware of the structural fragility of banking systems in East Asia which lay behind the lending 
excesses. On the contrary the model implies that markets, aware of domestic and international 
bail-out structures, were encouraged to ignore this broader structural fragility.
Moral hazard and its structural dimension only enter into the explanation of currency crises in 
the new fundamentalist version if currency crises interact with a banking crisis related to a 
foreign debt crisis.11 This was, for example, the case in the emerging market currency crises of 
Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Russia (Bordo et al. 2001). In contrast, as the IMF points 
out, the ERM crises “were essentially currency crises”. Only the Nordic countries which had 
unilaterally pegged to the ECU experienced domestic banking crises around the time of the 
ERM crisis (IMF 1998: 75). The structural implications of the moral hazard aspect in the first
11 On the distinction and interaction between these three types of crisis see IMF (1998: 74-75)
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generation model is thus of limited relevance for my investigation of the possible influence of 
domestic structures on market sentiment in pure currency crises.
A more complex picture emerges in the second-generation model, distinguished by its emphasis 
on market expectations about the willingness and ability of governments to implement and 
sustain the policy measures necessary to defend the exchange rate (Flood & Garber 1994; 
Krugman 1996; Obstfeld 1996; Ozkan & Sutherland 1994). 12 As Krugman puts it, '...the 
defence of an exchange rate is a matter of trade-offs rather than a simple matter of selling 
foreign exchange until the money is gone' (Krugman 1998a). Governments are looked at more 
realistically as political agents, constrained in their choices by domestic conditions. They have to 
make a political decision about the benefits and costs of maintaining exchange rate stability 
through monetary and fiscal policies consistent with the peg. Such a consistency might require 
monetary and fiscal contraction, at the price of falling output and rising unemployment. On the 
other hand the alternative, the abandoning of the peg, comes at the price of potential inflationary 
depreciation and a loss of credibility (Krugman 1996). Domestic structures are of considerable 
importance for this trade-off not only in that they shape government preferences, but also 
because they can create veto points that make certain policies more difficult to implement. 
Furthermore, uncertainty and the possibility of self-fulfilling attacks enter the debate on market 
rationality.
Markets are now faced with the much more difficult task of having to deal with the time 
consistency problem: they have to gauge whether the commitment of a government to maintain 
an exchange rate peg is credible. The way market participants assess the domestic constraints 
which influence the trade-off a government faces between its domestic objectives (employment) 
and its external objective (exchange rate stability) will be crucial for the formation of market
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sentiment. As with the first generation model, the second generation model assumes that 
financial markets are informationally efficient. As it takes the domestic political and structural 
factors which determine government preferences into account, currency commitments face 
credibility problems not because of unsound fundamentals, but because domestic structures 
make measures to restore external equilibrium untenable. As Eichengreen (2000) points out, the 
second generation explanation essentially models a capital account crisis, allowing for an 
interaction between rational market judgement and rational decisions by policymakers regarding 
the trade-off between short-run costs and long-run benefits of a peg. The key is that rational 
market expectation for a devaluation are not driven by fundamentals, but by expectations of a 
coming change in monetaiy policy in response to politically unsustainable costs of disinflation 
(Cobham 1996: 589). Once such expectations have been formed the resulting confidence crisis 
can be self-fulfilling: under attack the unemployment and growth costs for the government of 
defending the exchange rate through ever higher interest rates will finally outweigh the benefits 
of a stable exchange rate, shifting the incentive structure towards abandonment of the peg 
(Krugman 1996).
A central question in the debate surrounding the second generation model is whether the 
devaluation, triggered by a self-fulfilling speculative attack, would otherwise have occurred. 
Here two different versions have emerged, the ‘expected policy change model’ and the 
‘contingent policy change model’ of self-fulfilling speculative attacks.13 The former model 
assumes that financial market participants realise that a currency peg has become politically 
unsustainable. Its collapse is only a question of time, given the costs of disinflation needed to 
maintain the peg. By worsening domestic policy disequilibria through the dynamics of a self-
12 For a good overview see Jeanne (1999).
13 The terminology has been introduced by Cobham (1996). Representatives of the first view are Flood &
Garber (1984); Ozkan & Sutherland (1994); Krugman (1996, 1998a). Proponents of the contingent policy
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fulfilling speculative attack, financial markets only precipitate the inevitable collapse of the peg 
by accelerating the already unsustainable losses the government incurs from staying on the peg 
(Krugman 1996; 1998a). In contrast, the latter model assumes “multiple rational equilibria”: one 
equilibrium being a politically sustainable exchange rate commitment, as long as it has not to be 
defended against speculative pressure, the other an equilibrium at a depreciated rate, to which 
the policy preferences of government will shift in response to a disequilibrium emerging at the 
old rate, resulting from the need to defend it against a speculative attacks through interest rate 
hikes (Eichengreen 1996; Radelet & Sachs 1998). Currency crises are now not only self- 
fulfilling but self-generated. As DeLong put it in his review of recent currency crises:
“It was only the belief that macroeconomic politics would prove unsustainable in the end that made them 
inappropriate; in the absence of that belief, policies would in all likelihood have been sustainable and appropriate.” 
(1999:254).
The second generation crisis model has influenced the explanation o f speculative attacks on 
especially those countries with manageable fundamental economic problems, but which were 
vulnerable from a political sustainability point of view.14 Regardless of whether a speculative 
attack was in anticipation of expected or contingent policy change, it only takes place 
because the political commitment was perceived by market participants to have entered a 
“zone of vulnerability” (Eichengreen 2000).15 Although, as suggested by the time- 
consistency problem, all policymakers have incentives to reflate at the cost of abandoning the 
exchange rate peg, only in certain domestic circumstances will this susceptibility translate 
into acute vulnerability of the commitment.16
change model are Eichengreen & Wyplosz (1993); Eichengreen et al. (1995), Obstfeld (1996); Eichengreen 
(2000); Sachs & Radelet (1998).
14 See the analyses of e.g. Eichengreen & Wyplosz (1993) and Radelet & Sachs (1998).
15 Krugman (1996) calls the range within which self-fulfilling speculative attacks can occur a “crisis zone” 
(1996:349).
16 On the distinction between susceptibility and vulnerability see Keohane & Nye (1977).
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The problem for markets is how to assess whether the zone of vulnerability has been entered. 
Even if  markets are assumed to be rational and forward looking, they have to deal with 
uncertainty when it comes to forming expectations about future policy decisions. In the 
words of Paul Krugman:
“The decision [on the future exchange rate strategy; W.H.] is essentially political, it is likely to be influenced 
strongly by the exhaustion of hard-to-measure reserves of public patience and political capital rather than 
tangible measures like financial reserves.” (1996: 365)
Krugman points out in this context the possibility o f unsuccessful speculative attacks which 
are nevertheless rational, since markets faced with a high degree of “uncertainty about the 
government's loss function” might decide that it is worth taking the risk of testing a 
government’s resolve (1996: 357). To reduce the inevitable losses associated with such a 
strategy, rational market participants should have an interest in obtaining and processing as 
much information as possible on the government’s loss function, including its domestic 
structural determinants.
The second generation model is weak as concerns the extent to which structural factors are 
considered in market views of the vulnerability of exchange rate commitments. Its main 
emphasis is on the events triggering a self-fulfilling attack, which can be of political or 
economic, international or domestic nature (Eichengreen 2000; Radelet & Sachs 2000). Many 
of these events, like national referenda (ERM 1992), political assassinations and uprisings 
(Mexico 1994/5), bursting property price bubbles or corporate bankruptcies (Asia 1997/8), 
point at underlying domestic political or economic structural features. Only weaknesses in the 
domestic banking structure have been explicitly emphasised, but without in-depth analysis or
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a discussion of whether these weaknesses did influence market sentiment.17 Whether markets 
have been aware of these features has not been addressed in the second generation model.
Instead, the model puts considerable emphasis on international developments like external 
shocks and contagion as reasons for a sudden increase in a government’s susceptibility to 
speculative pressure. But even here the issue of domestic structures should come into play, 
since markets have to make a proper judgement as to whether a government’s monetary 
policy strategy will be influenced by domestic preferences or the international shock. De 
Grauwe describes this problem for the case of a too hawkish monetary policy of the anchor 
currency in an asymmetric key currency system:
“In an uncertain world, the increase in unemployment observed by private agents can be interpreted in two ways. It 
can be interpreted as evidence that the authorities are committed to reducing inflation. In that case inflationary 
expectations will decline. Or it can be seen as the result of a shock, which will increase the incentive to follow more 
expansionary policies. Private agents may then think that the authorities are likely to devalue the currency.” (1996: 
70)
Again, market awareness of domestic structures should reduce this uncertainty. Similarly, 
different forms of contagion can result in spreading sustainability problems. This can be 
through trade contagion after competitor nations have been forced to devalue, capital account 
contagion, due to the withdrawal of funds by investors who had to cover losses in the 
countries first forced to devalue, and informational spillover, caused by financial market 
participants becoming aware of problems in other countries similar to those in the country 
which fell victim to the original speculative attack. (Glick & Rose 1998; IMF 1998; Jeanne 
1999). Finally, if  a self-fulfilling attack succeeds, it might lead to “political contagion” as 
financial markets realize that the depreciation of one government might negatively affect the 
rationale for continued pegging for other governments (Drazen 1999). The fact that not all
17 For the Asian financial crisis the emphasis is here on the structures of what has become know as “crony 
capitalism” (Radelet & Sachs 2000). For the ERM crisis Eichengreen has pointed out that financial fragility in 
Britain was caused by a combination of high interest rates and excessive mortgage lending. (Eichengreen 2000: 
24-5).
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countries in a similar international situation are equally vulnerable to contagion pressures 
suggests that market participants are able to differentiate between the different capabilities of 
national regimes to facilitate disinflation in defence of the peg. The second generation model 
takes the view that market participants concern themselves with different outcomes of 
disinflation in terms of unemployment and political support for the peg, without asking for the 
underlying structural factors causing these differences. The exception is the narrow concern of 
second generation authors about the specific direct vulnerability of domestic financial structures 
to interest rate increases and capital outflows. Weaknesses in national banking and financial 
systems have been highlighted here, starting with the ERM crisis, and ending with the analysis 
of “crony capitalism” in Asia (IMF 1998; Radelet & Sachs 1998; Irwin & Vines 1999; 
Eichengreen 2000).
Consequently Goldstein et al. argue the need for widening the analysis of what constitutes 
financial vulnerability of emerging market countries beyond macroeconomic variables to 
include institutional characteristics (2000:17). Rationalist institutionalists are of course even 
more aware of this weakness in the economic analysis of currency crises. Haggard (2000b) 
asserts that in the case of Asia, the longer-term sources of vulnerability in the political and 
financial institutional structure have to be addressed, beyond ad hoc explanations of bad 
policies, in order to systematically understand why financial markets lost confidence in 
exchange rate commitments. He concludes that both the first and second generation models of 
currency crises fall short on this account (2000b:7-8). The question remains whether financial 
markets were indeed taking these critical structural factors into account in the systematic fashion 
suggested by rationalist institutionalism. Economic crisis models give mixed support to this 
assumption.
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2.3.2. Market Rationality
Only the first generation fundamentals crises model and its ‘new fundamentals’ variation 
suggest that financial market behaviour can be explained by fully rational expectations in 
market decision-making. Juxtaposed to this position are radical accounts o f self-fulfilling 
speculation, in the post-Keynesian or structuralist/post-structualist tradition, which fully 
discard notions of market rationality in favour of comparing market behaviour to gambling in 
what Keynes dubbed “casino capitalism” (e.g. Strange 1998; Alves 2000; Harmes 2001). 
Market participants, unable to form reasonable opinions about an uncertain future, make 
decisions based on conventions and “fads” prevailing endogenous in the market place, 
resulting in lemming-like behaviour among traders. External events (“sunspots”) only come 
in as random triggers for irrational swings in market sentiment from optimism to pessimism. 
Both positions have been criticised for making extreme assumptions about either market 
rationality or market irrationality, failing to capture the interaction between reality and 
investor behaviour.18
In contrast, classic second generation self-fulfilling speculative attack models maintain the 
assumption of market rationality, although broadened to include the interplay between 
government vulnerability and market behaviour. Within the second generation self-fulfilling 
attack models, markets initially form rational expectations as to the vulnerability of 
government commitments, in order to determine whether and when a multiple equilibria 
situation exists. Then, once rational markets have come to the conclusion that an exchange 
rate commitment is vulnerable, speculation, driven by endogenous market dynamics, 
becomes rational, since it is through this speculative build-up that the crisis becomes self- 
fulfilling, shifting the government’s loss function from a “good” to a “bad” equilibrium. 
(Obstfeld 1996; Radelet & Sachs 1998, 2000). In this situation it becomes rational for
18 See Willett (2000), who called in this context for an “intermediate view of investor behaviour”.
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individual market participants to discard private information supporting the sustainability of 
the peg in favour of “rational herding”. As Radelet & Sachs put it, panic among market 
participants is “one rational equilibrium” once they have concluded that the government can 
be pushed towards devaluation, even if  this behaviour is socially inefficient in the sense that 
the peg could have been sustained (1998:5). In this context it seems possible that the decision 
to join the herd might be based on an awareness of the domestic institutional fragility of an 
exchange rate commitment.
The picture changes if  speculative attacks are seen to be caused not by a rational calculation 
of vulnerability, but by information asymmetries and/or informational frictions (Calvo & 
Mendoza 1996; Radelet & Sachs 1998; Flood & Marion 1998). Market participants who are 
uncertain about the validity of their own judgement on the sustainability of a peg because 
they are unwilling or unable to obtain sufficient country-specific information, might ignore 
their own judgement and base their decisions on the decisions of investors before them, 
resulting in “information cascades” (Flood & Marion 1998).19 As Food and Marion point out 
in this context:
“Globalization reduces the incentives to collect country-specific information to discredit rumors and increases 
the likelihood that fund managers who worry about their relative performance will each select the same 
portfolio. Consequently, small rumors can induce herding behaviour and move the economy from the no-attack 
to the attack equilibrium.” (1998: 16)
Such herding behaviour will hurt investors sometimes, since the speculative attack takes 
place in an environment of high uncertainty about the government’s vulnerability and thus 
the speculators’ ultimate success. This might give investors an incentive to push back 
limitations on full rational foresight by collecting more information on domestic institutions
19 Suggestions that herding is in particular caused by the leader role of hedge fund managers has been 
questioned by IMF studies which found little evidence that hedge funds lead other investors (IMF 1998; 
Eichengreen et al. 1998). Eichengreen et al. argue that hedge funds carry little weight in market opinion, 
because investors realise that these institutions with comparatively little research capacity are particularly 
exposed to information asymmetries (1998:10).
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in particular, as Maxfield argues from a rationalist institutional viewpoint (1998: 1216). But 
this incentive will be in conflict with the desire of market participants to economize on their 
collection and processing of country-specific information that lie at the root o f informational 
inefficiencies in the first place. From this point of view it seems unlikely that they will 
undertake systematic domestic institutional-structural analyses.
A way forward, taking account of the reality of investor reasoning, has been suggested by 
Willett (2000), drawing on bounded rationality concepts. In his “too late, too much” 
hypothesis he asserts that market behaviour is not fully efficient because market participants 
suffer from information asymmetries and cognitive limitations, and are consequently prone to 
feedback loops among individual investors’ analyses, resulting in speculative herding. 
Consequently, highly volatile international financial markets operate inefficiently, oscillating 
between exuberance and panic. Although ultimately making valid judgements, market 
participants arrive at these conclusions too late, with a tendency to overshoot.
What is at issue here is the tension between the practical rationality of investors in their day- 
to-day business and the optimising rationality of rational expectations formation, an issue that 
has been addressed neither by rationalist institutionalism nor by economic currency crises 
explanations.
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2.4. The 1992/93 ERM Crisis
The analyses of the causes of the wave of speculative attacks on ERM currencies over 
1992/93 shows a similar neglect of the possible influence of domestic structures on market 
sentiment. To introduce my review of the ERM specific crisis literature, a short historical 
overview of the crisis is necessary.20
2.4.1. A Brief Historical Account
The ERM crisis took place against the backdrop of four critical international developments: 
the creation of full capital mobility in the European Community (EC),21 the launching of 
Economic and Monetary Union project (EMU), German unification, and the global recession 
of the early 1990s, led by the USA.22 Full capital mobility was established in the EC as part 
of the single market programme to become effective in July 1990.23 Britain, Germany and 
France were in the vanguard of liberalisation. Britain suspended all remaining barriers to 
inflows and outflows in 1979, France lifted most restrictions in 1988, with all remaining 
controls abolished on 1 January 1990 and Germany had already started to liberalise inflows 
from 1958 onwards, with residual outflow restrictions gradually removed in the course of the 
1980s (Bakker 1996). At the end of 1991 all ERM member states had removed remaining 
restrictions and in 1992/93 the ERM area constituted a zone fully open to international capital 
flows. In addition, the high degree of domestic financial deregulation as part of the EC’s neo­
liberal reform agenda increased its vulnerability to speculative attacks (Tsoukalis 1997, 
Eichengreen 2000). Table 2.2 gives an indication of the scale as well as the regional and the 
currency distribution of cross border currency trading for 1992, illustrating the potential 
exposure of ERM currencies to the quantitative leverage o f financial markets.
20 A tabulatory chronology of the crisis is given in the Appendix, Table 1. Main economic indicators for France, 
Germany, Britain and the USA from 1988 to 1994 in the Appendix, Table 2.
21 The European Community changed its title to European Union (EU) on 1 November 1993, with the 
Maastricht Treaty formally entering into force. Up to this date I will use the abbreviation EC.
22 For a good review of the crisis see Kenen (1995); Tsoukalis (1997); Eichengreen (2000).
23Fourth Directive on capital movements, adopted 24 June 1988. The directive allowed for a derogative 
transition period for Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland until May 1994. A detailed account of EC and country 
specific capital account liberalisation in the EC /EU can be found in Bakker (1996).
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Table 2.2:
Foreign exchange and derivatives m arket activity 1992
(Daily Averages in April 1992)__________________________________
Daily global foreign exchange market turnover (US dollar bn)
Spot 394
Forwards and swaps 382
Reporting gaps 44
Total 820
Currency distribution o f reported foreign exchange market turnover (percent)2*
US dollar 82.0
D -M ark 39.6
Pound Sterling 13.6
French Franc 3.8
ECU and other EMS 11.8
Reported foreign exchange turnover by currency pairs (percent)
US S/DM 25
US $/£ 10
US $/FFr 2
US $/other EMS 6
D-Mark/£ 3
D-Mark/FFr 1
D-Mark/other EMS 3
Geographical distribution o f  reported foreign exchange market turnover (percent)
United States 15.5
Germany 5.1
Britain 27.0
France 3.1
Source:
BIS (2002): Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2001
The push for monetary union (EMU) was related to the creation o f a single market, including 
full capital mobility. Mapped out in the Delors Report (Committee for the Study o f Economic 
and Monetary Union 1989), the project gained critical political momentum with the Franco- 
German bargain linking German unification to European monetary integration, which led to 
the formal launch of EMU in the Maastricht Treaty, negotiated in December 1991. The 
treaty’s convergence criteria, which stipulated that national currencies must remain within the 
‘normal’ fluctuation margins of the ERM for at least two years to qualify for EMU, made the
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system more rigid and at the same time more vulnerable to speculative pressure in the case of 
difficulties on the route towards the single currency (Eichengreen & Wyplosz 1993; 
Eichengreen 2000).
German reunification constituted a classic case of an external shock to the ERM as a system 
of pegged exchange rates, with the D-mark as key currency (Branson 1994). The rapid full 
integration of the east-German economy threw the west-German economy off balance, 
resulting in conflict between the domestic priorities of German monetary management and 
the role of the D-mark as anchor currency (De Grauwe 1997). High German interest rates, 
justified domestically by the Bundesbank to contain rising inflation, induced by deficit 
spending after reunification, imposed a too restrictive monetary policy stance on the rest of 
the ERM.
Finally, after the boom of the 1980s, the European economies, with the exception of 
Germany, had entered into severe recession in the early 1990s, led by a post-Gulf War 
cyclical downturn in the US. US interest rate cuts from 1990 through to the end of 1992, and 
“benign neglect” of the exchange rate, contrasted with the continuous German reunification 
boom and high interest rates in Germany, driving up the D-mark against the dollar, thus 
adding to the strains within the ERM in 1992. (BIS 1993) (See Chart 2.1 and 2.2).
24 Because two currencies are involved in each transaction, the sum of percentage shares of individual 
currencies totals 200% instead of 100%.
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Chart 2.1: Exchange rates: DM to FFr; £; Lit; US $
(01 January 1991 -30  October 1993; 01/01/91 = 100)
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Source: Datastream; Deutsche Bundesbank
Chart 2.2:
France, Germany, UK, USA: Official interest rates
(Daily; 01 July 1 9 9 1 -3 0  June 94)
RANCE
ERMA
Germany: Discount Rate; France: 5-10 Day Repo Rate; UK: Clearing Banks Base Rate-, USA: Intended Federal 
Funds Rate
Source: Datastream; Federal Reserve
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Together these international factors undermined the stable pattern o f the workings of 
European monetary relations in the early 1990s. As a result the conventions in financial 
markets about the stability o f the ERM system gradually broke down, ending with the 
speculative attacks o f 1992/93. A first indication o f the vulnerability o f D-mark pegs came 
with the “Nordic currency Crisis” o f November 1991, which culminated in the devaluation of 
the Finnish markka on 15 November. The crisis within the ERM itself erupted in June 1992 
after a long phase of stability in ‘hard’ ERM since 1987. The trigger for this was the rejection 
o f the Maastricht treaty by the Danish referendum on June 2, which put the political 
feasibility of EMU itself in question. With the Maastricht convergence process now 
uncertain, confidence in the sustainability o f exchange rate stability took a severe blow. 
Countries where the hard ERM had concealed growing underlying fundamental problems, 
were the first to come under increasing speculative pressure towards autumn 1992. This was 
clearly the case for Italy, Spain and Portugal, with some indications also for Britain. High 
budget deficits and the legacy o f high inflation made the pegs o f these countries look 
overvalued, indicated in Britain by high current account deficits and deteriorating terms of 
trade (Charts 2.3; 2.4; 2.5; 2.6).
Chart 2.3: France, Germany, UK, USA: General government fiscal deficit
(1990-1994, annual, as % of GDP)
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook 66, Dec 1999 (Statistical Annex, Table 30)
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Chart 2.4: France, Germany, UK: Consumer price inflation
(monthly, percentages, 01/1991 -01/1994)
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (64x), CD-ROM
Chart 2.5: France, Germany, UK, Italy: Current account
(1991 -  1993, quarterly figures, annualised, as percentage o f GDP)
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Chart 2.6: France, Germany, UK, Italy: Real effective exchange rate
(1990/Q1 - 1993/Q4, quarterly, 1990/Q1 = 100)
—  France 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (99), CD-ROM
The need to shadow rising German interest rates (Chart 2.2), with the consequence of 
excessive disinflation, made even countries like France, with ‘sound’ economic 
fundamentals, vulnerable to speculative pressure. Growth and employment costs were 
particularly high for France and substantial for Britain (Chart 2.7 and 2.8). Both countries 
faced the additional problems of having financial sectors specifically vulnerable to excessive 
monetary tightness. In addition, Britain was particularly exposed to the US dollar 
depreciating against the ERM, given that it had the highest dependence on exports to the US 
of all the EMS member states.25 It was in this context, in September 1992, that financial 
markets received the news that George Soros had taken large speculative positions against 
sterling.
25 See Eurostat (1999). Table 2.4 gives figures for Britain, France, and Germany.
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Chart 2.7: France, Germany, UK, USA: GDP
(1991 -  1994, quarterly, percentage change on corresponding period o f previous year*)
5% . H  ........... .  — g — — — — — —
-3%
1991 1991 1991 1991 1992 1992 1992 1992 1993 1993 1993 1993 1994 1994 1994 1994
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
♦figures for the united Germany only from Q1 1992 onwards. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (60b), CD-ROM
Chart 2.8: France, Germany, UK: Unemployment
(as % of total labour force, monthly: Jan 1989 -Dec. 1994)*
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Source: OECD Statistical Compendium, ed. 01/1999, CD-ROM.
♦Germany: as % o f civil labour force. Data for unified Germany only available from 1992 onwards.
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Table 2.3:
Britain, France, Germany: Share of exports directed to the USA
Exports to US as percentage of total Exports to EU-15 as percentage of total
___________ exports_______________________________ exports_____________
Britain
1992 11.6 59.8
1993 12.8 56.8
France
1992 6.2 65.3
1993 7.0 60.0
Germany
1992 6.4 63.3
1993 7.4 58.5
Merchandise Exports. 
Source: Eurostat (1999)
Against this background the speculative pressure resulted in the “first” ERM crisis of autumn 
1992, triggered by the rejection of the Maastricht treaty in the Danish referendum of 2 June. 
Attempts towards a cooperative solution of the subsequent tensions by EC officials and 
national policymakers at the Bath meeting, which attempted to achieve Bundesbank 
monetary easing in return for realignments against the D-mark, failed. Afterwards, national 
interest rate hikes and massive intervention supported by the German Bundesbank were 
insufficient to contain mounting speculative pressure. First, the pound sterling and the Italian 
lira were floated on 16 and 17 September, then the devaluation of the Spanish peseta and 
Portuguese escudo followed on 22 November. Outside the ERM the speculation led to the 
collapse of both the unilateral D-mark pegs of the Swedish and Norwegian krone in 
November and December, despite determined interest rate increases by the monetary 
authorities. Only the French franc was able to maintain the peg in the face of huge selling 
pressure, due to exceptionally large-scale coordinated intervention by both the Bundesbank 
and the Banque de France, and French official interest rate hikes (Chart 2.2).
The crisis flared up again in the winter of 1992/93, when it became clear that the Bundesbank 
would for the time being not relieve tensions in the ERM by significant monetary easing. The 
Irish punt had to be devalued in January 1993, and again the French franc could only survive
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through coordinated support by the German and French monetary authorities. From February 
1993 onwards relative calm began to return to the system, after the Bundesbank had finally 
embarked on a process of gradually easing its monetary policy stance (Chart 2.2). The 
“Iberian Currency Crisis” of May 1993, forcing a second devaluation of the peseta and the 
escudo, remained confined to these two countries.
Ironically the return to a degree of systemic stability seems to have been due to an erosion of 
the credibility o f the ERM’s anchor currency, the D-mark, in the first half of 1993, as a 
response to possible stagflation, excessive deficit spending and inflationary wage increases in 
Germany (Charts 2.3; 2.4; 2.9).
Chart 2.9: France, West Germany, UK: Wage increases
(Quarterly: Ql/1991- Ql/1995; Index, Ql/1991 = 100)
France
West Germany
France and W.-Germany: Earnings; Manufacturing (Hourly) 
United Kingdom: Earnings; Manufacturing (Weekly)
Source: OECD, Statistical Compendium, ed. 01/1999, CD-ROM
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Comments by George Soros in June 1993 highlighted these problems. Pressure on the D- 
mark resulted in a period of recovery for the French franc which was seen in financial 
markets as a potential alternative to the D-mark anchor. But these impressions were shattered 
by the clash between the French government and the Bundesbank in June 1993 over the 
challenge of French policymakers of German monetary leadership. It indicated not only that 
Bundesbank monetary policy was still excessively tight for France, burdened by continuously 
rising unemployment (Chart 2.8), but also that Germany was increasingly unwilling to adjust 
its policy in support of the franc. The subsequent speculative attacks of summer 1993, 
concentrating this time on the French franc and to some extent on the Danish krone, were of 
such scale that European central bank governors and finance ministers finally conceded to 
market pressure by widening the ERM band to +/-15 percent during the last weekend of July 
1993. The de facto termination the ERM as a system of pegged exchange rates was 
successful since the incentives for speculative bets against fixed parities were greatly 
reduced. With calm in the system restored, France managed to maintain the old parity against 
the D-mark from December 1993 until the start of monetary union in 1999, confounding the 
expectations of devaluation in foreign exchange markets.
2.4.2. Market Rationality and Domestic Structures in the Analysis of the ERM Crisis
The basis for most academic analyses of the ERM crisis is its “official” account by the IMF,
the BIS and the EC.26 These accounts explain the crisis as a result of a combination of 
international and domestic factors, without any deeper analysis of the structural reasons why 
these factors differed from country to country. Firstly, systemic explanations dominate the 
analyses, from Bundesbank monetary policy and the US recession, via the ‘Nordic currency 
crisis’ to the deteriorating prospects for EMU after the Danish referendum (e.g. BIS 1993). 
Secondly, when it comes to domestic factors undermining currency credibility, economic
26 For a systematic summary overview of ERM crisis explanations see Table 2.3.
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fundamentals explanations dominate in the analyses of the September 1992 crisis, with the 
tensions and crisis in 1993 explained by growing economic and social sacrifices in defence of 
the peg. The official reports concluded here that although interest rate increases have proved 
to be the most effective instrument to defend the exchange rate in an environment of high 
capital mobility, their effectiveness ultimately depending on market assessment of whether 
the authorities are willing and politically able to maintain higher rates as long as is necessary 
to check the pressure on the currency (Group of Ten 1993:34). In the words of the BIS:
“Even where the ‘fundamentals’ are deemed to be sound, as in the latest episode in Europe, the underlying 
monetary policy changes implicitly required to hold a fixed exchange rate can quickly come to be seen as “non- 
credible” -  especially where unemployment is very high” (BIS 1994: 169).
A partial departure from the general lack of structural analysis is provided by the IMF which 
discusses structural problems in the financial sector in France and Britain (Goldstein et al.
1993).27 Following the rational market assumption, the authors maintain that the credibility of 
fixed exchange rates depends on whether “ .. .markets perceive the costs of that action as being 
so high as to raise doubts that the authorities will both be willing and able to sustain them” 
(15).
O f great importance here are what the Fund study terms “side effects”, resulting from the 
individual counties’ financial structures. In France the financial structure supported 
sustainability. Commercial lending could be insulated from an interest increase to squeeze 
speculators, because co-operation within the banking system allowed the charging of 
different interest rates to different classes of borrowers. In contrast, in Britain excessive debt 
levels in the household and corporate sector became unmanageable because of a “financial 
market structure under which any rise in the Bank of England’s minimum dealing rate spread 
relatively quickly to the whole yield curve, including to retail markets and mortgage
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markets.’ (Goldstein et al. 1993: 16). The weakness of this analysis is that, although it gives 
some indication as to why Britain was structurally more vulnerable to speculative attack than 
France, it fails to investigate whether this difference had an influence on market sentiment 
towards sterling and the franc.
The neglect of domestic structures in the official accounts might explain why these accounts 
are weak as regards to their analysis of why even Germany finally came under scrutiny in 
financial markets in 1993, whereas the credibility of the Dutch guilder, the Belgian franc and 
even the Austrian schilling with its unilateral peg to the D-mark, remained largely intact. The 
IMF explains this simply with the ‘firm and long-standing commitment to a fixed parity vis- 
a-vis Germany’ of the Dutch, Belgium and Austrian authorities (Goldstein et al. 1993:31). 
But such a commitment alone is not enough to convince markets, as was demonstrated by the 
French case.
Markets are portrayed in the official crisis explanations very much as rational actors. They 
essentially form rational expectations of the economic and political sustainability of the 
commitment by governments to defend the exchange rate: competitiveness problems are seen 
as having combined with a deteriorating trade-off between the sacrifices of maintaining the 
ERM peg and exchange rate stability. The systemic shock of Bundesbank tightening 
dominates the explanation as to why this trade-off deteriorated, taking priority over country 
specific factors. Markets are ultimately interpreted as imposing reason on government by 
challenging economically or politically unsustainable pegs. But, as the IMF asserts, market 
rationality was not always consistently exercised:
27 The discussion of has been expanded in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (IMF 1998), to include the 
coincidence of currency and banking crises in emerging markets in the 1990s.
74
“The discipline exerted by capital markets is neither infallible nor is it always applied smoothly and 
consistently. Nevertheless, the markets eventually decide on what are unsustainable situations, and when they 
do, their size alone increasingly allows them to force adjustments.” (Goldstein et al. 1993: 22)
Questions concerning the extent of market rationality arose in particular because of the
‘excess credibility* of the ‘hard ERJVT enjoyed in the markets between 1997 and 1992. The
IMF points out that markets pushed aside competitiveness problems in some countries by
betting on what has become know as the ‘convergence play’: higher interest rates in countries
with weak fundamentals due to high inflation were interpreted not as indicating devaluation
risk, but as aiming at improving fundamentals by bringing inflation into line with Germany.
The markets are seen to have taken the view that convergence would reduce the exchange
rate risk over time, ignoring the direct social and political costs of tight monetary policy.
Investors shifted leveraged investment from low yield to high yield countries, with
devastating effects once the view was reversed in autumn 1992 (Goldstein et al. 1993: 8-10).
Davis (1995), drawing on the IMF analysis, takes the convergence play as an illustration that
institutional investors can behave in an inefficient, destabilising fashion. Aside from the
‘convergence play* the aspect of how rational actual market behaved was not investigated
further.
The ERM crisis has been analysed in great depth by economists and political scientists drawing 
on the earlier accounts by international financial institutions. Following the argument in these 
accounts, the studies focus predominantly on the systemic dimension of the crisis. Domestic 
factors to explain differences in market sentiment towards individual member states are 
investigated in greater detail only by applied economists. The systemic bias in IPE points at its 
general weakness with regard to domestic factors. So far the domestic structures approach in 
comparative political science has not come forward with an analysis of the crisis.
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Table 2.4:
Explanations of the ERM Crisis
Causes G F UK I SP p DK NL B IR
High interest rates 
/unemployment (credibility 
problem)
X1 X X (X) X X (X)
Nordic currency crisis X X X
Danish referendum shock X X X
Competitiveness problems 
(misalignment before 
crisis)
(X) X X X
Budget deficits/govt, debt X* (X) X X (X) (X) X
Inflation X' X X X
Contagion (competitiveness 
Problems because of crisis) X X
German unification shock
All countries affected
$ weakness
Removal of capital controls 
(capital mobility)
Lack of co-ordination 
(no orderly realignment)
Excess market credibility 
(ERM stability assumption)
Political stability 
commitment
(Maastricht; ERM rigidity)
G = Germany; F = France; UK = Britain; I = Italy; SP = Spain; P = Portugal; DK = Denmark; 
NL = Netherlands; B = Belgium; IR = Ireland.
Parentheses indicate comparatively minor problems.
'High interest rates, deficits, and inflation in Germany are interpreted as cause for system wide tensions in the 
ERM, not as posing a credibility problem for the D-mark.
Typical examples of the systemic approach of IPE are the studies by Andrews (1994b, 1995). 
He interprets the asymmetry in the ERM as a constraint imposed by financial markets on EC 
countries in order to stabilise against the D-mark. As a consequence he explains the crisis as 
reinforcement of German hegemony by the structural power of markets. Other studies 
focusing on the role of Germany see the crisis as a case of the key currency problem in 
pegged exchange rate systems (Bush 1994; Kenen 1995). This view is reflected in general 
IPE accounts of the crisis, like Tsoukalis (1997). An exception is Dyson (1994), who takes a 
two-level international-domestic approach, but focuses on domestic and international policy 
processes rather then structures. His institutional analysis remains by and large confined to 
the EC level.
76
Explanations by economists present a more differentiating picture. 28 Country specific 
political and economic developments are widely discussed, but not to the level of the 
different domestic institutional conditions shaping these developments. Furthermore, a 
detailed discussion of market rationality is missing, including the influence of domestic 
structural variables. Generally, broad assumptions of markets acting rationally in response to 
either escalating fundamental problems or the emergence of multiple equilibria in the 
governments loss function seem to underlie most analyses. In the words of Vaciago:
“Markets' assessments incorporate two perspectives: the past, with reference to the cumulative loss of 
competitiveness up to the present, and the future, with reference to the sustainability of the authorities' response.” 
(Vaciago 1993: 22, emphasis in the original)
The first-generation fundamentals model is reflected in the 'competitiveness approach', 
explaining the crisis as caused by exchange rate misalignments resulting from past national 
policies. There is widespread consensus that competitiveness problems were a main cause for 
the “first” ERM crisis affecting mainly Italy, Britain, Spain and Portugal.29 The fundamentals- 
competitiveness approach is supplemented by contagion-based explanations. They describe 
Spain’s and Portugal's already fundamentally weak competitiveness as further weakened by the 
improvement of their terms of trade after the Italian and British depreciations. This trade-related 
contagion is seen as having also affected originally 'sound' countries like France and Ireland.
The second generation model provides the background for the 'expected policy change model', 
as well as for the 'contingent policy change model', which are generally taken as better
281 use in the following review of crises explanations the classifications suggested in the excellent discussion of 
ERM crisis explanations by David Cobham, building on the first and second generation crisis models (1996). A 
good overview of the crisis and its explanations is also given by Kenen (1995), Buiter et al. (1998), and Gros and 
Thygesen (1998).
29 The competitiveness approach basically states that the ERM as a mechanism of “borrowed credibility” found 
its limits in diverging fundamentals (see Tsoukalis 1997). Representatives of this view on the 'first1 crisis phase are 
Pons (1993); Steinherr (1994); De Grauwe (1995); Otker and Pazarbasioglu (1997); as well as Bacchetta (1994) for 
Spain; Micossi and Padoan (1994), and Fratianni and Artis (1996) for Italy. Johnson (1994) makes the
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explanations for the 'second' attack in summer 1993 on currencies with “sound fundamentals”, 
i.e. the French franc and the Danish krone (Pons 1993; Cobham 1996,1997; Eichengreen 2000). 
But the two variations have also been applied to the sterling crisis in September 1992, as the 
case of fundamentals weakness for Britain is contested, and the autumn 1992 and winter 1993 
attacks on the French franc. The “expected policy change model” emphasises the German 
interest rate shock: markets expected the governments, especially in France, to break their 
commitment not to devalue because of the rising unemployment caused by German-imposed 
excessive disinflation.30 Buiter et al. specifically make the point that because hopes for fiscal 
restraint by the German government did not materialise, the Bundesbank, against expectations, 
continued its tight monetary policy into 1992/93, “regardless of the consequences for the 
domestic real economy and with utter disregard for the international implications of its policies” 
(1998:41).
The “contingent policy change model”, in contrast to the expected policy change version of the 
second generation model, can be seen as a representation of the multiple equilibria version of the 
self-fulfilling speculative attack scenario. It puts great emphasis on the Danish referendum as the 
event which shifted the political loss function of all governments to a new equilibrium by 
weakening their exchange rate commitments (Eichengreen & Wyplosz 1993; Eichengreen 
2000). Country-specific conditions are brought in to explain which countries were first and most 
exposed to speculative pressure. As Eichengreen explains, markets picked Britain and France as 
countries in which interest increases were least tolerable, due to high unemployment, large 
amounts of short-term debt and indexed mortgage rates, and, in a rare reference to domestic 
institutions, weak banking systems (2000:25). In addition, the credibility of their exchange rates
competitiveness problems case for Britain by asserting that the government entered the ERM in 1990 at an 
overvalued parity.
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was undermined in the case of Britain by a back-bench rebellion within the ruling party and in 
the case of France by parliamentary elections.31
Complementing the second generation explanation for the case of Britain and France is the 
“inconsistent policy view”. According to this view inconsistencies in national monetary 
policies increased uncertainty in financial markets by signalling the vulnerability of the 
government’s position, encouraging a speculative attack. The view refers to the hazardous 
undertaking by authorities in Britain in 1992 (Cobham 1997) and in France in 1993 (Melitz
1994) to signal to the markets their desperate need for lower interest rates and at the same 
time to restate their pledge to defend the currency. French politicians attempted to argue from 
a position of strength in demanding concerted interest rate cuts by pointing at German twin 
deficits and its own strong nominal fundamentals, but were seen by the foreign exchange 
markets as only demonstrating their growing nervousness about the political sustainability of 
rising unemployment.
None of the crisis explanations expands into analysing the erosive effect of domestic 
problems in Germany on the credibility of the D-mark, especially in spring -  early summer 
1993, before the triumph of the Bundesbank in July. This is not only because the D-mark was 
ultimately backed as ERM-anchor by the markets, but also because Germany’s problems as 
the key currency country were exclusively home made, and could thus not be captured by the 
strongly systemic explanations of the crisis.
30 This view prevails in the analyses of Branson (1994); Ozkan and Sutherland (1994); and Krugman (1996); 
and Buiter et al. (1998). Explanations of this type have been put forward for Britain by Masson (1995), and for 
France by Moutot (1994), De Boissieu (1994), Ozkan &Sutherland (1994), and Salvatore (1996).
31 In addition the contingent policy model points out market endogenous contagion (Eichengreen and Rose 
1998). The crisis spread in this view because markets, after their original 'success' against lira and sterling, 
attacked countries, which were also considered to be vulnerable, like Spain or France.
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Overall the ERM crisis literature gives the impression that markets by and large acted 
rationally, without the need to take institutional factors into account. A rare challenge to this 
view has been put forward by Moutot in his interpretation of the 1992 attack on the French 
franc, linking the question of rationality to the issue of the influence of domestic institutions:
“[I]t has become clear that even currencies with very sound fundamentals can come under attack whenever doubts 
about the ability of authorities to maintain the course of their policies develop. These doubts, even when groundless 
or based on debatable evidence, may spread rapidly because expectations on foreign exchange markets are unstable, 
autocorrelated, very sensitive to endogenous dynamics and sometimes biased by the gains made by major market 
participants as a result of higher volatility. They are also heavily influenced by political and institutional 
developments like referenda and must be envisaged in a context encompassing more variables than the most 
traditional macroeconomic variables. In particular, the opinion that markets have on sustainability and time 
consistency of economic policies play a central role.” (Moutot 1994:42)
These comments suggest not only that domestic institutions are of importance for the 
formation of market opinion on time consistency, but also that the way market sentiment 
takes account of these and other variables can be inconsistent and unstable. Unfortunately 
Moutot does not follow these suggestions up with a detailed analysis o f the formation of 
market sentiment for the French case.
The only detailed survey of actual market sentiment which can be found in the ERM crisis 
literature, the February 1993 survey of foreign exchange traders undertaken by Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz (1993:95-99), fails to address the influence of domestic factors on market views 
of time consistency. It focuses instead exclusively on the systemic stresses emanating from 
Bundesbank policies and country specific economic fundamentals problems.32 The survey is 
more informative as regards the question of market rationality. Market participants gave the 
Danish referendum as the event which triggered a change in market perceptions about the 
stability of ERM exchange rates (46.6 %), suggesting that markets where rational speculators, 
realizing the option of self-fulfilling speculative attacks. The rational character of speculation
32 Over 60 percent financial market participants gave as reason for the crisis that a defence of ERM pegs had 
become difficult in the face of German monetary policy. Weak country specific fundamentals, indicated by high 
inflation, was seen as a very important cause for the crisis for Italy (27.8%), Span (21.8%), and to some extent 
the UK (15%).
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is put into doubt by 76.7 percent of dealers who agreed that after the successful attacks of 
September 1992 the crisis proliferated because “markets ‘tasted blood* (realized that there 
were profits to be made)” (Eichengreen &Wyplosz 1993:99, Table 7).
2 .5 . Conclusion
Overall, the crisis literature presents a picture in which economic accounts fail to pay 
sufficient attention to domestic institutional factors and rationalist institutional accounts fail 
to question rational expectations assumptions on the decision-making in financial markets. 
Both accounts fail to analyse the actual role of domestic institutions in the formation of 
market sentiment. The weakness of the approach of applied economics is reflected in the two 
crisis models that inform the analysis of the ERM crisis, which neglect domestic structures. 
The weakness of rationalist institutionalism is that its underlying rational choice assumptions 
have resulted in studies which reduce the investigation of market sentiment to correlating 
domestic factors with economic indicators for investor decisions, thus avoiding an 
investigation of market practice. This reinforces idealised notions o f full market rationality 
towards domestic institutions.
What is needed to remedy the shortcomings of both approaches is a disaggregate, in-depth 
study of a historical case, taking an intermediate process oriented look at the formation of 
market sentiment with specific focus on domestic institutions and rational behaviour by 
market participants. The next chapter will explain the theoretical-methodological framework 
for such a study of the ERM crisis, building on the theory of “bounded rationality*’.
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Chapter 3:
Theory and Method
3.1. Introduction
The previous chapter has established that rationalist institutionalism is correct in 
assuming that financial markets, conceptualised as rational actors, should pay 
systematic attention to domestic institutions, since they influence the sustainability of 
monetary policy commitments. It has also established that rationalist institutionalism 
is idealistic in its assumptions about market rationality, and weak when it comes to 
establish whether financial market rationality is in practice comprehensive enough to 
include domestic institutions. Thus, the chapter has concluded that a detailed 
empirical study is necessary of how market participants de facto take account of 
domestic institutions, taking currency crises to analyse market sentiment. Such a 
study should be conceptualised as an attempt to refine out understanding of the 
behaviour of investors by investigating the possibility that market participants’ 
rationality is in practice limited or “bounded”. Empirically, this necessitates an 
“intermediate view of investor behaviour” through a detailed, process orientated, 
contextual study of a historical episode of currency crises.
The following chapter will develop the theoretical-methodological framework for a 
detailed case study of investor behaviour during the 1992/93 ERM crisis. The 
research design will be derived from a critical discussion of the concept of rationality 
in rationalist institutionalism. This discussion will establish that the rationality 
assumptions of classical rational choice impose limits as to the theory’s ability to 
explain the complex reality of decision making by financial market participants in the 
process of trading. Since “the central role of empirics involves the isomorphism
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between analytical and modelling assumptions and the underlying reality to be 
assessed” (Stein 1999: 208), the empirical study has to be designed to bring greater 
realism into the narrow assumptions of rationalist institutionalism. This will be done 
by building on “bounded rationality” theory. I will arrive at a qualitative research 
design, using cross-section content analysis for controlled comparison of the 
evolution of market sentiment towards pound sterling, the French franc and the D- 
mark during 22 months of ERM crisis.
Following this introduction, the chapter will, in the second section, expand on 
bounded rationality as a good theory to inform my research design. Section three will 
introduce qualitative controlled comparison as a methodology suited to investigate the 
bounded nature of market rationality, since it allows reconstructing the actual process 
of decision making in financial markets in a systematic fashion. It will explain why I 
choose country cases in the ERM crisis as units for structured and focused 
comparison. Section four will then expand on classical content analysis, aided by 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), as my method to 
investigate a representative sample of contemporary market reports. Section five will 
conclude.
3.2. “Bounded Rationality”: An Approach to Refine Rationalist
Institutionalism
My study will clarify the concrete conditions of market rationality, i.e. the question of 
the how and when, the circumstances and the extent of rational institutional analysis 
by financial market participants. It attempts to refine the assumptions of rationalist 
institutionalism about market behaviour by bringing in bounded rationality, a concept
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central to behavioural economics.1 By doing so I can stay within the broad scientific 
parameters of positivist political economy without having to accept the narrow 
theoretical and methodological restrictions suggested by game theoretical strategic 
choice. Bounded rationality criticises the strategic choice paradigm underlying 
rationalist institutionalism by pointing out that its theoretical and methodological 
strength comes at the price of unrealistic simplifications (Simon 1982a, 1982b). The 
critique is best understood against a brief review of the key features of rationalist 
institutionalism.
Rationalist institutionalism has two distinguishing features. First the clear and 
unambiguous conceptualisation of institutions as structures shaping action, making it 
particularly suited for systematic comparative empirical analysis on the effect of 
clearly delineated institutional designs on actor’s decisions. It defines institutions as 
durable structures constraining actors by imposing parameters for what actions are 
possible. “Institutions are sets of rules (and sanctions) that structure social interactions 
and whose existence and applicability are commonly known within the relevant 
community” (Levi 1997: 325). Rationalist institutionalism shares this relational 
definition with historical and sociological approaches.4 It is distinguished by the 
assumption of methodological individualism: it is through institutions that diverse 
individual preferences are aggregated into matrixes of sanctions and incentives,
1 The concepts of “bounded rationality” have been developed in the seminal work of Herbert A. Simon 
(1982a; 1982b; 1997). For a good review see Odell (2002: 3-7).
2 For a good overview, see Levi 1997: 24-27.
3 A similar definition is given by Milner (1997:18).
4 For an overview of different approaches to institutions in comparative political science from different 
paradigms, see Lichbach & Zuckerman (1997).
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structuring choices or outcomes for the collective (Stein 1999).5 A classic example is 
the central bank and its status in the political system.
Secondly rationalist institutionalism uses rational choice theory to model actor 
behaviour (Milner 1997; Milner 1998). This does not mean that rationalist 
institutionalism stipulates that all possible actors affected by domestic institutional 
structures will behave in this way. It is only if rigorous empirical testing of a rational 
choice model of decision making against the actual results of decision making 
produces significant results that rationalist institutionalism implies rational choice 
behaviour.
Rational choice models are based on a clear set of demanding assumptions about how 
human decision making operates. It is assumed that actors have coherent stable 
preferences. They will then compute alternatives available to find which will be 
optimal to maximise their utility.6 In the case of financial markets international 
investors will attempt to optimise profitability by rationally weighing the risks and 
returns of assets denominated in alternative currencies against each other.
Furthermore actors are assumed to act strategically, being aware o f the strategic 
interaction between different interest groups, and alternative bargaining outcomes 
(Milner 1998: 776-7). Financial market participants are for instance assumed not only
5 Hence rationalist institutionalism represents a version of ‘new institutionalism’ in economics (North 
1981, 1990; Williamson 1985), although it focuses more on the politics rather then the economics of 
institutions.
6 Milner (1997) distinguishes between fundamental interests and preferences, which will vary 
according to the political and institutional situation. Nevertheless, within a given institutional and 
political setting preferences are then assumed to be stable.
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to anticipate government policy in the light of the actions of other economic agents 
such as labour unions:
“In the strategic model considered ... we would expect capital outflows when there are signs that 
market distortions may undermine the government’s production or employment objectives. One 
measure of impending distortion is increased strike activity.” (Simmons 1994: 63)
Methodologically the rational choice framework does allow for scientific and 
parsimonious operationalisation of its assumptions through deductive and 
comparative analysis. Hypotheses derived from rationalist assumptions about actors 
can be scientifically tested against empirical observations along the lines of natural 
and medical science. Institutions (together with interests and ideas) are defined as key 
independent variables for causal inference, controlling for other independent or 
intermediate variables. The testing of theory by comparative case studies generates 
falsifiable results on what is general in the causation of specific events, to arrive at 
general knowledge.7 By studying systemic patterns in similar parallel events, as in the 
study of differences in market sentiment towards national currencies embroiled in 
regional currency crisis, it is possible to systematically investigate the consequences 
of alternative institutional arrangements, avoiding the post hoc quality of some 
institutional research (Milner 1998: 781-2). Strategic choices of financial market 
participants between different currencies can be investigated for the influence on 
credibility of institutional features linked to sustainability, resulting in general 
conclusions on what constitutes institutional efficiency.
In line with the demands of scientific inference, rationalist studies on the effect of 
domestic institutions on market sentiment ideally use a statistical-correlative
7 King et al. (1994), who offer a good introduction into rationalist research design.
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approach, depending on the availability of statistically significant sets of observations. 
These observations are normally easily attainable for market sentiment, but harder to
o m
come by for domestic institutions. If a sufficient number of observations is not 
possible due to a small set of countries available for comparison, second best less 
rigorous designs often involve some form of formalised presentation of evidence on 
institutional developments or typology derived from country-specific narratives, plus 
descriptive statistics, which can then be related to the development of significant 
market indicators over limited time periods.9
The critique of these rational choice assumptions put forward by bounded rationality 
is essentially that the strength of the rationalist comparative research framework 
comes at the price of weaknesses in its ability to capture the reality of the issue 
investigated. Proponents of bounded rationality point out that the rigor and the 
internal consistency of strategic choice modelling requires excessive simplifications 
and unrealistic assumptions. By approaching the complex reality of decision making 
from rigorous abstract modelling, rationalist institutionalism risks incomplete,
8 This approach usually operates with OLS regressions in sectoral cross-time series analysis. Examples 
are Simmons (1994), who compares the effect of domestic institutions of 13 countries between 1923 
and 1939 on capital flows, Leblang and Bernhard (2000), who investigate how national political 
structures and processes in 15 OECD countries over 25 years affect ‘speculative pressure, measured by 
exchange -, interest rate- and reserve changes, and Mosley (2000), who evaluates the effect of 
government policies on market sentiment for 15 developed countries from 1981 to 1995, gauging 
market sentiment by long-term interest rates. A combination of the use formalized presentation of 
qualitative evidence, and the use of descriptive statistics and correlations is Geoffrey Garrett’s study of 
fourteen industrialised democracies in the period from 1966 to 1990, investigating the effect of 
globalisation on national autonomy and the viability of distinct national economic regimes (Garrett 
1998).
9 Examples are here the investigations of Haggard & Maxfied (1996), devising a coding scheme to 
compare financial openness in a small number of developing countries from 1970-90, and of MacIntyre 
(2001) of the politics of the Asian financial crisis, using ’’thumbnail sketches” of national institutional 
frameworks.
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unrealistic or indeterminate explanations and post hoccery (Ward 1995; Stein 1999; 
Odell 2002).10
The gist of this critique is that it is based on heroic assumptions about the nature and 
capabilities of human choice and that decontextualised result-focused rational choice 
ignores decision making processes. As Simon (1982b: 103/4) puts it in his discussion 
of rational choice:
“If we examine closely the ‘classical’ concepts of rationality, we see immediately what severe demands 
they make upon the choosing organism. ... My first empirical proposition is that there is a complete 
lack of evidence that, in actual human choice situations of any complexity, these computations can be, 
or are in fact, performed. ...In the absence of evidence that the classical concepts do describe the 
decision-making process, it seems reasonable to examine the possibility that the actual process is quite 
different from the ones the rules describe.”
The argument that decisions have to be looked at in the specific context of the 
circumstances in which they are made has been put forward not only by bounded 
rationality theorists, but also by radical historical and constructivist views. These 
views emphasise the historical path dependency of institutions to explain their 
culturally contingent patterns of meaning.11 As Radice (2000) admits, the problem is 
to reach general conclusions, since cultural-historical approaches conceptualise 
institutions as being contingent in time and space. Bounded rationality in contrast 
takes a functional approach to the meaning of institutions for actors that can be found 
in new institutional economics (Simon 1997: 281-2).12 This allows bounded 
rationality to accept the need for systematic rigour typical for rational choice,
10 Criticism of the rational choice paradigm has been particular strong from the structuralist camp (e.g. 
Ellen M. Wood 1989). For a good empirical critique of rational choice, see Green & Shapiro (1994).
11 For the difference of these approaches to the rationalist approach see Hall (1997:190). A good review 
of the contextual-historical approach to institutions in comparative study can be found in Radice 
(2000). For the constructivist approach, see Ruggie (1998).
12 So does mainstream sociological comparative institutional analysis investigating the influence of 
domestic regimes on economic policy outcomes. It has adopted systematic classification of institutions 
in functional terms to structure a comparison of complex historically grounded institutional regime 
types. Key examples in the area of finance are Zysman (1983); Hall (1986); Goodman (1992); Henning 
(1994); and Walsh (2000).
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preserving critical preconditions for a parsimonious research design (Odell 2002: 23- 
28). Bounded rationality differs from maximising rationality concepts in economics in 
so far as it maintains that expectations of institutional arrangements are not reached 
by optimising risk analysis of all available information, but by qualitative arguments 
about what is analysis is ‘functional’ to undertake in specific complex circumstances, 
in response to present uncertainty and characterised by practical capacity constraints 
in decision making processes (Simon 1997: 282).
Rational choice is criticised for starting from heroic assumptions about the rationality 
of the “economic man” (Simon 1982a, 1982b, 1997). Decisions cannot be made in a 
maximising fashion, given limited information, search costs and cognitive limitations 
to compute optima (Odell 2002:4-6).13 Optimising evaluation of alternatives is seen 
as particularly difficult if  decision makers are faced with the complexity of highly 
structured social settings typical for domestic institutional arrangements. As Stein 
points out, attempts to integrate complex social settings, sequential choice and 
incomplete information into strategic choice modelling quickly reach the limits of 
mathematical tractability, resulting in multiple equilibria and indeterminacy 
(1999:218).14
Bounded rationality emphasises the analysis of practical decision making processes to 
understand how actors cope with information, which is paradoxically abundant
13 Stein points here especially at the limitations of optimising behaviour by social actors when it comes 
to assessing political structures, describing them as “crippled rationalist” (1999:216).
14 This indeterminacy is demonstrated by the ultimately inconclusive and sometimes contradictory 
perditions and findings of rationalist institutionalists on the effect of different national structures on the 
sustainability of exchange rate commitments (See Chapter 4). The game theoretical assumption that 
situations of incomplete information can be handled by full rational choice, with decision makers 
acting Bayesian rational through persistent and systematic updating of limited information, runs into 
the same deliberation cost and capacity limits pointed out by bounded rationality for complex full 
information. (See Stein 1999: 214,fn.51).
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beyond computational capacity but also incomplete. In practice, “ ...the entire 
mechanism of decision is molded by information-processing considerations” (Simon 
1982a: 237). Instead of attempting to optimise between all possible alternatives, 
actors will, in Simon’s terminology, “satisfice”: they will economise on their decision 
making by stopping the process of assessment at a practically acceptable solution with 
an outcome that is good enough, rather than optimal:
“Decision makers usually satisfice, both in the sense of failing to examine all of the information that is 
available, and in the sense of choosing an alternative as soon as one has been found that is satisfactory 
along all dimensions of concern.” (Simon 1997: 286)
Simon’s distinction that satisficing rationality is procedural, whereas maximising 
rationality is substantive, is of critical importance. Furthermore, decision makers in 
reality will not maintain stable preferences and analytical criteria, but adopt different 
outlooks and emphasise different aspect dependent on changing circumstances (Odell 
2001:12-13).
Satisficing rationality limits search and analysis by considering systematically only a 
“subset” of all available information, which in practice operates as “information 
surrogate” for complete information (Simon 1982a: 235-244). For example, in the 
daily operation of financial markets it might well be possible that complex in-depth 
information on domestic institutions, like the actual degree o f independence of 
monetary policymakers from political pressure, is difficult to obtain and requires 
sophisticated and knowledgeable interpretation. In such a situation a variable like 
official interest rate decisions can function as a surrogate indicator.
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Bounded rationality along these lines contains elements of systematic and 
unsystematic reasoning. Systematic reasoning within bounded rationality has been 
described by Simon as “approximate rationality”: “it is accomplished by substituting a 
simplified approximate decision model for the complexities of the ‘real world’.” 
(Simon 1982b: 396). It is within these simplified models that certain surrogate 
variables merit systematic analysis.
It is important to point out that these information surrogates can be proper or improper 
representations of full information, since they are not derived from a systematic 
analysis of full information. As Simon pointed out, the fundamental reason why there 
are surrogates is that they reduce the amount of information required (1982a: 240). 
Information surrogates are thus stochastic from a full rational choice point of view. 
Whether they are a proper subset of full information will ultimately only be known 
from proof. Practitioners will add to their approximate models in an ad hoc fashion, 
through what Simons describes as “adaptive rationality” operating via “stochastic 
learning”:
“The subject is adaptive -  or learns -  but not necessarily in any optimal fashion. We mean, gradually 
and on the basis of experience responding more frequently with the choice that, in the past, has been 
most frequently rewarded.” (1982b: 305)
Complex variables, like domestic institutions, can come directly into play, if  existing 
systematic approximation does not satisfice, and experience suggests that more 
complex information should be taken into account. But these complex variables are 
not systematically integrated into models of approximation, since this would pose the 
well known computational problems of full rational evaluation of institutional risk. 
Or, as Simon put it, “the principal usefulness [of adjustments in expectations in 
bounded rationality] lies in the fact that they remove the necessity for such
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evaluations” (Simon 1982b: 399). What information about complex variables to take 
into account is in this practical vein of reasoning a mere question of “opportunity 
costs”, that is search costs relative to the aspiration to find more satisficing answers, 
and not of rigorous analysis (see Simon 1982 a: 393-5). Consequently, complex 
variables like institutional structures will only be taken into account in a bounded 
rational way. In the words of Simon:
“Rationality can be bounded by assuming complexity in the cost function or other environmental 
constraints so great as to prevent the actor from calculating the best course of action.” (Simon 1982b: 
411)
Given that a systematic analysis of complex variables like domestic institutions is 
impractical, bounded rationality uses “mental shortcuts”, like readily available 
conventions, past experience or views by other decision makers, to form opinions 
about these variables (Odell 2002). As Simon points out, the real work in 
conventional behaviour is done by “ad hoc auxiliary assumptions”, which is different 
from inferring behaviour suggested by rational choice (Simon 1997: 280). As a 
consequence, changing preferences do not systematically reflect objective changes in 
institutional settings, as suggested by rational institutionalism. They might change for 
subjective reasons, because the issue is presented differently to actors in the public 
domain over time, feedback from the peer group, and changes in the individual’s 
material position. Decision makers, confronted with complex institutional patterns 
and interacting interests, are liable to be influenced by emotions, beliefs, social norms 
and the emulation of other actors. In the view of bounded rationality these 
“bandwagon effects” can be the result of reasonable individual behaviour, if  aggregate 
decisions can be expected to influence outcomes (Simon 1982a: 460-468).
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The conclusions of bounded rationality have been widely adopted by authors 
associated with behavioural economics, demanding a more realistic analysis of market 
sentiment, in particular in financial markets. Supporters of bounded rationality have 
pointed out that the “hard-core assumptions” of rational choice following the 
“dictates of mathematical tractability in formal modelling”, typical for rational 
institutionalism, are not suited to a realistic investigation of investor behaviour in 
financial markets (Willett 2000: 8). Bewley warns of the dangers of assuming full 
rationality for market participants, in his case business people involved in wage 
setting processes, “who react to complex and stressful circumstances at work that may 
be unfamiliar to academic economists” (Bewley 1999: 7). In his view the statistical 
testing of models based on narrow instrumentalist assumptions cannot capture these 
conditions. Instead he recommends checking as many aspects as possible o f the 
mechanism to be explained, including the realism of the assumptions” (1999: 10)
Shiller (1989; 1996; 2000) speaks out against a quantitative or empiricist approach, 
characteristic for rational expectations, to investigate the formation of financial 
market sentiment, since such an approach seeks data “as measure of the acts of 
people, not the interpretations they place on these acts.” In his view it is important to 
collect evidence on investor behaviour directly, by observing investors in the actual 
investing environment. He calls instead for a “hermeneutic approach” under the 
banner of “interpretative social sciences”, which allows us to “collect evidence on 
investor behavior directly, by observing investors in the actual investing 
environment” (1989: 435-6).
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This view is supported by Davis (1995), who takes the ERM crisis as a case to point 
out the critical role of institutional investors in the build up of excessive optimism 
during the ‘convergence play’ before the crisis, and the overreaction resulting in 
selling waves once the crisis had started.15 He suggests, like Moseley (2000), that the 
performance pressures under which institutional investors operate result in 
institutional herding and short time horizons affecting information collection. 
Consequently he emphasises the importance of further empirical investigation of the 
behaviour of global portfolio investors and the decision making processes of 
institutions through process tracking, suggesting interview surveys of fund managers 
as a fruitful avenue for future research (1995: 16).
The weakness of studies tracking decision making processes in financial markets 
analysis is that they often focus on endogenous market dynamics. Most extreme is 
behavioural finance theory. Here exogenous variables only come in to influence 
market sentiment as stereotypes, conventions or news events (Shefrin 2000). More 
helpful from a bounded rationality point of view are studies which accept that 
fundamentals analysis plays an important role in the decision making of professional 
investors, but focus on the limits of this analysis resulting from competitive 
performance pressures in fund management and rational herding or feedback loops 
(Davis 1995; Gibson 1996; Shiller 2000). Alas, these studies say little about where 
fundamentals analysis ends, and whether institutional factors play a role. Therefore 
they are of little help for my project, although they point out the need for a qualitative 
study of the actual formation of investor sentiment.
15 ‘Convergence play’ refers to the positions financial markets took in high yield ERM currencies
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3.3. Qualitative “focused structured” Comparison of Britain, France and 
Germany in 1992/93
The problem with direct micro-investigations of market sentiment through the 
reconstruction of actual investor behaviour is, in the words of Bewley, that “the data 
collected are often thought as ‘touchy-feely’ rather than ‘hard’”(1999:13). The task 
for a research design based on qualitative representations by market participants is 
thus to come up with a method that allows for scientific rigour without compromising 
the contextual-procedural dimension offered by an interpretative approach to direct 
market representations.
King et al. (1994) demand that process tracking approaches have to conform with the 
full set of academic rigour of rational choice causal inference: it has to be informed by 
general theory, and has to come to falsifiable conclusions through a systematic 
evaluation of evidence. As a consequence, it makes sense to adopt the preferred 
analytical framework of rationalist institutionalism: comparative institutional analysis. 
Following Milner (1998: 781-2), comparative analysis is especially suited not only for 
rationalist institutionalism, but for any systematic institutional analysis, since it avoids 
the post hoc quality of some institutional research by investigating the consequences 
of alternative institutional arrangements under otherwise broadly similar conditions.
My methodological framework is designed to find causal mechanisms by combining 
inductive process tracking with deductive reasoning derived from my theoretical 
discussion of market rationality towards institutions. This combination should on the 
one hand help to avoid the risk of a too narrow selection of observations, dictated by
before the 1992 crisis, expecting that these countries would improve their economic fundamentals to 
fulfil the Maastricht convergence criteria (See Chapter Two).
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the need to focus on indicators considered a priori as relevant by a specific theory, and 
on the other hand bring in systematic rigor. The research design thus represents a 
compromise between traditional institutional approaches, exploring specific political- 
economic systems and their history, and rationalist institutionalism.16 To reconcile 
inductive interpretation with deductive rigour, the empirical analysis has be to both 
controlled and detailed in the analysis of a historical case.
These aspects can be reconciled by following the research design suggested by 
George under the label “focused, structured comparison” (George 1979). Focused, 
because it allows for the interpretation of observations in their broadest possible 
context by selective concentration on a specific historical case, to come to a realistic 
evaluation of the veracity of a theory; structured, because it employs general 
questions derived from theory to guide data collection and interpretation of this 
historical case. To quote George:
“The investigator who employs the controlled comparison strategy seeks to identify the variety o f  
different causal patterns that can occur for the phenomenon in question. He seeks to identify the 
conditions under which each distinctive type o f causal pattern occurs.” (1979: 60)17
As George (1989: 54-5) explains, a focused, structured research design has firstly to
decide what phenomenon is to be investigated, and what existing theory, bearing on
aspects of the phenomenon, is singled out for refinement. In my case the phenomenon
is market sentiment towards government monetary policy commitments, the theory is
rationalist institutionalism, brought together in my research question of how financial
market sentiment has been influenced by domestic institutions. Secondly, the
independent and dependent variables have to be specified. In my study domestic
institutions are taken as the independent or causal variable and market sentiment
16 On the classic institutional approach in political science see Rhodes (1995).
17 Emphases in the original.
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towards exchange rate commitments by governments as the dependent or outcome 
variable.
Next a “class of events” has to be specified that is suited in so far as it represents 
circumstances that are most favourable to rationalist institutionalism. I choose 
currency crises, since it is during crises that it should most pay investors to explore 
institutions. Finally, ways have to be considered by which variances in the causal 
pattern between independent and dependent variable can best be described to further 
the development of general theory. Here I brought in bounded rationality as a theory 
that would allow a refining of rational choice in taking account of the procedural 
context in decision making. The next step is the choice of a suitable currency crisis 
episode, with “appropriate cases” for controlled comparison, which will be explained 
below. The section following this explanation will then expand on content analysis as 
my method of comparative investigation.
■ Why Britain, France and Germany in the ERM crisis?
The crisis episode chosen has to be appropriate to the issue I investigate, the effect of 
domestic structures on internationally mobile capital in situations of time consistency 
in respect of a currency commitment. This means the crisis episode has to take place 
in a situation distinguished by unrestrained cross-border capital flows, to allow 
international investors to respond to institutional factors unimpeded by restrictions on 
their ability to move abroad. The integration of these countries into the circuit of 
internationally mobile capital should also be reflected in the role of their currencies in 
foreign exchange markets, especially in FX-tumover. If a choice can be made 
between countries with different degrees of openness to trade, countries with lower 
openness should be chosen, to avoid the overdetermination of domestic interests by
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competitiveness concerns, regardless of domestic institutions (see Frieden 1991). 
Furthermore, the crisis countries should not be suffering from massive economic 
fundamentals problems, since institutional factors are expected to matter most when 
political sustainability, and not economic fundamentals related competitiveness, is at 
stake. The episode chosen should also represent a scenario o f where the whole range 
of domestic structures associated with time consistency matters in equal fashion, to 
avoid overdetermination. Furthermore, the crisis episode has also to fulfil the critical 
criteria of “unit homogeneity” and “conditional independence” (King et al. 1994: 
ch.3). The former means that the countries chosen for comparison have to match as 
closely as possible, except for the explanatory variable. The latter means that the 
problem of “endogeneity” has to be avoided, that is the independent variable should 
not be affected by the dependent variable.
Firstly, the ERM crisis is highly representative for the problem I am investigating, 
since it is the only modem currency crisis which affected OECD countries with highly 
developed and fully liberalised capital markets (Eichengreen 2000). As pointed out in 
Chapter Two, in the beginning of 1992 all member countries of the ERM had de facto 
fully liberalised their capital accounts (see Bakker 1996).18 The other crises of the 
1990s all affected emerging market economies. Not all of them had opened up their 
capital accounts to the degree of ERM countries. Consequently, these crises are less 
well suited for an investigation of the conditions that determine the effect of capital 
mobility on domestic autonomy.19
18 Chapter Two discusses openness to capital flows, with special attention to Britain, France and 
Germany.
19 Table 3.1. lists key indicators for the year before the crisis, for countries affected by the 1992/93 
ERM crisis, the 1994/95 Tequila crisis and the 1997/98 East Asian crises, to gauge which crisis episode 
would be suited for a controlled comparative study. The following discussion of the country sample 
draws on the figures represented in this table.
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For the three ERM core currencies, the D-mark, sterling and the French franc, the 
integration into international capital markets is further underlined by their prominent 
role in foreign exchange market activity (Table 2.2). In 1992 the D-mark accounted 
for almost 40 percent of total European foreign exchange turnover, sterling for 13.6 
percent and the French franc for almost 4 percent, with the rest of the ERM currencies 
together only making up for about 12 percent. Financial openness beyond the single 
market is demonstrated by the high share of trading of the currencies against the US 
dollar, as well as the prominent role of both Britain and Germany as geographical 
locations for foreign exchange trading. The particular importance of the three G-5 
country members of the EMS for international financial markets is reflected by their 
systematic and regular coverage in major financial market reports, in contrast to the 
irregular analysis of other ERM countries.20 Furthermore, Britain, France and 
Germany combine high levels of capital account openness with comparatively low 
levels of trade openness compared to their ERM partners, and have comparatively 
limited fundamentals problems, as discussed in Chapter Two.
Similar considerations disqualify most countries affected by the Tequila and East 
Asian crises. Immature financial markets were a problem in key Asian countries like 
South Korea and Malaysia, and key Latin American countries like Mexico and 
Argentina had substantial competitiveness problems. Furthermore, the ERM crisis 
has the advantage over emerging market currency crises in that it represents a pure
20 See my review of financial market reports in section 3.4. of this chapter.
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Table 3.1:
Economic indicators of countries affected by currency crises
(Year before the respective currency crisis)
Trade
(%GDP)
GDP per 
capita
(Thousand 
current 
US $)
GDP
growth
(Annual
%)
Inflation
(Consumer 
prices, 
annual %)
Budget
deficit
(Overall,
%GDP)
Current
account
(%GDP)
ERM 1991
Britain 48.2 16.2 -2.0 5.9 -1.2 -1.5
France 45.0 17.8 0.8 3.2 -1.3 -0.5
Germany 51.0 18.6 4.2* 1.6 -2.2 -1.0
Belgium 130.8 19.2 1.6 3.2 -6.0 +2.4
Denmark 68.5 18.7 1.4 2.4 -1.1 +1.5
Italy 38.0 17.6 1.1 63 -9.9 -2.1
Ireland 111.6 11.9 2.5 3.2 -1.0 +0.6
Netherlands 103.3 17.6 23 3.1 -2.8 +2.7
Spain 37.4 13.1 23 5.9 -3.6 -3.7
Portugal 69.9 11.5 23 11.4 -5.9 -0.9
Latin America 1993
Argentina 16.3 10.2 5.9 10.6 +0.7 -3.4
Brazil 19.6 5.9 4.9 1928 -93 +/-0
Mexico 34.3 7.1 1.9 9.8 +0.5 -5.8
East Asia 1996
Indonesia 52.3 30.5 7.8 8.0 +1.2 -3.4
Malaysia 180.2 8.1 8.6 3.5 +2.0 -4.6
Philippines 89.8 3.7 5.8 9.0 +0.3 -4.8
S. Korea 63.1 14.4 6.6 4.9 +0.1 -4.4
Thailand 84.4 6.6 5.5 5.8 +2.4 -8.0
♦West Germany only 
Source:
World Bank (2000): World Development Indicators, CD-ROM;
except for GDP growth Germany (West Germany only): IMF (1997): World Economic Outlook
currency crisis, not interacting with a banking and external debt crisis (see IMF 1998: 
75). Problems in the financial structure as a key factor in emerging market currency 
crises seems to present a strong case for an investigation o f the effect o f domestic 
structures. However, these cases pose the problem that financial markets focused in a 
possibly untypical way on escalating structural problems in just one domestic 
institutional sector, as a result of the exceptional exposure o f the financial and 
industrial system to foreign borrowing.
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Secondly, the ERM crisis, more than the emerging market currency crises of the 
1990s, offers a sample of cases that fulfil the requirements of homogeneity and 
conditional independence. The member states of the ERM, especially Britain, France 
and Germany represent a picture of great homogeneity for a comparative study, 
compared to the emerging or transition economies affected by currency crises during 
the 1990s. They were members of the same formal exchange rate system, had 
therefore formally entered identical international monetary commitments, and were 
exposed to the same systemic crisis. The results for the three core ERM countries 
show a close match for capital account openness, GDP per capita, inflation, public 
sector deficits and the current account, with only the GDP growth figures being 
significantly out of step. A similarly good match can by and large be found for at least 
a number of East Asian crisis countries, but these countries did not qualify because of 
their immature capital markets and the interaction of banking and currency crisis. In 
the case of Latin America some homogeneity exists for only Mexico and Argentina, 
while Brazil is clearly out of step.
Finally, as to the problem of conditional independence, in the ERM crisis the outcome 
variable “market sentiment” and the causal variable “domestic structures” remain 
unambiguously separated, in contrast to emerging markets. The latter crises are 
distinguished by speculative attacks interacting with upheavals in the political or 
economic structure, often associated with the demands for structural adjustments 
coming from the IMF as crisis manager (Radelet & Sachs 1998). For example this 
was the case for the political system in Indonesia, the banking system in Mexico and 
the banking-industry relationship in Korea. In contrast, speculation against ERM 
parities in 1992/93 interacted neither with IMF involvement nor domestic political
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instability. This means that the ERM crisis allows for a clearly delineated 
investigation of how a given set of domestic institutions influenced market sentiment 
across the whole crisis episode. Therefore, because of capital account openness and 
pure currency crisis, in addition to the high degree o f homogeneity and conditional 
independence, the ERM crisis has been chosen as the historical episode best suited for 
a disciplined in depth investigation, with Britain, France and Germany as the units for 
comparison.
The analysis will cover the troubled period from the slowly emerging tensions in 
October 1991 approaching the Maastricht treaty conference, coming to the fore in the 
Nordic currency crisis in November/December 1991, to the widening of the ERM 
fluctuation bands from +/- 2.25 percent to +/- 15 percent at the end of July 1993, the 
critical step to restore calm within the system. Twentytwo months of crisis will be 
investigated, starting from 01 October 1991, and ending with 02 August 1993. The 
British case will be covered only for the period up the 16 September 1992, when 
sterling was withdrawn from the ERM.
3.4. Classical Content Analysis of Market Reports, Using Computer-Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS)
Disciplined comparison can make use of three types of empirical material: sampling
surveys, structured or unstructured interviews and content analysis of historical text, 
image or sound (Bauer 2000: 148). I have chosen to investigate market sentiment 
towards sterling, the French franc and the D-mark through classical content analysis 
of historical market reports, published by the Financial Times newspaper and by 
leading investment banks.
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Classical content analysis has several advantages.21 Firstly it allows the interpretation 
of social reality through reconstructing social representations. As Nigel Fielding 
(1993: 168) states, “good qualitative analysis is able to document its claim to reflect 
some of the truth of the phenomena by reference to systematically gathered data. Poor 
qualitative data is anecdotal, unreflective, descriptive without being focused in a 
coherent line of enquiry.” Content analysis, like sampling surveys and structure 
interviews, facilitates such scientific data gathering through the analysis of coherent 
and homogeneous representations of a specific social reality via the construction of 
indicators of opinions, views, themes and values (Bauer 2000). Paisley describes this 
as “information processing in which communication content is transformed, through 
objective and systematic application of categorisation rules.” With the help of the 
categories the content can then be interpreted to pick up trends and changing patterns 
in market sentiment, differences in the coverage of the ERM crisis by different market 
participants, and finally to reconstruct ‘maps of knowledge’ embodied in the market 
reports, including the position of domestic institutions within these maps.23
Content analysis does this by bringing in statistical formalism into qualitative 
analysis, thus representing a “hybrid technique” on the qualitative/quantitative divide 
(Bauer 2000: 132). But, as Bauer emphasises, it remains essentially an act of 
interpretation, with statistical formalism only aiding the systematic organisation of 
information, facilitating reliable “objectified interpretation” (Bauer 2000: 145). To 
exploit the advantage of statistical formalism to the full I will use computer-assisted 
content analysis, which not only assists in the systematic organisation of market
21 For an excellent review of classical content analysis see Bauer (2000). An in depth description of its 
methodology is given by Krippendorff (1980).
22 W.J. Paisley, quoted on Bauer (2000: 133)
23 See Krippendorff (1980)
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reports through “coding”, but supports complex retrieval of coded data in support of 
contextual interpretation. Objectified interpretation brings with it the second 
advantage of content analysis: it is falsifiable, because it operates in a transparent 
fashion along clearly organised and well documented procedures, which can be easily 
reproduced.
The third advantage, related to the former, is that content analysis through systematic 
coding offers the possibility to combine deductive with inductive analysis of market 
reports. As Kelle (2000: 295) explains, codes can be used in a referential function, to 
support inductive analysis, or can be treated as representations of factual information 
themselves, independent of the data they represent, in support of a deductive analysis 
to test theory. I will use a combination, with both usages reflected in my design of the 
coding frame.
Fourthly, content analysis can be applied to different categories of text, for cross- 
sectional analysis of opinion in a specific social environment (Bauer 200:135). In my 
case I will compare a daily newspaper market column (Financial Times), with two 
market reports published by investment banks, one on a weekly basis (Salomon 
Brothers), and the other on a monthly basis (Goldman Sachs), to find out not only 
about different viewpoints, but also about the effect of different levels in the depth of 
analysis, in particular with respect to domestic institutions.
Fifthly, in contrast to interview analysis, content analysis allows for a longitudinal 
study of a historical event by using naturally occurring materials (Bauer 2000). A 
longitudinal study, like my study of the ERM crisis, can detect regular or irregular
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fluctuations in sentiment, to infer concomitant changes in context possibly including 
institutional factors. Furthermore, market sentiment during the crisis, which is now 
difficult to reconstruct through interviews or surveys of market participants, can be 
analysed by drawing on historical reports. This has the additional advantage that these 
reports are “naturally occurring material” (Bauer 2000: 148), produced for another 
purpose than my empirical study, and thus not biased by my questions as researcher. 
They represent direct evidence of the views expressed during the crisis by market 
participants, for market participants in their professional function and for a 
professional purpose.
The main disadvantage of content analysis is that, through the process of coding, text 
units will be separated along the categories suggested by the coding system. This risks 
“inaccuracies” of interpretation, since the researcher has to make a judgement of the 
specific contextual meaning of a single section of the text she or he is coding (Bauer 
2000: 148-9). In my analysis, I have taken this downside into account by making 
myself familiar with the overall content and structure of a market report before coding 
sections of text and by ensuring that these reports are representative of wider market 
sentiment. Furthermore, I have devised a comprehensive coding system and applied 
procedural thoroughness to the coding process.
■ Market Reports: A Representative “Corpus ”
The sample of market reports to gauge market sentiment during the ERM crisis has to 
be carefully selected. Following Bauer and Aarts (2000), my selection of market 
reports should constitute a “corpus” as signifier of market sentiment, defined as a 
finite collection of materials, which is determined with an inevitable degree of 
arbitrariness, but has to fulfil three main criteria: to be relevant, i.e. representative for
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market sentiment and thematically focused on the issue of my investigation, the 
analysis of sterling, the franc and the D-mark in the ERM; to be homogeneous, i.e. to 
compare texts of a similar character; to contain historically coherent texts, i.e. 
published regularly and in the same format; and finally to offer synchronicity, that is 
to cover the same period (Bauer & Aarts 2000). The corpus should also reflect 
different strata of the sample, that is different types of reports and level of analysis.
Financial market reports with focus on my country cases in the opinion-forming 
financial press and by major international investment banks, which are key 
participants in international financial markets, fulfil these criteria. They are 
representative and they are homogenous, since all represent original market sentiment 
in its natural historical occurrence, structured by proceeding country by country, or 
currency by currency. They are historically coherent and offer synchronicity, since 
they have been published during the crisis in parallel to each other at regular intervals, 
organising the analysis in similar ways. Systematic analysis will be facilitated by 
taking into account the depth of reporting through the selection of a daily, a weekly 
and a monthly report. Selecting reports from different banks for different firm-specific 
views will cover the width of opinion. Including a general overview represented in the 
financial press will be a way to represent a wide range of market opinion without 
having to operate with an impractical large sample of reports.
To secure focus the market reports ideally should be currency reports specialising on 
sterling, the franc and the D-mark. This is possible for the financial press, with the 
Financial Times offering a specific daily currency market column in its Companies & 
Markets section on the Currencies & Interest Rates page, titled during the ERM crisis
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“Foreign Exchanges”.24 In depth market reports by investment banks focusing solely 
on the foreign exchange markets are rare and hard to find, but major general financial 
market reports, which can be weekly, monthly, or quarterly, focus on monetary policy 
and exchange rates in the context of country specific analysis and forecasting. They 
typically cover all the major countries systematically. These reports are given to 
currency traders in addition to informal daily briefings, which are internal and are not 
archived.
Before I come to the question of which reports to choose, I have to determine the size 
of the corpus. In an ideal world, all market reports covering Britain, France, and 
Germany during the ERM crisis should be covered. In practice, a realistic cost-benefit 
analysis as to the size of the sample has to be undertaken, looking for the optimal 
trade-off between thorough manageable analysis and generalisabilty of the findings 
(Krippendorff 1980:69). As Bauer and Aarts explain, small samples are not 
considered a disadvantage in qualitative analysis, since they allow for in depth data 
collection, categorization and analysis, avoiding the creation of “data dungeons” of 
material collected but never really analysed (Bauer & Aarts 2000:34).
I have constructed a corpus containing three samples, of which the “Foreign 
Exchanges” column in the FT is probably the most significant and widely noticed 
market report on a continuous daily basis in the financial press. The other two are key 
financial market reports focusing on G-7 countries by two major investment banks, 
the weekly published “International Market Roundup” by Salomon Brothers, and the
24 The column has since been renamed and is now simply titled “Market Reports”.
107
monthly “International Economics Analyst” by Goldman Sachs.25 This makes for a 
well stratified corpus, representing a wide range of market participants’ views through 
the inclusion of the FT, while juxtaposing the viewpoints of two major operators in 
the financial services industry. Furthermore, market sentiment will be covered 
coherently on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. The reports of Salomon Brothers 
and Goldman Sachs are representative of similar reports produced by all major 
international banks; their choice was arbitrary in so far as it was influenced by the 
easy availability of these two sources.
In which way are these reports representative of market sentiment? First, the Financial 
Times had a worldwide daily circulation of ca. 290.000 copies in 1992/93, which put 
it ahead of the Wall Street Journal internationally.27 Furthermore, the FT currency 
market column offers a much broader coverage of market sentiment than its rival 
“Currency Trading” column in the Wall Street Journal. Whereas the former 
emphasises market opinion over data, the latter is a more direct summary of facts 
about market trends based on Dow Jones data, with only the occasional representation 
of an analyst’s view.28
25 In my empirical chapters I will use the following abbreviations for these reports:
“Foreign Exchanges “ column in the Financial Times: FT 
“International Market Roundup” by Salomon Brothers: SB 
“International Economics Analyst” by Goldman Sachs: GS
26Investment banks do either not archive market reports systematically and/or are reluctant to grant 
access to the historical records they keep. The “International Market Roundup” by Salomon Brothers 
has been fully kept by the Bank of England’s Library, and the “International Economics Analyst” by 
Goldman Sachs by the British Library of Political and Economic Science.
27 Source: FT Customer Services Department. According to a 1993 European Business Readership 
Survey, the FT had nearly five times the readership of the Wall Street Journal, with the FT being 
significantly more popular with business executives in Europe than any other English language 
business title. Source: http://www.ft.com/newspaper/220e.htm.
28 Interview with Christopher Swann, Financial Times currency correspondent, on 28/11/2001. Similar 
columns in the continental financial press have been excluded since, according to my interviews, the 
majority of foreign exchange traders in the City does not read non-English language newspapers 
(Interviews withNatascha Gewaltig, Eurozone Economist, IDEAglobal, 16/06/1999; Tom Grant, 
Currency Trader, Lehman Brothers, 12/05/1999; Phillipp M. Hildebrand, Senior Managing Director, 
Moore Capital, 12/05/1999).
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The “Foreign Exchanges” column, reporting foreign exchange market movements and 
sentiment of the previous day, is published daily, except for Mondays. The column is 
the prime responsibility of a single journalist, normally the currency correspondent, 
positioned below the economics editor in the Financial Times economics 
department.29 During the investigated period the FT gives the name of the author of 
the “Foreign Exchanges” column for only 80.4% of the articles, starting from January 
1992. Of these individually authored texts, James Blitz, who was the currency 
correspondent during at this time, wrote 70.1%.30 In the early 1990s the column was 
very much the product of its author. It was only occasionally edited by the economics 
editor and was not discussed at the FT editorial board meeting.31
During the ERM crisis the column covered continuously the US dollar, Yen and D- 
mark, plus pound sterling. The French franc, regularly covered even before the crisis, 
became the object of permanent attention from autumn 1992 onwards. Other 
currencies, including other ERM currencies, have only been commented on 
occasionally, whenever they became the focus of market attention. The column gives 
the key news on exchange rate movements, but reserves most of its space to reflect 
market sentiment, or, as Swan put it, “to give a flavour of what the big bankers are 
thinking”. For this purpose, the currency correspondent elicits opinions from currency 
strategists at major banks mainly based in London, with some analysts based in New 
York. These analysts are, as a rule, willing to be interviewed and quoted as marketing
29 Only in case of his/her absence another member of the economics department steps in as a substitute. 
(Interview with Christopher Swann).
30 13 other journalists account for the remaining authored articles, covering each between 0.5% and 
5%, obviously substituting for Blitz during his absence.
31 This and the following information about the column are based on my interview with Christopher 
Swann.
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exercise, acting in a “salesman-like function” to drum up business for their bank. As a 
rule the currency correspondent raises topical questions with the analysts, but leaves it 
to the respondents to answer the questions according to their own preferences, or 
point out other issues they consider to be of importance. The selection of what is to be 
reported and who is to be quoted was done pragmatically on the basis of how 
interesting and representative opinions were.
The column attempts to sum up the sentiment in financial markets as reflected in the 
range of opinions collected during the daily research. The column thus reflects 
sentiment of financial market participants in a rather open way, with the opinion of 
the writing journalist taking a back seat. Altogether, 26 analysts have been quoted in 
the column dining my period of investigation.32 Even if each individual column is to 
some extent eclectic in its coverage, in aggregate they constitute a good source to 
gauge market trends.
In addition, the column, although not widely noticed by the broad FT readership, 
operates as a forum for the exchange of views and opinions between insiders. In the 
words of Swann:
“For the markets it is like a community thing. It is a very incestuous market; almost everybody has 
worked with each other at some point. They like to keep track on their colleagues, they like to get a 
sense what other analysts’ position might be. People tend to talk their book. If someone is telling 
something, other analysts will assume that the person is advising his traders similar things. It is a 
delicate balance between strategist not wishing to give away the position of their bank and trying to get 
quoted, and other people trying to interpret what the strategists are saying what their banks position is. 
From the market’s point of view it helps people to know which way the wind is blowing.”
This view has been confirmed by interviews with traders and analysts, with one hedge
fund manager stating that there was little the financial press could report that analysts
32 For how often individual analysts have been quoted for each of the three currencies investigated, see 
Appendix, Table ^  (Index Tree).
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would not know already, but that he would read the foreign exchange column “to get 
a feel for which direction the market is moving.”
The two market reports by financial services firms in my sample corpus are published 
by Goldman Sachs and Salomon Brothers, two major international investment 
banks.34 In the first half of the 1990s both banks were grouped by The Economist 
magazine in the top half dozen “bulge-bracket” of global investment banks. 
According to an October 1993 league table rating of global investment banks 
undertaken by Euromoney, Goldman Sachs takes overall top position and Salomon 
Brothers place thirteen. Goldman occupies place four for trading activities, and 
Salomon Brothers place ten.
Both market reports, the weekly “International Market Roundup” by Salomon 
Brothers, and the monthly “International Economics Analyst” by Goldman Sachs are 
typical of country specific economic and market analysis by the economic research 
departments of major banks. Both reports are also similar in terms of coverage, 
structure, production, and circulation.37 Typical for this type o f overview analysis of 
international economic conditions targeted at international financial market 
participants and global fund managers, the reports focus on key OECD countries and
33 Interview with Phillipp Hildebrand, Moore Capital. A similar view was voiced by a currency trader 
(Interview with Tom Grant, Lehman Brothers).
34 Salomon Brothers has since become Salomon Smith Barney, part of Citigroup.
35 The Economist: “Battling back: Post-scandal Salomon Brothers”, 21 Nov. 1992; “They’ve really got 
a hold on EU: US investment banks are increasingly dominant in European financial markets”, 20 
April 1994.
36 Reported in The Economist: “Survey of International Banking” 30 April 1994.
37 Salomon Brother’s “International Market Roundup” is not being produced any longer. The following 
description is based on interviews with the following economic analysts: Dimitry Gladkov, Goldman 
Sachs (17/10/2001); Jens Nordwig-Rasmussn, Goldman Sachs (17/10/2001); Michael Saunders, 
Salomon Smith Barney (25/10/2001); Natascha Gewaltig, IDEAglobal (16/06/1999); Stanislav Gelfer, 
Credit Suisse First Boston (17/10/2001). Further information was provided by Katherine Stuart, 
Assistant, Economic Research Dept., Goldman Sachs (25/10/2001).
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on the key international economic themes of exchange rates, monetary and fiscal 
policy, interest rates, and balance of payments. These themes are discussed and 
commented on within the context of recent country specific and international 
economic and political development, containing forecasts on key variables like 
exchange rates, inflation, and interest rates. Both reports follow the standard format 
by starting out with a general international overview, followed by country specific 
analysis.
In the case of Goldman Sachs the coverage is very extensive. In addition to the 
general overview (“The International Economy - Overall Summary and Forecasts”) 
the report includes a thematic section “International Economic Themes”, followed by 
“Country Reports” on 14 OECD countries, led by reports on the US, Japan, Germany, 
the UK, and France. In addition to this regular coverage, the report contains 
occasional features of particular importance to financial markets. These occasional 
features can be country or issue specific. Smaller and less detailed in its range and 
depth of investigation, Salomon Brothers’ weekly “International Market Roundup” 
starts with a section titled “Overview”, summarising key international developments 
normally dominated by the US, Europe and Japan, and then moves on to country 
specific sections. Here the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK are always 
covered in a separate section, with other European countries being represented on an 
irregular basis.
The country specific sections of these reports are always written by the same country 
analyst in charge of the respective country, with issue specific sections in the 
“International Economics Analysts” by issue specialists on the ERM, international
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interest rates etc.. The reports in their entirety nevertheless represent a team effort by 
the international economic research teams in the respective research departments.38 
Through a continuous coordination process, including informal editorial supervision 
by the chief economist, it is ensured that the reports present a coherent and uniform 
“message”, with individual views forming parts of a consistent global scenario 
representing the stance of the firm. This stance is also presented in the overview 
section, which, in the case of Salomon Brothers, was written by the senior economist 
in charge of the “International Market Roundup”, who also acted as an editor (John 
Lipsky); in the case of Goldman Sachs by two senior international economists (David 
Walton, Jeremy Hale) in charge of the “International Economics Analyst”, and then 
edited by the chief economist (David Morrison). The coordination/editorial process 
included regular coordination meetings on a monthly basis to align and match 
forecasting on key economic indicators like GDP figures. In addition, informal 
coordination of views took place during the writing of the report, with the final 
product in its entirety edited by the chief economist. As several interview partners 
have pointed out, the coordination process aims at guaranteeing constancy in 
particular as to the global outlook and the forecasting of key variables. Broader 
country specific assessments, regarding political developments and structural aspects, 
are left to the discretion of the individual country specialist, as long as his/her analysis 
does not stand in conflict to the overall message of the report. Thus, when it comes to 
an interpretation of domestic structural trends, the individual analyst is rather 
unconstrained to give his own individual explanations.40
38 The procedures of Salomon Brothers and Goldman Sachs are typical for how these reports are 
produced across the banking industry.
9 Interviews with Jens Nordwig-Rasmussn, Michael Saunders.
40 Interviews with Katherine Stuart, Jens Nordwig-Rasmussn, Natascha Gewaltig.
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Reports like the two chosen here are distributed widely within the financial 
community through formal and informal channels. Traders read these reports, 
although the daily briefings are of greater direct relevance, given the short-term time 
horizons and instantaneous nature of decision making in currency trading.41 But since 
the same analysts who produce the more in-depth general market reports write these 
daily reports, it can be assumed that the latter reflect opinions given to traders in the 
former. Furthermore, since these reports, produced “in their thousands”,42 are 
distributed to other analysts in-house and circulate widely within the analyst 
community in the financial services industry, they influence the opinion of other 
analysts, and their briefings of traders.43 As one interviewee pointed out, market 
reports like the International Economics Analyst are of particular importance if 
analysts want to get information on country specific structural issues in situations 
where they lack the information and resources to come up with a view on their own 44 
Consequently, the inclusion of the two market reports by different investment banks 
into my sample corpus complements the FT column not only because they represent 
firm specific views directly or indirectly influencing trading desks, but because they 
put monetary policies and exchange rate analysis by market participants in the context 
of a wider analysis of the economic and structural conditions of a country.
■ Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis with NUD *IST
The systematic analysis of my market reports will be facilitated by organising the
information contained in the texts using a computer assisted qualitative data analysis
41 Interviews with Natascha Gewaltig, Tom Grant, Dimitry Gladkov.
42 Interview with Dimitry Gladkov. It was impossible to get exact circulation figures for these reports 
from the publishing banks.
43 Market reports are circulated informally within what is a close-knit financial community in which 
most members know each other, and formally through the distribution to clients of investment banks, 
including the asset management arms of those investment banks which are clients of the bank which 
publishes the report (Interview with Dimitry Gladkov; interview with Stanislav Gelfer).
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software (CAQDAS) package. Essentially, CAQDAS is nothing but a computerised 
method for the systematic organisation of text through indexing (coding) typical for 
classical content analysis. Computerised coding has the advantage of automating and 
speeding up the analysis tasks and of facilitating more sophisticated searching and 
complex questioning of the data (Barry 1998). For the use of computer-assisted 
analysis it is critical to understand that the pursuit of automatic content analysis -  text 
in, interpretation out -  would be absurd. Semantic coding has to remain the privilege 
of the human interpreter (Bauer 2000: 148). Consequently I use the computer 
software merely as a mechanical devise to speed up coding. I developed the 
methodology and the coding system independently of the technical capabilities of the 
CAQDAS, strictly in line with what is required by a systematic analysis of my 
samples in regard to the questions I pose.
NU*DIST, the software I use, has the advantage over its main competitor Atlas/ti in 
offering a more structured, sequential and verbal classification system of text 
content.45 The disadvantage of this logical structure is that NU*DIST, in contrast to 
the more pictorial and open-ended organisation of Atlas/ti, is more rigidly linear, 
leaving little room for creative solutions. However, it is precisely the highly structured 
ways of NU*DIST which match my own approach to undertaking a rigorous analysis 
through a mixture of a deductive and inductive analysis.
At the heart of the coding exercise lies the design of an internally coherent category 
system, the “coding frame”. A well designed coding frame, together with clear
44 Interview with Natascha Gewaltig.
45 For an evaluation of NUD*IST, in comparison to Atlas/ti, see Barry (1998). As Barry points out, the 
third most widely used CAQDAS package, ETHNOGRAPH, is outdated, lacking the flexibility and 
sophistication of its two competitors.
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instructions on the execution of coding, and a documentation o f the coding frame, 
ensures methodological quality through a coherent, transparent and falsifiable 
research design (Krippendorff 1980).
To be coherent, coding must be developed from clear principles, which can be derived 
either from theory (deductive approach: “coding down”), or can be arrived at in the 
process of the coding of text, expanding and reworking the coding frame during 
analysing more and more text units (inductive approach: “coding up”) (J. Fielding 
1993:227). I have developed my coding frame using both methods, in line with my 
approach to combine deductive and inductive approaches. To allow for systematic 
comparison, the coding frame has to be symmetrical, i.e. the same coding scheme or 
“index tree” has to be applied to each country case. Thus, there will be three index 
trees covering domestic variables for Britain, France and Germany respectively, 
prefixed (1) (Britain), (2) (France), and (3) (Germany), with six primary nodes, 
followed by a number of sub-nodes, in addition to a separate index tree for 
international developments, prefixed (4).46 The coding frame will then attempt to 
cover the whole range of possible factors influencing market sentiment, to put 
domestic structural variables in context. Furthermore, it has been designed to facilitate 
longitudinal indexing of data, to capture trends and processes in the development of 
market sentiment.
The primary nodes are economic performance (x 1), economic policy (x 2), politics (x 
3), EMS-EMU (x 4), domestic structures (x 5) and exchange rate movements (x 6), 
and crisis episodes (x 7). The broader structure of this coding frame is a case o f
46 In the terminology of NUD*IST a code is called “node”.
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deductive coding down, since it is derived from the theory underlying my 
comparative research design, investigating the validity of domestic structure 
approaches as explanations of currency crisis. The comparative element is reflected in 
country specific index trees. The domestic structures approach is reflected in the 
distinction between domestic and international factors in separate trees, with a 
primary node for domestic structures (x 5). The secondary and tertiary nodes of this 
node have been deduced from the explanation of rationalist institutionalism. Separate 
primary nodes for domestic economic variables (x 1) (x 2) and domestic politics and 
structure variables (x 3) (x 5) reflect the first and second generation crisis models.
The inductive approach has informed the construction of the “international 
developments” index tree in my coding frame (4), and of the primary node “EMS- 
EMU” in the domestic trees (x 4). These nodes are the result o f working with sample 
texts. As far as the international index tree is concerned, it became obvious that 
market participants analyse developments outside my three country cases in a 
country-by-country or currency-by-currency fashion, with great emphasis given to 
developments in the US and the EU. Particularly significant was the impact of the 
ERM crisis itself as a systemic crisis for market sentiment towards sterling, franc and 
D-mark. The recognition of the ERM crisis as a systemic factor in this coding tree is 
independent from my taking account of EMS-EMU related factors in the domestic 
trees (x 4). Although equally a product of inductive analysis, it takes account of the 
specific importance market participants attributed to the domestic politics of European 
monetary integration in the three case countries. In a similarly inductive fashion a 
number of sub-nodes have been added in the course of my research to the economic
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and political primary nodes (x 1) (x 2) (x 3), acknowledging the importance of issues 
for market sentiment which I had not deduced from theory.47
The primary nodes “exchange rates” (x 6) and “crisis episodes” (x 7) have a simple 
descriptive function, with the former being created in recognition of the fact that most 
text units include exchange rate forecasting for my three currency cases, thus giving 
an quantitative indicator for the direction of market sentiment. My intention to capture 
in detail the widest possible range of factors influencing market sentiment has led to a 
detailed breakdown of not only the domestic structures primary node, but of all 
primary codes in several secondary and tertiary nodes. My plan to capture the process 
of decision making has resulted in Node (x 7), which makes it possible to code text 
units in a longitudinal fashion, by breaking down the whole ERM crisis into a 
sequence of country specific crisis episodes, separated by times of relative calm or 
“non-crisis”. Crisis episodes have been defined by using quantitative indicators 
indicating speculative pressure, that is exchange rate movement, the spread of official 
interest rates over the Bundesbank discount rate, and the spread of short-term money 
market interest rates over German rates. In addition, to define definite dates marking 
the turning point of market sentiment, political or economic events or decisions have 
been taken into account.48 Finally, for all levels of indexing a node “other” has been 
added, to ensure that all issues raised in the reports can be accounted for in my coding 
frame.
Following Kelle (2000), the coding procedure consisted of assigning codes to 
previously defined text segments or units. I defined a single whole column (FT) or
47 An example would here be Node (x 2 1 4) “Bundesbank statements”
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issue of a market report (Salomon Brothers, Goldman Sachs) as text segment, thereby 
guaranteeing that my text segments were matching each other as closely as possible 
within each representative source, being samples of the same article/report. The 
coding process then consisted of indexing these units of my three sources, which 
NUD*IST identifies as three separate “documents”, along the coding frame. Any 
mentioning of one of the issues represented by a node was coded, regardless of how 
important it was in the respective text unit.
NUD*IST was then used to assist my qualitative interpretation, by facilitating 
searches for interconnectedness between individual nodes. The software offers 17 
different types of index searches, to find for example all texts units coded at several 
nodes, or coded at one node, or coded at at least one node o f a range of nodes, etc. 
Altogether 872 index searches were undertaken in the course of my research. To 
ensure transparency and falsifiability, the coding frame has been documented in the 
appendix, including the number of text units coded at each individual node. 
Essentially, the coding process allowed me to establish statistically which quantitative 
weight a specific variable has in the analysis of a text sample. For a specific period 
this weight can be measured by the number of texts in a sample source coded at a 
specific node or combination of nodes, as a ratio of all texts of the sample source 
during this period. This ratio will be expressed in percentages for each sample text, 
and presented graphically by standardised charts. The qualitative interpretation of 
these statistical findings will draw on the actual analysis in the text and its context, 
often using direct quotes. This interpretation will take an inductive stance by taking 
account of the fullest possible range of variables, to understand the reasoning of
48 For the German case this combination of indicators has also been applied to define episodes of
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market participants about institutions in its broader context, but will emphasise the 
interpretation of institutional factors.
Clearly, not every indexing at each code can be given extensive interpretation. Hence 
a significance threshold has been established as a rough benchmark below which a 
detailed analysis will only be undertaken if the low numbers of text units coded 
includes highly significant texts. It will be considered why certain variables were of 
such low significance for a specific country case. The significance threshold has to 
differ for each of the three text samples. The chances of a variable being covered by 
Goldman Sachs are considerably higher than by Salomon Brothers, and even lower 
for the Financial Times, since they differ significantly in depth. This is indicated by 
the fact that the average Goldman Sachs report has about 5000 words, the average 
Salomon Brothers report about 1500 words, and the average FT report only about 500 
words. Consequently, different significance thresholds have to reflect different levels 
of analysis and coverage, with the highest value for the “International Economics 
Analysts”, the lowest for the FT, and the “International Market Roundup” taking a 
middle position. The actual thresholds have been established in the process of coding, 
in light of the experience of how coverage broadly differs among text samples. The 
following values have been set: only those variables will be analysed in detail that 
pass at least two o f the following three thresholds: for the FT at least 5 percent of text 
units have to be coded at the respective node (or combination of nodes); for Salomon 
Brothers at least 20 percent; for Goldman Sachs at least 40 percent.
weakness of the D-mark.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has mapped out my methodology, informed by bounded rationality 
theory, on how to investigate the rationality of market sentiment towards domestic 
institutions through a qualitative comparative study. In the following chapters the 
qualitative interpretation will be organised along the key categories of my coding 
frame for each country case.
So far, the concept of rationality in rational institutionalism has been discussed, and 
the need to focus on domestic institutions to explain currency crises has been pointed 
out. What is still missing before I can move on to the empirical analysis is a 
discussion of which domestic institutions should matter for rational financial market 
participants. The next chapter will therefore expand on the domestic structures that 
theorists have identified as important for the time consistency of political 
commitments to monetary and exchange rate stability.
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Chapter 4:
Domestic Structures and Monetary Policy Commitments
4.1. Introduction
Rational financial markets should be 'institutionally sensitive' when forming expectations 
of the credibility of government commitments to defend the external and/or internal value 
of their currencies. This is because the domestic institutional structure, together with the 
constellation of domestic interests, is critical for the political sustainability of this 
commitment.1 As neo-classical monetary economics has formulated in the 'time 
consistency problem', the credibility of these commitments depends on whether financial 
market participants will expect the national authorities to renege on it in the future.2
How exactly did time consistency become a problem in the ERM in the early 1990s? In 
the asymmetric ERM, time consistency depended on whether Germany, as the leader 
country, was willing and able to maintain its superior record of domestic price stability 
which underpinned the D-mark’s anchor currency role, and whether the other ERM 
countries were able and willing to follow Bundesbank monetary policy decisions to 
maintain exchange rate stability against the D-mark. Potentially unsustainable adjustment 
costs in terms of unemployment and growth were possible as a consequence of German 
inflation in the wake unification for both the leader country and the follower countries. In 
Germany the Bundesbank had to curb the post-unification inflationary boom by imposing 
disinflation at the price of growth and employment sacrifices. In the follower countries
^ h e  importance of domestic structures for political sustainability has been elaborated on from the 
viewpoint of rationalist institutionalism in Chapter Two.
2See: De Grauwe (1996).
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the difficulties were greater. Disinflation was necessitated not by the need to restore 
domestic price stability, but to maintain external equilibrium in the face of a monetary 
policy unilaterally imposed by the leader country Germany. This could cause possibly 
unsustainable domestic disequilibria in pegging countries.3 From a rationalist 
institutionalist point of view, both the time consistency of the German monetary policy 
commitment to price stability and the commitment of the other ERM members to 
exchange rate stability depended on their domestic institutional capacity.
To support time consistency, domestic structures have to facilitate policies which in the 
medium term reconcile the objectives of low inflation, decent growth rates and high 
employment.4 Depending on the institutional structures, adjustment can be quick or slow, 
smooth or disruptive. If disinflation is necessary, the smoothness and speed of adjustment 
matters for its costs. If adjustment is disruptive, the resulting sacrifices might not be 
politically sustainable over time.5 Domestic institutions, by determining not only the 
costs of adjustment, but also the capability of policymakers to impose these costs, are 
critical for time consistency. To find out what institutional information should have 
influenced financial market assessment, it is necessary to review how exactly institutions 
constrain monetary policy-making.
3 The general problematique of a disinflationary strategy overdetermined by a peg to the D-mark has been 
elaborated for the French franc by Lordon (1998).
4 Helen Milner identifies these three objectives as the key policy preferences of political actors motivated 
by maximizing their reelection prospects (1997:42-3).
5 De Grauwe, in his application of the Barro-Gordon model to an open economy, points out in particular 
sustainability problems for pegging countries in asymmetric fixed exchange rate system, resulting from a 
‘hard nosed’ disinflationary stance by the anchor country (1996:61-71).
In the following chapter, I map out which constellation of interests and institutions in the 
financial, labour market and government structures would be optimal to underpin a hard 
currency commitment, in accordance with the analysis of domestic structures approaches. 
For national institutions, each ideal-typical review is followed by a comparison of the 
respective structures for the UK, Germany, and France, in order to establish how their 
structural features should have influenced financial market participants conceptualised as 
rational actors. As will be shown, ideal-typical models have to be substantially qualified 
to take into account the actual strengths and weaknesses of the historically rooted 
complex social configurations of each country. Although this thesis focuses on domestic 
structures rather than interests, I start by briefly pointing out the importance of domestic 
interest patterns for the sustainability of strong currency commitments, since it is a 
combination of interests with domestic structures, shaping preferences, which determines 
policy outcomes.6 The following three sections cover financial, labour market and 
government institutions respectively, since these structures are of particular importance to 
the time consistency of monetary policy commitments. The conclusion will evaluate what 
these structural differences should have meant for the credibility of pound sterling, the 
French franc, and the D-mark.
4.2. Domestic Interests and Monetary Policy Commitments
Starting with government, the key economic interest of office-seeking politicians in
democracies can be assumed to be the manipulation of the economy for electoral 
advantage (Hall 1997: 178-80). Assuming that a government’s utility is dominated by the 
rationale of the short-run Phillips-curve, left-wing governments should to be more
6 See Milner (1997).
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accommodating in their monetary policy to reduce unemployment than right wing 
governments and thus more likely to renege on their inflation and exchange rate 
commitments.7 Furthermore, following the framework set out by Frieden in his sectoral 
preferences approach, interests can be delineated for key groups of economic agents.8 
Firms and labour in the competitive export sector will favour low inflation and exchange 
rate stability of a strong currency in order to fully exploit their competitiveness through 
exchange rate certainty and strong terms of trade. Uncompetitive industries in the 
tradables sector and their workers will press for devaluation to improve competitiveness, 
accepting possible inflationary consequences. The financial sector’s narrow interests are 
in low inflation to protect the real value of assets, preferring a strengthening currency to 
external stability.9 Labour and employees in the non-tradable sector, especially SMEs and 
the public sector, will favour monetary accommodation to promote growth and 
employment, paying little attention to the exchange rate.10 Thus, competitive 
international business and their labour unions support non-accommodating monetary 
policies to achieve long-term price stability, and will tolerate disinflation as long as it 
does not undermine exchange rate stability. Resistance towards disinflation and demands 
for devaluation will be strongest from uncompetitive export-orientated businesses and 
their workers, with the financial services industry taking the opposite position. Hence, 
investors should prefer currencies of countries which ideally feature a right wing
7 Simmons (1994: 276). Opportunistic economic behaviour by politicians results in what has become 
known as the “political business cycle”. For a review of the literature supporting this argument, see 
Leblang & Bernhard (2000: 297-8), and Clark et al. (1998).
8See Frieden (1991), and Frieden & Rogowski (1996). For an application of this approach to explaining 
national preferences towards European integration, see Moravcsik 1998.
^ h e  basic opposition of financial intermediaries to inflation is explained by Adam Posen (1993: 48).
10See Gowa (1988) on the preferences of the nontradables sectors, notably the public sector in the USA, 
and Josselin (2001) on the sectoral preferences of German and French trade unions towards EMU.
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government, facing no near-term elections. The economy should be dominated by 
competitive international business, with trade union power concentrated in the private 
export sector.11 How these basic interests translate into actual policy preferences and to 
what extent a government is constrained by these interests depends on the domestic 
institutional structure.12
4.3. Domestic Institutions and the Time Consistency of Monetary Policy 
Commitments
The setting of an external monetary policy strategy is determined by government, with 
exchange rate policy normally a task falling to the finance ministry (Henning 1994). This 
was the case for Germany, France, and Britain in the ERM 1992/93. The strength of 
strong currency/pegged exchange rate commitments depends on the sustainability of a 
non-accommodating monetary stance at home. Domestic monetary policy falls formally 
into the remit of the central bank, with different degrees of independence from the 
finance ministry for each of the three countries investigated. The domestic interests and 
structures that facilitate both low inflation combined with decent growth and smooth 
adjustment, are related. Domestic structures approaches suggest that the interest and 
institutional constellation is decisive in particular in the financial, government and labour 
market structures.13 The following analysis will start with the financial structure, first the 
position of the central bank in the national economic regime, and secondly the critical 
institutional features of the wider financial structure. This will be followed by a
11 For a country specific review of the interest constellation in Britain, France, and Germany, see the 
respective case study chapters (Chapters Five, Six, Seven).
12 Helen Milner distinguishes between relatively stable actors’ interests and their preferences, the latter 
varying according to their political situation (1997:15,fn.4)
13see Keohane & Milner (eds.) 1996; Milner 1997; Hall 1997.
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description of national labour market structures, with the nature of the wage bargaining 
system and labour market flexibility as key variables. Finally, national government 
structures will be investigated.
4.3.1. Financial Structure
The sustainability of a strong currency commitment first of all depends on the position of 
the central bank. Secondly, it is determined by the wider financial structure, the character 
of the bank-industry relationship and the monetary transmission mechanism, in particular 
the speed and extent at which changes in official monetary policy spread to the economy. 
As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, my thesis will focus on the domestic structural 
determinates of pure currency crises, unrelated to a domestic banking crisis. The 
following discussion of financial structures will therefore investigate which structures 
best facilitate time consistency of exchange rate commitments. It will not analyse which 
domestic financial structures support a sound and solvent banking system to prevent 
banking crises.
4.3.1.1. Central Bank Independence
“Central bank independence is regarded by current economic literature as one of the most 
effective guarantees for the pursuit of price stability.”14 The credibility of the anti- 
inflationary stance of an independent central bank is seen to reduce inflationary 
expectations, leading to less inflationary behaviour by private agents in wage and price 
setting, as well as sound budgetary decisions by government. Neo-classical theories on 
central banking emphasise that central bank independence (CBI) per se should be able to
14 Bagella and Becchetti (1998: 53). For an overview of orthodox theories of central bank independence, 
see Hall and Franzese (1998: 506-509), and Posen (1993).
127
deliver low inflation at little cost to the real economy (Alesina & Summers 1993). If the 
central bank’s commitment to enforce low inflation through non-accommodating 
monetary management is credible, it should, in a rational expectations framework, deliver 
low inflationary behaviour by economic agents who care about real outcomes and 
anticipate price stability, thus reducing the need for adjustment through disinflation. CBI 
should therefore suffice to combine low inflation with low unemployment.15 In the case 
of an exceptional inflationary shock, the statutory insulation of central banks from 
political pressure should strengthen their capacity to defend a monetary policy 
commitment by imposing costly disinflation.
Consequently, CBI should enhance market confidence, making speculative attacks less 
likely. CBI has been recognised by rationalist institutionalism as a critical institutional 
factor underpinning currency credibility in financial markets. Beth Simmons comes to 
this conclusion in her analysis of monetary policy commitments to the inter-war gold 
standard:
“Central bank independence is expected to assure markets that promises of monetary stringency would
actually be fulfilled I hypothesised that greater central bank independence would contribute to currency
strength and adherence to the first norm of gold standard adjustment” [i.e. priority to external economic 
balance above economic conditions at home; W.H.]16
But, as econometric analysis has shown, no clear link can be established between formal 
CBI and an improved macroeconomic performance, except possibly for inflation (Grilli,
15 See Franzese & Hall (2000: 174-77) and Soskice (2000:40-43).
16 (Simmons 1994: 277). Simmons, in her later findings, recognises the potential conflict between price and 
exchange rate stability confronting an independent central bank, pointing out that independent central
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et al. 1991). Other economists have even disputed the findings for inflation (e.g. Posen 
1993). Rationalist institutionalism and institutional monetary economics have gone 
further by asserting that even low inflation has been an outcome not simply of legal CBI 
as such, but of the broader structural context in which it operates.
Firstly, legal independence is not enough to improve monetary policy outcomes if the 
central bank is not de facto insulated from excessive political pressure by the broader 
structure of the political system. Political structures which feature strong checks and 
balances to constrain excessive political leverage over the central bank are of critical 
importance, in particular if combined with polarisation in the political landscape (Keefer 
& Stasavage 2000). In this line of argument Lohmann (1998) asserts that a federal 
bicameral system is well suited to underpin real monetary policy autonomy of the central 
bank by giving a stake to political agencies with conflicting preferences in decisions 
concerning the composition of the central bank council and the institution’s legal status.
Secondly, even if a central bank is capable of imposing disinflation, it cannot eliminate 
inflationary behaviour by economic and political agents. Hence the need for costly 
disinflation, if economic agents do not support non-accommodating central bank 
monetary policy. Hall and Franzese (1998) have pointed out that the effectiveness of CBI 
in lowering inflationary expectations is not just a function of its credibility, but the 
reception of its signals by domestic actors, who are constrained in this respect by the
banks, by prioritising price stability under conditions of a fragile low inflation culture, can destabilise fixed 
exchange rate regimes (Simmons 1996).
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institutional context which shapes their short-term preferences. It is of particular 
importance whether domestic institutions allow organised labour to overcome collective 
action problems when it comes to adopting non-inflationary behaviour. A similar case 
has been made for the structure of the financial sector: it depends on the institutional 
structure of the banking system whether anti-inflationary preferences can be effectively 
conveyed to policymakers (Posen 1993; 1995; 1998).
Similar structural conditions apply to the sustainability of strong currency commitments. 
CBI will only suffice in backing an exchange rate commitment through sustained low 
inflation, if it is supported by the institutional features of the finance, industrial relations 
and politics. In particular, the bank-industry relationship has been emphasised as crucial 
for the broader social support of exchange rate stability (Henning 1994; Walsh 2000). 
Ultimately monetary policy outcomes will depend not simply on the position of the 
central bank, but on the wider societal context. As Issing put it: “Not even an independent 
central bank can lastingly defend monetary stability against a ‘society of excessive 
demands’ -  in other words, every society ultimately gets the rate of inflation it deserves 
and basically wants” (Issing 1993: 36).
From a rational market point of view, CBI should ideally be embedded in a supportive 
structural context in order to make monetary policy announcement credible. I will 
therefore review those measures of CBI in Britain, France and Germany which go beyond 
narrow constitutional status to include broader political and economic variables.
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Broad political-economy indices for CBI have been put forward by Grilli et al. (1991) 
and Cukierman et al. (1992).17 Grilli et al. look at CBI in terms of political and economic 
independence. “Political independence is the capacity to choose the final goal of 
monetary policy, such as inflation or the level of economic activity. Economic 
independence is the capacity to choose the instruments with which to pursue these 
goals.”18 The degree of political independence is indicated by whether there is a statutory 
requirement for the pursuit of monetary stability, by whether the bank has the power to 
decide on monetary policy (especially official interest rates), by the degree of 
government political influence on the central bank board (especially its president), and by 
whether the central bank’s position for autonomous acting is legally enforced. For 
economic independence it matters whether the central bank is required to finance 
government and is involved with banking supervision, with possible exposure to demands 
from the financial sector. Table 4.1 uses these criteria to indicate the degree of 
independence of the Bundesbank, the Banque de France, and the Bank of England.
17 The index by Grilli et al. (1991) covers the period from 1950-89, the index by Cukierman et al. the 
1908s.
18 Grilli et al. (1991:366). Emphases in the original.
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Table 4.1:
Germany, France, UK: Comparison of central bank independence in 1992/9319
Bundesbank Banque de France20
Bank of 
England21
(1) Legal priority of price stability Yes No No
(2) Power over monetary policy formulation Yes No No
(3) Board/CB president not appointed by 
government No No No
(4) Term of office for board members/president 8 6 4(years)
(5) Board/CB president dismissible by 
government No Yes No
(6) Board/CB president subject to instructions 
by government No Yes Yes
(7) Legal enforcement of CB in conflicts with 
government Yes No No
(8) Requirement to finance government Some Substantial Substantial
(9) Banking supervision not entrusted to CB Partial Yes No
(10) Index of political and economic 
independence (Grilli et al. 1991) 13 7 6
(11) Index of legal independence 
(Cukierman et al. 1992) 0.69 0.24 0.27
(12) Questionnaire-based index 
(Cukierman at al. 1992) 1.00 0.65 0.64
19 Row (1) to (9) of the table is based on the independence indicators by Grilli et al. (1991), and modelled 
on Table 3.5 in Henning (1994: 115). Row (10) gives the summery figure for political and economic 
independence recorded by Grilli et al. (1991: 368-9), a simple aggregate of positive single points scored for 
each individual variable, with 17 as the highest possible score. Row (11) and (12) give as comparison two 
central bank indices developed by Cukierman et al. (1992). The two indices measure independence on a 
scale from 0 (lowest level of independence) to 1 (highest level of independence). ‘Legal independence’
(row 11) takes into account: the terms of contract of the governor; policy formation, including the 
resolution of conflicts over monetary policy with government; policy objectives of the central bank; the 
possibility and conditions of central bank lending to the public sector. The questionnaire-based index (row 
12) is based on questions to a sample of specialists on monetary policy in various central banks. The 
questionnaires focused on the same range of issues as those taken into account in the legal independence 
index. For a review of the main CBI indicators presented in the economic literature, see Bagella &
Becchetti (1998). For an excellent historical-constitutional overview for the three central banks investigated 
here, see Capie et al. (1995: Appendix B), and Toniolo (1988).
20 The Banque de France gained legal independence on 1 January 1994, with the appointment of an 
independent governing council and the setting of a new monetary policy framework committed to price 
stability (Loriaux 1997a: 152). The process towards independence was launched by the Prime Minister 
Balladur on 09/04/93, with government approval for independence granted on 10/05/93.
21 The Bank of England was given ‘operational independence’ to set interest rates to meet the 
Government's stated inflation target by the new Labour government in May 1997.
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Britain
In 1992/93 Britain’s central bank, the Bank of England was formally highly dependent on 
the finance ministry, the Treasury. Although interest rate decisions were decided 
officially in consultation between the Treasury and the Bank, the Treasury decided 
monetary policy, leaving the Bank with the task of implementation. In the period of ERM 
membership this meant that the Treasury was deciding whether and to what extent the 
peg should be defended through interest rate increases, de facto instructing the Bank to 
execute these policies. Furthermore, the dependent status of the Bank allowed 
theoretically for the financing of government deficit spending through non-automatic 
direct credit facilities (Grilli et al. 1991: 369).
In addition to its political dependence, the Bank of England was constrained by its close 
relationship with the financial services industries of the City of London.22 This closeness 
was reflected by the fact that the Bank was in sole charge of banking supervision before 
1997. The Bank played, and still plays, a crucial coordinating and mediating role between 
government and City (Kynaston 1995: 44-53). Based on this "hegemonic position in 
banking and securities" (Coleman 1996: 185), it acts as "spokesman for the financial 
markets" (Hall 1986: 248). This means that in reality the Bank has considerable leverage 
over government policies by representing the interests of Britain’s important financial 
services industry, leading Peter Hall to describe it as “a particularly powerful central bank” 
(1986: 61). But this power comes at the price of being subjected to partisan pressure from 
the financial sector, a sector with no consistent preference for exchange rate stability within 
the ERM.
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France
In 1992/93 the Banque de France was, like the Bank of England, formally highly dependent 
on government. In contrast to Britain, influence was exercised by the state over the banking 
system via the central bank. This reflects the integral role of the central bank in the 
centralised bureaucratic apparatus of French economic governance, with the Treasury at its 
centre. Characteristically, banking supervision lay in the hands of specialised agencies set up 
within the Finance Ministry structure, not the central bank (Coleman 1997: 283). As 
Kenneth Dyson put it:
“France provides an example of a relatively well-structured policy process. Its commercial banks, public and 
private, are particularly sensitive to the policy of the Banque de France: being tied to the Banque de France, and 
the Banque de France in turn locked into the Tresor of the Finance ministry through a web of interpersonal 
relations.”23
This dirigiste integration of the financial sector under public authority gave France the 
ability, as Coleman put it, “to adjust to internationalisation on its own terms” 24 Through its 
influence over commercial banks the Banque de France was able to shield the private sector 
from official interest rate increases in defence of the franc, as demonstrated in autumn 
1992.25 Legislative steps taken by the government during the course of 1993 to establish 
central bank independence in January 1994 did little to change the reality of close links
22 Roberts (1995). The governing body of the Bank, the court, had an inbuild majority of members drawn 
from City institutions (Hutton 1995:144).
23 Dyson 1994: 262. In 1993 two of the largest three commercial banks were still state owned ( Credit 
Lyonnaise and BNP), with Societe Generate having been privatised only in 1988 (Coleman 1997: 288). 
Furthermore, top positions in private banking were, like those in the Banque de France and the Tresor, 
normally filled from the network of the bureaucratic elite, educated at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration 
(Cameron 1995).
24 (Coleman 1997:274). France’s state-led approach to liberalisation and deregulation has been described 
by Loriaux (1991,1997a).
25 See Dyson (1994: 190).
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between the Tresor and the Banque de France, since both were run by well-connected 
members of the same administrative elite.
Germany
The Bundesbank represented the classic case of a high CBI, with a high degree of political, 
personal and financial independence (Loedel 1999: 44-55). Political independence is 
enshrined in the Bundesbank law of 1957, conferring the Bundesbank the autonomy to use 
its monetary policy instruments in pursuit of “safeguarding the currency”. In Germany, as 
in other ERM countries, the authority in respect to the formal commitment to exchange 
rate stability in the ERM fell to the government. The Bundesbank, in charge of 
‘safeguarding the currency’, could nevertheless claim to have a stake in external 
monetary policy. Its low inflation policies not only underpinned price stability, but also 
the strength of the D-mark and thus its anchor status in the system (Henning 1994: 90- 
94). Independence of the Central Bank Council was high, with its core Directorate 
composed of non-partisan technocrats, conforming as a rule with the Bundesbank stability 
consensus (Lohmann 1998; Marsh 1992). Not only are council members appointed long 
term and cannot be dismissed, but the federalist structure of Germany’s political system, 
reflected in the composition of the governing board of the central bank, shields the bank 
from direct pressure from vested private interests as well as from the federal government 
(Lohmann 1998). Furthermore, any change in the Bundesbank law would require the 
approval of the upper house, representing the federal states in Germany’s bicameral 
system. 26 Consequently, assuming institutionally aware market participants, the
26 (Duckenfield 1999, Lohmann 1998). The streamlining of the Bundesbank council in the wake of 
reunification, although used by the federal government to reduce the influence of the federal states, left the 
original federal structure basically intact. See Kaltenthaler (1996).
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credibility of Bundesbank autonomy in financial markets should have been enhanced by 
the institutions of German federalism.
The Bundesbank was financially highly independent, with the Bundesbank law prohibiting 
the bank from granting the federal government anything but limited short-term credit.27 
Although the central bank’s policy remit included the maintenance of financial stability, in 
the early 1990s direct banking supervisory responsibility lay with the banking supervisory 
office, an agency of the Finance Ministry (Marsh 1992; Posen 1993).
However, the central bank’s autonomy over domestic monetary policy to maintain price 
stability was constrained by political reality, above all by the imperatives of the 
government’s foreign monetary policy strategy, with international monetary policy 
cooperation falling into the realm of the finance ministry (Henning 1994). Although in 
particular the political commitment to the ERM could result in tensions between the bank 
and government over the maintenance of exchange rate stability, open conflict was rare 
since the Bundesbank commitment to prioritise domestic price stability above all else has 
never been as clear cut as is generally assumed.28 In practice the central bank has always 
attempted to reconcile domestic price stability with exchange rate stability. As a result its 
monetary policy making since the 1950s has been characterised by a dilemma: the
27 (Loedel 1999:53). The 1997 dispute between the Bundesbank and the finance ministry about the revaluation 
of gold reserves demonstrates that the central bank can rely on public opinion when it comes to reject demands 
by government for financing public debt See Duckenfield (1999:101-4).
28 The myth that the Bundesbank gives uncompromising priority to price stability above international and 
domestic pressures for exchange rate stability or domestic growth, has been promoted by the bank itself. 
This view has been adopted by a number of authoritative studies on the Bundesbank. Classic examples are 
Kaltenthaler (1998) and Kennedy (1991). Kaltenthaler speaks here of the ‘Bundesbank paradigm’ (p. 75), 
Kennedy of the ‘Bundesbank ethos’ (p. 6). Other authors arguing in the same vein are Marsh (1992), de
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potential conflict between external and internal equilibrium.29 As Henning describes, this 
enduring overdetermination of the Bundesbank’s monetary policy by the external flank 
has to be understood against the backdrop of the embeddedness of Bundesbank policy in 
Germany’s foreign policy and foreign trade relations (Henning 1994:85). In the reality of 
the German political economy the Bundesbank could only succeed if it took account of 
the interests of the export sector, dominant in the German economy, and accepted the 
government’s commitment to the EMS. As a consequence Goodman concludes:
‘To maintain its independence the Bundesbank has been forced to take the views of West Germany’s major 
societal actors into account. In practice, the Bank has always sought to build a coalition of supporting 
groups or, at a minimum, avoid uniting too many powerful interests in opposition” (Goodman 1992: 100- 
101).30
On the other hand the Bundesbank’s relative autonomy turned it into a powerful 
international actor when it came to Germany’s exchange rate strategy, despite the lack of 
a legal mandate in this area. Heisenberg claims that the Bundesbank acted as “an 
institutionalised opposition to force European-level initiatives proposed by the 
government.”31 By keeping public opinion on its side, the Bundesbank has been able to
Grauwe (1997), and Grahl (1997), and Connolly (1995). Randall Henning delivers an excellent critique of 
this view. See 1994:177-251.
29 The classic description of this dilemma was given by the former Bundesbank President Otmar Emminger 
(1977), building on Keynes’ writings on money from the 1920s (in particular his “A Treatise on Money”: 
Keynes 1930). Three aspects in his analysis deserve particular attention: that the dilemma cannot simply be 
solved by moving to floating exchange rates, given the importance of external stability not only for the 
German export sector, but also for the maintenance of price stability; that the exposure of the D-mark on 
the external flank is complicated by the interaction between exchange rate stability in Europe and the D- 
mark - US dollar exchange rate; and that the key currency countries stability can serve as an anchor for 
others only if it combines narrow domestic monetary stability with broad domestic economic stability.
30 See also Kaltenthaler 1998: Ch. 2.
31 (Heisenberg 1999: 188). The Bundesbank ‘enshrined’ its veto power over the government’s exchange 
rate commitments in the ERM already in 1978 in the co-called “Emminger-Letter”, which stated the 
Bundesbank’s right to suspend compulsory intervention, if it threatened to undermine domestic monetary 
stability. (See Heisenberg 1999:63-4; with a translation of the letter on p. 65, fig. 3.1). The inability of the 
Bundesbank to assert its autonomy against a broad societal consensus was demonstrated during German 
reunification, when the Chancellor ignored the bank’ objections to German Economic and Monetary Union. 
See Duckenfield (1999), and Marsh (1995).
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constrain and shape governmental foreign monetary policy strategy, as Mark Duckenfield
(1999) demonstrated in the case of the design of the European Central Bank.
As a tactical means to consolidate the “fragmented” structures and complex interest 
patterns of Germany into broad societal support, the bank accepted frequent overshooting 
of its domestic money supply targets. These tactics facilitated a socially acceptable hard 
currency strategy at an undervalued exchange rate by delaying and resisting upward 
valuations. Only when the competing objectives of internal and external equilibrium 
could not be reconciled, and exchange rate stability could only be had at the price of 
rising inflation and the subsequent erosion of the D-mark’s credibility as hard currency, 
did the Bundesbank give priority to price stability over immediate competitiveness 
considerations, and push for revaluation as a last resort. When it came to this point, it 
could only succeed if backing from the interest coalition behind the German stability 
consensus was forthcoming.
Ultimately the Bundesbank relied on the capacity of the wider structures of the German 
political economy to facilitate long-term price stability to allow for the management of 
exchange rate stability. As Spahn put it with reference of the role of the D-mark in the 
EMS:
“The standard assertion by the Bundesbank that fighting inflation in Germany was the precondition for 
allowing the D-mark to play its role as anchor currency in the ERM is highly problematic. In fact, it is the 
pre-existence of domestic monetary stability, which safeguards the national and international role of the D- 
mark, whereas the need to establish price stability by restrictive monetary policy disrupts the smooth 
functioning of a key currency system. As a consequence domestic stability has to be given by other 
measures (e.g. through co-operative, macro-economically responsible wage setting policies), to allow the
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central bank of the anchor currency to concentrate on its intrinsic task of maintaining external equilibrium 
and thus to stabilise the key currency system as a whole.” (Spahn 1995)32
Two factors are of key importance here: fiscal policy (i.e. budgetary discipline by federal 
and state governments), and wage policies (i.e. a sense of macro-economic responsibility 
in the German system of collective bargaining).33
To conclude, as the case of Britain, France and Germany demonstrate, the position of the 
central bank is shaped by the respective national economic and political context. In the 
words of Randall Henning: “Irrespective of their relationship to their governments, all 
central banks are firmly embedded in their national political systems.” (Henning 1994: 90). 
Rational financial market participants should make currency credibility conditional on the 
embeddedness of central bank policy autonomy in the wider national institutional 
context, avoiding a single-minded focus on the central bank’s formal statute. The ability 
of the financial structure, the wage bargaining system and the government system to 
deliver price stability by shaping the respective actors* preferences to behave in a macro- 
economic responsible fashion is of critical importance. Furthermore, the flexibility and 
speed of adjustment in financial and labour markets will influence adjustment costs, 
critical for the social acceptance of disinflationary policies imposed by a central bank, 
regardless of its formal status.
32 Own translation. Emphases in the original.
33 Kenneth Dyson (1994: 350) speaks in this context of a “three-legged” stool which supports German 
monetary virtue: fiscal and wage discipline, plus Bundesbank independence.
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4.3.I.2. The Bank-industry Relationship
The importance of the structure of the financial sector, and of its relationship with 
industry in influencing the financial services industries’ preferences for price stability and 
exchange rate stability, has been widely discussed.34 The argument acknowledges the 
basic interest of the financial services industry in low inflation, in order to protect asset 
values, and of the large export industry in a stable and competitive exchange rate. It 
asserts that a stable currency regime will be a function of a tight bank-industry 
relationship. Randall Henning concludes:
“Where banks are close to industry, specifically, private preferences tend to favour a competitively valued, 
stable currency. Where banks are distant to industry, private preferences are weak and often discordant.”35
Drawing on the distinction by Zysman between bank credit based systems and capital 
market based systems (Zysman 1983), the former ideal-type features close bank-industry 
links, distinguished by indirect long-term finance of industry (loans) through large banks, 
which gives them a stake in industrial policy. The latter is distinguished by a weak bank- 
industry relationship, since firms are self-financing through the capital market (bonds and 
shares), at arms length from the financial sector, allowing investors to focus on short­
term shareholder value and the protection of their assets through low inflation.36
In regard to backing an official exchange rate commitment, bank - industry ties matter:
“First, they enlarge the coalition favouring fixed and competitive exchange rates. Second, a small number 
of banks aggregate the preferences of a large and heterogeneous industrial sector and effectively transmit 
these preferences to monetary authorities” (Walsh 2000: 148).
34 See Henning (1994), and Posen (1993). Henning gives a good review of the debate on the efficacy of 
different financial systems (1994: 22,fn.4).
35 Henning (1994: 6). A similar argument has been made by Hall (1986); Scharpf (1991); and Walsh
(2000).
36 On the different logic of these two systems, see Albert (1993), and Dore (2000).
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But strong bank-industry relations are not by definition an indicator of private 
preferences consolidating around exchange rate stability if the export sectors’ preferences 
are built around achieving competitiveness through occasional devaluation as James 
Walsh points out in the case of France (2000: 124). If the export sector aims to maintain 
competitiveness through nominal devaluations rather than through “competitive 
disinflation”, weak bank-industry links might be a better foundation for a sustainable 
commitment to a strong currency since banks linked to industry might compromise on 
their anti-inflationary strong currency preferences.37
Despite these qualifications there is a strong case for the superior performance of a bank 
credit based system when it comes to delivering low inflation. The case has been made by 
Adam Posen (1993; 1998) who asserts that universal banks engaged as intermediaries in 
long term lending are more exposed to inflation than capital market based financial 
institutions, and therefore more opposed to inflation than their investment banking 
counterparts, regardless of the interest of industry they lend to. Furthermore, Posen, like 
Walsh, emphasises the advantage of universal bank systems in unifying the banking 
sector, allowing it to transmit opposition to inflation effectively to the central bank. 
(Posen 1993: 48). It can be assumed that this superior signalling mechanism works both 
ways, allowing the central bank to exert greater influence on the inflationary expectations 
of banking and industry in a credit-based financial system.
In all, clear-cut generalisations concerning the optimal financial system in regard to 
sustaining monetary policy commitments are difficult to make. If geared towards a policy
37 On the concept of competitive disinflation, see: Fitoussi et al. (1993).
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of competitive disinflation, a credit-based financial system with strong universal bank- 
industry ties should be more effective in underpinning a strong and stable currency 
strategy. Capital market based systems, with weak ties between finance and industry, 
might perform better on inflation in comparison with a credit based system geared 
towards periodic devaluations, but can be expected to be more discordant on both 
inflation and exchange rate objectives overall. Ultimately, an investigation of the specific 
financial structure-macroeconomic strategy interaction in individual countries is 
required. How do the financial structures of Germany, France and Britain compare on 
this account?
Table 4.2:
France, Germany, UK: Financial structure in the early 1990s
France Germany UK
(1) Household financial liabilities 
(% of disposable income) (1993) 51.0 77.9 102.0
(2) Homeowners as % of total households 
(1994) 54 40 66
(3) Outstanding residential mortgage debt as % GDP 
(1986-96 averages) 22.1 45.1 51.9
(4) Credit at adjustable interest rates, all sectors 
(% of total credit) (1993) 44 39 73
(5) Variable-rate mortgages (% of total mortgages) 
(1993) 10 <10 90
(6) Equity market capitalisation as % GDP 
(end 1990) 26.3 23.6 86.3
(7) Liabilities of non-financial enterprises: % of bank 
loans in total debt liabilities (1993) 80.2 85.1 49.4
Sources: Row 1 and 7: Dombusch et al. (1998:46; 44); Row 2 and 5: Britton & Whitley (1997:153; 154); 
Row 3: Chiuri & Jappelli (2000:22); Row 4: Borio (1995:28); Row 6: IMF (1996:45)
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Britain
Britain represents a classic case of a capital market based system, distinguished by 
distance between industry and finance. With commercial banks not being able to provide 
sufficient long-term finance to industry, and the City of London investment banks mainly 
concerned about international finance, firms in Britain rely on the capital market and 
retained earnings for their financing.38 In reality the result has been not so much an arms- 
length relationship between banks and firms, but a divide.39 Finance, dominated by 
international financial services firms, is mainly interested in low inflation and promoting 
the international financial status of the City of London through a strong currency. 
Industry, on the other hand, following the competitiveness through a weak currency 
pattern, prefers accommodating monetary policy and devaluation (Walsh 2000: 148-9; 
Henning 1994: 337-8).
With conflicting pressures from both sides of the divide, British internal and external 
monetary policy up to the 1990s has been highly inconsistent. Influenced by City 
interests, the government tolerated overvaluation.40 A strong sterling policy, in the 
interests of the City, conflicted with loose domestic monetary policy in the interest of 
industry and households causing chronic balance of payments problems, with the need 
for periods of sharp deflation. The result were stop-go cycles in the British economy, and 
periodic sharp depreciations of sterling. As Henning put it, the conflicting private
38 (Hall 1986; Hutton 1995; Vitols 1997). For the dependence of UK corporate finance on the capital 
market, see Table 4.2, Row (6) and (7).
39 see: Ingham (1984); Kynaston (2001).
40 The financial sector’s share of value added to the economy was about 20 percent in the early 1990s, and 
its interests were conveyed to government by the Bank of England (Hutton 1995: 142-44).
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interests behind British monetary policy led to the “tolerance of overvaluation, flexibility, 
and misalignments” (1994: 338).
The 1990-92 ERM membership experience has been adduced as a typical example for 
the structural inconsistency characterising British exchange rate commitments. Although 
British industry supported ERM membership for the sake of exchange rate stability, 
Britain entered at too high a rate, reflecting City interest in bringing inflation down. Once 
in, the exchange rate was not defended by consistent high interest rate policies. In the 
end, industry demanded devaluation and reflation, whereas the City, never interested in 
exchange rate stability per se, lost interest in the ERM, with inflation having been 
reduced successfully (Walsh 2000: 149-50). Given the divisions in the industry-finance 
structure, the official commitment to the currency peg was inherently unstable.
France
In the early 1990s, France’s political elite had firmly adopted the German strategy of 
competitive disinflation, with the franc fort, representing a de facto no devaluation 
commitment within the ERM, as its external monetary policy component.41 The 
interventionist state realised that stabilisation, credibility and exchange rate stability in 
the ERM could only be achieved through a structural break with the old regime of 
dirigisme itself through deregulation and liberalisation (Loriaux 1997a). At the core of 
the old bank-industry link had been the allocation of cheap credit to selected industries 
through a banking system under tight control of the treasury, described by Perez as a
41 Sandholtz summarises the rationale of competitive disinflation as follows: “Higher inflation elsewhere in 
an adjustable-rate system like the ERM in which realignments were not entirely compensating for
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state-directed system of “selective credit regulation” (1997: 203). The system tried to 
diffuse the costs of rapid modernisation through inflation and periodic devaluation (Hall 
1986: 176). Although the system had been in crisis since the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system, its structures proved highly resistant to attempts to impose an external 
constraint on inflation via ERM membership.42
The resulting structural reforms saw the creation of a domestic financial system geared 
towards low inflation, complementing the franc fort strategy in the ERM (Loriaux 
1997a). The French elite intended to marketise industrial finance along the lines of the 
German model of credit organised by private banks. They intended to shift the principal 
locus of monetary control from the banks to the newly reformed money market, and thus 
facilitate the control of interest rates and monetary growth through intervention by the 
central bank (Loriaux 1991: 225-6)43 As Perez describes (1997: 212-13), contrary to the 
intentions of policymakers, France during the 1990s actually evolved towards an 
increased role for capital markets in the financing of French firms, i.e. the Anglo-Saxon 
model, based on a competitive and liberalised Paris stock market. However, this 
transformation was and still is taking place slowly and gradually, with bank loans still by 
far the dominant form of industrial finance in the early 1990s.44
The state directed shift towards a mixture of the old credit-market based system and a
accumulated inflation differentials, meant that foreign prices rose faster than French prices. Hence the 
increasing price competitiveness of French output” (1996: 264, fn. 120)
42 Loriaux (1991) explains that the functioning of “overdraft economy” was ultimately dependent on the 
inflationary provision of global liquidity by the US during the Bretton Woods period.
43 Perez (1997) asserts that French policymakers choose market-led adjustment over direct intervention, 
thus deflecting political resistance.
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capital-market based structure had nevertheless significant implications already during 
the time of the ERM crisis. In particular, it led to competitive big business relying more 
on the new deregulated capital market. This caused banks to become more orientated 
towards capital market performance, attaching greater importance to low inflation and 
exchange rate stability. Consequently small and medium-sized firms, which remained 
dependent on bank credit and relied on periodic devaluation, lost an important ally in the 
banks (Walsh 2000). Walsh concludes that in the early 1990s this divergence of 
preferences had “...reduced the political power of industry and created space for 
governments to concentrate on stabilising the nominal exchange rate” (2000:124). 
Although these developments theoretically exposed industry to the costs of tight 
monetary policy and the franc fort, in practice government, through its still considerable 
formal and informal control over the semi-public commercial banking sector, continued 
to provide credit to SMEs at affordable interest rates (Perez 1997: 216).
Germany
Germany represented the ideal case of successful competitive disinflation, backed up by 
close ties between a credit-based universal banking system and an export orientated 
industry. Higher inflation elsewhere in the ERM, with realignments not entirely 
compensating for accumulated inflation differentials, was a key factor in German 
competitiveness. The domestic export coalition, which included, in addition to industry 
and banks, major trade unions, was thus interested in maintaining German international 
competitiveness by keeping the D-mark “dynamically undervalued” through price 
stability and exchange rate stability in the ERM (Henning 1994: 246-51; Herr 1989: 19-
44 See Table 4.2, Row (6) and (7). On the nature of financial reform in France see Loriaux (1997a), and
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25). The result was persistent current account surpluses until the early 1990s, and a 
profitable and dynamic export sector at the heart of the German economy, providing and 
protecting well paid jobs for a qualified workforce. Herr speaks here of a “stability- 
oriented mercantilism” underpinning the dominance of the D-mark in the ERM (Herr 
1997: 135-40).
Close bank-industry ties lay at the heart of the “German model” and provided the 
background for the Bundesbank to successfully reconcile exchange rate with price 
stability.45 The creation and maintenance of the EMS was accordingly never opposed by 
the banking system tied in with the export industry, imposing constraints on the 
Bundesbank’s priority of internal over external stability (Henning 1994: 328-30).
At the core of German relationship banking were the big German universal banks and 
major insurance companies, both linked to the export orientated manufacturing sector 
dominating the German economy.46 In the early 1990s, the banks and insurance 
corporations at the centre of Germany’s corporate web not only provided long-term stable 
and cheap credit to industry (see Table 4.2, Row 6 and 7), with an underdeveloped capital 
market largely endogenous to the banking system. The “House Banks” and insurance 
companies were at the apex of corporate strategic decision-making and governance. Story 
describes this as a “nexus of banks, insurance companies and industrial corporations, 
which own each others’ shares and share each others’ supervisory board seats” (1995:
Coleman (1997).
45 On the link between Germany’s industrial-financial structure and Germany’s surplus oriented exchange 
rate policy, see Story (1997).
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14).47 Although these characteristics of German credit-based capitalism began to “fray at 
the edges in the 1990s” under the pressure of internationalisation, deregulation and a 
growing role for arms length equity finance, in 1992/93 the finance-industry relationships 
underpinning internal and external monetary stability in Germany were still, in essence, 
intact.48 Coherence was stronger than in France, given that big industry and banks were 
still integrated in the traditional structure.
4.3.I.3. The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
What matters for the sustainability of a monetary policy giving priority to the defence of 
a strong currency is how costly it is in terms of employment and output. The monetary 
transmission mechanism, that is the speed and extend to which a national financial 
structure spreads contractionary monetary policy into the wider economy, is of critical 
importance (see Dombusch et al. 1998).49
Differences in the monetary transmission mechanism, and thus the interest rate-output 
link across countries, are difficult to measure by econometric methods, as the discussion 
of such attempts by central banks in Dombusch et al. (1998) demonstrates. As a
46 The following description draws on Story (1995); Henning (1994); Edwards & Fischer (1994); Dyson 
(1992).
47 The “Big Three” industrial banks are Deutsche, Dresdner, and Commerz Bank. The largest insurer, 
acting as an industrial holding company, is Allianz.
48 (Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 227-228). On the pressures for change, and the defences put up by the 
German model, see Story (1997).
49 The monetary transmission mechanism differs from the related sacrifice ratio in so far, as it focuses 
directly on how vulnerable an economy is to official interest rate increases, an important aspect when it 
comes to the sustainability of such increases. The sacrifice ratio in contrast refers to the cumulative 
employment and output losses arising from a permanent reduction in inflation. According to Andersen & 
Wascher (1999) the sources of higher sacrifice ratios among countries remain elusive and one should be 
cautious about drawing strong implications for monetary policy.
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consequence Dombusch et al. and Maclennan et al. (1999) discuss the issue by looking 
into the domestic structural features influencing the effect of monetary policy measures. 
They conclude that important institutional differences which exist in asset markets, in 
particular those in housing and credit market, imply large differences in the monetary 
transmission mechanism across European countries. Both studies suggest that, at least as 
far as the early 1990s are concerned, the impact of an EU-wide change in interest rates on 
real activity was highest in the UK, lower in France and lowest in Germany.50 A clear 
indicator for these differences is the credit channel which transmits official interest rate 
increases to bank lending rates (Table 4.3).
Table 43:
France, Germany, UK: Bank lending rate response to a change in the official interest
1 month 1 quarter 2 quarters 1 year 2 years
France 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.60
Germany 0.00 0.32 0.50 0.73 0.91
UK 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Response of bank lending rates (in percentage points) to a 100 basis point rise in the policy rate. 
Source: Borio & Fritz (1995: Table 8)
Which institutional features explain these differences? The character of the monetary 
transmission mechanism is important for the flexibility of interest rates, the wealth effect 
of changing asset prices in response to interest rate changes, and the role of assets as
50 Dombusch et al. (1998) see a recent convergence between France and the UK, related to the growing 
role of the capital market in the financing of firms in France. Maclennan et al.(1999) in contrast insist that 
the UK was and still is an extreme an extreme case.
51 The econometric simulations are for the period of around 1990 to 1994, with the exact start model is 
based on exact start of the period country-specific (Borio & Fritz 1995: 5). The loan rates are standard 
short-term reference rates, e.g. “prime”rates. France: Base rate; Germany: Rate on current account credits, 
average; UK: Prime rate. The official interest rates are repurchasing agreement rates. France: Tender rate, 
generally one week; Germany: PR tender rate, two weeks to one month; UK: Outright purchases, 1 day to 2 
weeks.
source of direct financing and collateral for loans.52 Germany and France, dominated by 
relationship banking, which provided for long-term credit at stable rates to both 
households and firms and pay-as-you go pension systems, were capable of insulating the 
real economy, to some extent, from the contractionary effects of official rate increases 
(see Table 4.2: Row 4 an 6). For France, this aspect contributed to the sustainability of 
the franc fort in 1992/93. The economic performance of Britain on the other hand was, 
and still is, more vulnerable in this respect. Firstly, in a capital-market based system 
credit to firms and households is more short-term and predominantly at variable rates (see 
Table 4.2: Row 3 and 4). Secondly, Britain’s structure of private accommodation centred 
around home ownership (see Table 4.2: Row 2) resulted in the highest level of household 
liabilities of the three countries, mostly in the form of housing mortgages at variable rates 
(Vitols 1997, see Table 4.2: Row 1). Finally, both corporate investment and household 
spending was strongly influenced by falling asset prices in response to rising interest 
rates: firms are vulnerable because they rely heavily on direct financing through equities 
and bonds, the prices of which are sensitive to monetary tightening (See Table 4.2: Row 
6). Households are affected by falling asset prices, through the importance of securities 
for pension funds and of assets as collateral for consumer credit and mortgages. 
Consequently Dombusch et al. conclude:
"Effects of monetary tightening in countries such as France and Germany, characterised by a bank-centred 
financial system, are systematically weaker than in the UK, where the capital markets play a central role in 
the financing of industry. ... A bank cultivates a long-term relationship with its customer: it will thus be 
prepared to absorb, at least temporarily, some effects of an interest rate hike, anticipating that it will be able 
to make this up in the future" (1998:43/44).
52 See Maclennan et al. (1999), and Dombusch et al. (1998). The following discussion draws on these two 
studies.
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In general, the institutional structures of the British financial system contributed to 
inflationary-disinflationary boom-bust cycles as a distinctive characteristic of British 
economic performance. This lies in contrast to the more stable performance of the 
German and French economies. Germany and France were able to achieve disinflation at, 
comparatively, the lowest costs. The fact that their transmission mechanisms were slow 
compared to Britain, when it came to fighting inflation, was normally no disadvantage 
given the low inflation culture in Germany, and the success of competitive disinflation in 
France. But in Germany, in exceptional situations, the Bundesbank was confronted with 
the disadvantages of a slow monetary transmission mechanism. If an inflationary shock 
was combined with uncooperative behaviour from government and wage and price setters 
(as during the early 1990s post-unification boom), the central bank was forced to impose 
prolonged tight monetary policy to bring inflation under control (see Spahn 1988).
The variations in national financial structures rooted in the distinct institutional features 
of the credit-based system in Germany and France, as opposed to those of the capital- 
market based system in Britain, resulted in considerable differences in the degree of 
structural strength backing the strong currency commitments of each of the three 
countries. Rational financial markets should have analysed these variations to improve 
their predictions about the time consistency of these commitments.
151
4.3.2. Labour Market and Wage Bargaining Structures
Wage bargaining systems have been widely recognised as a critical factor in determining 
the sustainability of strong currency commitments. 53 In the case of the ERM, low 
inflation and exchange rate sustainability were dependent on adequate domestic wage 
behaviour in member countries. The EMS did little in itself to promote less inflationary 
wage behaviour (De Grauwe et al. 1996). As for the behaviour of wage setters, the 
premises of “tying one’s hands” through an external peg did not hold. As Reimut 
Jochimsen, a past member of the Bundesbank Council, put it from a German point of 
view:
“Fixing exchange rates without having earned stability on the domestic side does not work. It will only 
work if the long-term stability of money shapes expectations of wage setters. Collective wage bargaining 
fostering responsible behaviour and other labour market frameworks, starting from the basis of a stability 
consensus, will be crucial.”54
Economists have pointed out that wage-push inflation intrinsic in certain wage bargaining 
structures is not the only relevant factor for price stability and exchange rate stability in a 
fixed exchange rate system like the ERM. Factors like capacity utilisation, exchange rate 
adjustments (devaluation effect), government tax and spending policies, international 
price developments are also important. Finally, wage-push inflation will be strongly 
related to national employment rates (Artis & Kontolemis 1996: 77-78; Herr 1997: 124- 
5). Nevertheless, labour market institutions are a critical factor not only in delivering the
53 This has been emphasised in respect to exchange rate stability by both economists from the neo-classical 
side (see: De Grauwe et al. 1996; Artis & Ormerod 1994) and the Post-Keynesian side (Flassbeck 1994; 
Herr 1997). Both Flassbeck and Artis & Ormerod emphasise the link between national pay bargaining 
levels and labour market structures. There exists consensus that wage increases above productivity 
increases undermine the Balance of Payments position of a country, with destabilising effects on the 
external value of the currency. For a good discussion of the importance of labour market behaviour for 
economic performance in EU countries aspiring to form monetary union, see: Ishikawa (1999).
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structural underpinnings of low inflation, but also in facilitating flexible downward 
adjustment of wages and prices.
4.3.2.I. Wage Bargaining Structures in Britain, France and Germany
The behaviour of wage setters was important for the performance of Germany, France
and Britain during the ERM crisis. The problem for Germany was excessive wage 
inflation after reunification, affecting the anchor currency status of the Bundesbank, 
whereas for Britain and France the issue was the manner in which wages responded to 
persistent disinflationary pressure, influencing the unemployment costs of defending the 
peg.
The central argument on the importance of wage bargaining structures for low inflation 
goes back to Calmfors and Driffill (1988). It asserts that given sufficiently encompassing 
wage setting mechanisms in co-ordinated and centralised wage bargaining systems, 
unions will be aware that their agreements have an affect on aggregate prices. If the 
central bank is non-accommodating, co-ordinated wage setters will have an incentive to 
moderate nominal wage increases, resulting in overall improved macroeconomic 
performance, including employment. In un-coordinated, fragmented wage bargaining 
systems on the other hand, where the overall macroeconomic outcome of individual 
settlements is uncertain, and unions are competing with each other, each individual wage
54 “Germany and Europe in Transition: The Task for Economic and Social Policy”. Public Lecture, 
European Institute, London School of Economics, 14 October 1998. See also: Jochimsen (1994).
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setter will demand a wage increment that will be inflationary in the aggregate (Carlin 
&Soskice 1990; Soskice & Iverson 2000; Franzese & Hall 2000).55
Various political economists have built on this basic axiom, coming up with a range of 
variations, centred on the interaction between central bank monetary policy and the 
institutional shape of the wage bargaining system.56 The key assertion is that 
comprehensive, coordinated wage bargaining systems, whether comprising whole 
industrial sectors, as in Germany, or organised encompassing the whole economy, can 
potentially be highly sensitive to signals from the central bank, since these systems 
resolve collective action problems inherent in a fragmented militant wage bargaining 
structure. Comprehensive systems allow for strategic behaviour of social partners, who 
can take the overall effect of wage settlements on inflation, as well as the expected 
reaction by the central bank, into consideration (Hall 1997; Franzese & Hall 2000: 177- 
180).57 Decentralised wage bargaining systems, on the other hand, will be supportive of 
non-accommodating monetary policies only if competing unions will be too weak to push 
through wage increments. This would be the case in a market-liberal regime combining 
non-accommodating monetary policy with commodifying social/employment policies 
(Iversen 2000: 216).
55 An early political economy recognition of the importance of coordinated wage bargaining for low 
inflation is Cameron (1984). For a review of the literature, see Ishikawa (1999: 107-8).
56 For a good overview of the argument, see Iversen et al. (2000).
57 The effectiveness of wage bargaining systems to contribute to low inflation is not just a question of the 
centralisation of union structures, but also of the comprehensiveness of employer confederations (Hall & 
Franzese 1998: 509-10).
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Iversen refines this model by maintaining that in a highly centralised wage bargaining 
structure of the social-democratic type, the capacity of unions to support conservative 
monetary policy might be jeopardised by an excessive need for internal compromises 
within the centralised organisation, leading to “wage drift” (2000: 207-8). As a 
consequence he prefers intermediately centralised systems such as the German sectoral 
bargaining structure.
The paradigm has been further supplemented by the addition of sectoral preferences of 
unions and the political orientation of government. As mentioned above, employees and 
employers in the non-tradables sectors have little interest in maintaining low inflation and 
exchange rate stability, compared to those in the tradable sector, exposed to international 
competition, regardless of the wage bargaining structure. Low inflation behaviour can be 
least expected from the non-traded public sector, where unions can rely on a de facto job 
guarantee by the state, regardless of the contractory monetary response of the central 
bank to excessive wage increases. Consequently Garrett and Way conclude “that 
encompassing labour movements are only associated with desirable macroeconomic 
effects cases when public-sector unions are weak” (2000: 288).
According to Garrett (1998), the efficacy of labour market regimes to improve 
macroeconomic outcomes is also a function of its interaction with the political orientation 
of government. He argues that encompassing labour market institutions will only make 
use of their capacity to contribute to economic stability, if left-wing or Christian 
Democratic parties are in government. Associated with the welfare state, they promise to
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be redistributive and mitigate the uncertainties of globalised capitalism for workers. 
Comprehensive unions, confronted with right wing governments, can, on the other hand, 
use their capability in a highly destabilising fashion. Against this background Garrett 
speaks of “coherent political economies” where
“.. .politically powerful left-wing governments are allied with encompassing labor market institutions and 
where right-wing dominance is coupled with very weak institutions in the labor market” (1998: 49).
Other permutations are considered to result in political instability and inefficiency. 
Garrett qualifies his argument on the efficiency of the corporatist government-labour 
constellation, by admitting that social-democratic corporatist regimes under-performed 
when it came to inflation, the macroeconomic aspect most critical for the economic 
sustainability of a strong currency commitment (1998: 126). Nevertheless he suggests 
that rational financial markets should recognise the overall advantages of such regimes, 
concluding that “...there is no good a priori reason to think that mobile asset holders will 
choose to exit from social democratic corporatist regimes” (1998: 9).
Britain
The British system, characterised by un-coordinated wage bargaining, comes close to 
representing one of the two ideal-types described by Garrett, combining a right-wing 
government with very weak institutions in the labour market. Traditionally, industrial 
relations in Britain have been voluntary, with the state playing a limited role, leaving 
employers and trade unions free to decide on whether and how to enter into a mutual 
relationship to negotiate wages and employment conditions (Ozaki 1999: 68).
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In the 1990s, collective bargaining structures in Britain had become highly decentralised, 
with settlements at the individual company/establishment level predominating. Trade 
union rights had been weakened by the policies of successive conservative governments 
since the early 1980s, abolishing institutional structures aimed at facilitating central 
tripartite negotiations and consultations among the government, employers and 
employees. Furthermore, due to the fragmented structure of organised labour, 
coordination among unions was weak (Hall 1986, Ch. 5). The British union 
confederation, the Trade Union Congress, does not deal with wage issues. As a result, 
unions had little leverage left to disrupt the monetary policy strategy of the conservative 
administration through labour unrest. However, despite the reforms, wage push inflation 
had not been fully brought under control. Chart 2.9 shows that in the first half of the 
1990s wage increases, although moving in line with rising German wages, were high in 
comparison to France, failing to mitigate the nominal appreciation of sterling in this 
period.
France
In contrast to Britain, France in the early 1990s displayed non-inflationary wage 
performance consistent with the ERM peg, demonstrating the success of competitive 
disinflation in this area. As Artus and Salomon claim, this success was owed not to the 
external constraints set by ERM membership but to domestic reforms of the wage 
bargaining structure (Artus & Salomon 1996; Iverson & Pontusson 2000). French trade 
unions were fragmented along ideological, political, religious and professional lines, with 
little coordination between several competing trade union confederations.58 In the 1980s
58 For an overview of French trade union organisations, see Josselin (2001: 60-1)
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and 1990s industrial relations between unions and employers in France were conflictual, 
with inefficient collective bargaining, and the possibility of disruptive strikes in particular 
in the public sector. Though sectoral level collective bargaining was still prevalent in the 
early 1990s, a considerable shift towards bargaining at the firm level had taken place 
since the mid-1980s.
As Ishikawa describes, the reformist elites in the administration planned to remodel 
labour market institutions in order to facilitate German style consensual collective 
bargaining by improving the bargaining position of trade unions at the firm level, in face 
of a fragmented trade union structure at the national level (1999: 60). Paradoxically the 
reforms failed to create German-style trade union power at firm level, but rather eroded 
union power in sector wide bargaining.59 According to Ishikawa, the crucial law, the Loi 
Auroux, “...resulted in a rapid increase in firm agreements to improve efficiency and 
undercut sectoral wage bargaining. ... [it] restored the power of the patronat under 
conditions of greater flexibility” (1999: 61). On top of this, a considerable number of 
employees in small and medium enterprises were not covered at all by collective 
bargaining.
Within these structures, labour unions, although militant, were ineffective in pushing 
through significant wage increases, due to the low unionisation among employees, the 
weakness vis-a-vis employer organisations and the fragmented nature of organised labour
59 For details, see Boyer (1994: 63)
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in France.60 Overall, moderate wage increases in the late 1980s and early 1990s made a 
major contribution to the sustainability of the franc fort, with the recessionary climate of 
1992/93 preventing union militancy from turning to disruptive industrial action. Only 
militant sections of unionised labour in the public sector occasionally challenged the 
economic policies of government, creating the potential for significant disruption after 
the election of a conservative administration in spring 1993. However, since it was not 
the public sector which had to bear the brunt of the adjustment costs of the franc fort 
strategy, awareness of the wider structural weakness of French organised labour should 
have reassured financial markets about the policy’s sustainability.
Germany
The German wage bargaining system has been portrayed as an ideal-type of a 
comprehensive sectoral wage bargaining structure which combines with an independent 
central bank to facilitate internal and external monetary stability.61 Unions are organised 
by 17 industrial sectors, under all-encompassing union confederation, the Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). They engage in consensus-oriented collective bargaining 
with corresponding sectoral employers’ organisations in a sophisticated rule-based 
system of annual wage rounds. Consensus seeking is further supported by elected work
60 Trade union density in France is among the lowest in OECD countries. However, low union density as 
an indicator for low union influence has to be treated carefully. Union density in 1995 was 9.1% in France, 
28.9% in Germany and 32.9% in Britain (Source: ILO 1997), but industrial relations experts agree that the 
influence of unions on wage bargaining and economic decision-making is highest in Germany (see 
Ishikawa 1999).
61 See Franzese & Hall (2000:180-3). Recently, even in Germany comprehensive wage bargaining at the 
sectoral level is on the defensive. Increasingly, collective agreements often include “open clause” that 
allow for modifying firm level agreements to suit the particular conditions of individual companies. 
Significantly, these developments were partly triggered after the 1993 crisis, when sectoral bargaining 
extended to east Germany had proved to be inefficient and inflationary.
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councils at plant level, and co-determination of labour in company decision-making 
through union representation on the supervisory board of large firms.
The German comprehensive collective bargaining system seems particularly well suited 
to respond to the non-accommodating monetary signals by the Bundesbank due to the 
central coordinating role of consensual bargaining in the key electrical and engineering 
manufacturing sectors. The wage increases negotiated in this sector between the powerful 
IG Metall, the metal workers union, and Gesamtmetall, the sectoral employers 
association, serve as the benchmark for other sectoral agreements. Not only is the IG 
Metall aware of the potentially inflationary consequences of its settlements, which are 
generalised throughout the economy, but, representing Germany’s manufacturing export 
sector, it is also strongly concerned about maintaining unit labour costs at internationally 
competitive levels. As Franzese and Hall put it, the actors in the key sectors of the 
German wage bargaining structure are “especially sensitive to signals from the central 
bank, because the restrictive monetary policies that the bank wields not only depress the 
level of economic activity but also tend to appreciate the exchange rate” (2000: 183). 
Given its critical role delivering wage moderation, the IG Metal has been described as 
Germany’s “social Bundesbank” (Incomes Data Services 1996: 123).
However, immediately after reunification, Germany’s collective bargaining system went 
through a phase of exceptional turmoil, exerting the strength and efficacy of the 
comprehensive system to push through excessive wage demands. Responding to the 
massive boost of the east and west German economy through federal deficit spending,
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trade unions, in collaboration with employers’ organisations, demanded wage 
equalisation in east Germany and achieved substantial wage increases in west Germany, 
with the inflationary consequences damaging external competitiveness.
As Flassbeck (1994), Tullio et al. (1996) and Soskice (2000) have pointed out, the 
exceptional temporary breakdown of non-inflationary wage coordination following 
reunification was one of the key reasons for the savage deflation unleashed by the 
Bundesbank. With coordinated wage bargaining temporarily turning into a bilateral 
monopoly of employers and employees organisations to agree excessive pay increases, 
the central bank found itself largely powerless to restore price stability. As a result, 
Germany in 1992/93 actually represented the worst case scenario for wage bargaining 
structures, with powerful trade unions using a well-organised, comprehensive bargaining 
system to take part in what was a general shift towards inflationary behaviour by private 
economic actors, encouraged by irresponsible government deficit spending. In such a 
scenario one would expect financial market agents to invest resources in assessing 
whether Germany’s labour market structure was undergoing permanent change.
4.3.2.2. Labour Market Flexibility
Following the Mundell-Fleming model, a commitment to currency stability means the 
loss of monetary policy autonomy and the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism. In 
such a situation, speedy and smooth adjustment in the labour markets, through labour 
market flexibility, is critical to allow for a quick reduction of unemployment and return to 
growth. Labour market experts distinguish between several types of labour market 
flexibility. In respect to keeping the cost of disinflation at a minimum, two types of
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flexibility matter: labour cost flexibility and numerical flexibility.62 Labour cost 
flexibility comprises wage and non-wage cost flexibility. Numerical flexibility refers to 
the adjustment of the number of employees or of hours worked.
In 1992/93 cost flexibility was important for Germany, since it would have promised a 
quick response by wage setters to rising unemployment caused by disinflationary 
Bundesbank monetary policies. Cost flexibility was also relevant for the sustainability of 
the ERM pegs of Britain and France, since both countries needed speedy downward 
adjustment of wages to stay competitive as their exchange rates appreciated against non- 
ERM currencies.
For the ERM in 1992/93 the picture is more complex as regards numerical flexibility. On 
the one hand a numerically inflexible labour market would have been advantageous to all 
three countries investigated in coping with contractive monetary policies, since in the 
short-run this would reduce the unemployment costs of disinflation. In the long run, 
however, a lack of numerical flexibility would aggravate the problems encountered by 
business in restoring profitability in a downturn, thus delaying a return to growth. In the 
context of the threat posed by rising unemployment to the immediate political 
sustainability of the strong currency strategy in France, Britain, and even Germany, 
numerical inflexibility was probably of greater direct importance for market credibility. 
The degree of flexibility in both areas is affected by national labour market regulations of
62 The third important type, functional flexibility, refers to the adaptability of the labour force to new tasks, 
restructuring and technological change. This further explanation of this classification see: Atkinson (1987), 
Wood (1989) and Lagos (1994). For a discussion of labour market flexibility, see Streeck (1987), 
Sengenberger (1990) and Auer (1991).
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wages, working hours and employment protection against redundancy etc., i.e. the 
respective labour market regimes of Britain, France and Germany.
Cost Flexibility
By examining the responsiveness of real wages to changes in output and productivity 
between 1962 and 1996, Ishikawa (1999) found that aggregate wage flexibility is highest 
in Germany, followed by France and then Britain. However, given the temporary 
breakdown of the country’s efficient comprehensive wage bargaining system after 
reunification, Germany’s cost flexibility was exceptionally low in 1992/93, which was 
reflected in excessive wage-push inflation. France’s comparatively good record is 
explained by the weak wage bargaining structure described above. The poor record of 
UK cost flexibility demonstrates that the Thatcherite reforms had only succeeded in 
increasing numerical flexibility, failing to significantly increase the responsiveness of 
wage setters to an economic downturn. According to Johnson (1994), due to 
insufficiently flexible labour market structures, the costs of the disinflation necessary to 
make up for an overvalued exchange rate was made worse by an insufficiently rapid fall 
in pay settlements to restore competitiveness
Numerical Flexibility
According to Ishikawa (1999: 251-61), a good indicator for the numerical flexibility of 
national labour market structures is the manner in which employment protection laws 
(EPLs) influence hiring and firing behaviour of firms. These laws set out rules governing 
unfair dismissal, layoffs, severance payments, minimum notice periods, administrative 
authorisation for dismissals and prior discussion with labour representatives. Table 4.4
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indicates the numerical flexibility of labour markets in Britain, France and Germany by 
ranking these countries according to constraints imposed by their EPLs.
Table 4.4:
Britain, France, Germany: Numerical labour market flexibility63
(Ranking by Strictness o f  EPLs)_______________________________________________________
Source O E C D(1994) IO E  (1985)
Bertola
(1990)
EC Ad Hoc 
Survey 
(1995)
T otal
B ritain 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.5 3.5
France 2 2.5 2.4 2.4 9.3
G erm any 2.3 2.5 1.8 2.3 8.9
Source: Ishikawa 1999:261
According to this table, numerical labour market rigidity is very high for France and 
Germany, in contrast to the very flexible structures of Britain. The four sources 
investigated by Ishikawa agree that these differences are due mainly to the much tougher 
restrictions on dismissal, combined with higher compensation requirements, in Germany 
and France, resulting in a significant lower job turnover for these two countries. In 
1992/92 the evidence on both forms of labour market flexibility should have revealed to 
informed analysts that France was best positioned to sustain the strong currency option, 
with high cost flexibility and low numerical flexibility. Germany takes a middle position, 
with equally ‘good’ low numerical flexibility, but exceptionally poor cost flexibility. 
Britain scores worst, with poor cost flexibility and high numerical flexibility, leaving it 
ill-equipped to contain the real appreciation of sterling, while having at the same time to 
cope with rapid increases in unemployment (see Chart 2.8).
63 The table presents the evaluation o f the rigidity o f EPLs by four key sources. In order to compare the 
different rankings, they have been re-adjusted on a scale from 0 (insignificant constraints), 1 (minor 
constraints), 2 (serious constraints), to 3 (fundamental constraints). Column 5 presents the simple sum of  
the ranking numbers, to indicate the relative degree of employment protection in the three countries.
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4.3.3. Political Structures
The importance of political structures, that is, the institutional structure of government, is 
of central interest to comparative and rationalist IPE, since it is ultimately the 
government’s willingness and ability to maintain a strong currency commitment which 
matters for exchange rate stability. According to the widely accepted political business 
cycle argument, in democracies office-seeking politicians interested in electoral 
advantages will always be prone to short-term opportunistic manipulation of short-term 
macroeconomic outcomes. This causes the risks to long-term economic stability and 
therefore the foundations for a sustainable strong currency commitment.64 Opportunistic 
short-term stimulation can be monetary or fiscal, risking economic overheating, which 
will result in internal and external imbalances and instability.
The relationship between government and central bank is critical in this context. The 
ability and willingness of government to undermine exchange rate stability through short­
term monetary policy stimulation depends firstly on whether the government has 
committed itself to fixed exchange rates, and secondly on its control or influence over the 
central bank, i.e. the degree of CBI (Grilli et al. 1991). As for fiscal expansion, according 
to the Mundell-Fleming model, in open economies fiscal stimulation will be particularly 
problematic for the sustainability of fixed exchange rate commitments, since it entails 
additional monetary expansion to maintain exchange rate stability. Furthermore, 
escalating fiscal deficits will make the government inclined to lean on the central bank to
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lower interest rates in an attempt to reduce the debt service and, through inflation, the real 
value of the principal. As such, fiscal laxity, endangering price stability, would result in 
pressure on the currency.65 Even if a strong, independent central bank policy refuses 
monetary expansion and fights fiscal laxity through monetary tightening, a strong 
currency commitment might become politically unsustainable given the disinflationary 
costs of a stand off between government and central bank (Posen 1998). Consequently 
the interest and institutional constraints and incentives faced by politicians in connection 
with opportunistic macroeconomic intervention, matter for sustainability and should 
matter for market credibility.
The degree to which politicians are susceptible to short-term vote-seeking behaviour 
depends on their partisan orientation and the institutional conditions of government. In 
the framework of the short-run Phillips curve, left-wing parties in government are more 
likely to use inflation to create employment than right-wing governments, especially 
before elections.66 Partisan issues are seen to be particularly relevant in the run-up to 
elections, when the risk of vote-seeking reflation is naturally at its highest. It is of 
importance whether the expected new government will be more left wing or intends to 
regain national monetary policy making autonomy.67 According to Leblang and Bernhard 
(2000) the probability of a speculative attack by currency traders increases not simply
64 See Hall 1997: 178-80. For a good review of the political business cycle literature see: Clark et al.
(1998) and Clark & Hallerberg (2000).
65 This has been pointed out by Gros & Thygesen to explain the need for including a three percent upper 
limit on budget deficits in the Maastricht convergence criteria (1998: 327-328).
66 Milner (1997:49). Simmons finds this distinction confirmed by her analysis of exchange rate stability 
during the inter-war period (Simmons 1994).
67 Milner distinguishes here between domestically orientated “hawkish”, and more international 
cooperative “dovish” governments (1997: 37).
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with the prospect of a cabinet change, but also with uncertainty over political instability, 
election dates and outcomes.68 Institutional aspects matter in so far as political systems 
with exogenous election timing, i.e. legally fixed election dates, are supposed to be more 
at risk of short-term manipulation of the economy by politicians than systems with 
endogenous election timing, where politicians can pick the peak of the business cycle for 
elections, without the need for manipulation (Bernhard & Leblang 1999).
Once in office, a government’s weakness or instability is important for the sustainability 
of monetary commitments from a domestic institutional point of view (Grilli et al. 1991; 
Simmons 1994). Critical is the legislature-executive relationship, that is, whether a 
government is unified or divided (Milner 1997). According to Milner, different 
constitutional arrangements will produce different outcomes, with united governments 
better placed to implement the measures necessary to defend a strong currency 
commitment than divided governments, which are weakened by the need for compromise 
and possible splits and instability.
Generally speaking, divided governments are considered to be less likely in majoritarian 
single chamber parliamentary systems. A strong government elected by the one party that 
has won in general elections in what is de facto a two party system, unconstrained by the 
veto power of a second chamber, seems to be ideal here. Government in a presidential 
system would be similarly unified, provided the president, concentrating executive power 
in his hands, and the majority in the legislature come from the same party. But this
68 Political instability as a major obstacle to sound economic policies and the maintenance of strong 
currency commitments has also been identified by Grilli et al. (1991) and Simmons (1994).
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outcome is by no means guaranteed, given that in presidential systems president and 
legislature are elected separately, with the possibility of divided government. Finally, 
governments in parliamentarian proportional systems, which have to rely on multi-party 
coalitions built around the need for political compromises, tend to be weak or instable. 
Such governments can be divided internally between coalition partners, in addition to a 
possible division between government and the legislature in the case of minority 
governments or if the opposition dominates the upper house. A further source of 
weakness in these systems is the possibility of fragmentation and extremism in the 
multiparty spectrum represented in parliament.69
But this parsimonious model has been criticised for its limited usefulness as ideal type. 
Firstly, the superiority of one-chamber systems in delivering on strong currency 
commitments has been questioned. MacIntyre (2001) points out the importance of veto 
power in preventing an overbearing executive from sudden opportunistic policy shifts. 
This argument is supported in respect to strong CBI by Keefer & Stasavage (2000), 
Lohmann (1998) and Posen (1993), who suggest that the embeddedness of an 
independent central bank in a federalist system, with states represented in the second 
chamber, protects and insulates the central bank from political pressure by central 
government. Furthermore, the superiority of majoritarian systems over parliamentarian 
proportional systems has itself come under scrutiny: single party governments may be 
more likely to shift to accommodating monetary policy than incoherent multiparty 
coalitions, since voters will be able to clearly allocate responsibility for disinflation to the
69 This argument has been put forward by Haggard & McCubbins (2001); Hall (1997); Milner (1997); 
Simmons (1994); Grilli et al. (1991).
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ruling party (Mosley 2000). Proportional representational systems are also seen as more 
amenable to exchange rate commitments, since they provide a focal point for coalition 
building, and the costs of electoral defeat are lower for individual parties (Bernhard & 
Leblang 1999). Finally, as Milner points out, majoritarian governments face the 
possibility of division, not because they rely on multiparty backing, but because they 
depend on party discipline within the majority party (1997: 41-2).
The overall picture demonstrates the difficulty of consolidating the views of rational 
political economy into an ideal typical model. Causal pathways for decision-making in 
financial markets appear to be multiple and potentially unstable when it comes to 
government structures as institutional determinants of currency credibility. Distinct 
government systems have their respective advantages, if they come in the right 
configuration. A consensual coalition government, backed by a well functioning 
parliamentarian two chamber system, with checks on party fragmentation, should be as 
well positioned to defend a strong currency commitment as a committed single chamber 
majoritarian parliamentarian government or presidential system. Whereas the former type 
probably has more to offer in terms of the wider social embeddedness of the monetary 
commitment, the latter has advantages as to sheer strength and stability, when it comes to 
sustaining such a commitment in hard times. How do the three country cases shape up 
against this backdrop?70
The following summary is based on these authors.
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Britain
The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament: the 
House of Commons (659 seats), elected by majority voting to serve five years with the 
possibility of earlier elections under endogenous election timing, and the House of Lords, 
comprising non-hereditary and hereditary peers (CIA 2000). In the early 1990s Britain 
represented a rare case of a highly unitary state, with a single domestic source of power 
in Westminster. Not only was power centralised in the hands of the national executive, 
with no voice for the regions, the executive was also dominating the legislature, due the 
majoritarian two-party system in the lower house, and an upper house without any 
relevant veto powers.71 The result was de facto a majoritarian single chamber system 
(Dunleavy 1997; Hall 1986).
This system allows for what Dunleavy described as “a potential concentration of 
executive power unparalleled in any other liberal democracy” (1997: 130). He lists a 
range of key components of this highly centralised Westminster system: first, the 
permanent duopoly of power over parliament by government and opposition leadership, 
through an effective whips system, to maintain party discipline; second, the large 
freedom for executive action by government from checks by the legislature; third, strong 
central government’s control over all subordinate agencies and local governments; fourth, 
extensive protections from judicial interference; and fifth, the capacity of the two main 
party elites to rearrange any aspect of an unwritten constitutional order.
70 The following review of constitutional systems in the UK, France, and Germany draws on information 
from Keesing’s Record of World Events, and CIA (2000).
71 After 1997 the new Labour government proceeded with devolution of power to Scotland and Wales.
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This constitutional setting allows British politics to be run by a close-knit “core 
executive”, comprising a small number of cabinet members and top civil servants, with 
the Cabinet Office, the Treasury, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the key 
ministries (Hood &James 1997). Although in the early 1990s the two main parties 
appeared polarised, with the Labour Party strongly associated with the trade union 
movement and the Conservative Party seen to be the party of business and City interests 
(Hall 1986: 64-5), the “club ethos” permeating the Westminster system resulted in a 
convergence of views especially on international economic policy objectives (Dunleavy 
1996).
An example of this is the long term mutual concern of both Conservative and Labour 
administrations for the defence of the pound, drawing attention and resources away from 
domestic problems (Hall 1986:58). This consensus was reflected in the general bipartisan 
support for ERM membership. The Conservative administration, who had ruled with a 
comfortable majority of 41 in the 659 seat House of Commons was returned to office in 
the general elections of April 1992, but with a majority reduced to only 21. With this slim 
majority, Prime Minister John Major faced the problem of party discipline typical of 
majoritarian systems, in particular with respect to the highly divisive ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Milner 1997: 233).
France
The Fifth Republic is a highly centralised presidential democracy with a bicameral 
parliamentary system.72 Absolute majority elects the President for a seven year term. He
72 On the tentative steps to distribute power from Paris to the provinces, see Mazey (1994).
appoints the Prime Minister, who is responsible to parliament. The Lower House, the 
National Assembly, has 577 seats; its members are elected by direct popular vote under a 
single-member majoritarian system, for a five-year term. In the upper house, the Senate, 
one-third of the seats are renewed every three years by indirect elections, through a mix 
of majority and proportional voting systems (CIA 2000). The French constitution thus 
defines what Milner dubbed a “semi-presidential system”, with a popularly elected 
president and a cabinet run by a prime minister and dependent on the confidence of the 
national assembly creating two representative agents of the electorate. When the 
parliamentary majority represents the same party as the president, the system can provide 
for strong, unified government. If they are from different parties, divided government, 
know as cohabitation, can result in intense conflict between the President and the Prime 
Minister (Milner 1997: 38).
According to Machin, during the presidencies of Francis Mitterrand in the 1980s and 
1990s, unified government was characterised by a shared leadership pattern with the 
Prime Minister as the key domestic figure, and the President leading in foreign and 
defence policy. Periods of cohabitation, on the other hand, “involved continual 
competitive coexistence, often at the risk of public conflict” (Machin 1994: 107). 
Nevertheless, on the project of furthering the construction europeenne, which had gained 
hegemonic status in the French elites during the 1980s, President and Prime Minister 
cooperated closely, even during periods of cohabitation.
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This was particularly visible in respect of the ERM and EMU during the early 1990s. 
From 1988 until the parliamentary elections of March 1993, Francis Mitterrand had 
presided over a unified minority, Socialist Party government. After the devastating 
election defeat of the scandal-ridden Socialist Party, the Gaullist Rassemblement du 
Peuple (RPR) and the centre right Union pour la Democratic Frangaise (UDF) held 
nearly three quarters of the seats in the National Assembly, and Mitterrand had to govern 
in cohabitation with a RPR-UDF government led by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur. 
The scale of the socialist defeat left the President isolated and forced him to adopt a 
consensual style of cohabitation cooperative, with the prime minister clearly in control of 
the levers of power (Machin & Guyomarch 1994: 321). Consensus was particularly 
strong on the necessity to sustain the franc fort within the ERM, continuing the unified 
stance against devaluation as part of the strategy of competitive disinflation adopted by 
both the right and the left in the mid 1980s.73
The weak position of parliament in France’s presidential system contributed to executive- 
bureaucratic power being an essential feature of the political structure. Peter Hall speaks 
here of France as dirigiste state, organised towards orchestrating the modernisation of the 
French economy through economic planning (Hall 1994). This etatisme of the French 
system sets state power to some extent apart from party politics, by establishing the state 
apparatus as an independent agency (Hall 1986: 164-71). At the heart of this relative 
independence lies the highly coherent and stable administration shaping and 
implementing key policies. With the higher civil service the reserve of an elite shaped by 
the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), the administrative system was governed by
73 See Le Cacheux (1995).
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a small set of grands corps at the heart of key ministries, above all the Ministry of 
Finance, with its Inspection des Finances (Suleiman 1995; Hall 1994).
In the 1980s this cohesive politico-administrative elite had been won over by neo-liberal 
prescriptions and the primacy of European monetary integration. Within the thinking of 
the grands corps elite, the franc fort project had taken on hegemonic position (Josselin 
2001). The Tresor and the Finance Inspectorate were convinced that a strong franc was 
necessary not only for economic reasons, but also in the national interest of France to 
advance the construction europeenne. As a result the government could rely on the 
determination of a highly organised bureaucracy to defend the strong currency 
commitment, shielding it from social pressure, with the prestige and career of civil 
servants tied in with the government’s external monetary strategy.74 The long term goal 
of the dirigiste state helped the government to resist short term electoral cycle 
temptations.
A source of weakness in the French system is that the impressive coherence of the elitist 
French national political structure lies in contrasts with growing legitimacy problems of 
this system and its economic policies in the wider society. This was especially true in the 
early 1990s, when the social costs of disinflation put the social consensus backing the 
government under severe strain. The result was increasing popularity for the extreme left 
Communist Party and the extreme right National Front, with significant representation of 
the Communists in parliament, despite the majoritarian election system.75
74 See Dyson & Featherstone (1999), and Suleiman (1995).
75 See Machin & Guyomarch (1994: 19).
174
The continuous appeal of extremist parties to the French electorate led Grilli et al. to the 
conclusion that political stability in France was weak in comparison to Germany and 
Britain (Grilli et al. 1991: 353-4). Furthermore, splits appeared in the centre parties as 
well, with the franc fort policy strongly criticised by both the socialist left and the 
Gaullist right (Loriaux 1997a: 150). But, as Yves Meny explains, this moral crisis in the 
party system in the early 1990s might actually have strengthened the authority of the 
President over a people searching for authoritarian leadership (1995: 193).
Germany
The Chancellor, elected by the Federal Assembly, leads Germany’s cabinet. The 
bicameral legislature consists of the Bundestag (Federal Assembly: Lower House) and 
the Bundesrat (Federal Council: upper chamber), comprising representatives of the 16 
federal state governments. The Bundestag, with usually 656 seats, is elected for a fixed 
four-year term by popular vote under a system combining direct and proportional 
representation. Each party must win at least 5% of the national vote or three direct 
mandates to gain representation. Key legislation can be reviewed by the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, with half the judges elected by the 
Bundestag and half by the Bundesrat (CIA 2000).
The complex structure of Germany’s political system seems to present a case of divided 
or even fragmented government.76 But the reality of German politics, especially 
economic policy making, displays a remarkable degree of stability and continuity. This is
76 See e.g. Kaltenthaler (1998) for this point of view.
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explained by the multilayered interaction between political and societal actors in an 
interrelated network of institutions. The institutional system of government is 
characterised by a complex set of checks and balances. According to Glaessner, the 
system combines a horizontal separation of power between executive, legislature and 
judiciary, with a vertical separation of powers between the federal, the state and the local 
authorities (1996: 18). The power of the executive, with the Chancellor at its centre 
deciding the broader policy framework, is constrained not only by a bicameral legislature, 
but also by the veto power of the Constitutional Court over legislation and the 
independent Bundesbank.77
In respect of the legislature-executive relationship, effective strong government needs the 
backing not only from a multiparty Bundestag, but also from the federal states 
represented in the upper house. Sturm speaks here of “multiparty government 
compounded by multilevel government” (1996: 118).78 As a consequence unified 
government has been the exception in the history of the Federal Republic, with 
governments backed as a rule by multiparty coalitions in parliament, often facing an 
opposition-dominated upper house. The German parliamentary system features a
77 The Constitutional Court, embodying the strong legal component in German policy-making, can, like the 
Bundesbank, only sustain legitimacy if it acknowledges the wider social and political trends in its decision 
making (Goetz 1996:116).
78 In addition most government functions are shared between the sate and the federal level. Exclusive 
federal administration exists only for the Foreign Office, Defence, and financial administration (Glaessner 
1996).
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complicated set of bodies, designed to produce political compromise through 
institutionalised bargaining.79
The complex system of checks and balances, typical for Germany, shaped the Helmut 
Kohl administration from 1990 to 1994. The government was backed by a centre-right 
coalition of CDU (Christian Democrats) and FDP (Liberals) in parliament, and had to 
seek political consensus or compromise with an SPD (Social Democrats) dominated 
upper house. In addition, it had to face a revision of key legislation by the Constitutional 
Court, as demonstrated by the need to have the Maastricht Treaty approved by the court. 
Finally, although Germany, in contrast to Britain and France, did not have general 
elections scheduled for the 1992/93 period, the ruling coalition had to face three 
important regional elections during this time, in addition to a number of local elections.
This formally fragmented system, requiring persistent bargaining and compromise to 
bring about decisions, works only because it is backed by strong underlying coherence in 
the highly connected German political party and wider societal structure. With radical 
parties marginalised by the election system’s five percent electoral threshold to qualify 
for parliamentary representation, German politics is dominated by the two big “People’s 
Parties” SPD and CDU, which alternate periodically in government by forming coalitions 
with either the FDP, or more recently, the Green party. Not only does this comparatively 
small number of key parties minimise collective action problems, Germany also has a 
centripetal rather than a polarised party system because of what Smith describes as 
“cartel” democracy, with German parties acting more as agents of the state than for
79 See Sturm (1996).
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partisan interests (Smith 1996). This is particularly important when it comes to 
macroeconomic management, where all main parties have converged on the German 
‘stability culture’, rooted in the concepts of German post-war ‘ordo-liberalism’, thus 
allowing for effective compromise in day-to-day politics.80
Finally, the representation of key societal interest groups in the German political system 
of institutionally mediated compromise and consensus is critical. It is in the bargaining 
process between these organisations and political institutions that the foundations for 
political compromise are laid (Kaltenthaler 1998: 113-115). According to Padgett, 
Germany’s organised interest groups
“...help to establish order among the myriad of private interest in society, weaving them into the broader 
fabric of the public interest. Effective systems of interest representation promote social cohesion, 
overcoming the clash of competing interests and resolving conflicts between the private and public sphere.” 
(1996: 233)
In respect of the German corporatist consensus underpinning the economic and especially 
monetary policy management in Germany, the key societal organisations are the peak 
associations of industry and finance, as well as the trade unions.81
In 1992/93 the weakness of this system lay in its inherent complexity. At least 
temporarily, it proved unable to cope with the political, economic and social shock of 
German reunification. Designed to reconcile competing partisan interests, it proved
80 See Smyser (1993).
81 This are for industry the BDI (Confederation of German Industry) and the DIHT (German Chambers of 
Commerce), the BDB (Federation of German Banks) and the GSDS (Association for the Protection of the 
German Saver) for financial services, and for trade unions the DGB (German Trade Union Federation), 
plus the large sectoral trade unions. See Kaltenthaler (1998: Ch.2).
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unable to come up with radical macroeconomic and structural adjustments to respond to 
this challenge. Dyson points at the power of “vested interests to veto radical change to the 
accumulated pattern of state support, of which they were beneficiaries”, as a cause of 
“political blockage to fiscal and structural reforms" (1999: 229).
In 1993 this structural blockage of adjustment resulted in a period of stagflation, raising 
the possibility of a fundamental crisis in Germany’s stability regime. On the one hand, 
the political system procrastinated on fiscal adjustment. On the other hand, the 
fragmented political system with checks in balances shielded the independent central 
bank from political pressure. This allowed the Bundesbank to maintain the 
“Schlingerkurs” between an overall anti-inflationary policy lacking broader societal 
support, and periodic ERM stabilisation in response to high politics until summer 1993.
4.4. Conclusion
It is difficult to interpret national interest-institution patterns against an ideal-typical 
institutional design for specific institutions, since in reality institutions constitute integral 
parts of specific types of national regimes in which they are embedded. Hollingsworth and 
Boyer describe this nexus as a "social system of production":
"Institutions or structures of a country or region are integrated into a social configuration.... While each of [the] 
components has some autonomy and may have some goals that are contradictory to the goals of other 
institutions with which it is integrated, an institutional logic in each society leads institutions to coalesce into a 
complex social configuration.” (1997a: 2)
Using the classification put forward by Hancock (1991), in the 1980s Germany represented 
the ‘social market -democratic corporatist’ regime type, France still the ‘etatist -  centralist’ 
type and Britain the ‘regulated market -  pluralist’ type, being reshaped by Thatcherite
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reforms towards market-liberalism.82 In 1992/93 Germany’s system, distinguished by 
corporatist structures in the private sector, was facing a major regime crisis in the wake of 
reunification. For France, the features of the old dirigiste system where increasingly diluted 
by liberalisation and deregulation.
All three types of regime have specific advantages and disadvantages when it comes to their 
capacity to sustain a strong currency commitment, and in the case of Britain, Germany and 
France their specific capability depends on their historical evolution. A measurement of 
their key institutions against an ideal-type, in a strictly linear fashion, is thus of little use to 
gauge the credibility of the structural factors underpinning a currency commitment. As 
rationalist political economy admits, national institutions must be interpreted as interlocking 
parts of a complex system (Iversen & Pontusson 2000: 19).
Table 4.5 presents a comparative classification of the institutional features of Britain, France 
and Germany, grading the key domestic institutions for their capacity to underpin the time 
consistency of a strong currency commitment on a scale from +2 to -2. Overall institutional 
capacity of each country is then measured by simply adding up the grades for individual 
institutions. The problem with such measurement is that a grading of individual institutional 
features against an ideal type can only narrowly capture the capacity of complex 
institutional configurations in a specific historical situation. I have attempted to overcome 
this problem by giving two indicators for institutional capacity (Table 4.5).
82 This classification fits in with earlier regime type definitions by Zysman (1983), Katzenstein (1983), and 
Hall (1986), indicating stability over time.
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Table 4.5:
France, Germany, UK: The structural sustainability of a strong currency 
commitment
Theoretical
Ideal Britain France Germany
Regime Type
No ideal type Regulated market -  pluralist regime
Statist-centralist 
regime
Social market -  
democratic corporatist 
regime
Financial Structure
Credit based
financial
system
Capital market based 
financial system
Mix of capital market 
and credit based 
financial system
Credit based financial 
system
Formal Actual Formal Actual Formal Actual
Central Bank CBI (-2) -2 (-2) ±0 (+2) + 1
Financial
System
Close bank-
industry
relations
(-2) -2 (-D + 1 (+2) + 1
Monetary
Transmission No ideal type -2 + 2 -1
Labour Market Structure
Formal Actual Formal Actual Formal Actual
Wage
Bargaining
System
Centralised
co-operative
wage
bargaining,
or
decentralised
un­
coordinated
fragmentation
(+2) + 2 (-2) -2 (+2) -2
Labour
Market
Flexibility
No ideal type -1 +1 ±0
Political Structure
Formal Actual Formal Actual Formal Actual
Government
System
Centralised
one chamber
majoritarian
parliamentary/
unified
presidential
system,
or
fragmented 
checks and 
balances plus 
CBI
(+2) ±0 (±0) + 1 (+2) +1
Formal Actual Formal Actual Formal Actual
Results (-3) -5 (-2) + 3 (+7) ± 0
+ 2 = very good
+1 = good
± 0  = neutral
-1 = bad
- 2 = very bad
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The first measures formal capacity as defined by the legal-organisational constitution of an 
institution against the ideal-typical design suggested by domestic structures approaches, 
including rationalist institutionalism. The second gives an adjusted measure for the actual 
institutional capacity in 1992/93 as embedded in the complex national institutional 
structure.83
The results of the table indicate that, with regard to combining financial, labour market and 
government structures into a coherent regime supporting a strong currency, in 1992/93 
France offered the most credible regime, German credibility was weakened but still intact, 
and Britain had the least credible institutional system. Differences between this result and 
the formal institutional capacity of the three countries, judged against the ideal-type, can be 
explained by differences in the actual status of the key institutions.
Firstly, in the ideal typical institutional design suggested by rationalist institutionalism, 
political and economic central bank independence should be supported by political checks 
and balances and a banking sector interested in a combination of low inflation and exchange 
rate stability. In this regard Germany would score top results, with France and the UK at the 
other end of the scale. But this picture has to be qualified for 1992/93, when the societal 
embeddedness looked fragile in the case of Germany, whereas in France moves were 
undertaken to grant the Banque of France independence and the banking sector was 
increasingly having a stake in the franc fort strategy. Only in the case of Britain did ideal- 
typical weakness and real weakness in regard to the willingness and ability of the Bank of
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England to defend exchange rate stability overlap. Not only were the Bank’s monetary 
policy decisions set out by government, it was also closely linked to the City of London, 
which had lost interest in the ERM.
As regards the broader financial structure, the ideal-typical model of domestic structures 
approaches seems to capture the reality of Germany and Britain, with Germany’s credit 
based banking system and export orientated competitive industrial sector forming an ideal 
combination to back both low inflation and exchange rate stability. Meanwhile, the British 
split between a capital market based financial sector and industry was detrimental for 
domestic and external monetary instability. For France, the model has to be applied broadly, 
taking account of the fact that a weakening industry-finance relationship shielded the franc 
fort strategy from the pressures of firms accustomed to devaluations and inflationary 
financing. As for the structural determination of the monetary transmission mechanism, it is 
difficult to come up with an ideal type for pegged exchange rate regimes.
Whether a speedy monetary transmission is desirable depends on whether disinflation is 
pursued in response to domestic inflation by the leader and leads to excessive monetary 
tightening in follower countries. In 1992/93 Germany needed speedy adjustment in response 
to Bundesbank disinflation, and was hindered by structures resulting in a slow, although 
smooth adjustment mechanism. In the case of France, however, an equally slow and smooth 
transmission mechanism (although for different structural reasons) shielded the real 
economy from possible deflation. Britain was in the worst position, with its financial
83 The first measure is given in parenthesis, since it is actual capacity which should matter for financial 
markets.
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structures resulting in a quick and disruptive transmission mechanism amplifying the 
problems of following the Bundesbank monetary policies.
For wage bargaining structures the ideal models, derived from rationalist institutionalist 
political economy, only apply to the 1992/93 reality of Britain and France. In the case of 
Britain, representing the ideal of a fragmented wage bargaining system combined with 
commodifying market-liberal government policies by a conservative administration, the 
reality of 1992 matches ideal typical predictions. In the face of recession the regime 
delivered non-inflationaiy acquiescence from the labour force with monetary austerity, 
despite low labour market flexibility. In France, the ideal typical model is similarly 
confirmed by real outcomes. The country experienced dissent by sections of organised 
labour in response to the franc fort strategy, which did not allow even the socialist 
government to offer a trade-off between welfare spending and wage moderation. But, in line 
with rationalist institutionalist predictions, the weakness of union power inherent in the 
fragmented union structure made militant protest ineffective. High labour market flexibility 
combined with unemployment to keep wage increases low. For Germany, on the other hand, 
ideal-typical predictions and reality diverge. Combining a comprehensive co-ordinated wage 
bargaining system with a political system committed to the welfare state, the country 
represents a show-case for the second ideal-type of structures supporting wage moderation. 
But in the specific circumstances following German reunification, the comprehensive 
corporatist wage bargaining system turned from a structure supporting price stability into an 
engine pushing inflation, with the country experiencing an extraordinary phase of high 
upward wage flexibility.
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As for the government structure, the ideal typical predictions derived from rationalist 
institutionalism hold only in part for the situation in 1992/93. The unified majoritarian single 
chamber party system, as represented by Britain, had ambiguous results with respect to 
strengthening the UK government’s exchange rate commitment in 1992. On the one hand, 
this structure endowed Britain with a strong government with an impressive capacity to stick 
rigidly to its commitment in the face of deteriorating economic conditions. On the other 
hand, as the September 1992 episode demonstrated, the British governmental structure 
allowed the government to renege on its commitment in a sudden U-turn of strategy. As 
predicted by rationalist institutionalism, this had to do with internal divisions in the 
governing parliamentary party.
Federal Germany on the other hand, with its fragmented proportional parliamentarian 
system, was, according to the rationalist model, a clear case of weak government and should 
accordingly have lacked consistency when it came to defending its strong currency strategy. 
Although these predictions seem to have been borne out in 1992/93, the temporary 
weakness of the German governmental institutions was not owed to intrinsic structural 
divisions. The diverse governmental structures failed, not because the consensus seeking 
mechanisms which interlinked them had collapsed, but because the stability consensus was 
temporarily replaced by the broad acceptance by all political actors, that the integration of 
east Germany had to take priority over price and exchange rate stability.
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Finally, in France, following rationalist institutionalism, the semi-presidential system gave 
the executive substantial power to give in to the temptations of the electoral cycle, especially 
in situations of unity between the president and the government. France’s political system, 
from an ideal-typical point of view, was therefore badly positioned to deliver time 
consistency. However, in the reality of 1992/93, the unified socialist government sustained 
the franc fort in the run up to parliamentary elections, thereby contributing to its devastating 
defeat. In the following period of cohabitation, the new conservative government continued 
with this strategy despite internal divisions and the weakness of the president. This 
remarkable consistency is explained by institutional ‘French exeptionalism’: the power of 
the highly organised administrative bureaucracy in the French dirigiste system, committed 
to the franc fort.
Financial market participants, wishing to optimise their predictions of monetary policy 
outcomes during the ERM crisis by systematically taking domestic institutional capacity 
into account, would have faced a difficult task. Not only would this have required 
sophisticated and time-consuming analysis of individual national structures similar to that 
of rationalist institutionalism. Market participants would also have had to interpret this 
analysis to take account of the complex institutional interconnectedness characteristic of 
the British, German and French political economy. Furthermore, they would have had to 
adjust their interpretation to the specific socio-political situation in each country in 
1992/93. Only then would information available on domestic structures have been 
analysed in an optimising fashion. As academic studies demonstrate, the systematic 
application of functional models of domestic structures to specific situations and
countries demands a high degree of expertise and is time consuming. The following 
empirical chapters will investigate how decision-making in financial markets coped in 
practice with information about domestic institutions as variables influencing policy 
outcomes.
Chapter 5:
Sterling during the ERM Crisis
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5.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the first o f three case studies of the 1992/93 ERM crisis, focusing on 
the crisis of pound sterling, which led to its withdrawal from the ERM on 16 September 
1992. How did market sentiment towards sterling evolve over the 12-month period preceding 
“Black Wednesday” and how did domestic institutions affect it?
From a structural point of view the time inconsistency of the British commitment to defend 
parity within the ERM is not surprising. In Chapter Four I established that the structural 
sustainability of the British strong currency commitment was indeed weak. The Treasury and 
not the central bank de facto set monetary policy. Arms-length bank-industry relations meant 
that City finance had little deeper interest in exchange rate stability, whereas industry, 
although interested in external stability, was used to regaining cost competitiveness through 
sterling depreciations. Most importantly, Britain’s highly centralised political structure gave 
the government relative autonomy not to undertake currency commitments, and also to break 
them if it was politically expedient. Such behaviour was especially likely in situations of 
small government majorities with possible backbench dissent, since the characteristics of the 
British monetary transmission mechanism made a decisive defence of the currency costly for 
the electorate. Overall, the British institutional regime thus displayed little coherence when it 
came to backing the ERM peg.
In this context what has to be explained is not so much the ultimate credibility crisis of 
sterling, but rather why the ERM peg suffered from a fully blown credibility crisis only as 
late as September 1992. The Chapter will conclude that this was due to a general neglect of
domestic structures by financial market participants, except for the politically highly sensitive 
credit structure. But even this structure was only taken into consideration unsystematically, in 
an ad hoc way triggered by policy-making decisions. Although acutely aware of the issue of 
political sustainability of the exchange rate commitment beyond narrow economic 
fundamentals sustainability, financial markets in general relied upon direct policy outcome 
indicators, such as official British and German interest rates, unemployment rates, GDP 
figures and opinion polls before the general election, to gauge this sustainability. These 
variables did little to reassure markets of the time consistency of the government’s monetary 
policy strategy. To overcome uncertainty, market participants joined with government in 
strategic denial of the underlying fragility of the ERM stance, only to swing towards 
pessimism, triggered by events in the ERM and an indecisive domestic monetary policy 
response. Deteriorating international and domestic variables were then used as a short-cut to 
diagnose sustainability problems without deeper analysis of structural strains. Overall these 
conclusions confirm the "second generation" inconsistent policy model of exchange rate 
crises, but add a structural-institutional dimension to explain the “too late -  too much” 
behaviour of international investors.
This chapter is organised in four sections: section two gives a brief review of the sterling 
crisis and its interpretation in the literature. Section three presents the findings of my 
qualitative analysis of the relative relevance of different factors in the formation of market 
sentiment, and section four concludes.
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5.2. Sterling and the ERM Crisis
The crisis o f sterling in the ERM has to be considered against the backdrop o f a hard 
currency policy which, in contrast to that o f France and Germany, was not strategic, but was 
the outcome of the pragmatic ad hoc tactical decision-making which had characterised British 
monetary policy since the end of the Bretton Woods. Critical for this lack o f a long-term 
strategy was that key societal actors in Britain were by-and-large content with a policy of 
benign neglect towards sterling, displaying only periodic and then conflicting interest in a 
monetary policy targeting the exchange rate (see Stephens 1997; Henning 1994). Under these 
conditions o f strategic weakness the government’s commitment to the ERM paradoxically 
turned into dogma, with the actual defence o f the exchange rate indecisive.
Chart 5.1: Exchange rates: DM to FF; £; $
(Daily, 01 November 1991 -0 1  October 1992; 01/11/91 = 100)
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1: 14/11/91. Finnish Markka abandons peg to ECU
2: 11/12/91. Maastricht Treaty agreed.
3: 09/04/92. UK general elections.
4: 02/06/92. Danish referendum on EMU.
5: 03/09/92. ECU lObn borrowing by Bank of England announced
6: 16/09/92. “Black Wednesday”. UK leaves ERM.
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Chart 5.2: Britain: short-term interest rates
(Daily; 01 November 19 91- 01  October 1992; differential with German rates)
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2: 11/12/91. Maastricht Treaty agreed.
3: 09/04/92. UK general elections.
4: 02/06/92. Danish referendum on EMU.
5: 03/09/92. ECU lObn borrowing by Bank of England announced
6: 16/09/92. “Black Wednesday”. UK leaves ERM.
5.2.1. Politics and the Pound in 1991/92
British membership o f the ERM lasted from 8 October 1990 until 16 September 1992 (’’Black 
Wednesday”) when sterling was forced to quit the ERM by overwhelming speculative 
pressure from the foreign exchange markets.1 Politically, this period represents the beginning 
of the end of a long period o f majority government by the Conservative party which had 
lasted since 1979. Britain had entered the ERM with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister.
1 The following historical review is based on Philip Stephens’ excellent history of the pound in the ERM 
(Stephens 1997)and the accounts o f Connolly (1995), Grahl (1997), Dyson (1994), Leigh-Pemberton (1993).
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After her resignation over the European strategy of the Conservative government in 
November 1990, John Major, who had taken sterling into the ERM as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, took over as Prime Minister and managed to return the Tories to power for a 
fourth term in April 1992, in spite of the economic strains experienced by the country.
Economically, the period of British membership in the ERM was characterised by 
disinflation, with deepening recession, escalating budget deficits and rising unemployment.2 
Only after September 1992, when Britain was freed from the external constraint on its 
monetary policy autonomy by ERM membership, did economic growth set in and 
unemployment fall. The pound entered the ERM at a central rate of DM 2.95, and within the 
wider fluctuation band o f +/- 6%.
The following features stand out in this period: ERM entry was the outcome of narrow 
cabinet decision-making, ERM membership was more the result of a lack of alternatives than 
of a strategic policy shift, ERM policy was driven more by party political divisions and 
electoral concerns than interest group preferences, monetary policy autonomy was reluctantly 
and only partially surrendered to Bundesbank leadership and, finally, the ERM parity became 
a “badge of pride” for the government.
Britain entered the ERM after alternative monetary policy frameworks, such as monetarist 
money supply targeting in the early 1980s and shadowing the D-mark in the late 1980s, had 
been discredited, having contributed to the boom-bust cycles typical of British economic 
performance. Economically, the ERM was widely seen as the only option left to deal with the 
inflationary consequences of the “Lawson boom” of the late 1980s. Politically, the decision
2 See Charts 2.7, 2.3, 2.8, and Appendix, Table 2.
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to join represented a triumph of the European integrationist Foreign Office over the sceptical 
Prime Minister. This situation was reflected by the high central rate of DM 2.95 at which 
sterling joined. Although it exposed Britain to competitiveness problems, it was chosen 
because of its anti-inflationary impact and for reasons of national prestige, to appease 
eurosceptic concerns within the governing Conservative Party by entering the ERM from a 
position of strength, against the advice of the Bundesbank.
From the beginning, ERM policy was therefore shaped by narrow political manoeuvrings in 
the ruling party reflecting the structure of state-society relations in Britain, which gives the 
government a high degree of autonomy from societal influence. Throughout the period of 
membership the strategy chosen by the conservative government was characterised more by 
appeasing eurosceptic backbenchers and by electoral considerations than by economic 
interest groups (see Fioretos 2001: 228-9). Inner-party divisions became critical in particular 
after the conservative election victory in April 1992, which returned the government with a 
slim House of Commons majority of only 21 seats. Of particular concern for the new 
administration was the exposure of its core constituency, the home-owning middle classes 
with huge mortgage debt, to official interest increases in defence of the external value of the 
pound. This added to similar problems stemming from a highly leveraged corporate sector 
and strains within the banking system.
As a result the defence of the exchange rate commitment lacked consistency from the outset. 
Contrary to the practice of other ERM countries, the Bank of England under the control of the 
Treasury did not shadow Bundesbank monetary policy, but exploited whatever room the 
ERM constraint allowed for domestic monetary policy autonomy. It opted for an independent 
path of official interest rate cuts against the trend of Bundesbank rate increases until May 
1992 and then left rates unchanged despite mounting ERM tensions, relying on intervention
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to defend sterling. The bank rate was only increased on “Black Wednesday”, too late to 
prevent sterling being forced out of the ERM (see Chart 2.2). The Major government tried to 
make up for this politically opportunistic monetary policy weakness by talking tough, 
elevating sterling’s ERM parity to a “badge of pride” (Stephens 1997: 261). By suggesting 
that it was impossible for his government to survive a sterling devaluation, the government 
forwent an orderly exit strategy. Unwilling to raise official interest rates, the half-hearted 
followership of the Bundesbank left the Treasury ultimately at its mercy when speculative 
pressure mounted. When the German central bank refused to cut interest rates in response to 
British demands in the beginning of September, the British ERM strategy had collapsed, and 
sterling became highly vulnerable to speculative attack.
1992: Domestic Tensions 
The high-risk and ad hoc exchange rate policy by the British government is explained by the
incoherent rootedness of ERM membership in the wider societal structure. The uncoordinated
key institutions of British politics and economics remained mostly ambivalent about to the
idea of turning a fixed exchange rate into the linchpin of monetary policy-making, depriving
the government’s policy of consistent structural foundations and shaping influence.
Lack of co-ordination and structural incoherence was also present in the institutions of central 
government itself. Only the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office were unambiguous 
supporters of ERM membership and the defence of parity, both being motivated by the high 
politics of establishing Britain as an influential player in the rapidly advancing project of 
European integration. But the Treasury and the Bank of England were deeply ambivalent 
towards EMU, following the policy instructions of the Prime Minister with lingering doubts. 
Backing for the Prime Minister in the governing Conservative Party was equally weak, with 
the parliamentary majority divided between Euro-philes and anti-ERM Euro-skeptics. The
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opposition Labour Party took an opportunistic stance towards ERM membership. Although it 
declared its support for entry and the defence of the pound, in order to banish fears of 
inflationary spending and monetary easing by a future Labour government, in 1992 it tacitly 
favoured devaluation as part of a return to a monetary policy stimulating growth and 
employment (Stephens 1997: 262).3
The ambivalence of policy-makers towards the ERM was reflected in the stance of financial 
interests in the City and the interests of industry. Bankers and City analysts were 
fundamentally interested in price stability and not exchange rate stability, but, in the specific 
circumstances of the 1990s, came to support ERM entry as a means to control inflation. Once 
inflation had been brought under control, the City lost interest in ERM membership, in 
particular because ERM-induced disinflation continued, putting the banking sector under 
strain (Walsh 2000). Industry, represented by the CBI and the Institute of Directors was more 
fundamentally supportive of exchange rate stability through ERM membership, hoping for a 
more stable internal and external monetary policy environment and a stake in European 
integration. But it wanted membership at a competitive rate, with the option of occasional 
devaluations. When the actual ERM policy turned out to be anti-growth and rigidly 
committed to a very high exchange rate, industry demanded lower interest rates, implying 
devaluation (Stephens 1997).
Organised labour, weakened by the Thatcherite industrial relations reforms of the 1980s, was 
equally ambivalent towards joining the ERM. The trade union confederation (TUC) 
supported ERM entry as a way to regain some influence over social policy making through 
constructive engagement with Europe. But trade unions associated with the public sector,
3 The Liberal Democrats, of only marginal importance in the House of Commons, followed a more consistent
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such as the GMB, the TGWU and UNISON, remained critical since they preferred to 
maintain monetary policy autonomy in order to stimulate growth and employment (see 
Josselin 2001). When it became clear that the government’s ERM policy was responsible for 
continued deflation and rising unemployment (see Chart 2.8), trade unions in general gave 
priority to an easing of monetary policy, regardless of the consequences for ERM 
membership.
Table 5.1:
Monetary policy interests in Britain in 1991/92
DOMESTIC POLICY EXTRNA]L POLICY
Employment/
Growth Disinflation
ERM
Membership
Devaluation/
Depreciation
Administration
Prime Minister + + + +
Foreign Office + + -
Treasury + + + +
Bank of England + + +
Private Sector
City - Banking + + +
CBI/IoD + + + + + +
Unions
TUC + + - + +
GMB/TGWU/UNISON + + - + +
Political Parties
Conservatives
- Majority + + +
- Back Benchers + + - + +
Labour + + - + +
Liberal Democrats + + + + -
Based on Josselin (2001), Walsh (2000), Moravcsik (1998), Milner (1997), Stephens (1997 , Connolly (1995)
+ + strongly in favour
+ in favour
opposed
strongly opposed 
blank: neutral
pro-ERM political line.
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Given these considerable structural tensions it is remarkable that financial markets waited 
until September 1992 to mount a full-scale attack. This is indicated in particular by the 
development of short-term interest rates. The sterling exchange rate against the D-mark 
deteriorated from the Danish referendum onwards (see Chart 5.1). However, the short-term 
interest rate spread over D-mark rates, which had increased after the referendum, narrowed 
from the beginning of July until the end of August, to shoot up only shortly before “Black 
Wednesday” (Chart 5.2). The empirical investigation has to establish whether this belated 
reaction of financial markets to a growing tension between external strains and domestic 
structural weaknesses is owed to a lack of systematic institutional awareness.
5.2.2. Periodization of the History of the Pound Sterling in the ERM Crisis
Market sentiment towards sterling was investigated during the period from 1 October 1991,
before the Nordic currency crisis and the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, until 16 September 
1992 , “Black Wednesday”, when sterling was forced out of the ERM by speculative 
pressure. Four “crisis episodes” were identified:
■ the pre-Maastricht crisis episode (15 November 1991-12 December 1992);
■ the post-Maastricht crisis episode (16 December 1991-14 January 1992);
■ the pre-election crisis episode (02 March 1992 -  09 April 1992);
■ the Black Wednesday episode (03 June 1992 -  16 September 1992).4
Each of these episodes has been investigated individually. They have been aggregated as "All 
Crisis Episodes" and juxtaposed against “Non-Crisis Episodes” (the aggregate of the periods 
before and between the crisis episodes) to contrast factors influencing negative market 
sentiment with those influencing positive sentiment. Altogether the investigation of market 
sentiment stretches over almost 12 months, broken down into eight periods:
4 For the criteria of delineating these episodes see Chapter Three. Given the erratic behaviour of short-term 
interest rates in the case of Britain (see Chart 5.2), characterised by stochastic one-off spikes in response to data
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1. Sterling stability before the Nordic currency crisis (01 October 1991 -  14 November 
1991). This period was characterised by calm in the ERM and improving economic 
fundamentals for inflation, GDP and the current account, suggesting that the British 
economy could sustain ERM membership.
2. The first severe sterling weakness episode (15 November 1991 -  12 December 1991) 
took place in the context of the Nordic currency crisis and growing apprehension about 
the chances for a successful conclusion of the Maastricht treaty, with the prospect of 
EMU having been a major incentive for Britain’s ERM membership. It culminated with 
the pound reaching a low of DM 2.84 on 9 December 1991, two days before the 
successful conclusion of the Maastricht agreement.
3. A brief moment of recovery, triggered by the conclusion of the treaty, raising hopes that 
sterling would join the narrow band of the ERM (13 December 1991 to 15 December 
1991).
4. A second flurry of speculation against sterling (16 December 1991 -  14 January 1992), 
after the Treasury decided against following the Bundesbank lead to raise interest rates. 
Again, Sterling reached a low of DM 2.84 on 14 January.
5. Sterling recovery in response to the strong US dollar recovery between mid-January and 
the beginning of March and hopes for Bundesbank interest rate cuts (15 January 1992 to 
01 March 1992).
6. After the pound had strengthened to DM 2.88 at the end of February, it was hit once again 
by a third wave of speculative selling (02 March 1992 -  09 April 1992). The growing 
consensus, based on opinion polls, that the general election on 9 April would result in a
releases on domestic and international variables, the periodization of market sentiment is based mainly on 
political events and turning-points in the exchange rate.
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Labour victory or even a politically unstable “hung-parliament” with no clear majority 
played an important role in this.
7. Sterling recovered immediately after the unexpected Tory victory (10 April 1992 to 02 
June 1992). The government used the election victory to embark on a two-pronged 
strategy of proclaiming that sterling had entered the top league of ERM currencies, 
suggesting a move to the narrow band, while alleviating disinflationary pressure through 
an unilateral official interest rate cut on 06 May, raising hopes for imminent economic 
recovery. Internationally, weaknesses in the German economy and pressure for German 
monetary easing conspired in support of sterling. Foreign exchange markets pushed 
sterling up to DM 2.94, close to its central rate, on 1 June 1992.
8. The no-vote on the Maastricht treaty in the Danish referendum triggered the fourth and 
final phase of speculation against sterling (03 June 1992 -  16 September 1992). This 
period is characterised by growing international and domestic tensions and government 
denial. Internationally, the dollar fell rapidly against the D-mark. The Bundesbank 
discount rate hike of 16 July added to ERM tensions, culminating in the devaluation of 
the Italian lira on 14 September. Domestically, the recovery of growth and the current 
account stalled, unemployment was approaching ten percent and strains in the housing 
market and banking system mounted. Politically, the government faced an unruly back­
bench rebellion against the ratification of the Maastricht treaty which put Britain’s future 
European integration at stake. Despite these pressures the administration did not increase 
official interest rates, relying instead on tough no-devaluation pledges and central bank 
intervention for the defence of sterling. This strategy brought brief relief for the pound 
with the announcement on 03 September that the Bank of England had borrowed ECU 
lObn for massive intervention. But the strategy disintegrated when the Bundesbank 
refused to assist Britain with an official interest cut at the Bath meeting of 5-6 September
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and pushed for a realignment of sterling, which was rejected by the Treasury. The 
currency accelerated its decline towards its lowest point in the ERM of DM 2.78. On 16 
September the government withdrew from the ERM in the face o f a massive speculative 
onslaught, after a last ditch attempt to save the peg on the same day by announcing an 
increase in the bank rate to 15 percent had poven futile. It is remarkable that during this 
period of continuous decline of the pound after the Danish referendum short-term interest 
rates could oscillate narrowly around German interest rates, sometimes falling below 
German rates (see Chart 5.2).
5.2.3. Interpretations of the Sterling Crisis
Interpretations of the sterling crisis in the academic literature remain divided as to its causes. 
All three main crisis models are reflected in the various competing explanations. There is 
widespread belief among economists and political scientists that the key reason for the 
sterling crisis was an initial overvaluation of the pound in the ERM (Pons 1993; Portes 1993; 
Johnson 1994; Bareli et.al. 1994; Gros & Thygesen 1998).5 These arguments give some 
support to the “first generation” competitiveness model.6
In contrast, proponents of “second generation” expected policy change model as explanation 
of the crisis emphasise the mounting and ultimately unsustainable unemployment costs of 
disinflation, resulting from the asymmetric structure of the EMS on the British economy. 
According to this view, the root cause of the crisis lies with the cyclical divergence between 
the UK economy and the economy of the anchor currency country Germany (Leigh- 
Pemberton 1993; Bareli et al. 1994; Masson 1994,1995; De Grauwe 1995,1997). Proponents
5 Whether this is was indeed the case remains a matter of academic dispute. Real effective exchange rate 
measurements, in contrast to purchasing power parity indicators, support overvaluation. See Westway (1992); 
Eichengreen & Wyplosz (1993:65-69), and the interchange between Bareli et al. (1994) and Allsop (1994).
What seems to be undisputed is the pound’s overvaluation against the US dollar (Leigh-Pemberton 1993).
6 For the UK current account and REER see Chart 2.5 and 2.6.
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of this view point out factors specific to the UK in this explanation of the sterling crisis. 
According to Masson (1994, 1995), the Major administration managed to convince market 
participants of the time consistency of this commitment up to a point, because of the 
government’s tough rhetoric, but ultimately lost confidence in its willingness to defend the 
peg in the face of rising unemployment. In contrast Bareli et al. (1994) emphasise the 
government’s structural weakness, since it lacked political support for ERM co-operation as a 
result of the narrow majority it could command in Parliament.
Dyson (1994), Grahl (1997) and Eichengreen (2000) expand on the particular structural 
problems of the UK economy by pointing out that the overextended UK banking and credit 
system made it exceptionally vulnerable to deflation. Against this background Congdon 
(1993) concludes that German interest rate levels were not appropriate for Britain, not only 
during the specific cyclical conditions prevailing in 1991/92, but also for general structural 
reasons stemming from the peculiar functioning of the UK housing market. Johnson (1994) 
makes a similar argument for the UK labour market structure, which he considers as lacking 
the downward wage flexibility necessary to allow for real depreciation of sterling in absence 
of nominal devaluation.
The “inconsistent policy view”, related to the expected policy change view and applied to 
Britain by Cobham (1995, 1996, 1997), delivers an explanation of the “Black Wednesday” 
speculative attack as resulting from the credibility problem of the government’s behaviour of 
“strategic denial”. In his view, Britain imposed on markets a monetary policy stance 
inconsistent with domestic equilibrium by neither increasing interest rates in line with the 
Bundesbank nor allowing sterling to depreciate. This was a high-risk strategy, since it caused 
uncertainties in financial markets and invited a one-way bet against the pound.
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Although it has been popular after the crisis to blame speculators for the pound’s exit from 
the ERM, only Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and Eichengreen (2000) support the 
contingent policy change view. They see the sterling crisis as caused by a self-fulfilling 
speculative attack, triggered by the Danish referendum. But the argument that the rejection of 
the Maastricht Treaty put monetary union in question and thus undermined the willingness by 
ERM member states to defend existing parities as a precondition of participation in EMU 
applies to Britain only to a limited extent. It had never been committed to the project in the 
first place, as the Maastricht opt-out demonstrated.7
Overall there is little support for an economics fundamentals explanation of the 1992/93 sterling 
crisis. Most analyses emphasise that the crisis took place because market participants expected 
that the government could not implement and sustain a disinflationary stance consistent with the 
ERM peg and defend this peg effectively under speculative pressure. But political sustainability 
models of the crisis fail to explain why it took so long for market sentiment to realise how 
ultimately fragile the government’s exchange rate commitment was. This is due to the result 
oriented character of most analysis, which pays little attention to the process of how market 
sentiment deteriorated and what factors market participants took into account at certain moments 
in time.
7 The argument has been explicitly rejected by Leigh-Pemberton (1993), who was Governor of the Bank of 
England during the crisis.
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5.3. M arket Sentiment towards the Pound during the ERM Crisis
Chart 5.3: Market sentiment UK: Economic, political, structural variables
(as percentage of text units coded at UK crisis episodes)8
(1) USA
(2) Germany
(3) EMS-EMU
(4) Domestic Economy
(5) Economic Fundamentals
(6) Domestic Politics
(7) Domestic Structures
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
(1) International developments: USA (US monetary policy and US dollar)
(2) International developments: Germany (Bundesbank policy and DM)
(3) International developments: EMS-EMU
(4) Domestic developments: British economic performance and economic policy (including economic 
fundamentals)
(5) Domestic developments: British economic fundamentals only (inflation, BoP, budget deficits)
(6) Domestic developments: British domestic politics (especially elections)
(7) domestic structures (especially central bank; financial, wage bargaining, government structures)
8 The categories in this chart, and the following charts on ‘market sentiment’, refer to noded categories and their 
subordinated categories in the index tree (Appendix , Table 3).
Category [1] = Node ( 4 1 1 )  and ( 4 1 3 ) ;
Category [2] = Nodes (3 2 1 1), ( 3 2 2 1), (3 6);
Category [3] = Nodes (1 4), (1 2 1 1 7), and Nodes (4 3 9), (4 3 11);
Category [4] = Nodes (11)  and (1 2);
Category [5] = Nodes (1 1 1 1), (1 1 1 2), (1 1 1 3), (1 1 1 6), (1 1 2 1), (1 1 2 2), (1 1 2 3), (1 1 2 6);
Category [6] = Node (1 3);
Category [7] = Node (1 5).
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Chart 5.4: M arket sentiment UK: Expectations of pound sterling to weaken in the ERM
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)9
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Chart 5.5: M arket sentiment UK: Concerns about the sustainability of the ERM 
exchange rate commitment
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episodes)10
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10 Node (1 4 1 5).
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The following section will analyse the influence of international and domestic factors on 
market sentiment. It aims to establish in particular the relevance o f domestic structures over 
time, relative to other variables. The relative statistical significance of economic, political 
variables, both domestic and international, and of domestic structural variables is presented in 
Chart 5.3.
The following features stand out: international developments and domestic economic 
variables clearly dominated market sentiment towards sterling in 1991/92, with domestic 
politics and structures paying a comparatively minor role. In particular monetary policy 
developments in Germany and the USA were highly significant. This indicates that the 
sterling crisis might not have happened without the fateful interaction between the monetary 
squeeze imposed by the Bundesbank’s management of the regional anchor currency, and the 
benign neglect of the dollar exchange rate by loose US monetary policy. Furthermore, 
systemic tensions within the EMS, related to political uncertainty about the Maastricht - 
EMU project, were also influential.
Domestic economic variables were of critical importance to markets as key indicators of the 
sustainability of sterling’s ERM parity. Market sentiment distinguished not only in the British 
case, but also that of France and Germany, between two types o f sustainability, which I will 
call balance o f  payments sustainability and political sustainability. Balance of payments 
sustainability is the type of sustainability that matters for the first generation crisis model. It 
is determined by a range of narrow economic fundamentals variables indicating a national 
economy’s competitiveness. The inflation rate, public finances, the trade and current account, 
and, more indirectly, wage developments are of critical importance. Political sustainability
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refers to the time consistency of the political commitment to exchange rate stability. In line 
with the second generation crisis model, variables indicating the vulnerability o f the 
governments exchange rate strategy to the costs of disinflation are important, especially 
economic growth and unemployment.11
Domestic political and structural factors were only looked at narrowly by financial markets. 
Politics mattered only in relation to the general election in April 1992. Domestic structures 
were ignored except for the significant wider financial structure, which was particularly 
vulnerable to disinflation.
Market sentiment throughout the investigated period was uncertain about the strength of 
sterling in the ERM, with a continuously expectation of a weakening o f the exchange rate in 
both crisis and non-crisis episodes (see Chart 5.4). But concerns about the sustainability of 
ERM parity clustered in the Black Wednesday crisis episode (see Chart 5.5). For the FT and 
Salomon Brothers, 100% of all text units which raise concerns about sustainability fall in this 
period.
Firstly this pattern indicates that it was ultimately concerns about the political time 
consistency of the government’s exchange rate commitment, and not worries about unsound 
fundamentals, that caused the collapse in the credibility of sterling. Whereas economic 
fundamentals sustainability improved during ERM membership as a consequence of 
disinflation, political support for the defence of the ERM peg deteriorated with rising 
disinflationary sacrifices.
11 For the crisis models see Chapter 2, esp. Table 2.1.
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Secondly, the sudden collapse o f market confidence indicates a “too late -  too much” 
reaction by markets, which raises questions about the depth o f market analysis. As the 
development of the exchange rate and of short-term interest rates shows (see Chart 2.1 and 
2.2), market sentiment deteriorated following the Danish referendum after a phase of 
euphoria, with a sudden collapse in September 1992. This volatile behaviour might be linked 
to the selective and only occasional attention market participants paid to domestic structures.
My empirical analysis will start with the influence of international factors, followed by 
domestic economic and political indicators. Finally domestic structures variables will be 
investigated.
5.3.1. International Variables
Chart 5.6: M arket sentiment UK: Expectations of US dollar to weaken against the 
D-mark
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)12
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Chart 5.7: M arket sentiment UK: Bundesbank statements
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episodes)13
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Chart 5.8: Market sentiment UK: Concerns about hawkish Bundesbank statements
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episodes)14
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5.3.1.1. The D-Mark/Dollar Cross and Bundesbank Interest Rate Policy
Two developments in the international monetary system were critical for market sentiment
towards sterling: US dollar and D-mark politics. Two aspects stand out: firstly, attention to 
the D-mark/dollar exchange rate reflected volatility in the actual exchange rate (see Chart 5.6 
and 2.1). Secondly, financial markets supported sterling until summer 1992 despite growing 
strains, mainly because of expectations for an imminent easing in German monetary policy 
and for a strengthening of the dollar.
The dollar/D-mark cross was of particular importance for markets in the case of sterling 
because analysts were aware of the exceptionally high dependence of UK trade on the US 
market (see Table 2.3). UK trade was seen to be “...more skewed toward North America 
than that of EC countries.” (SB, 26/06/92:5) Consequently sterling was considered to be at 
“the mercy of the dollar/D-Mark cross, whatever policy the Bank of England may adopt” (FT 
05/09/92:11). As a consequence the D-mark/sterling exchange rate was strongly correlated to 
the D-mark/dollar rate, in contrast to the French franc (see Chart 2.1).15 What stands out in 
the across-time analysis of market sentiment is that expectations for the dollar to weaken 
against the D-mark followed actual DM/$ exchange rate volatility. After a late 1991 peak 
these expectations fell to levels of little significance in the pre-election crisis and the post­
election non-crisis euphoria, only to re-emerge in the Black Wednesday episode (Chart 5.6 
and 2.1). This oscillating market sentiment ignored the persistent widening German-US 
interest rate differential (see Chart 2.2).16 Markets thus acknowledged the specific 
international exposure of sterling, but gauged this exposure by overly relying on short-term 
exchange rate movements.
15 Correlation DM/£ : DM/$: 0.67 (in comparison: correlation DM/FF : DM/$: 0.04).
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Underlying this short-termist attitude was the strong cyclical view markets took of the 
prospects of the D-mark and the dollar. As reflected by all three sources, market participants 
assumed that the US economy, boosted by low interest rates, would recover from its 1991 
recession and that the German economy, with tight Bundesbank interest rates, would slow 
down quickly. With German inflation squeezed, the German central bank would sooner rather 
than later relieve pressure on sterling by cutting official interest rates. Furthermore, from the 
beginning of 1992 onwards the hawkish Bundesbank stance was considered to be 
unsustainable in the face of the weakening German economy, and US recovery was seen to 
be imminent.
The lingering expectations of a cut in German rates gained in strength the longer the 
Bundesbank maintained its hawkish stance, reaching significant levels in summer 1992, just 
in time to delay the Black Wednesday attack (see Table 5.2). “They [the Bundesbank] are 
also keeping an eye on unemployment and slow industrial production growth and it seems 
likely that there will be a cut, just later than anticipated” (Mark Austin, HSBC; FT 
24/06/92:31).17 Whereas the FT reports showed weak hopes, Salomon Brothers were rather 
enthusiastic, with Goldman Sachs the most sober source.
Table 5.2: Bundesbank interest rates: Expectations of an imminent official rate cut
(as percentage share of total expectations on German interest rates)18______________________
 Pre-Maastricht Post-Maastricht Pre-Election Black Wednesday
FT 0% 0% 0% 7%
SB 0% 0% 20% 43%
GS 0% 0% 0% 0%
16 The respective variable (Node 4 113) remained insignificant for the UK.
17 A strong supporter of this view was Salomon Brothers, see SB 31/7/92; 07/08/92; 14/08/92.
18 Text units coded at Node (3 2 1 1 2) as percentage of text units coded at Nodes (3 2 1 1 1), (3 2 1 1 2), 
(3 2 1 1 3), (3 2 1 1 4).
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The problem with this essentially correct analysis was that markets underestimated how long 
it would take to materialise. With their short-term expectations disappointed, market 
sentiment became uncertain and volatile, with temporary excessive swings, relying on ad hoc 
sentiment and rumours. Irritation was growing with regard to German rates when markets, in 
search of confirmation of their expectations of a rate cut, increasingly paid attention to 
Bundesbank statements (Chart 5.7). Concern and uncertainty increased when the German 
central bank was persistent in its hawkish signals during the course of 1992, contrary to the 
trend in opinion prevailing in financial markets (see Chart 5.8).19 In the period between 1 
September and 16 September a high proportion (29%) of all FT reports commented on 
Bundesbank statements. Market irritation became tangible when expectations for a cut in 
German rates were disappointed by the inconclusive outcome of the Bath emergency meeting of 
European finance ministers and central bankers between 4 and 6 September. "There is nothing 
new there at all" commented Jim O'Neill, head of research at Swiss Banking corporation, and 
added "What the market wants to know is when the cut will come." (FT 08/09/92).
With no significant shift in Bundesbank policy materialising, the Italian lira demonstrating that 
unilateral devaluation was on the agenda, and growing uncertainty about the position of the 
French franc in light of the approaching referendum, the swing in market sentiment was 
ultimately ad hoc. It was triggered by a remark from Bundesbank President Schlesinger to the 
press, suggesting the need for a sterling realignment on 15 September.
19 Markets clearly hoped for a Bundesbank interest rate cut for domestic German reasons and international 
considerations relating to the EMU project and the Franco-German axis (see Chapter 6). But, in contrast to the 
case the French franc, expectations for Bundesbank intervention in support for sterling remained insignificant 
(Node 3 4 12).
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Market irritation was demonstrated even more clearly by the changing attitude to the dollar. 
In May 1992, after the dollar rally earlier in the year, Goldman Sachs was speaking of a mere 
overshooting on the downside (GS, May 1992, 7/5: 1.09). One month later bankers saw “that 
the potential is here for a real dollar crisis” (Paul Chertkow, head of global currency research 
at UBS Phillips and Drew; FT 18/07/92: 11), and wondered, with the dollar “collapsing”, 
whether “things aren’t unravelling” (Ian Amstad, Bankers Trust; FT 18/07/92: 11). One 
trader even believed “that dollar depreciation could be part of the US authorities' strategy, 
aiming at boosting export growth” (Neil McKinnon, Yamaichi International London; FT 
07/07/92: 33).
Ultimately, instead of shifting to a more profound, systematic analysis of the state of the two 
economies, markets decided to make up their mind ex post, rather than relying on false 
expectations: “Given the number of “false starts” that the dollar recovery has made, it seems 
likely that markets participants will await an actual change in US/German monetary 
conditions before acquiring dollars enthusiastically” (GS, June 1992, 7/6:1.05).
Market sentiment took the monetary developments in the two top currency countries 
consistently into account as they were recognised to be of critical importance for the 
prospects of sterling. But this account was ad hoc and short-termist, relying excessively on 
unfounded conventions on cyclical developments and the simple extrapolation of exchange 
rate movements.
5.3.1.2. EMU Problems and ERM Tensions
Increasing tensions in the ERM, associated with the prospects for EMU added a critical 
regional dimension to international pressures on the pound. As Chart 5.9 indicates, 
expectations for a devaluation/realignment of the pound were particularly strong before the
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general election and after the Danish referendum. Thus market sentiment seems to have been 
influenced both by domestic as well as systemic factors.
Chart 5.9: Market sentiment UK: Expected devaluation/realignment of sterling
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episodes)20
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The link between EMU problems and realignment expectations for sterling becomes visible 
as early as in the pre-Maastricht crisis episode o f November/December 1991, with financial 
markets concerned about the success o f the Maastricht treaty negotiations on the single 
currency. Concerns resurfaced forcefully after the whole EMU project seemed to have been 
thrown into disarray by the rejection o f the treaty in the Danish referendum of 2 June.
A key reason for the vulnerability to speculative pressure on ERM currencies whose 
governments wanted to qualify for EMU membership were the diminishing prospects for the 
single currency to become reality after the Danish referendum. As an anonymous trader put it 
after 2 June: “ERM realignment expectations can only be encouraged by overnight 
developments. One questions whether the commitment to currency parities will be as durable
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without the external discipline provided by the convergence criteria” (FT 04/06/92:41). But 
since the UK was an unlikely candidate for EMU membership in the first place, given its opt- 
out from the single currency, financial markets should have had little reason for taking the 
Danish referendum as a turning point for the credibility o f the UK government’s commitment 
to the DM 2.95 parity.
However, as Table 5.3 shows, the credibility o f the government’s commitment, often linked 
to statements that a move to the narrow ERM band at the prevailing parity was on the agenda, 
suffered considerably in the wake of the Danish referendum, after it had peaked in the post­
election euphoria. A variation in opinion can be observed between a more confident Salomon 
Brothers and the continuous pessimism of Goldman Sachs, with the FT reflecting average 
market sentiment o f falling, but not collapsing confidence in the time consistency o f the 
sterling peg in the Black Wednesday episode. Goldman Sachs, although sceptical itself, took 
the prevailing overall optimism into account in evaluating the chances for a pound 
devaluation: “The fix markets probably believe that the UK government’s commitment to 
narrow bands is credible.” (GS, May 1992, 7/5: 1.14).
Table 5.3: Market sentiment UK: Concerns about the government’s commitment to 
Sterling’s ERM parity
(as percentage share o f total expectations on the government’s commitment)21_________________________
Pre-Maastricht Post-Maastricht Pre-Election Post-Election Black Wednesday
FT 50% 50% 50% 11% 67%
SB 0% - 50% 5% 40%
GS 100% - 100% 0% 100%
This poses the question why market sentiment towards the pound was sensitive to EMU 
prospects, in spite o f the UK's opt out. One possible explanation, contagion from the
20 Node (43  8 1 1)
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weakness of other ERM currencies, was an insignificant factor not only in general, but also 
specifically for the Black Wednesday episode, for obvious reasons: the Italian lira and 
sterling were the first ERM currencies to suffer from all-out speculative attack and to be 
forced off the peg.22
The systemic reason for the vulnerability of sterling to wider ERM tensions lies in the 
specific link between the UK’s commitment and the credibility of the French franc. Market 
agents realised that John Major had pinned his whole strategy of providing a stable economic 
policy framework on maintaining the peg to the D-mark. Financial markets therefore 
considered unilateral devaluation not to be a strategic option for government, since it would 
only have been possible at the cost of a massive loss of political and economic credibility. 
The only way a British devaluation could be imagined by market participants without a loss 
of credibility was as part of a general realignment including France, the major hard-core 
ERM country after Germany. Goldman Sachs stated this link clearly as early as May 1992, 
before the Danish referendum:
“The attitude of the French authorities is pivotal in determining the likelihood of an ERM 
realignment. At the present time the French would consider themselves members of the hard core 
group of countries. As long as this remains the case a realignment is effectively ruled out since Italy 
and especially the UK have no interest in seeking a more-or-less unilateral devaluation.” (GS May 
1992, 7/5: S.10)
Consequently the credibility of sterling did not collapse immediately after the Danish 
referendum, despite continuous downward pressure on the pound. Only in late August 1992, 
once the French referendum crisis was interpreted as making a realignment of the franc 
likely, did markets see a situation of multiple equilibria emerge for the UK government. A
21 Node (14 12). ERM commitment was a significant issue for market sentiment. The percentage of text units 
coded at this node, as percentage of total crisis episode text units are FT: 12%; SB: 41%; GS 100%.
22 Coding for sterling crisis episodes at the sub-tree of Node (4 3 8 1), excluding Node (43 8 1 1), was 
insignificant.
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•respected forex dealer1 concluded: "Politically, a devaluation is not much more difficult for the 
UK than a rise. I have a feeling that it is being considered. I cannot otherwise explain why rates 
have not yet been raised" (FT 27/08/92: 25).
The UK government was able to “borrow credibility” from the credible French commitment 
to EMU. Markets dealt with uncertainty about the time consistency o f the British ERM by 
taking the short-cut of linking the fate of sterling to the prospects of the French referendum. 
This line of reasoning was pragmatic in-so-far as it reduced the need for a systematic 
evaluation of complex, contradicting and often ambiguous domestic sustainability indicators 
in the light of deeper domestic structures, by simply looking into what were the realistic 
strategic options for the UK government. It did however expose markets to manipulation and 
strategic denial of the government. Prime Minister Major’s tactic of strategic denial, 
substituting decisive monetary policy action in defence of sterling with statements linking the 
fate of his government to sterling’s ERM parity, succeeded in influencing market sentiment 
until the French referendum strains. Financial markets consequently woke up too late to the 
fact that the British government, despite its unwillingness to devalue unilaterally, was unable 
to follow France in defending the peg through consistent monetary policy tightening.
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5.3.2. Domestic Economic and Political Variables
Market participants’ analysis of domestic factors affecting the credibility of sterling was 
influenced by the tension between balance of payments sustainability and political 
sustainability. As for France, a shift from balance of payments ‘fundamental’ concerns to 
political sustainability concerns can be observed for the case of sterling. This shift reflects the 
fact that the competitiveness of the UK economy improved during 1991/92, due to sustained 
disinflation, whereas the domestic sacrifices caused by disinflation increased. Goldman 
Sachs, generally more concerned about political sustainability than Salomon Brothers and the 
FT, suggested a shift in focus as early as May 1992, before the Danish referendum:
"In the days of yore, when men were men and realignments [in the ERM] actually occurred, they 
tended to be a response to some combination of (i) a weak dollar (ii) a huge 'competitiveness' 
discrepancy within the ERM or iii) a balance of payments problem. ... The "traditional" or historical 
rationale for an ERM-reshuffle no longer holds. There may, however, be a new variation. ... 
Sustainability ... will depend on countries being in a position to maintain low inflation rates and 
budget deficits and yet continue to grow and provide jobs." (GS, May 1992, 7,5: 1.13)
The evaluation of the sustainability of sterling’s ERM peg took place in the context of the 
debate about the government’s monetary policy strategy, especially about the direction of the 
Bank of England’s key official interest rate, the “Clearing Bank Base Rate”. In the next 
section I will analyse this debate. I will follow with a detailed investigation of firstly how 
competitiveness related variables and secondly political sustainability related variables 
influenced market sentiment.23
23 Economic performance and economic policy issues “other” than those covered specifically in the subtrees to 
Nodes (2 1) and (2 2) were insignificant. Coding for Nodes (1 1 1 7), (1 1 2 7), (1 2 1 5),
(1 2 2 4) falls well below the significance threshold.
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Monetary Policy: The Shift in Market Sentiment
Chart 5.10: M arket sentiment UK: Expectations of official interest rate policy
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)24
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Chart 5.11: M arket sentiment UK: Expectations of falling official interest rates
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24 Nodes (1 2 1 1 1) (1 2 1 1 2) (1 2 1 1 3) (1 2 1 1 4).
25 Node (12  1 1 2 )
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Chart 5.12: M arket sentiment UK: Expectations of rising official interest rates
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)26
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Expectations o f official monetary policy were highly significant across the period 
investigated, in both crisis and non-crisis episodes. Only in the pre-election phase were 
monetary policy deliberations overshadowed by concerns about the election outcome (see 
Chart 5.10 and 5.18). Overall, market participants were inclined to expect the Base Rate to 
fall. Only in the Black Wednesday crisis episode is a clear shift towards expectations o f an 
increase in official rates statistically evident (see Chart 5.11 and 5.12).
The fact that financial market participants expected a relaxation o f the British monetary 
policy stance could be interpreted as a simple recognition o f the actual trend in monetary 
policy. The Bank of England did not shadow Bundesbank rate increases until Black 
Wednesday, but had actually been pursuing the opposite course o f successive cuts since 
1991, with the Bank Rate being reduced below the German Discount rate after the April 1992
26 Node (1 2 1 1 1 )
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general elections (see Chart 2.2). But market sentiment on this aspect is remarkable in so far 
as investors maintained confidence in sterling until September 1992, in spite of official rates 
falling below their German equivalent and expectations for further monetary easing. This 
attitude reflects a basic inclination on the part of market participants to emphasise that official 
rate cuts were positive by stimulating the recessionary UK economy, but also to neglect that 
theses cuts could be problematic for the external monetary policy strategy. Positive sentiment 
clearly prevailed until summer 1992 when finally the need for a decisive defence of sterling 
through official rate increases was emphasised.
This belated recognition of the latent conflict between British and German monetary policy is 
astounding since markets were clearly aware of the subordinated status of British monetary 
policy to Bundesbank policy since the beginning of 1992:
“To all intents and purposes the pound is a satellite of the D-Mark. The path of UK interest rates is 
now probably more heavily influenced by the path of German interest rates than related to domestic 
British economic developments.” (GS February 1992, 8/2: 1.08).
The main effect of the combination of unilateral monetary easing by the UK monetary 
authorities and a positive reaction from market participants was that the conflict between 
balance of payments sustainability and political sustainability was temporarily defused and 
thus delayed until late summer 1992. By cutting rates the government addressed political 
sustainability concerns arising from the costs of disinflation, thereby prolonging the positive 
influence o f improving competitiveness on market sentiment. Uncertainty about time 
consistency, which would have developed had the government asked for even greater 
disinflationary sacrifices, was thus kept at bay.
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The government’s strong currency rhetoric after its election victory, suggesting a move to the 
narrow ERM band, was critical for the markets sanguine attitude about political sustainability 
prospects. Market participants, under the impression that rates were cut from a position of 
strength, based on sound economic fundamentals and firm political commitment, were 
willing to reward monetary easing through continued confidence. In doing so, markets 
delivered to policymakers cover of the external flank the government’s monetary policy 
strategy had exposed. Furthermore, expectations of German monetary policy helped to calm 
market concerns about the actual divergence of German and British interest rates. Markets 
viewed UK interest rates cuts as essentially only pre-empting forthcoming German cuts, 
demonstrated by the parallel movement of expectations of monetary easing for the two 
currencies (see Chart 5.11 and Table 5.2).
The virtuous cycle combining the government’s strong currency rhetoric and political 
sustainability improving interest rate cuts with growing market confidence, reached its peak 
in the phase of sterling exuberance after the Conservative party’s victory in the general 
elections of 9 April 1992. Market participants then became outright dismissive of the problem 
of interest rate divergence from the anchor currency by seriously entertaining the thought that 
British monetary policy could decouple from the German anchor, in combination with a 
move of sterling to the narrow ERM band at the prevailing DM 2.95 parity. These hopes were 
expressed by Salomon Brothers as late as 31/07/92 as part of an argument that ever more 
insistent calls for lower interest rates in the UK should not lead to exaggerated worries about 
the government’s long-term ERM commitment:
“Low inflation should allow UK short-term interest rates to fall in line with the gradual easing of 
German monetary policy that we expect. ... Alternatively, if German inflation and credit growth 
prove to remain stubbornly high, than falling UK inflation should still allow UK short-term interest 
rates to fall to or even below German levels.” (SB 31/07/92:5)
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Again it was Goldman Sachs who took the contrarian sober view by suggesting that “attempts 
to push rates below German levels will probably end in tears” (GS, May 92, 7/5:2.12). Post­
election market buoyancy towards sterling is confirmed by market reaction to the cut of the 
Bank Rate by 0.5 percent on 5 May, to which investors responded by moving into sterling, 
intimating that further cuts should be possible.
Growing market confidence in the time consistency of the government’s strong currency
commitment, based on the impression that improving competitiveness combined positively
with policy steps to reduce disinflationary pressures, turned out to be an illusion towards
*
September 1992. The illusion can be explained by the susceptibility o f market participants to 
the appearance of strong government suggested by the return of a Conservative 
administration in the election and its subsequent strong currency rhetoric. It was, for a time, 
self-fulfilling, due to the path-dependent nature of market reasoning.
Markets started to question the impression the government had created only when external 
developments in the form of a new dollar crisis, ERM tensions and persistent Bundesbank 
hawkishness forced them to take note of actual government inaction to defend sterling. In this 
systemic context, political sustainability worries re-emerged and financial markets were no 
longer willing to accept the UK government's strategic denial. On 14 July the FT quoted Neil 
McKinnon, chief economist of Yamaichi International:
"There is a mismatch between rhetoric and action. We have seen recently the Bank of Italy raise interest rates as 
a consequence of being in the ERM. The market wants to know whether the British are prepared to do the 
same." (FT 14/07/92: 27).
However, the resilience of the conventions formed during the post-election euphoria was 
amazing. As late as 4 September, in the light of the ECU lObn borrowing by the Bank of
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England to stock up reserves for possible intervention in support of sterling, Salomon 
Brothers emphasised again that the government’s commitment was credible (SB 04/09/92: 5). 
In the same vein Jeremy Hawkins, chief economist at Bank of America was quoted in the FT 
(04/09/92: 29): “Norman Lamont [the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer] is putting his money 
where his mouth is.”
When the spell was finally broken in the light of negative international developments, 
sterling’s credibility was caught up in classic multiple equilibria uncertainty. Although 
interest rates hikes were increasingly considered a necessity in order to demonstrate the time 
consistency of the government’s commitment to ERM parity, the demand for rate increases 
heightened awareness of rising political sustainability tensions. The case was best put by 
Salomon Brothers:
"With monetary policy already tight, the traditional cure for a weak pound - a rate hike - may be 
ineffective.... In the current situation a rate hike may buy a few weeks of currency stability, but unless 
quickly reversed, it could turn the current stagnation into a slump. This development would intensify 
subsequent pressure for lower interest rates, thereby giving little lasting support for sterling." (SB 
28/08/92: 5)
Contributing to the impression of a multiple equilibria situation was the apparent 
inconsistency of the government's interest rate policy with its stated exchange rate 
commitment, highlighted by its giving in to demands by building societies, reducing the 
significant interest rate of National Savings bonds. Here the FT commented "the cut unnerved 
sterling investors because it suggested to them that the government will not tighten monetary 
policy" (FT 10/08/92:25). With the view prevailing in financial markets that interest rate 
increases would not only be ineffective in the medium term, but also that the government was 
unwilling to take such action, a self-fulfilling speculative attack became a one-way bet.
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Market sentiment towards UK monetary policy demonstrates remarkable inconsistency. It was 
caught up in a positive feedback-loop between election results, government rhetoric, and market 
optimism. The event and policy statement driven behaviour created a temporary impression of 
certainty about the prospects of sterling, without having to rely on a systematic deeper analysis 
of political sustainability problems and their structural dimension. But this ad hoc behaviour 
only suppressed, but did not overcome uncertainty about the time consistency of the British 
exchange rate commitment, as the September 1992 “too late -  too much” run on sterling 
demonstrated.
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5.3.2.I. Competitiveness Related Economic Variables
Chart 5.13: M arket sentiment UK:
Strengthening balance of payments position (expectations and fact)
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Chart 5.14: Market sentiment UK: Falling inflation (expectations and fact)
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)28
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Chart 5.15: M arket sentiment UK:
Fiscal deficits and fiscal policy (expectations and fact)
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)29
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Economic variables related to the international competitiveness o f the UK economy and thus 
to the sustainability o f its balance of payments were significant for financial markets.30 In 
addition to the state o f the balance of payments itself (see Chart 5.13), market participants 
paid significant attention to inflation as the critical variable with regard to competitiveness 
(see Chart 5.14).
As Chart 5.13 indicates, direct competitiveness concerns dominated market sentiment in 
particular in the first two crisis episodes in late 1991 and early 1992. The issue was whether 
the UK had a competitiveness problem at the ERM exchange rate o f DM2.95 chosen by the 
government. Financial markets in particular were concerned about the rapid fall o f the dollar 
against the pound. Although this led to drastic deterioration o f sterling's real effective 
exchange rate (Chart 2.6), the current account deficit levelled out during 1992 (see Chart 2.5).
29 Node (1 1 1 2), (1 1 2 2), (1 2 1 2), (1 2 2 2).
30 In the UK case market analysis rarely used the generic term “fundamentals” to summarise competitiveness 
related economic indicators. Coding at the respective nodes remained insignificant [Node (1 1 1 6), (1 12 6)].
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Markets interpreted this as evidence that successful British competitive disinflation against 
Europe had compensated for the decline of competitiveness towards the US. From a 
fundamentals point of view real depreciation due to rapidly falling inflation was considered 
to make up the ground lost by sterling through nominal appreciation against non-ERM 
currencies. Consequently competitiveness concerns had made room for optimism as early as 
April 1992. The view of Salomon Brothers is typical:
"Most frequent arguments for an ERM realignment begin with the assertion that ERM currencies are 
fundamentally misaligned. However, if we compare data on relative unit labour costs, export prices, 
and consumer prices some countries - such as Italy - show significant pressure for a depreciation of 
their currency. If we take expected price developments into account, the United Kingdom does not 
show a competitiveness problem within the ERM. ... The United Kingdom's modest trade imbalance 
with the EC casts doubt on claims that its ERM parity is set too high, while its larger overall trade 
deficit reflects both overvaluation of all European currencies versus the dollar and the yen and the 
country's larger trade share outside Europe. A favourable invisible balance means that the current 
account is stronger than the trade balance." (SB 04/09/92: 3-4)
As with other variables, markets treated good news as no news, with reduced interest in 
balance of payments sustainability from spring 1992 onwards.
Market attention to disinflation differed from market concerns about competitiveness. After 
having fallen from high levels from late 1991 onwards, it rebounded during the Black 
Wednesday crisis episode (see Chart 5.14). This pattern can be explained by the ambiguous 
effect of highly successful British disinflation on sustainability.31
Until the Black Wednesday episode, disinflation was mainly looked at by market participants 
from a balance of payments sustainability point of view. Financial market participants 
welcomed inflation rates lower than those of the anchor currency country as clear evidence 
for the economic sustainability of ERM parity. Even in September 1992, Salomon Brothers
31 For the rapid reduction in consumer price inflation during ERM membership, see Chart 2.4.
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asserted that . .the United Kingdom's disinflation has put it within reach of the low-inflation 
heart of the ERM" (SB 14/09/92: 5).
Over time the optimistic fundamentals sentiment regarding sustained disinflation became less 
prominent in market analysis. The statistical resurgence of market attention during the Black 
Wednesday crisis episode was mainly due to political sustainability concerns, with markets 
now interested in the rising economic and social costs of disinflation.
Budget deficits and public debt were of only periodical relevance for market sentiment, 
although the UK budget deficit was deteriorating rapidly to minus 8 percent of GDP in 1993 
(see Chart 5.15 and Chart 2.3).32 Market participants showed significant concern only in the 
pre-election crisis episode, reflecting fears of a fiscal boost as part of electioneering and of 
fiscal profligacy by an expected new Labour government. The general lack of concern is 
explained firstly by market perceptions that the rising deficit would merely be a cyclical 
response to recession and secondly by market expectations that the deficit would have no 
inflationary consequences, given disinflationary monetary policy. Deficits therefore were of 
little concern from a balance of payments sustainability point o f view, but welcome as an 
urgently needed counter-measure to disinflation from a political sustainability position.
Wage developments were irrelevant to financial market participants. Only Salomon Brothers 
occasionally mentioned moderate wage increases as positive new s.33 Markets paid scant 
attention to wages since, with the economy marred in recession, the output gap growing from 
-0.9 percent of GDP in 1991 to -2.8 percent in 1992 and unemployment rates approaching 11 
percent, employees and trade unions were in no position to push for inflationary wage
32 see also Appendix, Table 2.
33 Neither the FT nor Goldman Sachs mentioned wages. Salomon Brothers attention was insignificant, 
amounting to only 15% of UK units coded at crisis episodes (subtree of Node 1 2 2 3).
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increases.34 In short, all seemed quiet on the wage front, and markets simply did not care to 
bother.
To sum up, competitiveness-related economic variables were taken into account in a selective 
way, with investors mainly focusing on developments that caused concern for the 
sustainability of the balance of payments. Since the balance of payments was improving 
towards sustainability due to disinflationary monetary policy, with fiscal deficits and wage 
increases posing no problem, market interest in competitiveness issues diminished during the 
course of 1992. With markets confident about the narrow sound fundamentals of the UK 
economy, attention turned to the forthcoming general elections of spring 1992. Market 
participants displayed pragmatic short-termism in their attitude to fundamentals, by dealing 
first of all with those variables which gave cause for concern and raised uncertainty, not 
bothering to maintain a consistent systematic analysis once uncertainty was receding.
34 Figures from OECD Economic Outlook 66, Dec. 1999, Statistical Annex.
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5.3.2.2. Political Sustainability Concerns
Explicit concerns about the political sustainability of the government’s disinflationary strong 
currency stance were only significant during the Black Wednesday crisis episode (see Chart 
5.5). This concentration of market concerns in the last crisis episode indicates that lasting 
disinflation resulted in escalating market uncertainty as to whether this strategy was tolerable 
any longer. However, market expectations for a realignment of sterling, which can be taken 
as an indirect indicator for political sustainability concerns, shot up as early as during the pre­
election crisis episode, having previously been insignificant (see Chart 5.9). This indicates 
that the time consistency of the political commitment to exchange rate stability came under 
scrutiny due to market concerns about the growing unpopularity of disinflationary sacrifices 
with the electorate. Before the general elections, markets were uncertain as to the direction 
the new government’s exchange rate policy would take. After the conservative election 
victory, popular disenchantment with disinflation continued to be a critical factor influencing 
market sentiment, now combined with growing ERM tensions:
"In some ways, the pressures beginning to mount in the ERM could be interpreted as a side-effect of 
the regime's 'success'. Sub-par growth and employment performances in many ERM countries, 
especially relative to Germany, have brought down inflation so much that electorates may no longer 
be prepared to sacrifice further losses of output and employment for a few notches more off inflation 
rates, especially since there is precious little evidence that maintenance of low and stable inflation 
produces subsequent economic recovery." (GS, June 1992, 7/6: 1.06)
In the following section the market account of the two key variables indicating the costs of 
disinflation, growth and unemployment, will be analysed. This is followed by an 
investigation of the role the electoral cycle played in the credibility of the government’s 
monetary policy commitment.
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Recession and Unemployment
Chart 5.16: Market sentiment UK: Concerns about recession (expectations and fact)
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)35
Black Wednesday
Pre-Election
Post-Maastricht
Pre-Maastricht
All Crisis Episodes
Non-Crisis Episodes
■  43
r _ . .
1
40
I
__j  75
8 25
' ""16
■ 1 4 4
100
100
100
10<□  GS
■  SB
■  FT
100
10 20 30 40  50  60 70 80
%
90 100
Chart 5.17: M arket sentiment UK: Rising unemployment (expectations and fact)
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)36
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Concern about the lack of economic growth in the UK economy has been significantly high 
throughout the period investigated. Concerns about the lasting recession, having fallen from 
their peak in the December 1991 post-Maastricht crisis episode to the post-election euphoria 
non-crisis episode, reached a new peak in the Black Wednesday crisis episode, when the slow 
recovery of UK GDP seemed to stall (see Chart 5.16 and Chart 2.7). The Danish referendum 
and the subsequent wider ERM tensions seem to have contributed to a rebound of old worries 
that further delays in the expected economic recovery, caused by continued disinflation, were 
becoming politically unacceptable.
The importance of popular support for the credibility o f the government’s exchange rate 
strategy is demonstrated by the influence the persistently rising unemployment figures had on 
market sentiment (see Chart 5.17 and Chart 2.8). With the exception of Goldman Sachs, 
whose consistent high attention to the issue confirms their heightened sensitivity about 
political sustainability, market concerns about unemployment are concentrated in the pre­
election crisis episode, since rising unemployment reduced the chances for re-election of a 
strong government committed to the defence of the ERM parity of sterling. Market 
participants thus demonstrated clear awareness of the importance of the electoral cycle for 
political sustainability, with employment concerns diminishing drastically after the 
confirmation of a Conservative government for another five years.
The account of negative output and rising unemployment by market analysts was rather ad 
hoc and volatile. Electoral concerns were clearly strongly linked to the level of market 
attention. Beyond this, markets seem to have underestimated the continued relevance of these 
two variables after the elections, as the rebound of related concerns in the Back Wednesday 
crisis episode, after a phase of little concern, indicates.
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Elections
Chart 5.18: Market sentiment UK: Election concerns (expectations)
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)37
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Concerns about the outcome of the general election of 9 April were highly significant for the 
pre-election crisis episode (see Chart 5.18).38 The negative sentiment dominating financial 
markets before the election was thus critical for the loss o f confidence in sterling during this 
episode.39
Despite opinion polls indicating that the Conservative government would lose the election, it 
was not so much an expected narrow Labour Party win that worried financial market 
participants, as the possibility o f a “hung parliament”, a situation in which no party would 
have the overall majority. It was therefore the stability o f government, more than its political 
orientation, which mattered to financial market agents. A minority government of either the 
Conservative or the Labour party would have to rely on the support of other parties, making it
37 Node (13  11 2).
38 89% of FT text units, 100% of SB, and 60% of GS dealing with politics were concerned with the general 
election. Attention to an eclectic range o f other political issues remained insignificant [Node (1 3 1 2), (1 3 2 2)].
39 The majority o f text units commenting on the elections voiced negative expectations (FT: 83%, SB 100%, GS 
100%).
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unlikely to sustain the commitment to the pound’s ERM parity, undertaken by the previous 
administration. A possible majority Labour government was of less concern for market 
participants who took the forceful declarations of Labour not to devalue to be credible. 
Wondering about sterling's strength in the face of a strong Labour lead in the opinion polls, 
the FT commented:
“Dealers say that this might be explained by the belief that, as both Conservatives and Labour are 
committed to taking sterling into the narrow band of the ERM at DM 2.95 central rate, sterling has 
less to fear from outright victory by either party than it does from a hung parliament and prolonged 
political uncertainty” (FT 23/03/92: 31)
Market reaction to the unexpected re-election of a Conservative majority government was 
euphoric. Financial market participants pointed to the apparent stability of the new 
government, which was seen to end political uncertainty about time consistency. In the words 
of the FT, it was “investor confidence in the one European country certain to have a stable 
government for the next five years” which boosted sterling (FT 09/05/92: 11). The fact that 
the new government had to rely on a small majority did not seem to diminish the prevailing 
sentiment that the new government would be strong. As Goldman Sachs pointed out:
“The final outcome -  a majority of 21 -  is sufficient to last a full five year term, unless the rate of attrition 
through by-election losses is unusually great. The government can therefore plan ahead for the long term (GS, 
April 1992, 7/4: 3.07).”
That the relative autonomy enjoyed by the Major administration in the UK political system 
could also be used for a short-term reversal of the government’s exchange rate strategy was 
not realised by financial markets until September 1992.
This optimism regarding the long-term commitment of the executive to defend sterling’s 
ERM parity raises the question of why financial market participants were not worried about 
the possibility that the new government could be held hostage on its ERM/EMU strategy by a 
small number of euro-sceptic back-benchers. In fact, British politics was dominated soon
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after the election by a Conservative back-bench rebellion against the government’s wider 
commitment to European integration, threatening to derail the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty in Parliament. Markets took account of the split within the governing Conservative 
Party, but confined their analysis to the actual conflict about the Maastricht treaty, failing to 
understand its implications for the executive’s political economic capacity in general (see GS, 
April 1992, 7/4: 1.09; FT 30/06/92: 26).
Market participants approached the problem of divided government in a superficial, event 
driven, ad hoc manner. In the case of the election result a simplistic belief in the arithmetic of 
majority substituted for a deeper analysis of the vulnerability of the government to internal 
ruling party splits. In the case of the Maastricht treaty, with internal divisions becoming 
manifest, market participants failed to grasp that these events were indicating fundamental 
structural weakness of the government’s policy-making autonomy. Furthermore, they failed 
to realise that this underlying weakness could combine with the government’s capacity to 
make a sudden U-tum on exchange rate strategy.
In judging the prospects of political sustainability, market participants were rational in so far 
as they took account of aspects emphasised by rationalist political economy as critical for 
time consistency: the political business cycle and government unity. Market analysts initially 
assumed that the possibility of a minority government being elected might result in greater 
vulnerability of the exchange rate commitment to the output and employment costs of 
disinflation. With a majority Conservative government confirmed in office for five years, 
markets reacted with relief, assuming renewed political leeway for the administration to 
impose further disinflationary sacrifices.
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However, market concerns about unemployment and falling output rebounded strongly in the 
Black Wednesday episode, indicating that market participants had underestimated the 
vulnerability of the new government. Firstly, their simplistic confidence that the 
government’s majority would deliver long-term time consistency led to selective attention 
being paid to its internal divisions and a neglect of the risks posed by unchecked executive 
power posed to time consistency. Secondly, a short-termist understanding of the political 
business cycle led analysts to neglect the suffering of the core Conservative Party 
constituencies, the business community and the property-owning middle classes, in the face 
of disinflation. Only in summer 1992 did market participants realise that it was uncertain 
whether the Conservative government would be able and willing to defend sterling with 
significant Bank Rate hikes in a situation of speculative attack. Markets failed to understand 
that, although the government did not have to face the electorate for another couple of years, 
such a hike would permanently damage the Conservative Party’s reputation for competent 
monetary policy making. This failure points at a weak understanding in financial markets of 
the structural exposure of the constituency to disinflation.
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5.3.3. Domestic Structures
Chart 5.19: M arket sentiment UK:
Domestic structures: Comparative significance
(text units coded at respective domestic structures node, as percentage of all text units)40
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Chart 5.20: Market sentiment UK: Domestic structures: Government
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)41
Black Wednesday
Pre-Election
Post-Maastricht
Pre- Maastricht
All Crisis Episodes
Non-Crisis EpisodesS 125
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
40 Central bank: Node (1 5  1 1 ); other financial structures: Node (15  12); wage bargaining structures: 
Node (1 5 2); government structures: Node (1 5 3); other structures: Node (1 5 4).
41 Node (1 5 3)
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Chart 5.21: M arket sentiment UK:
Domestic structures: Financial structures (excluding central bank)
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)42
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Market participants took domestic structures into account in a highly selective fashion. A 
single structure, the non-central bank financial structure, stands out, with a persistent, very 
high level o f attention. In contrast, attention to all other domestic structures was non-existent 
or insignificant (see Chart 5.19). Britain thus constitutes an exceptional case of narrowly 
focused market sentiment, in contrast to the broader awareness found in the French and 
German cases (see Chart 6.22 and 7.15).43
Assuming that markets would take into account those structures which gave cause for 
concern from a rationalist institutionalist vantage point (see Chapter Four), in particular, the 
wider financial and the government structure should have been the focus o f market attention. 
Britain’s financial system was wholly unsuited to underpin a monetary policy geared towards 
exchange rate stability. Its international banking was split from industry, and its rapid 
monetary transmission mechanism combined with high levels o f household and corporate
42 Node (15  12).
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debt. The weakness of the de facto single chamber majoritarian government system lay in the 
possibility of internal divisions within the ruling majority party and the autonomy of the 
government to renege easily and quickly on its monetary policy commitments. The actual 
pattern in market sentiment towards domestic structures only marginally reflects rationalist 
institutionalist concerns.
5.3.3.I. The Insignificance of Wage Bargaining Structures and of the Bank of 
England
Market participants completely ignored wage bargaining structures and mentioned the 
constitutional status of the Bank of England only once.44 The lack of attention to wage 
bargaining structures and the position of the central bank in Britain’s economic policy regime 
demonstrates the pragmatic nature of market reasoning towards domestic structures. Wage 
bargaining structures, characterised by weak and fragmented organised trade unions, denied 
workers the organisational capacity to stand up against the Conservative government in a 
situation of rapidly rising unemployment. Consequently market participants confidently 
expected peaceful industrial relations with modest wage increases and chose not to bother 
about structural evaluations.
The lack of market interest in the dependent status of the Bank o f England can be explained 
along similar lines. Given that in practice it was the government’s commitment to exchange 
rate stability that mattered for monetary policy decisions, market participants chose in general 
to take no account of the central bank’s position in the wider British political economic 
structure. However, the moment even a vague possibility emerged for the central bank to be 
turned into a relevant actor by granting it independence, markets took notice:
43 Domestic structures other than the financial, wage bargaining and government structure [Node (15 4)] were 
highly insignificant for market sentiment, with attention falling even below the very low French results.
44 No text units have been coded at Node “wage bargaining structures” (1 5 1 2) for any of the three text 
samples. The Node “central bank” (15 11) registers one single comment by Salomon Brothers.
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“The need to dampen fears over the direction of monetary policy could lead a minority government to accelerate 
a shift towards grater public independence of the Bank of England” (SB 06/03/92: 3).
The lack of influence wage bargaining structures and the status of the central bank had on 
market sentiment indicates that market sentiment understood the suggestion of rationalist 
institutionalism that these structures either posed no problem or were of little relevance for 
time consistency in broad terms, but reacted pragmatically in forgoing systematic 
investigation.
5.3.3.2. Government Structures
The influence of government structures on market sentiment was highly insignificant, 
especially during sterling crisis episodes (see Chart 5.20). The almost total neglect of these 
structures demonstrates the limits of bounded rational market sentiment to come to pertinent 
conclusions. Market expectations were volatile and event driven. After the April general 
elections, market participants substituted simple superficial conventions about the stability 
and strength of majority governments in Britain’s political system for a deeper, systematic 
structural analysis only to discard these conventions for rational herding in September.
The lack of rigorous analysis made markets unaware of the potentially explosive combination 
residing in the specific constellation of the British governmental structure of 1992, which 
combined the intrinsic weakness of majority rule due to internal divisions in the ruling party 
with the power of the executive for sudden unchecked monetary policy reversals. Instead of 
forming longer-term stable expectations about the structural fragility of the government’s 
strong currency commitment, market participants went from ad hoc post-election exuberance 
to ad hoc speculative panic over the course of only five months. Ineffective market reasoning 
caused by the failure to understand the constraints on time consistency imposed by the
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government structure was aggravated by the limited attention paid by market participants to 
the problems posed by the wider financial structure.
5.3.3.3. Financial Structures
The financial structure of Britain (excluding the central bank) significantly influenced market 
sentiment, with the high levels of attention in 1992 only interrupted by the pre-election crisis 
episode and post-election euphoria (see Chart 5.21). As pointed out in the analysis of Chapter 
Three, the UK credit structure, with the housing market in a pivotal position, was inconsistent 
with a prolonged defence of the ERM peg. Financial markets were aware of this specific 
exposure of sterling to the structural weaknesses of the British financial system, indicating 
rational structural evaluation.
Analysis in the financial markets concentrated on the effect of tight monetary policy on a 
banking system whose structural characteristics were variable interest rates and excessive 
levels of household, mortgage and corporate borrowing. Salomon Brothers serves here as a 
good example:
"Falling property prices, the steady uptrend in business failures, together with companies' reports that 
further reductions in employment and investment are planned, are all signs of painfully high debt 
levels. Apart from persistent high debts, the credit squeeze, especially on small business, remains 
acute. ... Rising bad debts are forcing banks to adopt tougher lending standards. The combination of 
high debt levels, high real interest rates and banks' caution over new loans means that there is likely to 
be a protracted period of liquidity accumulation before companies and households feel secure enough 
to start spending in excess of their incomes." (SB 24/04/92:3)
This analysis is later supplemented by the observation that the structural problems on the 
borrower side lay with the dismal state of the housing markets, which in turn affected 
consumer spending:
"Declines in house prices and housing wealth have led to a sharp drop inequity withdrawal.45 The 
importance of the link among personal wealth, equity withdrawal and consumer spending means that 
the prospects for a significant recovery in consumer spending during the remainder of 1992 and into 
1993 rest on a pickup in the housing market." (SB 17/07/92:5)
45 "Equity withdrawal" is the use of mortgage borrowing to finance consumer spending [W.H.].
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The direct reasons for heightened market sensitivity to the financial structure were twofold: 
firstly, the high debt levels meant that high interest rates resulted in debt deflation, which 
postponed the recovery that was urgently needed for political sustainability. As Goldman 
Sachs put it "debt is high, so there can be no recovery" (GS, May 1992, 7/5: 3.05). Secondly, 
markets knew that the main disinflationary cost stemming from the structural exposure of the 
financial system to interest rate increases had be borne by the Tory Party’s key constituency, 
the home-owning middle classes. This became clear in particular during the Black Wednesday 
crisis episode: "The pound may have been weakened by increasing calls from British political 
and business figures for emergency action to stimulate the housing market” (FT 05/08/92: 
23).
However, the fact that market interest in the financial structure receded during the period 
before and after the general election only to remerge in summer 1992 despite continuously 
rising structural strains, indicates that market analysis lacked consistency. The election, as the 
key political event of spring 1992, overdetermined structural concerns. Financial market 
participants focused in an ad hoc fashion on their most urgent concern, the short-term 
election outcome, at the cost of neglecting a systemic structural analysis of financial strains. 
In the aftermath of the election they preferred to give in to ad hoc euphoria, sidelining 
uncertainty associated with mounting problems in the financial structure. Again, market 
behaviour displayed practical reasoning characterised by superficiality and intellectual short­
cuts, confirming the assertions of bounded rationality.
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5.4. Conclusion
Domestic structures influenced financial market sentiment only selectively and periodically. 
Only the wider financial structure affected market sentiment significantly, but was not looked 
into consistently. The selective interest of markets particularly in this structure indicates that 
analysts paid attention only to structures pertaining to uncertainty about the political 
sustainability of the government’s commitment to the ERM peg. Structures other than the 
financial structure were neglected because they seemed to give less reason for concern.
Attention to the credit structure was volatile, varying with the ups and downs of market 
uncertainty about time consistency. When the positive general election result led to a boost of 
confidence in sterling, market interest in the strained British financial system fell, only to rise 
again during the Black Wednesday episode, triggered by growing uncertainty about the 
government’s monetary policy stance. As in the case of France and Germany, by noticing 
structural strains market uncertainty increased. Structural attention was determined by political 
events and monetary policy signals, but played a critical role in market participants losing 
confidence in the government’s policy statements.
This pattern suggests that financial markets by-and large took a rational, although pragmatic 
approach to domestic structures. This rationality was bounded, however, resulting in 
inefficiencies in the market judgement of the credibility of sterling. Because market participants 
acknowledged domestic structures only in a narrow, ad hoc and superficial way, they failed to 
develop stable and consistent expectations of the time consistency of the government’s exchange 
rate commitment, being instead liable to waves of uncertainty interrupted by over-confidence. 
The insufficient, bounded nature of market reasoning is demonstrated firstly by the unsystematic 
selection of the one domestic structure that mattered that for markets in practice. Markets looked 
into the financial structure because of its direct effect on the domestic costs of disinflation. But
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they failed to recognise the subtle features of the political structure, which turned out to be 
critical for time consistency. Secondly, they assessed the credit structure unsystematically, 
relying on direct policy indicators to switch interest on and off. This attitude prevented the 
already overly narrow structural analysis from having a stabilising influence on market 
sentiment.
Market participants were generally reluctant to enter into complex systematic structural 
deliberations in order to clarify how and to what extent domestic structures fundamentally 
constrained the longer-term capability of the government to defend the exchange rate, as long as 
there was some short-cut to overcome uncertainty in the short term.
Overall, the longitudinal analysis of market sentiment demonstrated that in the case of the 
British pound, as for the French franc and the D-mark, it was primarily uncertainty about the 
political sustainability of the strong currency commitment, and not competitiveness concerns, 
which caused the attack on sterling. Early market worries about balance of payments 
sustainability were dispelled in the course of 1992 due to the positive effect of disinflation on 
competitiveness. Market uncertainty, fuelled by strains in the financial structure, was clearly 
linked to political sustainability concerns. This result is contrary to the assertions in some 
academic explanations which see the 1992 sterling crisis to have been caused to a considerable 
degree by overvaluation (e.g. Portes 1993, Gros & Thygesen 1998).
Consequently, the analysis lends strong support to the second generation expected policy 
change model, but finds little support for the first generation competitiveness crisis model. 
Furthermore, both the contingent policy change version and the inconsistent policy view 
within the second generation model are confirmed by the sterling crisis. Clearly the
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government’s commitment to ERM parity had to enter a crisis zone of growing political 
sustainability problems for market participants to ponder a speculative attack in late summer 
1992, as predicted by the expected policy change model. But the actual attack was triggered 
by inconsistencies between the government’s strong currency rhetoric and its weak monetary 
policy signals. Finally, once the fragility of the exchange rate commitment had been 
acknowledged, a situation of multiple equilibria arose, with the time consistency o f the 
government’s exchange rate commitment contingent on whether it would have to defend 
sterling against a speculative attack. The ejection of sterling from the ERM on Black 
Wednesday was thus the result of a self-fulfilling speculative attack, triggered by policy 
inconsistency, but determined by escalating uncertainty pertaining in part to strains in the 
financial structure.
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Chapter 6:
The French Franc during the ERM Crisis
6.1. Introduction
This chapter investigates the evolution of international financial market sentiment 
towards the French franc during the ERM crisis. What variables were important for 
market participants and how prominent were concerns regarding domestic structures?
Following my methodological approach outlined in Chapter Three, I focus on episodes of 
currency weakness in order to establish what led to credibility problems of the ERM peg 
of the French franc. My analysis in Chapter Four concluded that there was significant 
structural support in the French political economy for the franc fort. The bureaucratic 
elite controlling the Treasury and the Banque de France in the dirigiste administration 
combined with a centralised semi-presidential political system to support the strong 
currency strategy. Against this support stood divided government during cohabitation, 
the relationship of banking with a devaluation inclined industry, and militant sections of 
the trade union movement. But in the early 1990s these structural weaknesses did not 
pose a serious challenge to the sustainability of the hard currency strategy, since there 
was bipartisan consensus in France’s political elite around the franc fort strategy, a 
weakening of bank-industry links, and fragmentation in the wage bargaining structure.
The chapter concludes that financial market participants took account of domestic 
structures, but a systematic and coherent analysis shared by all analysts of the specific 
nature of the institutional-structural underpinnings of the French monetary policy strategy 
was lacking. As in the British case, ad hoc auxiliary indicators as unemployment,
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referenda, election results, and political comments where taken as short-cuts to draw 
conclusions about the structural fragility of the French political economy. On the other 
hand financial markets underwent a process of structural learning as to the capabilities of 
the French political and financial system to cope with the strains of disinflation. 
Ultimately market participants were not able to make up their mind whether sound 
French economic fundamentals were embedded in corresponding domestic structures, or 
simply conditional on rigid adherence to Bundesbank imposed monetary policies. 
Inconclusive superficial structural awareness only added to uncertainty about the future 
of the French exchange rate commitment. In summer 1993 this uncertainty contributed to 
the impression in financial markets that the challenge of Bundesbank dominance by 
French policy makers represented policy inconsistency in regard of the commitment to 
the franc fort. Consequently my findings in this chapter will add a structural dimension 
to the “second generation” inconsistent policy model.
The second section of this chapter gives an account of the events surrounding the French 
franc in 1992/93 against the background of the franc fort strategy, followed by a review 
of the interpretations of the franc crisis in the literature. Section three presents the 
empirical evaluation of market sentiment, based on my qualitative analysis of the three 
financial market reports. Section four concludes.
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6.2. The French Franc in the ERM Crisis
Chart 6.1: Exchange rates: DM to FFr
(Daily; 01 November 1991-01 November 1993; 01/11/91 =100)
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Source: Datastream
Events:
1: 11/12/91: Maastricht treaty agreed.
2: 02/06/92: Danish referendum on Maastricht Treaty.
3: 02/04/92: Pierre Beregovoy replaced Edith Cresson as Prime Minister.
4: 16/09/92: "Black Wednesday".
20/09/92: French referendum on Maastricht Treaty.
5: 19/11/92: Swedish krona floated (mounting ERM tensions)
6: 21/03/93: France: first round of National Assembly elections.
7: 09/04/93: PM Balladur announces independence for the Banque de France at the end of 1993.
8: 13/05/93: Spanish peseta and Portuguese escudo devalued (Iberian currency crisis).
9: 09/06/93; George Soros speaks of "fundamental and long-term D-mark weakness".
10: 24/06/93: "La grande gaffe": France suggests concerted interest rate cuts to Germany.
11: 29/07/93: Bundesbank interest rate cuts insignificant (Lombard minus 0.5%);
31/07 - 01/08/93: widening o f ERM bands to 15%.
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Chart 6.2: France: short-term interest rates
(Daily; 01 August 91 to 01 December 1993; differential with German rates)
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Source: Datastream
Events:
l : 11 /l 2/91: Maastricht treaty agreed.
2: 02/06/92: Danish referendum on Maastricht Treaty.
3: 02/04/92: Pierre Beregovoy replaced Edith Cresson as Prime Minister.
4: 16/09/92: "Black Wednesday".
20/09/92: French referendum on Maastricht Treaty.
5: 19/11/92: Swedish krona floated (mounting ERM tensions)
6: 21/03/93: France: first round of National Assembly elections.
7: 09/04/93: PM Balladur announces independence for the Banque de France at the end of 1993.
8: 13/05/93: Spanish peseta and Portuguese escudo devalued (Iberian currency crisis).
9: 09/06/93; George Soros speaks of "fundamental and long-term D-mark weakness".
10: 24/06/93: "La grande gaffe": France suggests concerted interest rate cuts to Germany.
11: 29/07/93: Bundesbank interest rate cuts insignificant (Lombard minus 0.5%);
31/07 - 01/08/93: widening of ERM bands to 15%.
The succession of exchange rate crises of the French franc in the ERM during 1992/93 
represents a case of credibility crises resulting from political sustainability problems
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(Cacheux 1995: 84; De Grauwe 1997: 107-108).1 Although the devaluations and 
depreciations of other ERM countries following September 1992 had resulted in some 
deterioration of French competitiveness, French balance of payments-related 
fundamentals continued to be sound.2 It was the costs of lasting disinflation in terms of 
output loss and rising unemployment, resulting from the rigorous French commitment to 
exchange rate stability in the ERM, which was ultimately judged by financial market 
participants to be politically unsustainable. Therefore the franc crisis was internationally 
rooted not in overvaluation, but in the asymmetry within the ERM, i.e. the need to 
shadow excessively tight monetary policy by Germany (Tsoukalis 1997: 152-58).
What distinguishes the French case from the UK is that France did not use the leeway for 
monetary policy autonomy it had gained by the widening of bands in August 1993 to 
decouple from Bundesbank monetary policy.3 In autumn 1993 it became clear that 
financial market participants had got it wrong by expecting France to give priority to 
domestic monetary policy needs, sealing the fate of the ERM and the EMU project (see 
Gros & Thygesen 1998: 222). The surprising strength of the French commitment was 
grounded in the nature of French domestic structures described in Chapter Four. Market 
sentiment has to be investigated as to whether these conditions were fully understood.
1 The following review is based on Dyson (1994); Andrews (1995); Cameron (1995); Connolly (1995); 
Kenen (1995); Sandholtz (1996); Grahl (1997); Tsoukalis (1997); Walsh (2000); and Keesing’s Record of 
World Events.
2 For the convergence of key economic fundamental indicators towards German levels, see Cacheux 1995: 
72-81)
3 On the contrary, France scrupulously followed the gradual monetary relaxation of the Bundesbank, and 
the franc climbed back above the floor of its previous narrow band on 8 December 1993, after only a brief 
period of depreciation in the wake of the summer 1993 crisis (Andrews 1995: 169). The assessment that 
France did not break free from the narrow constraints of the DM peg is widely shared in the literature (e.g. 
Dyson 1994; Kennen 1995; Grahl 1997). An exception is Cameron (1995), who argues that France 
deliberately provoked the widening of ERM bands to regain monetary policy autonomy. His analysis
250
6.2.1. Competitive Disinflation and the Franc Fort
The French economic and ‘high politics’ interests behind the franc fort strategy have 
been described by Loriaux as a case of ‘second image reversed’ (1991: 241). 
International developments, first of all the end of the Bretton Woods regime and the 
consequent creation of the EMS resulted in the acceptance for domestic economic 
stabilisation and structural reform, which in turn shaped the external strategy of 
competitive disinflation and the franc fort. The asymmetric EMS had reduced, but not 
removed this exposure to US monetary policy, and sharpened the problem of German 
dominance over French monetary policy. As long as France continued with its post-war 
inflationary economic regime, franc crises and devaluations determined by American and 
German monetary policy moves were unavoidable, relegating France to a second rate 
nation in monetary affairs (Loriaux 1991).
The franc crisis and capital flight in response to the Mitterrand experiment of “reflation in 
one country” after 1981 led to the general acceptance of the need for a U-turn towards 
domestic stabilisation in the French elite (Perez 1997: 205; Goodman 1992: 135-6). The 
corresponding external monetary policy move was the shift towards the strategy of 
‘competitive disinflation’ and the franc fort in the ERM, as a way to establish a strong 
brand of franc credibility in financial markets (Cacheux 1995: 84).
The strategy of competitive disinflation constituted the narrow economic rationale behind
ignores that post-crisis French monetary easing was done in step with the Bundesbank, always preserving a 
considerable spread over German interest rates.
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the now stable and strong currency policy (Dyson 1994: 210). 4 Sandholtz summarises 
the rationale competitive disinflation as follows:
“Higher inflation elsewhere in an adjustable-rate system like the ERM in which realignments were not 
entirely compensating for accumulated inflation differentials, meant that foreign prices rose faster than 
French prices. Hence the increasing price competitiveness of French output.” (1996: 264, fh. 120)
Importantly, competitive disinflation was designed not to be in conflict with growth and 
employment, but seen as a means to create the conditions for an economic take-off:
“The economic rationale for the franc stable was presented as a virtuous alternative to the vicious circle of 
inflation-crisis-devaluation; ‘zero inflation’, combined with ‘modernization’ would ensure a more 
competitive French industry” (Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 81).
Ironically, the surrender of interventionist economic power coming with competitive 
disinflation was conceived as a strategy to retrieve power to determine monetary policy 
vis-a-vis Germany and ultimately the US (Loriaux 1991: 240).
Therefore, the importance of competitive disinflation and the franc fort as linchpin of a 
greater high politics strategy by the French policy-making elites should not be 
underestimated. According to David Andrews its grand objective was “to develop a 
framework for European monetary relations that, minimally, would allow symmetry 
between France and Germany and, maximally, might promote French dominance” (1995: 
165).5 The EMS was in this context nothing but a “halfway house” (Dyson 2000: 175). 
Only through the EMU project of pooled monetary sovereignty between member states 
including Germany could France at least partly regain national monetary policy
4 For detailed assessment of the strategy of competitive disinflation in France, see: Blanchard and Muet 
(1993), and Fitoussi et al. (1993).
5 See also Sandholtz (1996:268).
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autonomy. Hence to maintain the franc at the heart of the EMS was critical for the 
survival of this strategy, since a French devaluation would have not only undermined the 
ERM, but in all probability been a fatal blow to EMU.
In addition, shared monetary sovereignty had become the nub around which the Franco- 
German ‘high politics’ project of construction europeenne revolved (Dyson & 
Featherstone 1999: 81). In this context France saw monetary union as a way to anchor 
Germany in an integrated western Europe in return for supporting German reunification 
(Sandholtz 1993b). The resolution in both France and Germany to co-operate to create 
European monetary union gave additional strength to the Franco-German axis at the core 
of the ERM in the early 1990s. The high politics of EMU thus lent critical external 
supported to the franc fort by the German government.
In the early 1990s competitive disinflation and the franc fort had taken on hegemonic 
importance in the wider French national policy discourse. As Kenneth Dyson and Kevin 
Featherstone conclude:
“On French interest in rebalancing economic and monetary power with the USA and Germany there was an 
impressive domestic political consensus stretching across parties on which the French government could 
build in pursuing EMU. The pursuit of this long-term gain in so sustained a manner has the attributes of 
heroic leadership .... of directly elected Presidential power onto the apparatus and ethics of an 
administrative state that has a sense of operating on behalf of the general interest” (Dyson & Featherstone 
1999:253)
This ideational rootedness of the franc fort was the result of the capacity of France’s 
domestic structures to enable the French state to prioritise its policy objectives in a 
comprehensive fashion. The 1992/93 crisis put these structures to test, threatened 
everything that the French policy-making elite had achieved so far through competitive
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disinflation. The French economic and foreign policy paradigm itself was at stake (Dyson 
1994: 162-168).
1992/93: Domestic Tensions 
The 1992/93 crisis highlighted the fundamental weakness of the franc fort commitment:
heightened vulnerability to Bundesbank and US dollar politics. When the combination of
the German monetary squeeze and US benign neglect hit the franc in the early 1990s,
France saw itself forced to defend excessive exchange rate rigidity through rigorous
disinflaltion.
In 1992/93, participation in a co-ordinated ERM realignment, as suggested by the 
Bundesbank, would have put French qualification for EMU at risk, given the exchange 
rate stability requirement and timetable of the Maastricht design (Sandholtz 1996: 264- 
5).6 Furthermore the French policy-making elite did not want to undermine its hard won 
monetary credibility through another devaluation, which might have disqualified France 
for monetary union in the eyes of the Germans. Tensions in the ERM were thus increased 
from both sides of the ERM hierarchy: by dysfunctional Bundesbank leadership and by 
uncooperative French followership (see Abdedal 1998). Without realignment the Banque 
de France had to defend the franc fort by increasing interest rates to punitive levels (see 
Chart 2.2), pushing the French economy into recession (see Chart 2.1)?
Domestically, the erosion of the broad interest coalition in French society in support of
6 In addition, as James Welsh points out, in September 1992 French officials feared that realignment would 
have reduced voter’s support for the treaty (2000: 114).
7 See also the overview of French annual main economic indicators in the Appendix, Table 2.
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the franc fort, in the face of unemployment rising to 12 percent of the labour force in 
summer 1993 (see Chart 2.8), is probably the most significant. Looking into the support 
for the franc fort by the administration, the private sector, peak associations of social 
interest groups, and political parties (Table 6.1), only the core of the administration, i.e. 
the president, prime minister, the Treasury and the Banque de France, maintained a 
consistently united stance behind the defence of the hard currency until and beyond 
August 1993.8
This commitment is remarkable, since both the socialist and the centre-right government 
faced considerable pressures from the radical wings of their parties to abandon the franc 
fort in favour of stimulating the economy. In particular the government collation of RPR 
(Gaullist) and UDF (centre-right) elected in March 1993 faced what James Walsh 
described “...was a near insurrection against the policy of competitive disinflation from 
both senior and rank-and-file RPR members” (2000: 129). This resistance from part of 
the established parties added to the traditional opposition by the communist CPF and the 
extreme right Front Nationale (FN) to the project of construction europeenne. Both 
denounced the franc fort and the Maastricht treaty as a surrender of national policy 
autonomy to manage the economy.9
8 The reaction of French policymakers to the 1992/93 crisis was not to devalue, but to push ahead with 
legal independence for the Banque de France (Sandholtz 1996: 264).
9 On the rejection of the liberal European strategy of the French elite from the right and left of the political 
spectrum, see Berger (1995).
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Table 6.1:
Monetary policy interests in France in 1992/93
DOMESTIC POLICY EXTERNAL POLICY
Employment/
Growth Disinflation Franc Fort Devaluation
Administration
President + +  +
Finance Ministry/ Banque de 
France + + +  +
Foreign Ministry +  +
Private Sector
Patronat +  + - +
MNCs + + -
SMEs +  + - +
Commercial Banks + + -
Unions
CFDT + + +
FO + + - +
CGT + + - +
Farmers + +
Political Parties
CPF + + - -
PS +  + + -
UDF + + +  +
RPR + + -
FN + + + +
Based on Dyson & Featherstone (1999); Ishikawa (1999); Welsh (2000); Josselin (2001)
+ + strongly in favour
+ in favour
opposed
strongly opposed 
blank: neutral
Patronat: Confederation Nationale du Patronat Franqais (main employers’ organisation); CFDT: 
Confederation Franqaise Democratique du Travail; FO: Force Ouvriere; CGT: Confederation Generate du 
Travail; CPF: Communist Party; PS: Socialist Party; UDF: Union pour la Democratic Franqaise (centre- 
right); RPR: Rassemblement du Peuple Franqais (Gaullist); FN: National Front.
Criticism came also from the more radical organisations in the fragmented trade union 
movement, the communist union CGT and its public sector offshoot FO, and over time 
increasingly from the main employers’ organisation, the patronat, influenced by the 
interests of small and medium-sized enterprises (Josselin 2001: 60-1; Dyson 1994: 199; 
Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 79). Resistance centred on the consequences of the
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government monetary policy framework for unemployment and growth, and found a 
common theme in the reaction of the Maastricht treaty, especially the excessive austerity 
imposed by the convergence criteria and the Growth and Stability pact.10. Domestically 
orientated SMEs, more dependent on bank credit than big business, and seeking relief 
from competition through devaluation, suffered disproportionately under the credit 
squeeze of disinflation (Dyson & Featherstone 1999: 79). In this situation the rigorous 
defence of the franc fort by the Banque de France increasingly appeared to be out of 
touch with reality (see Connolly 1995).
6.2.2. Periodization of the History of the French Franc in the ERM Crisis
The analysis of market sentiment in the case of the French franc crisis starts from 1
October 1991, with market volatility increasing towards the Maastricht conference in 
November/December 1991, and ends with the widening of the ERM bands to +/- 15% on 
31 July to 1 August 1993. The investigated period stretches over 22 months, from 
October 1991 to 2 August 1993. The French franc went through several episodes of 
speculative pressure during this period, most prominently the period surrounding the 
French referendum on 20 September 1992 and the crisis following the French “Grande 
Gaffe”, the challenge of Bundesbank leadership in the ERM in summer 1993.11
10 Daphne Josselin (2001) gives a good summary of the critical positions to Maastricht within the French 
political party and trade union spectrum.
11 The term ‘Grande Gaffe’ refers to the misjudged call by France’s Finance Minister Edmond Alphandery 
on 24 June 1993 for joint German-French interest rate reductions, immediately rejected by his German 
counterpart Theo Waigel, triggering a run on the French franc. As Bernhard Connolly reports, the failed 
attempt for joint Franco-German leadership in the ERM became immediately known as “La gaffe 
Alphandery” (Connolly 1995: 309)
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A systematic definition of periods of speculative attack on the French franc has resulted 
in five so called “crisis episodes”: 12
■ the “Maastricht Treaty weakness episode” (28 October 1991-23 December 1991)
■ the “Danish-French referendum crisis episode” (03 June 1992 -  28 September 1992)
■ the “Swedish krona crisis episode” (19 November 1992 -  04 January 1993)
■ the “pre-election crisis episode” (21 January 1993 -  27 March 1993)
■ the “’Grande Gaffe’ crisis episode” (24 June 1993 -  31 July 1993)
The crisis episodes have also been statistically aggregated as “franc crisis episodes”. This 
variable is juxtaposed with “franc non-crisis episodes”, the aggregate of those periods in 
which the French franc was free or recovered from speculative pressure. Altogether the 
1992/93 periods has been broken down into ten episodes:
1. Franc stability before the Nordic currency crisis (01 October 1991 -  27 
October 1991). Banking on the growing credibility of the French franc, which 
had show remarkable stability since 1987, and bolstered by the prospect of an 
agreement on monetary union at the Maastricht conference in December, the 
Banque de France did on 17 October risk to undercut German official rates.
2. The franc weakness surrounding the Maastricht treaty negotiations (28 
October 1001 -  23 December 1991). In this period growing doubts on the 
ability of European politicians to reach an agreement on monetary union, 
drastic monetary easing in the United States, and the Nordic currency crisis 
boosted the D-mark against other ERM currencies, including the French franc.
12 For the definition criteria see Chapter Three. For a chronology of the events referred to in the following 
section, see Appendix, Table 1.
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At the end of October, markets signaled that they would not tolerate the 
French policy of decoupling official interests rates by driving up the spread of 
market rates over German short-term rates. Official French policy had to react 
to this confidence crisis by returning to a policy of shadowing Bundesbank 
monetary policy from 18 November onwards. On 23 December the Bank of 
France matched the increase in the German discount rate of 20 December, 
resulting in the franc stabilising.
3. The period of franc recovery until the Danish referendum (24 December 1991 
-  02 June 1992). Internationally, expectations of German interests rate cuts 
and a lasting recovery of the dollar, fuelled hopes for an imminent recovery 
and job creation in France. Domestically, the French minority government, 
which had been weakened by losses in regional elections and tainted by 
corruption scandals, emerged strengthened when President Mitterrand 
replaced Prime Minister Edith Cresson with the competent Pierre Beregovoy 
on 3 April, who announced rapid steps to implement central bank 
independence. The rapid recovery of the franc led to political speculation that 
the currency had the potential to replace the D-mark as ERM anchor.
4. The franc crisis triggered by the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the 
Danish referendum, ending with the narrow endorsement of the treaty in 
French referendum (03 June 1992 -  28 September 1992). Although the 
currency had started to weaken immediately after the Danish referendum, the 
crucial phase of speculative pressure, dubbed the “battle of the franc” lasted
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only from 16 September to 24 September.13 Internationally, pressure on the 
franc escalated when the British pound and the Italian lira were forced out of 
the ERM on 16/17 September. Again the situation was aggravated by dollar 
weakness. Domestically the French referendum of 20 September became a 
rallying point for the growing discontent with the economic and social costs of 
a monetary policy strategy accused of surrendering national monetary policy 
autonomy. The franc was finally stabilised through coordinated massive 
intervention by the Bundesbank and the Banque de France and drastic 
increases in French official interest rates to 13 percent on 23 September. The 
French financial structure partly insulated the banking system from these 
increases. Official rates could be cut unilaterally by France on 28 September.
5. A brief phase of franc strength (29 September 1992 -  18 November 1992). 
Supported by re-emerging doubts about the state of the German economy and 
a dollar recovery, the franc was now seen as a clear favourite for a possible 
‘hard-core’ monetary union including Germany and the Benelux countries.
6. The crisis episode triggered by the floatation of the Swedish krona, followed 
by the devaluation of the Spanish peseta and the Portuguese escudo three days 
later (19 November 1992 -  04 January 1993). The franc came under attack 
due to the impression that the Bundesbank was unwilling to follow up on its 
support of September with significant interest rate cuts, shifting back attention 
to the question of whether the franc fort policy was politically sustainable.
13 The term ‘battle of the franc’ was already used in the financial market reports of the FT during the crisis 
(see FT 24/09/92). It was later adopted in the literature, e.g. by John Grahl (1997: 97)
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Furthermore the devaluation or floating of major EU trading partners of 
France tarnished the image of France’s competitive strength.
7. A brief phase of franc stabilisation in expectation of German interest rate cuts 
(05 January 1993 -  21 January 1993).
8. The crisis period preceding the elections for the French National Assembly 
(21 January 1993 -  27 March 1993). Opinion polls forecast a clear defeat of 
the ruling socialist government, due to growing discontent with the output and 
unemployment costs of defending the franc fort. The question causing 
pessimism on the French franc was whether a likely new centre-right UDF- 
RPR government would abandon the franc fort. Although the centre-right 
signalled their intention to persist with the defence of the currency, 
announcing its own plans to confer independence to the Banque de France, 
doubts remained, given the vociferous criticism of this policy from the 
nationalist wing of the Gaullist RPR. A fully-fledged devaluation crisis could 
only be avoided by a repeat of determined French-German action to relieve 
pressure on the franc, this time including Bundesbank rate cuts.
9. The period of franc strength, following the landslide victory of the centre-right 
(28 March 1993 -  23 June 1993). The new Prime Minister Edouard Balladur 
reaffirmed his commitment to the franc fort by sticking to tight monetary 
policy and taking legal steps for full central bank independence in 1994. On 
the other hand the administration dramatically increased counter-cyclical 
deficit spending. Internationally the franc was supported by a rising dollar 
and intrinsic D-mark weakness. The impression that the franc was gaining
hard currency status independent of German was confirmed by the fact that it 
was able to shrug off the Iberian currency crisis in April/May and the Banque 
de France’s ability to lower its official interest rates towards Bundesbank 
levels. In June 1993, short-term market rates fell below German rates without 
undermining the stability of the franc (see Charts 2.2 and 6.2). The key factor 
behind this strength was that France now easily outperformed Germany on 
inflation.
The ‘Grand gaffe’ crisis episode, clearly defined by two political events: It 
starts with the call for French co-leadership in the ERM by Finance Minister 
Alphandery (‘Grande Gaffe’) on 24 June 1993, and ends with the widening of 
ERM bands to +/- 15 percent on 31 July 1993. The most severe speculative 
assault on the franc so far happened because the French policy move was 
interpreted as a sign of weakness, not strength. The hostile German reaction, 
followed by only insignificant piecemeal steps by the Bundesbank to further 
lower its interest rates, and reluctant intervention, revealed severe strains in 
the Franco-German axis. The French pressure on Germany also exposed the 
mounting domestic resistance to a continuation of the franc fort strategy by 
the elite. Since the government would not accept realignment, the widening of 
the ERM bands to ± 15 percent was devised as a face saving way to reduce 
speculative pressure. Contrary to expectations, French policymakers did not 
risk erasing at one stroke the credibility which had been earned through years 
of competitive disinflation, and which was critical for the prospect of EMU.
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France did not exploit the leeway for rapid monetary easing it had gained, but 
returned the traditional defence of the franc fort.
6.2.3. Interpretations of the French Franc Crisis
The French franc crises of 1992/93 have been interpreted in the currency crisis literature 
within the standard framework of the three competing crisis models, the “first 
generation” competitiveness model, the “second generation” expected or contingent 
policy change models, and the related “inconsistent policy view”. The discussion 
revolves around three questions: the “puzzle” why the franc came under speculative 
attack despite strong economic fundamentals, what explains the timing of the attack, and 
finally, why did financial markets get it wrong in expecting a policy change from the 
French authorities towards reflation at the price of devaluation.
The majority view in the academic literature is that the first generation model cannot 
explain the franc crises, since both the balance of payments and French inflation both 
indicated strong and improving international competitiveness of the French economy 
over 1992/93, despite the depreciations and devaluations of other ERM members.14 The 
deteriorating fiscal deficit has been dismissed as a minor problem, since it was low by 
international comparison (De Boissieu 1994, Gilibert 1994).15
14 See Eichengreen & Wyplosz (1993); De Boissieu (1994); Melitz (1994); Moutot (1994); Cobham (1996, 
1997), Gros & Thygesen (1998).
15 Not everyone agrees. Dissenting voices, pointing out economic fundaments weakness for the French 
franc, are Cameron (1995), emphasising French deteriorating competitiveness in after the devaluations and 
depreciations of other ERM member states, and Otker & Pazarbasioglu (1997), who add concerns about 
France’s deteriorating public deficits to worries about competitiveness.
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The second generation expected and contingent policy models on the other hand are 
widely assumed to hold the key to explaining the attacks on the French franc. Its 
proponents assert that, given the social and economic costs of disinflation and the 
deteriorating prospects for EMU after the Danish referendum, the wider French society 
suffered from “adjustment fatigue”. This critically weakened the political commitment to 
shadow German monetary policy (Moutot 1994). From this point of view it is of 
secondary importance whether market participants speculated against the franc because 
they expected French policymakers to renege on their commitment, as suggested by the 
expected policy change explanation, or because they expected France to succumb to the 
punitive interest rate increases in defence of the franc in response to speculative pressure, 
as suggested by the contingent policy change “multiple equilibria” explanation.16 
Finally, the inconsistent policy view adds an explanation for the timing of the summer 
1993 crisis by maintaining that the French demand for joint Franco-German monetary 
easing was contradicting the franc fort commitment, signalling that it would be reneged 
under speculative pressure. (Cobham 1996, 1997; Melitz 1994).
Academic crisis interpretations still fail to explain why French authorities did not reflate 
after the widening of the ERM band in August 1993, contrary to financial market 
expectations. Neither the expected nor the contingent policy view take account of the 
possibility that markets failed to fully appreciate that the strength of the French exchange 
rate commitment was based on strong domestic structural underpinnings. The problem of
16 Proponents of the expected policy change explanation for France are De Grauwe (1997) Krugman 
(1996), Salvatore (1996), Ozkan & Sutherland (1994), Moutot (1994), De Boissieu (1994). Their position 
finds support in ‘official’ accounts of the franc crisis (e.g. BIS 1994). The key representatives of the 
contingent policy view are Eichengreen & Wyplosz (1993).
“social rootedness” of disinflation policies is mentioned, (Gilibert 1994), but the issue is 
not followed up with an investigation of whether markets have been concerned about this 
rootedness. A notable exception is de Boissieu (1994), who speaks of “institutional risks” 
in connection with speculative attacks, accusing “Anglo-Saxon speculators” of failing to 
understand the strength of the French financial sector in coping with mounting private 
debt and high interest rates. Financial market sentiment has to be investigated directly in 
order to establish whether unsystematic and superficial awareness of French domestic 
structures offers some explanations for the misjudgement of French policy credibility by 
investors.
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6.3. Market Sentiment towards the French Franc during the ERM Crisis
Chart 6.3: Market sentiment France: Economic, political, structural variables
(as percentage of text units coded at French crisis episodes)17
(1) USA
(2) Germany
(3) EMS-EMU
(4) Domestic Economy
(5) Economic Fundamentals
(6) Domestic Politics
(7) Domestic Structures
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%
(1) International developments: USA (US monetary policy and US dollar)
(2) International developments: Germany (Bundesbank policy and DM)
(3) International developments: EMS-EMU
(4) Domestic developments: French economic performance and economic policy (including economic 
fundamentals)
(5) Domestic developments: French economic fundamentals only (inflation, BoP, budget deficits)
(6) Domestic developments: French domestic politics (especially elections)
(7) domestic structures (especially central bank; financial, wage bargaining, government structures)
17 The categories in this chart, and the following charts on ‘market sentiment’, refer to noded categories and 
their subordinated categories in the index tree (Appendix, Table 3).
Category [1 ] = Node ( 4 1 1 )  and ( 4 1 3 ) ;
Category [2] = Nodes (3 2 1 1), ( 3 2 2 1), (3 6);
Category [3] = Nodes (2 4), (22  1 1 7), and Nodes (4 3 9), (43  11);
Category [4] = Nodes (2 1) and (2 2);
Category [5] = Nodes (2 1 1 1), (2 1 1 2), (2 1 1 3), (2 1 1 6), (2 1 2 1), (2 1 2 2), (2 1 2 3), (2 1 2 6);
Category [6] = Node (2 3);
Category [7] = Node (2 5).
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Chart 6.4: Market sentiment France:
Expectations of FFr exchange rate: uncertain or weakening
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)18
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Chart 6.5: Market sentiment France:
Concerns about the sustainability of the ERM exchange rate commitment
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)19
Swedish Krona
Danish-French Ref.
AH Crisis Episodes
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Market sentiment towards the French franc was investigated for the relative influence of 
a broad range of international and domestic variables, with specific focus on domestic 
structures. As an overview of the relative importance of different variables shows (Chart 
6.3), international developments and the performance of the French economy have 
clearly concerned financial market participants more than domestic politics or domestic 
structures. The developments of German and US monetary policy and the D-mark and 
Dollar exchange rates were as significant for markets as the performance of the French 
economy itself. As for the case of Britain, market participants approached the credibility 
of the French ERM commitment in the context of developments in the anchor currency 
country, especially Bundesbank policies, and the wider international trend dominated by 
the US dollar. Narrow fundamentals, indicating balance of payments sustainability, were 
consistently monitored, in addition to the variables relating to political sustainability, that 
is unemployment and GDP growth. In comparison, international developments 
concerning the ERM and European integration have been less significant. The same goes 
for domestic politics. Domestic structures, on the other hand, received a remarkably high 
degree of attention from Salomon Brothers and Goldman Sachs.
Looking into two key indicators of French franc credibility, expectations of a franc 
devaluation (Chart 6.4), and concerns about the sustainability of the ERM commitment 
(Chart 6.5), a consistent pattern of a cumulative build up of pressure emerges. It 
increased from one crisis episode to the next, reaching explosive levels during the 
‘Grande Gaffe’ crisis episode in summer 1993. This build up of market sentiment against 
the franc is more homogenous than in the case of Germany and Britain, escalating
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periodically in speculative attacks that challenged the resolve of the government’s 
commitment to defend the franc fort. The qualitative analysis of market sentiment will 
confirm this broad trend.
This trend suggests that, in the case of the French franc, market participants had to cope 
with almost persistent uncertainty about the government’s exchange rate strategy, in 
contrast to Germany and even Britain. This uncertainty goes back to the central question 
of sustainability. Firstly, evidence for good balance of payments “fundamental” 
sustainability conflicted with equally influential evidence for deteriorating political 
sustainability. Secondly, markets registered mixed signals coming from close but fraught 
cooperation between the German and French authorities in the ERM, which was critical 
for political sustainability. On the one hand devaluation risks had to be gauged against 
the willingness of the Bundesbank to support the franc as part of the Franco-German axis. 
On the other hand the possibility of a successful attempt by the Banque de France to 
decouple from monetary policy had to be taken into consideration. The overall result was 
a highly charged feeling of political, social and economic uncertainty in markets about 
the future of the franc fort strategy.
Domestic institutions should have come in as a way to assess the structural strength of the 
French commitment to the franc fort policy in its tactical interaction with the German 
authorities and the domestic constituency. Although domestic structures were 
considerably more relevant for France than for Britain, market attention did not add up to 
a systematic and coherent investigation by analysts.
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The empirical qualitative analysis will begin with international factors, and move on to 
domestic economic factors determining balance of payments and political sustainability, 
and related political developments. Against these findings I then assess the influence of 
domestic structures on market sentiment.
6.3.1. International Variables
6.3.1.1. The D-Mark/Dollar Cross and Bundesbank Monetary Policy
In the context of the asymmetric nature of the ERM the French franc was caught up in a
scissors movement between tight German and loose US monetary policy. As this 
prevented France from relaxing its excessively tight monetary stance, financial market 
participants expectations for the franc were linked to hopes for opposite interest moves in 
the US and Germany from the end of 1991. Markets took account of the expected 
imminent recovery from the 1991 recession in the US, and equally expected imminent 
progress of the Bundesbank in bringing German inflation under control. In the French 
case, markets did not directly focus on US and German interest rates, but on the strength 
of the US dollar versus the D-mark (Chart 6.6).20
Attention to the role of the US dollar for the prospects of the franc was high until summer 
1993. This reflected D-mark -  dollar exchange rate uncertainty since success in Germany 
on the inflation front and signs for a US recovery alternated with successive setbacks. But 
worries about the dollar clearly receded with the US currency’s recovery in 1993 (see 
Chart 6.6). The fact that the franc came under attack in summer 1993 despite this points
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at a narrowing of the focus in market sentiment towards the critical Bundesbank -  franc 
fort relationship.
Chart 6.6: Market sentiment France:
Expectations of US dollar to weaken against the D-mark
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)21
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20 The issue of an expected widening of the US-German interest rate differential (Node 4 1 13 1) was 
insignificant in the French case.
21 Node ( 4 1 3 1 2 )
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Chart 6.7: Market sentiment France:
Expectations of the Franco-German axis causing the Bundesbank to stabilise the 
French franc
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)22
Grande Gaffe’
Pre-Election
Swedish Krona
Danish-French Ref.
Maastricht
All Crisis Episodes
Non-Crisis Episodes
Chart 6.8: Market sentiment France:
Expectations of an imminent Bundesbank interest rate cut
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)23
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Chart 6.9: Market sentiment France:
Concerns about hawkish Bundesbank statements
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)24
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Regarding the role of Germany, financial markets recognised that the sustainability of the 
franc fort was critically dependent on support by the Bundesbank through either interest 
rate reductions and/or intervention (see Chart 6.7). Coordinated Bundesbank - Banque de 
France intervention in defence of the franc/D-mark parity was seen as the decisive factor 
for the survival of the French currency in the Danish-French referendum crisis episode. 
This raised market expectations of further intervention by the Bundesbank in later crisis 
episodes, which by themselves helped to contain speculative pressure on the franc: 
“Speculation against the franc has not surged, because market participants expect that the 
Bundesbank will offer support to its French counterpart, as it did in September.” (SB 
27/11/92: 6)
22 Node (3 4 1 2) and ( 3 4 1 3)
23 Node ( 3 2 1 1 2 )
24 Node (32  14 1)
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Furthermore, the September episode raised expectations in financial markets that the 
Bundesbank would cut official interest rates in support of the franc fort. Markets saw 
these expectations confirmed by the German central bank’s cuts before the 1993 French 
National Assembly elections. Subsequently, expectations of further substantive cuts 
increased, culminating in the wake of the call by France’s Finance Minister Edmond 
Alphandery for joint German-French interests reductions (See Chart 6.8).
Despite consistent attention to Bundesbank moves, financial market participants 
remained inconclusive as to how critical an easing of German monetary policy would be 
for the survival of the franc fort. In summer 1993 this was reflected in the FT after only 
token German interest rate cuts in reaction to the ‘Grande Gaffe’ crisis of the franc:
“Mr Brian Hilliard, international economist at Societe Generale Strauss Turnbull in London said that 
ultimately the existing parities would survive. ‘What is happening is a scare, not a fatal blow,’ he 
commented. ‘There is plenty more that they can do to help the French. The Bundesbank’s commitment to 
support the franc is total.’ On the other side of the spectrum was Mr Neil MacKinnon of Citibank in 
London: ‘The absence of a Bundesbank rate move puts another nail in the coffin of the ERM.’ (FT 
16/07/92: 25)
Six days later the FT quoted an unnamed London analyst with “if the Bundesbank cannot 
reduce interest rates next week, the attention goes back to whether the French economy 
can get through the summer at today’s high rates” (FT 23/07/93: 29). Although this 
indicates that markets were aware of the need for deeper and broader assessment to 
overcome uncertainty about the French vulnerability to German monetary policy, it did 
not result in systematic structural analysis.
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At the level of European monetary cooperation market participants paid close attention to 
the high politics of Franco-German cooperation. As the FT put it during the ‘Grande 
Gaffe crisis episode:
“As far as many observers are concerned, the French franc cannot maintain its current position in the 
European exchange rate mechanism without lower real interest rates, and the mechanism itself cannot 
survive without the French.” (FT 26/07/93: 33)
The high politics of the Franco-German axis in support of the franc was understood by 
market participants to conflict with Bundesbank monetary policy priority, contributing to 
uncertainty about the chances for a decisive German defence of the franc. On the one 
hand persistent hawkish Bundesbank statements caused major concern until spring 1993 
(see Chart 6.9).25 On the other hand markets expected government pressure on the central 
bank to provide relief for the franc.26
Uncertainty was further increased from the French side in Franco-German axis 
diplomacy. In summer 1993 markets were aware of the high-risk brinkmanship monetary 
diplomacy undertaken by the French towards the Bundesbank:
“By allowing the franc to fall to its floor in the system, France’s tactic may have been to put the onus on the 
Bundesbank to support the franc, which it is obliged to do so under the ERM rules. ‘The French have been 
very clever,’ said one analyst. ‘They are effectively saying to the Bundesbank that the only way the system 
can be saved is by German intervention or a cut in German interest rates.’ (FT 31/07/93: 13)
In general, the complex political bargaining relations characterising Franco-German 
monetary cooperation proved impossible for market analysts to predict through mere
25 Dovish Bundesbank statements [Node (32 14 2)] were hardly registered, remaining well below the 
significance threshold.
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policy analysis. Consequently financial market participants considered any predictions of 
the franc parity in the ERM to be a “close call” (GS, Feb 1993,8/1: 1.10). This only 
changed when German domestic economic weakness added to international pressures for 
a German interest cut, leading to more persistent expectations of a cut in German interest 
rates towards summer 1993 (see Charts 6.7 and 6.8).
6.3.I.2. EMU Problems and ERM Tensions
Chart 6.10: Market sentiment France:
ERM tensions: Expected realignment of other ERM currencies (excluding the 
French franc)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)27
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26 In the aftermath of the September 1992 expectations flourished that a hard core “mini-EMU” would be 
superimposed on the Bundesbank, comprising Germany, France, and the Benelux countries. But such 
speculations remained statistically insignificant. See Node (4 3 11).
27 Nodes (4 3 8 1 1) (4 3 8 1 3), (4 3 8 1 4), (4 3 8 1 5), (4 3 8 16)
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Chart 6.11: Market sentiment France:
ERM tensions: Expected realignment of the French franc
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)28
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Similar to the wider international developments related to the dollar and the D-mark 
anchor, the regional level upheavals in the EMS in 1992/93 can only partly account for 
the loss of market confidence in the franc. Firstly, the spill-over of wider speculative 
pressures in the ERM to the franc is insufficient to explain the deterioration of market 
sentiment over the course of 1992/93. The influence of ERM tensions peaked already in 
the Danish-French episode, and became insignificant towards the ‘Grande Gaffe’ episode 
(see Chart 6.10), despite the Iberian currency crisis of April/May 1993. However, 
expectations of a realignment of the franc peaked in summer 1993, but were insignificant 
for September 1992 (Chart 6.11). Furthermore, the credibility of the French authority’s 
commitment to the franc fort deteriorated steadily from winter 1991 to summer 1993 
(Table 6.2). Together these trends in market sentiment indicate that essentially the
28 Node (43  8 1 2)
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problems of the franc in financial markets must have been country specific, rather than 
systemic.
Table 6.2: Market sentiment France:
Concern about the government’s commitment to the Franc Fort/EKM parity
(as percentage share of all expectations of the government’s commitment)29___________________
Maastricht Danish-French Ref. Swedish Krona Pre-Election ‘Grande Gaffe’
FT - 62% 53% 74% 95%
SB 0% 34% 50% 55% 81%
GS - 50% 100% 100% 100%
Secondly, evidence for self-fulfilling speculative behaviour for systemic reasons even 
during the early Danish-French referendum and the Swedish devaluation crisis episodes 
is mixed. The Danish and French referenda, signalling weak public support for the 
Maastricht Treaty, led to expectations of a less strong commitment of the French 
authorities to the prevailing franc parity.30 In the crisis episode following the Swedish 
Krona flotation of November 1992 fears grew about a speculative spill-over from the 
Italian lira and pound sterling crises to the franc.31
However, these pressures cannot simply be explained by market dynamics triggered by 
ERM wide problems, since the reaction of market participants was ultimately determined 
by domestic sustainability concerns. Goldman Sachs’ analysis of the spill-over of 
speculative pressure to the French franc after the Swedish float is representative in this
29 Node (2 4 1 2). As in the case of Britain, the ERM commitment was a significant issue for market 
sentiment. The percentages of text units coded at this node, as percentage of all crisis episode text units, 
are: FT: 16%; SB: 74%; GS: 78%.
30 The prospects for the French referendum following the Danish ‘No’, concerned 43% of FT, 86% of SB, 
and 100% of GS texts during the Danish-French referendum episode (Node 4 3 9). The figures for concerns 
about political and public support for EMU during this episode are: FT: 29%; SB: 79%; GS: 100%. For 
other episodes these concerns remained below the significance threshold. See Nodes (2 4 1 1), (2 4 2 1).
31 Nodes (2 4 1 4), (2 4 2 4). Results on market participants concerns about contagion are significant only 
for this crisis episode (FT: 3%; SB: 24%; GS: 100%)
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respect. They argued that markets were selling the franc in the expectation that the 
French authorities would follow the UK, Italy, Finland and now Sweden in recognising 
the “inappropriateness of maintaining disequilibrium real interest rates in a recessionary/ 
depressionary economy principally to maintain a fixed nominal parity for an exchange 
rate.” (GS, Dec. 1992/Jan. 1993, 7/11: 1.10).
Thus not only the collapse of confidence in the franc in summer 1993, but already the 
1992 crisis episode have critically to do with growing concerns about the domestic 
capability to sustain continued disinflation. Although in 1992 wider ERM tensions spilled 
over into speculative market dynamics against the franc, market participants understood 
well the importance of domestic factors for the vulnerability of the franc fort to mounting 
international adversities.
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6.3.2. Domestic Economic and Political Variables
Continuous disinflation by the French monetary authorities was justified explicitly within 
the paradigm of competitive disinflation as a way to improve the French terms of trade, 
and thus balance of payments sustainability. But competitive disinflation had the opposite 
effect on political sustainability, given its domestic economic and social costs. This 
conflicting evidence about the sustainability of the government’s exchange rate 
commitment shaped market confidence in the franc fort. In this section I first analyse 
how this conflict influenced the debate in financial markets about the course and 
sustainability of French monetary policy, followed by an investigation of how market 
sentiment was affected firstly by competitiveness related fundamentals variables, and 
secondly political sustainability related variables.32
Monetary Policy: Conflicting Views on Sustainability 
French monetary policy was dominated by the need to shadow German official interest
rates to maintain market credibility in the franc fort. In the overall picture financial
markets expected parallel moves in French and German official interest rates, indicating a
high degree of confidence in the resolve of the French monetary policy commitment to
act in defence of the franc (Charts 6.12 and 6.13). However, over the course of 1992/93
market participants were increasingly concerned as to whether this policy was time
consistent, since excessively high German imposed interest rate levels were considered
uniformly by all analysts as the root cause for the depressed state of the French economy
and rising unemployment. With growing uncertainty in 1993 the debate shifted towards
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the question of whether France had the option to unilaterally cut interest rates closer to or 
even below German levels.
The latter position was up to a point presented by Salomon Brothers. They argued that 
France had a considerable degree of monetary autonomy, because of inflation being 
lower than in Germany, allowing for a decoupling from German official interest rates: 
“The principal factor is the perception that French monetary authorities have greater 
leeway than the Bundesbank to reduce official interest rates” (SB 25/06/93: 5). 
Essentially this view assumed a virtuous cycle between positive fundamentals, monetary 
easing, falling cost of disinflation and consequently rising political sustainability.
Chart 6.12: Market sentiment France:
Expectations of steady or rising Bundesbank interest rates
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)33
Danish-French Ref.
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32 Economic performance and economic policy issues “other” than those covered specifically in the 
subtrees to Nodes (2 1) and (2 2) were insignificant. Coding for Nodes (2 1 1 7), (2 1 2 7), (2 2 1 6), 
( 2 2 2 4 )  falls well below the significance threshold.
33 Nodes (3 2 1 1 1), (3 2 1 1 3)
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Chart 6.13: Market sentiment France:
Expectations of steady or rising French official interest rates
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)34
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The opposing view, represented by Goldman Sachs, saw little room for manoeuvre. They 
expected that French monetary policy would have to follow the Bundesbank to maintain 
confidence in the franc, with political sustainability problems as a consequence. Because 
of these problems financial markets would demand a risk premium over German rates:
“The fact that France requires higher real short-term rates in order to maintain a steady nominal exchange 
rate with Germany indicates to market participants that the currency-interest rate relationship is not 
naturally stable. If France’s better inflation, budget, and trade position than Germany’s were the dominant 
influences on investors then there would probably be no need for the size o f the risk premium obviously 
demanded to hold French assets.” (GS, March 1993, 8/2: 1.07)
Essentially this view assumed a vicious circle between the need to shadow the 
Bundesbank, disinflationary costs, risk premia to compensate for possible time 
inconsistency, and even greater political sustainability problems. The likely outcome
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would be a possibly self-fulfilling speculative attack. Goldman questioned the virtuous 
cycle argument by pointing out the political business cycle constraint faced by French 
policymakers. In view of the presidential elections in 1995 they wrote:
“The weakness of the D-mark has provided scope for the monetary authorities outside Germany to cut 
interest rates independently of the Bundesbank. ... The question of whether there will be a renewed 
scrutiny of existing parities rests largely with the ability of governments to loosen policy sufficiently to pull 
their economies out of recession within a period of time tolerable to electorates.” (GS, June 1993,8/6:2.03)
Consequently this viewpoint suggested that devaluation of the franc might ultimately be 
unavoidable to allow French policymakers to shift towards a stimulatory monetary policy 
stance.
Confidence in the French franc oscillated between the extremes of these two positions. 
The latter view dominated whenever events made markets to assume that French 
policymakers were increasingly unable or unwilling to ignore growing public discontent 
with the franc fort strategy. This was specifically the case for the 1992 crisis episodes 
close to the French referendum, the pre-election crisis episode in early 1993 , and the 
crisis triggered by the ‘Grande Gaffe’ of the French economics minister. The importance 
of politics for negative market sentiment towards the time consistency of the franc fort 
commitment is confirmed by expectations of an imminent French official interest rate 
cut, with such expectations concentrating in the pre-election and ‘Grande Gaffe’ crisis 
episodes.
34 Nodes (2 2 1 1 1), (22 1 1 3)
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Table 6.3: Market sentiment France:
Expectations of an imminent French official interest rate cut
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)35_________________
Maastricht Danish-French Ref. Swedish Krona Pre-Election ‘Grande Gaffe’
FT 0% 2% 6% 5% 35%
SB 0% 14% 0% 10% 100%
GS 0% 0% 0% 24% 100%
The more sanguine view prevailed in non-crisis episodes in particular after March 1993, 
when the election of a new strong government in France combined with the confidence 
crisis of the D-mark to raise expectations of the French franc to replace the German D- 
mark as the anchor currency of the EMS.
In the end both views on the development of French monetary policy got it wrong, with 
France neither able to decouple from Bundesbank monetary policy, nor shifting to 
domestic monetary stimulation at the price of devaluation after August 1993. This raises 
the question to what extent event and policy statement driven market sentiment had 
allowed for a deeper systemic analysis of the factors determining the structural 
capabilities of the French economic system to either sustain German monetary policy or 
take over as anchor.
35 Node ( 2 2 1 1 2 )
284
6.3.2.I. Competitiveness Related Economic Variables
France’s comparatively good performance of competitiveness related economic variables, 
often summarised under the generic term “economic fundamentals” in market analysis, 
had significant positive influence on market sentiment (see Chart 6.14). Market 
participants consistently paid attention to the balance of payments, especially the trade 
and current account, inflation, and the state of public finances. Most important was the 
influence of France’s steadily improving inflation record (see Chart 6.16).36 In addition 
the positive balance of payments, with a swing to rising trade and current account
^7surpluses in 1992/93, supported confidence in the franc (see Chart 6.15). In contrast, 
consistently moderate French wage increases attracted little attention, with the exception 
of Salomon Brothers, who frequently pointed at wage moderation to support their case 
for the sustainability of competitive disinflation (e.g. SB 10/01/92. For the statistical 
relevance of wage bargaining outcomes see Chart 6.17).
The only other fundamentals concern significantly recognised by markets was the 
deteriorating state of public finances, with budget deficits rising well above German 
levels in 1993 (Chart 6.18).39 But this acknowledgement failed to dent “fundamentals” 
optimism in market sentiment, since escalating deficits were seen as merely cyclical. 
Given the ferocious overall disinflationary climate, their potential inflationary impact was 
dismissed as practically irrelevant (see e.g. GS, May 1993, 8/5:1.10 and 3.08). Fiscal 
stimulus was explained in line with the political business cycle. It was seen as an attempt
36 For France’s comparative inflation performance, see Chart 2.4.
37 For France’s current account position from 1991 to 1993, compared with other major ERM countries and 
the USA, see Chart 2.5.
38 For France’s wage developments, compared to Germany and the UK, see Chart 2.9.
39 For a comparative presentation of the French fiscal deficit, see Chart 2.3.
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by the government to avoid electoral defeat in the National Assembly elections of 1993 
and in view of the presidential elections of 1995, by mitigating the effects of the 
disinflationary franc fort strategy (e.g. SB 26/03/93: 5). But similar to the fundamentals 
concerns about the budget deficit, the positive contribution of the fiscal stimulus to 
political sustainability was dismissed as having little impact on the economy depressed 
by disinflationary monetary policy.
In quantitative terms attention to fundamentals was related to growing political 
sustainability concerns. As these concerns became more prominent in market sentiment 
over time, the relative importance of improving fundamentals as a countervailing factor 
was discussed more frequently. But market participants saw positive competitiveness 
factors as less relevant with prolonged weakness in French output and labour markets, 
with political sustainability concerns gaining in importance. The Financial Times located 
the turning point in early 1993, after the Irish punt was forced to devalue, quoting 
Avinish Persaud, a currency economist at UBS Phillips and Drew:
“The market needs to ask itself whether it is now targeting countries with high unemployment as 
devaluation candidates. If that is the new mentality, the franc will soon come under pressure’.” (FT 
01/02/93: 27)
This confirms the observation already made for Britain that market sentiment shifts from 
emphasising economic fundamentals sustainability assessment to political sustainability 
concerns with prolonged disinflation.
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Chart 6.14: Market sentiment France:
Sound “fundamentals” supporting competitiveness (expectations and fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)40
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Chart 6.15: Market sentiment France:
Strengthening Balance of Payments position (expectations and fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)41
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Chart 6.16: Market sentiment France: 
Falling inflation (expectations and fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)42
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Chart 6.17: Market sentiment France:
Positive assessment of wage bargaining (expectations and fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)43
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288
Chart 6.18: Market sentiment France:
Fiscal deficits and fiscal policy (expectations and fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)44
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Although the fundamentals argument per se should have stabilised market confidence in 
the franc, it contributed to overall uncertainty, due to its interaction with political 
sustainability concerns. In the longer term markets expected political sustainability to go 
hand in hand with improving political sustainability, since sound fundamentals raised the 
prospect for a significant easing of monetary policy. Even in the short run rising 
unemployment and falling demand, the main factors fuelling market concerns about 
political sustainability, were paradoxically interpreted as positive from a fundamentals 
point of view. At the height of the Danish-French referendum crisis Salomon Brothers 
asserts that:
“...markets eventually should draw encouragement from recent developments that point to weaker-than- 
expected GDP growth and additional disinflation pressures. Slowing demand will underpin recent evidence 
of renewed stagnation and depress 1992 GDP growth prospects.” (SB 21/08/92: 6)
44 Nodes (2 1 1 2), ( 2 1 2 2), (2 2 1 2), (2 2 2 2)
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But market participants looked at narrow economic fundamentals in the wider context of 
political sustainability, paying particular attention to the political business cycle. This left 
analysts in a state of basic uncertainty, since the achievement of sound fundamentals 
sustaining competitive disinflation had come at the price of deteriorating political 
sustainability, paradoxically increasing the incentive for policymakers to renege on their 
commitment to the franc fort. Market uncertainty was thus the result of pragmatic 
rationality in financial markets, mirroring the pragmatic nature of political reasoning. The 
extent to which policymakers’ susceptibility to the political business cycle considerations 
translated into actual vulnerability, given the countervailing domestic interests in 
competitive disinflation, could only be gauged by taking domestic structures into 
account.
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6.3.2.2. Political Sustainability Concerns
Recession and Unemployment
Chart 6.19: Market sentiment France:
Concerns about recession (expectations and fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)45
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Chart 6.20: Market sentiment France:
Rising unemployment (expectations and fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)46
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Growing concerns about the political sustainability of the franc fort is clearly indicated 
by the increasing significance over time of two variables: GDP (Chart 6.19) and 
unemployment (Chart 6.20). Both the concerns about the falling GDP (Chart 6.19) and 
rising unemployment (Chart 6.20) were not only highly significant, but increased steadily 
throughout the investigated period for all three sources. Inversely, mirroring market 
sentiment towards balance of payments fundamentals, political sustainability concerns 
were dismissed until mid-1992, but grew in relevance to dominate market sentiment 
during 1993. Electoral cycle considerations played a critical role in focusing market 
attention on political sustainability in the last two crisis episodes (see Chart 6.21). This 
development is clearly reflected by the Financial Times. Whereas in July 1992 it reports 
that “.... the French franc shrugged off disappointing unemployment data for June. The 
fundamental features of the French economy are strong, and the D-Mark softened” (FT 
31/07/92: 27), six months later it asserts: “With French unemployment at 10.5 per cent 
and an election less than two months away, such high rates may be unsustainable for 
long” (FT 06/01/93: 21).
Until summer 1992 market participants arguing the case for balance of payments 
sustainability discounted political sustainability for two reasons: firstly the franc fort 
strategy was regarded as having broad political backing, despite its disinflationary costs:
“Pressure for change has been almost negligible in France, both in the political and business communities. 
The strategy of ‘competitive disinflation has brought gains in exporter’s market share and corporate 
profitability. A return to “stop-and-go” policies would jeopardise these gains but have virtually no impact 
on unemployment. Rather, they would be unpopular with the electorate that severely sanctioned the policy 
U-turns of the early 1980s.” (SB 18/09/92: 7)
46 Nodes (2 1 1 5 2), (2 1 2 5 2)
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Secondly, market participants had exaggerated expectations of an early recovery of the 
French economy, providing relief from political sustainability pressure, linked to 
premature hopes for a Bundesbank interest rate cut.
The case against this line of argument was made mainly by Goldman Sachs. They 
highlighted that confidence in the franc was eroded not by the simple fact of low output 
and high unemployment, but because of their continuation over time, which made the 
franc fort increasingly unpopular and consequently politically costly to maintain. This 
was put succinctly in March 1993:
“Fixed exchange rate systems tend to come under most pressure in recessions, not necessarily because 
governments realise that their currency parities are ‘wrong’, but more because the cost of maintaining them 
is very high in terms of lost output and employment. Maybe this cost is temporary, and maybe it isn’t; but 
after several years of ‘sacrifice’, businesses and consumers, and sometimes governments decide to call 
‘time out’, not because they want to change the exchange rate but because they want to change the interest 
rate stance needed to maintain the exchange rate. There is no doubt that this line of thought carries no truck 
with the French authorities. This is understandable. Traditional fundamentals like inflation, trade, budget 
balances and competitiveness all point to a successful period of economic stewardship by the current 
government. It is natural, consequently, to believe that once market participants ‘wake up’ this success will 
be rewarded. The difficulty market participants have in ‘waking-up’, however, is that they question the 
underlying ‘model’.“ (GS, March 1993,8/2: 1.10)
This cumulative deterioration of political sustainability was eventually recognised by the 
majority of analysts, including those originally inclined to emphasise strong 
fundamentals in support of the franc. Salomon Brothers admit, for example, already in 
March 1993:
“While the traditional unpopularity of devaluations among the French electorate has been a powerful 
argument in favor of the ‘franc fort’, the risks exist that the price of that policy -  high interest rate and a 
weak economy -  ultimately will be judged as too costly.” (SB 19/03/93: 50)
The final collapse of the credibility of the franc fort strategy in summer 1993, after the 
‘Grande Gaffe’, was consequently caused first of all by political sustainability concerns,
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with the awful French unemployment figures having become the “focus for dogged anti- 
franc speculators” (FT 26/07/93: 33).
Elections
Chart 6.21: Market sentiment France: 
Election concerns (expectations and fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)47
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Election concerns explain why confidence in the time consistency of the political 
commitment to the franc fort did not erode in a gradual and steady fashion, but in violent 
swings from pessimism to optimism and back between January and July 1993. Firstly, the 
March 1993 French General Assembly elections led to an escalation of political 
sustainability concerns, resulting in the pre-election crisis episode. But the crisis in the 
run-up and the immediate aftermath of the 1993 National Assembly elections was not
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simply caused by worries that the Socialist government might give priority to domestic 
reflation during electioneering, as suggested by the political business cycle argument. 
The commitment of the socialist Beregovoy government to the franc fort was taken to be 
beyond doubt. The weakness of the franc was linked to uncertainty about the future 
course of the anticipated new centre-right government. Political business cycle concerns 
mattered here in regard of the French presidential elections of 1995, as indicated by 
Goldman Sachs on 18 March 1993, three days before the second round of voting for the 
National Assembly:
“With a Presidential election looming in two years time, no one on the right has any desire to take political 
ownership of prolonged recession. So if interest rates do remain sticky, the new government may launch a 
concerted drive to persuade the Germans to cut interest rates sharply or speed up the process of monetary 
union. Only if this fails will they contemplate floating the currency.” (GS, March 1993, 8/2: 3.08)
After the elections the new stable government managed to disperse market fears about a 
change in its monetary policy course by skilfully taking advantage of intrinsic D-mark 
weakness, combining strong assurances of its commitment to exchange rate stability with 
careful unilateral interest rate cuts from a position of strength. The result was the period 
of exceptional market euphoria about the franc until the French economics minister 
Alphandery challenged German leadership in the ERM. Only when the Bundesbank 
signalled that it would confront the French challenge, turning it into the ‘Grande Gaffe*, 
financial markets returned to the assessment already suggested by Goldman Sachs in 
March: that without German cooperation the new government would turn to devaluation 
to win the presidential elections.
47 Nodes (2 3 1 1 2), (2 3 2 1 2)
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Apart from electioneering, the political sensitivity of market sentiment was demonstrated 
by market reaction to the appointment of Pierre Beregovoy as Prime Minister in April 
1992, to replace the Edith Cresson, who had been discredited by scandals. Beregovoy 
enjoyed a reputation in markets as highly competent, following a tight economic strategy 
(see e.g. FT 31/03/92: 35). Consequently his appointment was greeted with enthusiasm 
by market participants, triggering the spectacular pre-Danish referendum recovery of the 
franc against the D-mark (see FT 03/04/92: 31).
By paying consistently strong attention to the short and medium-term vote seeking 
motives of policymakers, market participants took not only political events and election 
dates, but also political statements and personalities very seriously. This risked resulting 
in short run and ad hoc behaviour, in particular if  political action was not understood in 
the context of its specific national structural context.
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6.3.3. Domestic Structures
Chart 6.22: Market sentiment France:
Domestic structures: Comparative significance
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Chart 6.23: Market sentiment France: 
Domestic structures: Government
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)49
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48 Central bank: Node (2 5 1 1); other financial structures: Node (2 5 1 2); wage bargaining structures:
Node (2 5 2); government structures: Node (2 5 3); other structures: Node (2 5 4).
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Chart 6.24: Market sentiment France:
Domestic structures: Financial structures (excluding central bank)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)50
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Domestic structures mattered in the French case, somewhat less than for Germany (see 
Chart 7.16), but more than in the case of Britain, except for the wider financial structure 
(see Chart 5.19). Given the dirigiste features of France’s domestic structures and its 
history of trade union militancy, the government and wider financial structure, and the 
wage bargaining structure should have mattered for market participants. As Chart 6.22 
demonstrates, it was indeed particularly the government structure and the non-central 
bank financial structure which influenced market sentiment towards the French franc, 
with a remarkable neglect of the wage bargaining structure. The de facto irrelevance of 
the institutional position of the Banque de France is understandable to some extent, given 
the political and constitutional control of the central bank by the bureaucratic elite of the
49 Node (2 5 3)
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Treasury. The fact that against the backdrop of this political reality, financial market 
participants chose to ignore the legal status of the central bank despite the constitutionally 
significant moves by the government to grant the Banque de France full independence, is 
further evidence for the pragmatic nature of market rationality. Boundedly rational 
behaviour thus resulted in an understanding by financial markets of the institutional 
position of the central bank within the wider structural context of the French political 
economy, rather than in abstract isolation. The insignificance of the central bank differs 
from Germany, with the Bundesbank and wage bargaining most relevant, but resembles 
Britain, where markets were also particularly interested in the political and financial 
structure, but neglected the dependent Bank of England.
Although analysts had to come to terms with a structurally complex national regime, 
structural awareness by market participants is in the French case uniquely concentrated in 
one source, Salomon Brothers. Goldman Sachs shows exceptionally little interest, 
compared to the German and British case, and the Financial Times displays its usual 
neglect of structures, explained by its event-driven daily reporting. A possible 
explanation for this profile could be that Salomon Brothers were more uncertain in the 
case of France than Britain, always qualifying the political sustainability argument 
against the franc with a strong fundamentals counter position. Goldman on the other had 
already at the turn of 1992/93 spoke out about political sustainability concerns, thereby 
taking an increasingly firm stance against the credibility of the franc fort. In the 
following I analyse market sentiment towards the financial, labour market, and 
government structures, beginning with the insignificant central bank and wage bargaining
50 Node (2 5 12)
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structures, then move on to the highly significant government structure and the important 
wider financial structure.51
633.1. The Banque de France
The status of the Banque of France was only discussed occasionally with reference to the 
steps taken in the course of 1993 first by the socialist and later the centre-right 
government to grant it full independence towards the end of the year.52 Policymakers 
targeted statements and announcements signalling that central bank independence was 
forthcoming at financial markets in the hope that this would boost the credibility of the 
franc fort in the short run, to dampen speculative pressure.
For example, the statement during the Swedish krona crisis episode in winter 1992 by the 
leader of the opposition UDF, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, that his party, once elected, 
would grant independence to the Banque de France to strengthen the franc fort was 
acknowledged by the Financial Times with: “Although an independent French central 
bank is expected one foreign exchange dealer said; ‘Anything which focuses market 
minds on a monetary move that will strengthen the franc can only be helpful.’” (FT 
19/12/92: 11). Similarly the announcement of concrete measures towards central bank 
independence by the new centre-right Prime Minister Balladur in his first keynote speech 
to parliament attracted some support for the currency (see FT 10/04/93: 13).
51 Domestic structures other than the three key structures investigated here were overall of little 
significance to financial market sentiment (see Node 2 5 4). The issues addressed here were mainly relating 
to the structure of the tax and the social security system in regard of business costs and investment, and the 
structure of industry in regard of export competitiveness.
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But by-and-large the legal status of the bank had little influence, because market 
participants were aware that the government was the key player in the French political 
structure when it came to the commitment to the franc fort. It was recognised that this 
commitment was essentially political, part of a grand strategy of competitive disinflation 
and European integration by France’s ruling elites. Markets sensed that, should this 
strategy break under the pressures of disinflation, legal independence of the central bank 
would make little difference:
“Independence for the Banque de France, expected to be granted by mid-July, may lead to a slight 
reduction on risk premia on French interest rates in the medium term, although with ‘franc fort’ already 
established under political control the impact is unlikely to be too significant.” (GS, May 1993, 8/5: 3.08)
Policymakers thus clearly overestimated the importance of formal central bank 
independence for financial markets. The market reaction towards respective policy 
signals shows that market participants approached the issue of the status of the central 
bank in a pragmatic and realistic way. They seem to have been aware that the time 
consistency of the franc fort de facto was a question of the rootedness of the strategy in 
the wider etatist-centralist French political regime, regardless of constitutional status of 
the Banque de France.
6.33.2. Wage Bargaining Structures
Wage bargaining structures were clearly insignificant for market sentiment not only in 
statistical terms, but also in qualitative importance. Of the three sample sources only
53 ry-*iSalomon Brothers commented occasionally on these structures (See Chart 6.22). The
52 These comments on the structure of the Banque de France [Node (2 5 1 1)] are few and far in between, 
falling well below the significance threshold.
53 Wage bargaining structures [Node (2 5 2)] were considered by neither the FT nor Goldman Sachs.
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simple reason for this lack of attention seems to have been that wage bargaining and the 
behaviour of trade unions gave little concern to financial markets. Wage increases were 
moderate (see Chart 2.9), and union militancy remained low, with strike activities in 1992 
lower than any year since 1984, and around their ten year average in 1993.54 The relaxed 
attitude of market participants towards labour market structures is confirmed by the fact 
that for Salomon Brothers they mattered most in non-crisis episodes.55
Salomon Brothers’ sanguine view of French wage bargaining structures was based on the 
perception that the capability of the weak and splintered trade union movement to push 
through inflationary wage increases in the face of recession and unemployment was low. 
The challenge to the political sustainability of the government’s franc fort strategy 
through strikes and social unrest was dismissed:
“In our view market fears that growing social unrest could cause a significant alteration in die 
Government’s economic policy stance are unfounded. The recent tougher stance by labor unions against the 
Government’s economic policies is unlikely to lead to major labor disputes over the coming months. This 
expectation reflects (1) the continued disagreement among competing trade unions about a common policy 
stance, and (2) the ongoing decline of the union’s relative importance -  alter a decade-long drop in union 
membership, unions now represent only about 10% of the workforce.” (SB 25/10/9: 4)
Similar views might explain the silence of the Financial Times and of Goldman Sachs on 
the issue. Confirmed by the actual developments over 1992/93, this view did not change 
over the investigated period. French labour market structures are thus a good 
demonstration that practical market participants only looked into domestic structures that 
they associated with clearly visible imminent problems. Salomon Brothers, for example, 
commented on the still militant and still powerful public sector unions only related to
54 based on working days lost per annum (source: OECD: Statistical Compendium 01/1999; CD ROM.)
302
fiscal sustainability. It was feared not that they might significantly change the overall 
positive wage trend by pushing through substantial public sector wage increases, but that 
these increases might aggravate the fiscal deficit (see SB 23/04/93: 7-8).
Regarding France’s labour market flexibility, Salomon Brothers demonstrated a good 
understanding of the specific nature of the French structures:
“The labor market rigidities and shortage of skilled workers that have made unemployment relatively 
insensitive to GDP growth in recent years, also would limit the effect of a devaluation on unemployment.” 
(SB 24/07/92: 7)
However, it is questionable how relevant this argument was for the credibility of the 
franc fort, in the face of calls for immediate political action to tackle rapidly rising 
unemployment.
6.3.3.3. Government Structures
Although significant, the influence of government structures on market sentiment was 
limited. They were addressed throughout the investigated period, with concerns discussed 
at similar levels in both crisis and non-crisis episodes, without ever reaching a level of 
acute alarm. Again, only Salomon Brothers displays a consistent concern with their 
capacity to underpin the government’s ERM commitment. As predicted by rationalist 
institutionalism (e.g. Milner 1997, Haggard & McCubbins 2001), central to market 
sentiment was the question of whether these structures facilitate strong and stable 
government. One issue concerning financial market participants in this respect was the
55 Only during non-crises episodes attention by Salomon Brothers to wage structures was above the 
significance threshold (30%).
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stability of the minority socialist government before the March 1993 national assembly 
elections (e.g. GS, April 1992, 7/4: 3.08). In addition, Salomon Brothers paid attention to 
the spectre of internal divisions in the new centre-right government over the franc fort 
and the consequences of plans for constitutional reform in 1993 on the strength of the 
executive.
Concerns by Salomon Brothers about a possible internal split in the new right-wing 
majority government under Prime Minister Balladur, elected in March 1993, preceded the 
election and intensified towards summer 1993.56 The focus was mainly on internal 
divisions in the Gaullist RPR. The split surfaced before the elections, when the leadership 
of the RPR, committing itself to the franc fort and central bank independence, faced 
resistance by key representatives of its own nationalist wing, causing Salomon to warn 
that “the risk could surface of an ‘internal opposition’ within the new majority in 
Parliament” (SB 12/02/93: 5-6). In March 1993, immediately before the change in 
government, these concerns were aggravated by worries related to government by 
coalition, allowing Salomon to predict the developments resulting in the ‘Grande Gaffe’ 
later in July:
“Market concerns have been heightened by perceptions that policy priorities may differ between the two 
parties of the center-right coalition, which is expected to lead the new Government: The centrist UDF has 
emphasized European integration, but leading politicians within the right-wing RPR have called for 
‘political pressure’ on Germany to secure lower interest rates.” (SB 19/03/93: 5)
Salomon Brothers nevertheless remained confident about the future of the franc fort, due 
to two considerations: firstly the realisation that Prime Minister Balladur’s “coherent
56 The Financial Times and Goldman Sachs did not comment on this issue.
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pragmatic policy stance” was endorsed by former franc fort opponents (SB 02/04/93: 5), 
and secondly by an astute assessment of the nature of cohabitation between the centre- 
right coalition government and President Mitterrand:
“President Mitterrand approves of the ‘franc fort’ and of an independent Bank of France. Both the 
Constitution and tradition point to a strong Presidential role in defense and foreign -  and hence, European -  
affairs. President Mitterrand likely would use his authority to oppose any shift by the future Government 
away from goals of European integration, if it were to depart from its pledged pro-Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) stance.” (SB 05/03/93: 6)57
Finally, Salomon’s worries that presidential proposals for a constitutional reform of the 
electoral system might weaken strong government, by introducing proportional 
representation and changing the relationship between legislature and executive, displayed 
a detailed concern for political structures. In the end both concerns were of little 
influence. The majoritarian voting system was maintained, reducing “fears of political 
splintering that could result from a shift to proportional representation” (SB 10/04/92: 4). 
Also, there seemed to be little prospect for fundamental changes in the relationship 
between parliament and the executive:
“Markets could become worried that President Francois Mitterrand’s plans to reform the constitution could 
eventually increase political instability. In particular, President Mitterrand’s desire to rebalance power 
between the Government and Parliament in favor of the latter -  if carried out -  raise [sic!] threats of 
political paralysis and looser fiscal discipline. Currently parliamentary powers are limited by the 
Constitution, especially in the budgetary field. However, we expect Presidential plans to reform should fall 
short of undermining strong powers of government versus parliament.” (SB 13/11/92: 6)
In contrast to the other two sources, Salomon Brothers demonstrated an impressive 
structural awareness of the different shades of the divided government problematique
57 Salomon Brothers’ awareness of the centralised presidential structure of the French political system is 
further demonstrated by its dismissal of regional elections as unimportant, pointing out the regions 
marginal power over economic policy (SB 20/03/92:4)
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pointed out by rationalist institutionalists. They considered not only the possible tensions 
resulting from coalition government, but also the intricacies of cohabitation characteristic 
for the French version of presidential systems and the constitutional hegemony of the 
French president. The exceptional attention of Salomon Brothers to government 
structures again might have to do with their particular ambivalent position towards the 
French franc, always holding positive fundamentals against negative political 
sustainability indicators.
However, in the ‘Grande Gaffe’ crisis Salomon Brothers followed the general swing of 
market sentiment, putting renewed emphasis on possible divisions within the ruling RPR- 
UDF coalition over a more expansionary policy, despite their earlier positive assessment 
of the capacity of French government structures to support the franc fort (SB 16/07/93: 
7). This indicates that their institutional analysis was ultimately not sufficiently robust 
and consistent to justify continued support of the franc against a general change in market 
sentiment. The practical way out of this dilemma was rational herding, given that the 
structural analysis did not unambiguously discount the possibility that a self-fulfilling 
speculative crisis might succeed.
6.3.3.4. Financial Structures
France’s financial structures (excluding the central bank) received market attention at 
low, but significant levels for two reasons: firstly markets recognised that the 
considerable remnants of state dirigism in the financial system allowed the French 
authorities to manipulate the credit system in support of the franc fort strategy. Secondly,
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as in the case of Britain, financial market participants were concerned about financial 
distress, and attempted to gauge the resilience of the credit structure to excessively tight 
monetary policy.
The capacity of the French financial system to shield the economy from disinflation by 
delaying the full passing on of increases in rates to borrowers, was noticed already in 
November 1991, when Salomon Brothers, under the headline “France: Its Other Tool for 
Monetary Policy” reported that
“...the Bank of France will lower the reserve requirement ratio in an attempt to cushion the impact of the 
defense of the franc on domestic credit policies. As a consequence, banks have agreed that last weeks 
increase in the intervention rate will not be passed through to their customers.” (SB 29/11/91:4).
Financial markets learned from their experience of the Danish-French referendum crisis 
that French financial dirigism would work to strengthen political sustainability, as 
indicated by Jim Hall, an economist at Swiss Banking Corporation in London: “The 
French managed to hold the franc without pushing up bank lending rates, a move which 
would have produced more No votes in the [Maastricht] referendum” (FT 19/09/92: 15). 
Subsequently, market participants took the structural capacity of the French financial 
system seriously. As Mr Steve Hannah, head of research at IBJ International, put it in 
reaction to growing pressure on the franc in winter 1992/93: “I simply do not believe in 
something like the devaluation of the franc. We have not seen anything like the number 
of rabbits that could be pulled out of the hat by the French.’” (FT 07/01/93: 23)
Still, market participants knew that the losses the banking sector incurred as a result of 
accommodating government policies could not be sustained over time by the financial
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system. From winter 1992/93 onwards speculation grew that pressure on the franc might 
return when banks finally had to pass on rising official interest rates in full, shifting the 
focus back on the need for Bundesbank cuts (see FT 16/01/93: 11). When, in the ‘Grande 
Gaffe’ crisis, confidence in the political sustainability of the franc finally collapsed, 
renewed attempts by the French authorities to intervene in the operation of the banking 
system were dismissed as a return to “dirty tricks”, and together with intervention 
considered as insufficient to address the increasingly desperate situation of the French 
economy (see FT 23/07/93: 29).
Therefore, although market participants understood that the French structures gave the 
authorities nothing but a temporary advantage to fudge the effects of a policy whose costs 
would have to be borne in the end, they underestimated the resilience of the French 
banking system, which managed to keep borrowing costs at bay well into 1993. Since 
markets were uncertain for how long the French financial structures could sustain these 
delaying tactics, their confidence building effects diminished over time, with no end of 
disinflation in sight.
Financial fragility in the credit system was understood by market participants as arising 
from bad debt in the banking system, resulting from distress in the corporate sector and a 
“significant debt overhang in the consumer sector” (GS, Oct. 1991, 6/10: 3.08). Concerns 
over the effect of high official interest rates added to fears of a “credit crunch” (see SB 
06/12/91: 4). With banks particularly exposed to the depressed real estate market, market
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participants’ concerns resembled the structural worries significant for the crisis of pound 
sterling:
“Current monetary policy tightness results in tight credit conditions. Because of the increasing number of 
business failure and the weakening of asset prices (especially property prices), banks have adopted more 
restrictive lending policies.” (SB 29/01/93: 6)
However, these worries never reached the scale of the UK, since market participants 
recognised that the vulnerability of French household and businesses to tightening credit 
conditions was structurally lower than in the case of Britain. They acknowledged that the 
self-financing ratio of French firms was high and improving, reducing the negative effect 
of high interest rates. Furthermore, the absence of earlier widespread asset price inflation 
in the more rigid French financial system was considered to limit the negative wealth 
effect of subsequent disinflation (see SB 20/11/92: 6). Finally, the French monetary 
transmission mechanism was seen to be weak, leading Salomon Brothers to conclude that 
floating the franc would not be as supportive of growth as a reduction in taxes, 
’’...because the economy is not highly sensitive to short-term rates” (SB 19/03/93: 6).
Nevertheless, this structural rationale failed to support the franc when in summer 1993 
markets began to realise that the need for an interest rate reduction came not so much 
from a weak financial system, but from the need to change perceptions and boost 
confidence:
“In the event of a float, continental economies could begin a return to noninflationary growth next year. 
Although the French economy is much less sensitive to short-term interest rates than the U.K. economy, a 
significant drop in interest rates potentially could restore damaged confidence.” (SB 30/07/93:4)
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Market sentiment was thus influenced as much by the psychology in the domestic 
financial system as by an assessment of its structural characteristics. The structural 
analysis of the financial system, although addressing theoretically important features as 
the treasury-bank-industry relationship and the monetary transmission mechanism, 
remained unsystematic and event driven. It failed to overcome uncertainty about the 
impact the structural capabilities and features of France’s financial system would have on 
political sustainability. In the end market participants took negative sentiment by French 
firms and households about their financial position as a short-cut indicator to overcome 
uncertainty about the structural strength of the country’s financial institutions.
6.4 Conclusion
After the widening of the ERM bands to +/- 15 percent in response to the ‘Grande Gaffe’ 
crisis at the end of July 1993 French policymakers did sustain the franc fort strategy, 
contrary to market expectations. Can the failure of market participants to recognise the 
time consistency of the French exchange rate commitment be explained by deficient 
awareness of domestic structures?
Market sentiment towards the French franc during the 1992/93 crisis is a classic example 
of the tension between balance of payments sustainability and political sustainability 
evaluations. Structural concerns came in within the context of this tension. Market 
participants behaved rationally by considering the relevance of domestic structures 
broadly in line with the analysis of rationalist institutionalism. But market rationality was 
bounded, pragmatic and ad hoc, rather than optimising and systematic. It failed to
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overcome uncertainty and was finally unable to prevent rational herding in response to 
prolonged and costly disinflation.
Of the three sources investigated, the daily reporting by the FT probably represents best 
the sporadic attention to domestic institutions already observed in the British case. More 
interesting in regard of the influence of domestic structures are the analyses by Goldman 
Sachs and Salomon Brothers. Goldman makes an early decision in favour of political 
sustainability concerns, dismissing the sound fundamentals argument as beside the point. 
Having established a relatively firm and consistent position emphasising the negative 
prospects of the franc, they spend comparatively little room on structural analysis. 
Salomon Brothers, in contrast, were much more ambivalent in their views, remaining tom 
between a positive fundamentals assessment, juxtaposed to political sustainability 
worries. Having to deal with greater uncertainty, they resort to a much broader structural 
analysis of the variables critical for the maintenance of the strong currency commitment.
The case of the French franc lends further support to the conclusion of the British case 
study that market participants mainly look into structures if and when they face a high 
degree of uncertainty. But in difference to Britain markets were more “institutionalist” 
when they had to come to terms with uncertainty about the sustainability of franc fort. 
This indicates that investors indeed underwent a process of “stochastic learning”, taking 
on board the lessons of the “Black Wednesday” crisis that, in order to form more reliable 
expectations about time consistency, it was not enough to rely solely on government
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statements and monetary policy moves, but that a deeper analysis of the underlying 
determinants might be advisable.
As to the structures that have significantly influenced market participants, a pattern 
lending support to the assumptions of bounded rationality emerges. All three sources 
concentrated on structural variables that are linked to political or economic fault lines in 
the underpinnings of the franc fort strategy. Hence governmental and non-central bank 
financial structures became the focus of attention, being critical in a situation where 
elections caused uncertainty over the stability and future monetary policy course of 
government, and lasting disinflation put the financial system under distress. Structures, 
which in the academic discourse of rational political economy are highly important (as 
central bank independence and the wage bargaining structures) only got scant attention, 
since in the political reality of 1992/93 these institutions posed no problems for the 
sustainability of the franc peg in the ERM. What mattered was not so much which 
structures underpinned moderate wage increases, or whether the central bank was 
independent within the coherent structural backing of the franc fort, encompassing the 
whole governmental system, but whether splits in the government could threaten this 
strategy, and whether the structures of the financial system could cope with mounting 
strain. This confirms a pragmatic rational attitude by market participants towards 
structural analysis. They behaved reasonably from a practical point of view, focusing on 
institutions associated with apparent sustainability problems. As long as there was no 
obvious problem, the need for investigation was low; only when uncertainty was caused 
by economic or political developments, attention turns to the underlying structures.
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However, such pragmatism came at the price of an analysis driven by events and short­
term economic indicators. By looking into domestic institutions only when these 
variables caused irritation, the structural analysis risked being ad hoc and superficial, 
failing to contain uncertainty through a clearer understanding of institutional risk.
The bounded rational nature of structural reasoning could explain why market 
participants, despite structural awareness, got it wrong in summer 1993. As far as 
structures are concerned, the key question was to what extent the sound fundamentals 
record of France was the product of a genuine French “stability culture”, justifying the 
assertion by French policymakers that France had advanced to the status of a strong 
currency country in its own right, independent of the D-mark peg. Goldman Sachs 
obviously gave little credence to such assertions by maintaining that good fundamentals 
were essentially owed to the Bundesbank diktat over French monetary policy. In contrast 
Salomon Brothers made the case for sound fundamentals being the result of overall sound 
structures underpinning the franc commitment. From their point of view it was possible 
to make the case that France’s good fundamentals indeed were the result of genuine 
structural soundness, with the franc fort the logical reward.
In the end it seems as if the structural analysis was not rigorous enough to produce robust 
results to sustain the latter view. On the contrary, by remaining uncertain, structural 
deliberations of Salomon Brothers could ultimately be sidelined to join rational herding, 
or could even be reinterpreted in support of speculative behaviour. Ironically it was the
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French policymakers themselves, banking on the strength of the structural analysis by 
market participants in support of the franc, who gave the final blow to structures based 
optimism by demanding co-leadership in the ERM. When the Bundesbank confronted 
financial markets with a choice between the structural capabilities of the German and the 
French monetary policy regime after the ‘Grande Gaffe’, market participants opted for 
the domestic institutional regime that they knew and trusted from long years of historical 
experience. As one London-based trader put it in reference to the D-mark -  French franc 
cross at the height of the ‘Grande Gaffe crisis episode: ‘This is about confidence in two 
economies, not the level of interest rates,’ (FT 13/07/93:27).
The practical-historical rather than optimising comparative rational approach to structural 
soundness by market participants might explain why markets misjudged the prospects of 
the franc fort strategy in summer 1993. By approaching the issue of French domestic 
structures mainly within the question of whether France could sustain shadowing 
Bundesbank policy, markets implicitly took French institutions as less credible than their 
German counterparts. Since neither sound fundamentals nor sound structures can sustain 
an externally imposed monetary policy stance forever which imposes excessive 
disinflationary costs on the domestic economy, the structures argument became 
increasingly irrelevant the longer Bundesbank hawkishness lasted. As long as the 
sustainability problem of the franc was approached within the conventions of the 
prevailing German leadership -  French followership framework, political sustainability 
ultimately depended on the Bundesbank, and not on French structures or fundamentals, as 
the proponents of the political sustainability argument rightly maintained.
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Ultimately, financial market participants did not draw abstract rationalist conclusions 
about potential capabilities of French structures, given their pragmatic bounded rational 
approach within a framework overdetermined by conventions on German regime strength 
drawn from historical experience. Domestic structural considerations were of critical 
importance for the credibility of the Franc. However, markets remained doubtful about 
French domestic institutions not because of abstract scientific conclusions, but because 
they had not experienced the franc fort to be sustainable without the external anchor of 
German monetary policy. Lacking the track record of autonomous monetary stability, the 
French authorities ultimately failed to win a vote of confidence in their domestic 
monetary policy regime from investors who relied more on historical experience than on 
abstract evaluation when it came to the credibility of domestic structures.
Regarding the explanatory value of the different crisis models, the French case, as the 
British case, provides, first of all, support for the expected policy change model. 
Essentially, the franc was attacked because markets lost confidence in the ability of 
office-seeking French policymakers to sustain their exchange rate commitment, facing 
growing unpopularity of further disinflation. From September 1992 onwards the franc 
was exposed to a series of speculative attacks testing the time consistency of the franc 
fort strategy, which had in the terminology of Kingman’s second generation crisis model 
entered the crisis zone (Krugman 1996).
But the actual speculative attacks, especially the final crisis in summer 1993, also show 
that the contingent policy change model and the inconsistent policy view can complement 
the expected policy change model. Once the credibility of the franc had been eroded by 
expectations of a policy change, the actual attack was triggered by the perceived policy 
inconsistencies of the ‘Grande Gaffe’ move, which combined a commitment to the franc 
fort with pressure on the Bundesbank to follow French reflation. Furthermore, political 
sustainability concerns became self-fulfilling, as the escalating speculative attack entered 
into a feedback loop with French official interest rate hikes in defence of the franc. In 
contrast, the first generation competitiveness crisis explanation is of little relevance for 
the French case, given by-and-large sound French economic fundamentals.
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Chapter 7:
The D-Mark during the ERM Crisis
7.1. Introduction
In this chapter I undertake the case study of market sentiment towards the D-mark during the 
ERM crisis. How did market sentiment towards the D-mark develop? How and to what extent 
did domestic structures of Germany play a role?
Academic analyses of the ERM crisis generally focus on the excessive strength o f the D-mark 
as the key feature of the ERM tensions in 1992/93. In my case study I pay particular attention 
to the phases of D-mark weakness, when its credibility as the de facto key or anchor currency 
of the system came under scrutiny by market participants.
My analysis of German domestic institutions in Chapter Four concluded that domestic 
structures in Germany provided only weak backing to the Bundesbank’s hard currency 
strategy in the early 1990s. Fiscal profligacy by governments and inflationary wage 
bargaining signalled the breakdown of the stability consensus in governmental and wage 
bargain structures, in which the Bundesbank had been embedded in normal times. In 
particular, Germany’s comprehensive wage bargaining structure had turned from a 
supporting factor of price stability to a factor pushing inflation. Furthermore, the strong 
relations bank -  export industry relationship only supported a strong but stable currency, not 
rapid appreciation as the result of the Bundesbank’s efforts to restore domestic price stability. 
As a consequence the central bank was socially isolated, except for the relief it received from 
political pressures for monetary easing from Germany’s fragmented federal political system.
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The chapter concludes that domestic structures influenced market sentiment towards the D- 
mark. But, as in the case of pound sterling and the French franc, direct attention of financial 
market participants to domestic structures remained superficial and ac hoc, confined to 
phases of heightened uncertainty. In Germany financial markets were concerned about the 
time consistency of Bundesbank anti-inflationary monetary policy. Market participants were 
as a rule satisfied to analyse fiscal policy decisions, wage bargaining demands, and regional 
election results as a shortcut to judge whether the industrial-financial, wage bargaining and 
political structures underpinning Germany’s stability culture could still be relied upon.
The case of the D-mark is special in so far as it deals with the currency at the centre of an 
asymmetric key currency system. This chapter concludes that German domestic structures 
were important for market participants when it came to assessing whether the country’s 
political economic institutions were consistent with continued Bundesbank leadership in the 
EMS.
Section two of this chapter reviews the role of the D-mark during the ERM crisis until the 
widening of bands on 2 August 1993 and how this role has been interpreted in analyses o f the 
crisis, to set the context for the empirical analysis. Section three contains the results of my 
qualitative analysis of market sentiment towards the D-mark in this period, followed by the 
conclusion in section four.
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7.2. The D-Mark and the ERM Crisis
Chart 7.1: Exchange rates: DM to FF;$
(Daily; 01 November 1991-31  October 1993; 01/11/91 = 100)
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Events:
1: 11/12/91: Maastricht treaty agreed
2: ~ 08/05/92: public sector strike in Germany leads to wage hikes
3: 02/06/92: Danish referendum on Maastricht Treaty
4: 16/09/92: "Black Wednesday"
20/09/92: French referendum on Maastricht Treaty 
5: 03/11/92: USA: presidential elections (first Clinton administration)
6: 19/11/92: Swedish Krona floated (mounting ERM tensions)
7: 16/03/93: Germany: "Solidarity Pact" agreed
20/03/93: Russia: Yeltsin declares direct rule (high point of political crisis)
21/03/93: France: first round o f general elections 
8: 13/05/93: Spanish peseta and Portuguese escudo devalued (Iberian currency crisis).
9: 09/06/93; George Soros speaks of "fundamental and long-term D-mark weakness"
10: 24/06/93: "La grande gaffe": France suggests concerted interest rate cuts to Germany
11: 29/07/93: Bundesbank interest rate cuts insignificant (Lombard minus 0.5%)
31/07 - 01/08/93: widening o f ERM bands to 15%
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Chart 7.2: France: Short-term interest rates
(Daily; 01 August 1991-01  December 1993; differential with German rates)
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1: 11/12/91: Maastricht treaty agreed
2: ~ 08/05/92: public sector strike in Germany leads to wage hikes
3: 02/06/92: Danish referendum on Maastricht Treaty
4: 16/09/92: "Black Wednesday"
20/09/92: French referendum on Maastricht Treaty 
5: 19/11/92: Swedish Krona floated (mounting ERM tensions)
6: 16/03/93: Germany: "Solidarity Pact" agreed
20/03/93 Russia: Yeltsin declares direct rule (high point of political crisis)
21/03/93: France: first round of general elections 
7: 13/05/93: Spanish peseta and Portuguese escudo devalued (Iberian currency crisis)
8: 09/06/93; George Soros speaks of "fundamental and long-term D-mark weakness"
9: 24/06/93: "La grande gaffe": France suggests concerted interest rate cuts to Germany
10: 29/07/93: Bundesbank interest rate cuts insignificant (Lombard minus 0.5%)
31/07 - 01/08/93: widening of ERM bands to 15%
 Short-i: FF-DM
 Events
The D-mark as key currency in an asymmetric system lay at the heart o f the dynamic 
instability o f ERM in the 1991-93 period. Germany’s destabilising role is generally attributed 
to the restrictive monetary policy stance o f the Bundesbank in response to inflationary
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pressures stemming from fiscal and wage policies, which resulted in excessive D-mark 
strength within the ERM grid.1 But the actual performance o f the D-mark in the 1992/93, 
although resulting in its de facto appreciation against most ERM currencies, is characterised 
by volatility, in stark contrast to its usual stability as a hard currency. From late 1991 to 
August 1993 the D-mark shifted between weakness and strength, with episodes o f heightened 
ERM tension characterised by D-mark strength and vice versa. This volatility became more 
pronounced towards August 1993, when, after period of severe weakening and growing 
doubts in the financial markets about its anchor position, the mark rebounded with the 
Bundesbank reasserting its dominant role in the ERM over the French franc.
7.2.1. Global Factors: USA and Russia
The root causes for the disruptive behaviour of the D-mark in the ERM are associated with 
the economic and political consequences of German unification on 3 October 1990. Global 
political and economic factors outside the ERM also played an important role, notably the 
international weakness of the US dollar and developments in Russia. Whereas US weakness 
in general supported D-mark strength, events in Russia pushed it in the opposite direction. 
Benign neglect of the dollar by US policy makers, in response to the 1991 recession and 
possibly associated with the presidential elections in 1992, collided with German monetary 
policy, similarly preoccupied with domestic issues, but to the opposite effect (see Chart 2.2). 
The consequence was growing international exchange rate instability culminating in the
1 For a review of the ERM crisis along these lines see e.g. De Grauwe (1995,1997); Grahl (1997); Tsoukalis 
(1997).
2 A detailed, but strongly anecdotal account of the events culminating in the 1993 speculative attack on the 
French franc has been given by Bernard Connolly (1995). For a more academic review see Loedel (1998), or 
Kaltenthaler (1998).
3 The US dollar fell from DM 1.95 in September 1989 to a low of DM 1.45 in September 1992 (Source:
Deutsche Bundesbank). Real US GDP contracted in 1991 by -0.2 percent (Source: OECD). Authors 
emphasising the relevance of US interest rates and the weak US dollar as cause for the tensions within the ERM 
as a regional key currency system are Henning (1998), Loedel (1998), Buiter et al. (1998) and Cobham (1997).
321
dollar crisis of August 1992. When sluggish economic growth pointed at the possibility of a 
“double-dip recession” in autumn 1992 and even a “triple-dip” recession in spring/summer 
1993, the Fed delayed monetary tightening until the beginning o f 1994. During the ERM 
crisis financial markets faced a substantial official and short-term interest rate differential in 
favour of the D-mark, although this narrowed in 1993 with step-by step monetary easing by 
the Bundesbank. As a consequence the dollar managed to stage a recovery from a very weak 
position against the German currency during 1993 (see Charts 2.2 and 7.1).
The other international factor, beyond the EMS, which influenced the performance of the D- 
mark in the ERM, was the mounting political and economic crisis in Russia. Between the 
dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 and President Yeltsin’s declaration of presidential 
rule over parliament in September 1993, followed by the storming o f the parliament building 
in October, Russia went through a period of economic and political turmoil.4 Given 
Germany’s proximity to eastern Europe and political and economic stake in Russian 
developments, period escalations of the crisis in Russia not only led to a temporary 
strengthening of the US dollar as safe haven currency, but also a weakening of the D-mark in 
international financial markets.
7.2.2. German Unification and the ERM Crisis
The impact of German reunification on the ERM has to be seen against the international 
backdrop. In the early 1990s the project of reunification was given overriding priority by the 
ruling Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition under chancellor Helmut Kohl.5 Kohl rushed 
through unification, exploiting original domestic enthusiasm for German unity to the full, in
4 According to the IMF, former SU output fell 18.2% in 1992, and annual inflation reached levels of above 
1,200% in 1993 and 1993 (IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1994, Tables A1 and A8)
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particular in view of the first pan-German general elections on 16 October 1990, despite 
problematic political and economic consequences. These consequences had a domestic and 
international dimension (Table 7.1).6
Domestically the government chose to inflate domestic expectations by promising virtually 
self-financing reunification without the need of income redistribution from west Germany to 
east Germany through tax increases. Furthermore, east Germans were attracted by the 
prospects of a one-for-one rate for exchanging the mark of the GDR into D-marks, as well as 
rapid equalisation of wages (Sinn & Sinn 1992; Loedel 1998). Internationally the Kohl 
administration strategy succeeded in securing backing for the project of a united and fully 
sovereign Germany not only by the US and the USSR, but also by the initially apprehensive 
France and UK. This was achieved by a strong commitment to integrate a reunified Germany 
more firmly into the EU, by sharing monetary sovereignty in a monetary union (Anderson & 
Wascher 1999; Garrett 1994; Haggard et al. 1993; Sandholtz 1993b).
5 See Anderson & Wascher (1999), Marsh (1995).
6 For a good review of the national and international consequences see Gretschmann (1994).
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Table 7.1:
The political and economic consequences of German unification
Domestic International
Political • Government strengthened by general elections
• Bundesbank defeated over GEMU
• Mounting social and political tensions
• Maastricht treaty (EMU)
• Franco-German axis strengthened
Economic • GEMU at 1:1 rate • ERM rigidity (Maastricht criteria)
• East-West wage harmonisation • D-mark strength (N-l problem)
Collapse of East German industry, but rising 
demand from East German consumers
ERM tensions/crisis
• Budget deficit up (demand boost)
• West German wage increases
* German inflation up
* Buba assertiveness (tight monetary policy)
Domestic Consequences o f German Unification 
First to the domestic political and economic consequences: on the surface, the success of
unification resulted in a substantial strengthening of the government’s position relative to
other actors in Germany’s political structure. Firstly, in the parliamentary elections of 16
October, the ruling coalition was returned to power with an overwhelming majority o f 134
seats in the wake of the reunification euphoria. This majority put the government in a position
of strength against the opposition Social Democrats, even after it had lost its majority in the
Bundesrat (upper house) in April 1991. Secondly, German monetary union on 1 July 1990 at
an overvalued one-for-one conversion rate of east marks, was pushed through against the
strong opposition of the Bundesbank. This constituted a de facto coup by the government
against the traditional authority of the central bank in Germany’s monetary affairs.
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However, over the longer term these political advantages faded away with the social and 
economic strains resulting from unification beginning to show. In the course of 1991 to 1993 
the disillusionment with Kohl’s reunification project, tainted by mounting economic and 
social costs, corruption and mismanagement, became apparent in the poor performance of the 
governing coalition in state elections in 1992 and 1993, as well as the rise of the racist far 
right in regional and local elections. With the government seemingly losing control, 1992/93 
saw increasing demands by the media and the public for a ‘grand coalition’ government 
including the opposition SPD. Furthermore, the defeat of the Bundesbank in pushing through 
GEMU turned out to be something of a phyrric victory for government. In May 1991 it led to 
the resignation of its popular President Pohl, a Social Democrat strongly opposed to the terms 
and speed of GEMU and critical of EMU. He was replaced by the orthodox Bundesbank 
technocrat Helmut Schlesinger, heralding the reassertion of traditional Bundesbank 
assertiveness in defence of the value of the D-mark through drastic interest rate increases.7
The economic consequences of reunification are more complex. On the domestic front the 
inflationary consequences of a demand boost are most important, coinciding with a collapse 
supply from east Germany. Four factors combined to produce this outcome (Table 7.1): 
First, the original decision for German monetary union at a one-to-one rate boosted east 
German demand and German money supply, at the same time reducing the competitiveness 
and thus output of east German industry. The devastation of east German industrial 
competitiveness was amplified by the second factor, the decision to rapidly bring east 
German wages to west German levels, out of line with east German productivity, thus 
boosting demand and at the same time damaging competitive productive capacity. Thirdly,
7 Schlesinger was succeeded by Hans Tietmeyer on 01 October 1993. Tietmeyer took a softer line on what it 
means to defend the value of the D-mark, more amenable to the demands of government and the EMU project 
(Connolly 1995).
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when both factors conspired to create a need for massive transfers and subsidies from west to 
east, the Kohl administration, for political reasons, chose to deficit finance these transfers, 
instead of increasing income and corporate taxes. This policy caused an inflationary demand 
shock across the German economy, driven by a rapidly deteriorating public sector deficit, 
culminating at 8 percent of GDP in 1993 (see Table 7.1, and Appendix, Table 2). Finally, 
inflationary demand was further boosted by excessive wage settlements agreed in the west in 
response to the surge in west German production and profitability to satisfy east German 
demand.
The overall result of these consequences was an explosion of the German money supply and 
an increase in inflation to over 6% in April 1992, well above the inflation rates o f other core 
ERM countries. (See Chart 2.4 and Table 7.2). 8 With inflation rates increasing and money 
supply overshooting the Bundesbank’s target corridor, the bank reasserted its control over 
German monetary policy by successively tightening monetary policy from the end of 1990 
until September 1992. Afterwards, easing took place gradually through a long sequence of 
small steps until early summer 1994 (see Chart 2.2).9 The ensuing stabilisation crisis led to a 
recession in 1993, with unemployment reaching 10.5 percent (see Chart 2.8).
8 The German demand shock was reflected in the swing of the current account into deficit (see Appendix, Table 
2).
9 The Bundesbank’s M3 target corridor for 1992, the crucial benchmark for its monetary policy strategy, was 
set for 1992 for a growth rate of =3,5 to + 5.5%. In reality M3 grew by more than 9% for the whole year. The 
Bundesbank consequently adjusted its corridor for 1993 upward, to a target range of +4.5% to +6.5%. Monetary 
tightening achieved a real M3 annual growth rate of just over 7%, close to the upper limit of the corridor. The 
key Bundesbank discount rate was increased from 6% in the beginning if 1991 to 8.75% in July 1992. It 
gradually fell to reach 4.5% in May 1994 (Source: Deutsche Bundesbank).
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Table 7.2:
German unification: economic indicators
East German 
Industrial Production
(1989=100)*
Public Sector n , 0 rp r- * c  * Public Sector Transfers to Eastern^  Deficit Germany
(% of GDP West)2 (% of GDP)3
West German 
Wages
(% change)4
Consumer
Prices
(% change)5
1989 100 0.1 4.1 2.8
1990 77.4 -2.0 6.4 2.7
1991 56.0 3.8 ~29 6.2 3.6
1992 61.7 4.5 -2-5 5.4 5.1
1993 67.4 4.6 -3-2 5.1 4.4
1994 76.8 4.2 -2-5 3.8 2.8
Sources:
1. Tobler (1997), p. 228
2. 91-94 only; Council of Economic Experts, Jahresgutachten 1995/96, Table 40
3. General Government Fiscal Balances; OECD Economic Outlook 66, Dec. 1999, Annex Table 16
4. Hourly compensation for production workers; US Dept, of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Sept. 2000
5. OECD Economic Outlook 66, Dec. 1999, Annex Table 16
International Consequences 
The project to merge the ERM currencies into a single currency, shifting monetary autonomy
from the Bundesbank to the new European Central Bank, was enshrined in the Maastricht
treaty o f December 1991.10 The success o f further economic and political integration in
western Europe to flank reunification assumed a pivotal position in the German government’s
foreign policy strategy, leading to a significant strengthening o f the Franco-German axis.11
The Maastricht convergence criteria de facto ruled out realignment as a political option for
ERM countries aspiring to join EMU in the first round, thereby turning the ERM into a rigid
exchange rate system. During the ERM crisis the German government was therefore
interested in keeping the EMU project on track by supporting core currencies under attack,
especially the French franc. The Bundesbank, to some extent obliged to support the
10 For details see Gros & Thygesen (1998).
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government, lived up to its responsibilities within the ERM through large scale interventions. 
However, after massive interventions in September 1992 the Bundesbank was unwilling to 
support ERM parities beyond levels which could be sterilised. As de Grauwe put it, the 
Germans “refused to throw all their weapons into the battle” (1997: 110).12 Furthermore, the 
central bank was unwilling to compromise on its tight domestic monetary policy stance 
which pushed the D-mark up within the ERM grid.
This meant that the ERM was confronted with the classic problem of “irresponsible” 
leadership, associated with the N-l problem in asymmetrically structured key currency 
systems. Germany chose to exploit the exceptional domestic monetary policy autonomy of 
the key currency country and shifted the adjustment burden onto the follower countries.13 
Due to the inflationary consequences of German reunification, the same anti-inflationary 
domestic monetary policy orientation, which had served as a stabilising disinflationary 
anchor for the ERM, now destabilised the system by imposing disinflation on the rest of the 
ERM.
11 The importance of “high politics” for the move towards monetary union has been emphasised by Sandholtz 
(1993a), Dyson (1994), Tsoukalis (1997).
12 Intervention by the Bundesbank in particular during the September 1992 crisis was indeed on an 
unprecedented and, in the eyes of the institution, intolerable scale (Bemholz 1999: 768-772). It amounted to DM 
92.7bn in September 1992, plus another DM 60bn in July 1993 (Deutsche Bundesbank: Monthly Reports 01/93 
and 08/93). These interventions were so high that German money supply could not be fiilly insulated through 
sterilisation.
13 For a discussion of asymmetry and the N-l problem see Krugman & Obstfeld (2000), Ch. 18, or, applied to 
die ERM, de Grauwe (1996): 39-44. In IPE the classic analysis of the problem of hierarchy and hegemonic 
leadership in monetary relations was delivered by Kindleberger, e.g. (1986). Abdelal (1998) analyses the 
hierarchical nature of the ERM by both drawing on the N-l and the hegemonic leadership paradigm
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1992/93: Domestic Tensions 
The domestic and international consequences of reunification revealed the fault lines in the
structures and political interests underlying the German stability consensus (see Table 7.3).14
Within the governmental structures, tensions grew between the chancellery and the foreign
office on the one side and the Bundesbank on the other, supported by the finance ministry
(Marsh 1995; Heisenberg 1999). The former were interested in an expansionary monetary
policy, firstly to accommodate the economic and social strains o f unification and, secondly,
to relieve tensions in the ERM in view of the Maastricht treaty and the importance of the
Franco-German axis. Against this stood a growing assertiveness by the Bundesbank to reign
in inflationary pressures by means of restrictive monetary policy in adverse circumstances of
ballooning budget deficits and wage demands.
The resurgence of trade union power due to the specific constellation of reunification led to 
increasing criticism of Bundesbank policy by the DGB, the trade union confederation. The 
central bank was accused of damaging growth, especially in the export sector, by 
undermining exchange rate stability. The BDI, the employers organisation representing big 
business, argued in a similar direction, partly supported by the peak organisation of 
Germany’s big private banks, the BDB. Against this criticism the Bundesbank was only 
backed by the peak organisations representing smaller investors and German savers (GSDS). 
The DIHT, the business organisation representing more domestically orientated SMEs, took a 
roughly neutral position.
14 Kaltenthaler (1998), Marsh (1995) and Lange & Shackleton (1998) expand on the conflicts between 
government departments, political parties and key peak associations over the Bundesbank’s monetary policy 
strategy in the wake of reunification. Connolly’s (1995) highly personalised account of the events around the 
ERM crisis emphasises the split between the Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Bundesbank president Helmut 
Schlesinger.
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In the political party landscape the consequences of reunification led to a strange reversal of 
roles between the ruling conservative-liberal coalition and the opposition Social Democrats 
(SPD). CDU (conservatives) and FDP (liberals), although traditional supporters of 
Bundesbank hawkishness, were ambivalent about the Bank’s restrictive policies, concerned 
primarily with managing reunification and European integration. On the other hand, the SDP, 
sceptical about the loss of national economic policy autonomy through EMU and highly 
critical of the government’s economic management of reunification, moderated its traditional 
criticism of Bundesbank independence. The conflict between government and opposition 
about monetary policy was played out not so much in the lower house (Bundestag), but 
between the executive and the upper house (Bundesrat), which was dominated by SPD-led 
‘Lander’ (state) governments (Marsh 1995: 90). As a result, the German federal system gave 
the Bank some relief from the pressure it encountered, especially from the Chancellery.15 
Similarly, Euro-sceptic public opinion, normally most critical of the Bundesbank when it 
triggered a ‘stabilisation crisis’ (Spahn 1988) to control inflation, now tolerated Bundesbank 
hawkishness as an expression of German monetary assertiveness against foreign challenges 
to national monetary autonomy (Connolly 1995).16
Altogether, the consequences of reunification can be summed up as a partial breakdown of 
the German stability consensus on monetary policy making, which underpinned Bundesbank 
autonomy (Tullio et al. 1996: 24), although the central support the Bundesbank received from 
the Germany’s federal political structure remained intact. With its structural underpinnings 
in partial disarray, Bundesbank policy lacked consistency in 1993. Thomasberger (1993) 
describes this as “Schlingerkurs” (lurching course) of the Bundesbank between price and
15 Henning (1994) points out the crucial role of the Bundesrat and the German Constitutional Court in particular 
for procrastinating on the final ratification of the Maastricht treaty.
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exchange rate stability. This “Schlingerkurs” can be observed in close relationship with the 
ups and downs of the D-mark during the ERM crisis. Adding the dollar-politics dimension, 
Loedel (1999:149) sees the Bundesbank in 1992/93 as being caught in a ‘triple bind,
“(1) confronting the government’s ill-defined financing plans for reunification and the developing economic 
slowdown in Germany on the domestic front; (2) confronting the EMS intervention commitments as well as the 
powerful driving forces of monetary integration surrounding Maastricht; and (3) confronting an indifferent U.S. 
dollar policy.”
Table 7.3:
Monetary policy interests in Germany in 1992/93
DOMESTIC POLICY EXTERNAL POLICY
Employment/
Growth Price Stability
Exchange- 
Rate Stability Realignment
Administration
Bundesbank + + +
Chancellor + + +
Finance Ministry + +
Foreign Office + +
Legislature
Bundestag + + + + +
Bundesrat + + +
Peak Associations
BDI + + + +
DIHT +
BDB + + +
GSDS + + + +
DGB + + +
Political Parties
CDU + +
FDP + +
SPD + + +
Based on Kaltenthaler (1998)
+ + strongly in favour
+ in favour
opposed
strongly opposed 
blank: neutral
16 See Table 7.3. for the traditional interest constellation towards German monetary policy by key domestic 
institutions.
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Despite these domestic tensions the Bundesbank eventually asserted itself in summer 1993. 
Paradoxically this was only possible against the background of prior Bundesbank weakness. 
It was the impression of loss of control in spring/summer 1993 which made it clear to key 
German interest groups that a repeat of the stabilisation of the ERM by the Bundesbank 
through intervention or even interest rate cuts would only be possible at the cost of a 
credibility crisis of the D-mark. In fact, what was at stake was Germany’s monetary 
sovereignty itself (Kaltenthaler 1998: 101). The second ERM crisis, triggered by the French 
push for ERM co-leadership, assisted the Bundesbank in restoring its hegemony in the 
German political economy. It managed to resolve its “Schlingerkurs” in favour o f domestic 
stability. Thus the domestic struggle and Bundesbank “Schlingerkurs” have to be seen as an 
interaction between the institution and financial markets, in the context of both external 
political pressures, mainly from France, and domestic pressures.
7.2.3. Periodization of the History of the D-mark in the ERM Crisis
In line with my other case studies, the analysis of the case of the German currency starts with
the tensions around the Maastricht conference and the Nordic currency crisis of late 1991 and 
stretches to the widening of the ERM bands in summer 1993, mirroring the analysis of 
market sentiment towards the French franc. The period covered is from 1 October 1991 to 2 
August 1993. Throughout this period, the D-mark never experienced an outright exchange 
rate crisis within the ERM grid. However, it went through distinct periods of weakness in its 
role as key currency, which were characterised by financial markets questioning the 
credibility of the Bundesbank’s ability to anchor the system to German monetary policy.
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1 7Three periods of D-mark weakness have been defined:
■ the pre-Danish-referendum weakness episode (10 January 1992 - 2 June 1992);
■ the post-French referendum weakness episode (29 October 1992 - 18 November 1992);
■ the pre-‘Grande Gaffe* weakness episode (04 Feb 1993 - 23 June 1993).18
As for the case of Britain and France, these episodes have been statistically analysed and 
interpreted individually. They have also been statistically aggregated as "DM weakness 
episodes". Periods during which the D-mark reasserts its position as anchor currency have 
been taken into account only in aggregated form as "DM-strength episodes". These are the 
periods associated with trouble in the ERM. In total, seven phases have been defined:
1. D-mark strength during and after the Maastricht negotiations and the Nordic currency 
(01 October 1991 - 09 January 1992). The phase was characterised by Bundesbank 
monetary tightening, a consequential widening dollar-D-mark interest differential and 
resilient German economic growth.
2. D-mark weakness in the pre-Danish-referendum weakness episode (10 January 1992 - 
2 June 1992). The 10th of January 1992 roughly marks the upward turning point for 
both the French franc and the dollar against the D-mark (Chart 7.1), combined with a 
beginning of short-term interest rate convergence between France and Germany 
(Chart 7.2). The period ends with the Danish referendum, marking the end of the 
upward trend of other ERM currencies, especially the French franc, against the D- 
mark.19 In Germany it was characterised by industrial disputes and excessive wage 
increases in the public sector in spring and fading popularity of the Kohl
17 For the definition criteria see Chapter Three. For a chronology of the events referred to in the following 
section, see Appendix, Table 1.
18 The term refers to the misjudged call by the French finance minister Alphandery on 24 June 1993 for joint 
German -French interest rate reductions, triggering a run in financial markets on die French franc. As Bernhard 
Connolly reports, the failed attempt became immediately known as “La gaffe Alphandery” (Connolly 1995:
309).
19 The dollar had peaked against the mark already on 21 April 1992 (Chart 7.2).
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administration, signalled by calls for a grand coalition, heavy losses of the governing 
coalition in state elections and an upsurge of the far right. Externally, Germany was 
exposed to political and economic instability in the former Soviet Union after the 
resignation of President Gorbatchev.
3. D-mark strength during the first ERM crisis following the Danish referendum and
culminating in the Black Wednesday and the French referendum (03 June 1992 - 29 
September 1992). The period saw the conclusion of a tripartite “solidarity pact” for 
1994 on budgetary consolidation and wage moderation. The Bundesbank’s hawkish 
policy stance in the face of continuous high inflation came under pressure with the 
escalation of the ERM crisis in late summer. In response to pressure by the German 
and the French government the central bank accepted to shelter the French franc from 
the ERM crisis by massive intervention. The special treatment of the franc indicated 
that the Bundesbank was willing to compromise if  ‘high politics’ was at stake.
4. D-mark weakness following the French referendum (29 October 1992 - 18 November 
1992). On the 29th of October the Bank of France unilaterally lowered official interest 
rates for the first time after the September crisis. Foreign exchange markets responded 
positively to this unilateral cut, the French franc remained stable. The date thus marks 
the end of the “first” ERM crisis, although French short-term interest rates had been 
falling relative to German rates since late September. Short-term rates continued to 
fall back to pre-crisis levels in November 1992 (Chart 7.2). The franc started to 
strengthen against the DM already on 24 September and the dollar’s volatile rally 
against the D-mark started on 16 September.
5. D-mark strength in the aftershocks of the first ERM crisis in winter 1992/93 (18
November 1992 - 03 February 1993). The rehabilitation of the D-mark was heralded 
by the floating of the Swedish krona on 19 November 1992. It was furthered by the
Bundesbank reasserting its anti-inflationary stance against political pressure to 
support the French franc through an interest rate cut. The winter crisis resulted in a 
round of devaluations in the ERM (Peseta, escudo, Irish punt).
D-mark weakness in the pre-‘Grande Gaffe* weakness episode (04 Feb 1993 - 23 June 
1993. The Bundesbank’s official rate cut of 04 February marked the final end of the 
winter 1992/93 ERM tensions. From then onwards the Bundesbank followed a policy 
of continuous but piecemeal interest rate cuts. Although the bumpy dollar rally 
against the D-mark dated back to Christmas 1992, and the French franc had already 
started to strengthen against the D-mark from the beginning of January 1993 on the 
back of official interest rate increases (Chart 2.2), D-mark weakness was only really 
setting in with French short term interest starting to come down in relation to German 
rates after 04 February (Chart 7.2).
The 1993 D-mark weakness episode differed from the 1992 episode in so far as the 
domestic economic situation was much worse than in 1992, contributing for the first 
time to a sustainability problem for traditional Bundesbank anti-inflation policies. 
Despite its tough stance the central bank had not been able to bring inflation under 
control but had contributed to a recession and rising unemployment. In the first 
quarter of 1993 inflation rose to nearly 5%, whereas unemployment reached 9% (see 
Chart 2.4 and 2.8). In addition, budgetary consolidation was put into question by the 
prospect of the weakened government having to fight a general election in 1994. The 
danger of Germany’s economy entering a phase of stagflation loomed, giving the 
impression of the Bundesbank loosing control. From the end of March, with the 
French parliamentary elections over and the Russian President Yeltsin declaring direct 
rule, D-mark weakness turned into an acute confidence crisis. On 9 June 1993 George 
Soros stated that D-mark weakness “was fundamental and long-term”. The crisis
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culminated with the rally of the French franc and the dollar against the mark in 
summer 1993.
7. D-mark strength after the triumph of the Bundesbank over the challenge of France for 
co-management of the ERM, starting with "La Grande Gaffe", the attempt by the 
French economics minister Edmond Alphandery to co-determine ERM monetary 
policy, and culminating in the widening of the ERM bands to ± 15% (24 June 1993 - 
1 August 1993). The Bundesbank refusal to cooperate with the French demands 
turned a potential D-mark crisis into another round of ERM crisis, which assisted the 
reassertion of Bundesbank dominance in the ERM.
7.2.4. Interpretations of D-Mark Volatility
Most literature analysing the ERM crisis does not deal with the confidence crisis experienced 
by the D-mark in 1993. When it comes to the role of Germany in the ERM crisis, the general 
view is that the Bundesbank’s management of the key currency caused tensions because it 
prioritised domestic stability over systemic stability (Kenen 1995; Andrews 1995; de Grauwe 
1997; Grahl 1997; Tsoukalis 1997; Abdelal 1998). The severity of the disinflationary shock 
imposed on the system is explained by Tullio et al. (1996), Thomasberger (1993) and Spahn 
(1995) by the impotence of the Bundesbank to succeed in fighting domestic cost-tax push 
inflation because the wider domestic preconditions for price stability were not in place in 
1992/93.
Domestic structure approaches (Henning 1994; Kaltenthaler 1998; Heisenberg 1999) show 
awareness of the institutional tensions and ambiguities underlying inconsistent Bundesbank
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behaviour in 1992/93. Although proponents of this view emphasise conflicts between 
German political and economic institutions and the central bank, they agree that the 
Bundesbank was responsive to domestic pressures to compromise its anti-inflationary stance 
only to the point where market confidence in the D-mark was at stake. Dyson (1994), 
investigating German domestic interests, suggests that the looming credibility crisis of the D- 
mark left social actors no other option than to restore the stability coalition, which had 
traditionally underpinned the Bundesbank paradigm.
The literature gives no indication as to the influence of German domestic institutional 
weaknesses on market sentiment towards the D-mark. Below, I will investigate the extent to 
which financial market participants had been aware of the stresses in the structural 
foundations of the Bundesbank reputation during the crisis.
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7.3. Market Sentiment towards the Mark during the ERM Crisis
Chart 7.3: M arket sentiment Germany: Economic, political, structural variables
(as percentage o f text units coded at German crisis episodes)20
(3) Domestic Economy
(4) Economic Fundamentals
(5) Domestic Politics
(6) Domestic Structures
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
(1) International developments: USA (mainly US monetary policy and US dollar)
(2) International developments: EMS-EMU
(3) Domestic developments: German economic performance and economic policy (including economic 
fundamentals)
(4) Domestic developments: German economic fundamentals only (inflation, BoP, budget deficits)
(5) Domestic developments: German domestic politics (especially elections)
(6) Domestic structures (especially central bank; financial, wage bargaining, government structures)
As in the analysis o f market sentiment towards pound sterling and the French franc, the issue 
o f credibility must take central position. But whereas in the case o f Britain and France, two 
‘follower countries’ in the ERM, the credibility o f the respective authorities to maintain their 
exchange rate commitment was at stake, in the case o f Germany, as the ERM ‘leader’, it is
20 The categories in this chart, and the following charts on ‘market sentiment’, refer to noded categories and 
their subordinated categories in the index tree (Appendix, Table 3).
Category [1] = Node (4 1);
Category [2] = Node (3 4), and Nodes (4 3 9), (4 3 10), (4 3 11);
Category [3] = Node (3 1) and Node (3 2);
Category [4] = Nodes (3 1 1 1), (3 1 2 1), (3 1 1 2), (3 1 2 2), (3 1 1 6), (3 1 2 6);
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the credibility of the D-mark as anchor currency which was questioned by market 
participants. As a result, the problems of the D-mark in financial markets in 1992/93 did not 
take the form of a classic currency crisis, i.e. a battle between markets and authorities about 
the sustainability o f a peg, but were related to the question o f whether the Bundesbank would 
lose its autonomy in setting monetary policy for Germany, as other European governments 
appeared to have wanted. Instead of crisis episodes, in the case o f the D-mark these 
‘weakness-episodes’ o f the anchor have to be investigated.
Chart 7.4: M arket sentiment Germany:
Expectations of DM exchange rate: uncertain or weakening
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)21
Pre-'Grande Gaffe'
Pre-Danish Referendum
20
DM-Weakness Episodes
DM-Strength Episodes
10 20 30 40 70 80 90 100
This section investigates the relative influence o f economic and political developments as 
well as domestic structural features, on market sentiment. Following this overview, individual 
variables o f these three categories are analysed for their respective relevance for market 
sentiment during these weakness episodes. One exception is the "post-French referendum
Category [5] = Node (3 3);
Category [6] = Node (3 5).
21 Nodes (3 6 12) and (3 6 1 4).
22 See Chapter 3 for the methodology.
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weakness episode” (29 October 1992 - 18 November 1992), which is not investigated 
systematically. Since this episode lasted only three weeks, the small number of sample texts 
does not produce statistically significant results: it is difficult to gauge market sentiment for 
the weekly Salomon Brother’s source, with a sample of only three, and even more so for the 
single publication by Goldman Sachs. This leaves the pre-Danish referendum and the pre- 
‘Grande-Gaffe’ weakness episodes. Market expectations of persistent D-mark weakness are 
exceptionally significant in the pre- ‘ Grand-Gaffe ’ weakness episode, with the pre-Danish 
referendum episode concerns well within the range of market concerns about the D-mark 
during non-Crisis episodes (Chart 7.4).
The credibility of the Bundesbank as the stalwart of price stability underpinning Germany’s 
hard currency strategy has been absolutely crucial for market sentiment. The interpretation of 
all economic, political and structural variables has been shaped by the questions of what their 
development might imply for the policy of the Bundesbank, and whether its anti-inflationary 
monetary policy stance was still credible. To gauge the prospects of Bundesbank policy, 
markets sentiment took account of variables stretching across the whole range of German 
political economy, starting from the surface, with Bundesbank policy statements, and going 
deeper to international and national political and economic variables. These variables have 
been analysed systematically to a considerable extent in all three sources, sometimes related 
to conclusions about the structural constraints of Bundesbank autonomy. Structural factors 
themselves have been taken into account by market participants in an ad-hoc fashion in 
reaction to growing uncertainty about the Bundesbank’s position.
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7.3.1. The Bundesbank: Policy Statements
Chart 7.5: Market sentiment Germany: Bundesbank statements
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)23
Pre-Danish Referendum
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DM-Strength Episodes
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Financial market participants paid considerable attention to the signals sent out by the 
Bundesbank, not only to official Bundesbank reports, press conferences after the two-weekly 
council meetings and other official statements, but also to speeches and virtually every 
utterance by Bundesbank president Helmut Schlesinger and the other 16 council members. 
This “Bundesbank watching” was o f particular concern for the daily commentators in the FT, 
and to some extent the weekly comments of Salomon Brothers (see Chart 7.5). The in-depth 
analysis o f Goldman Sachs, in contrast, rarely gave prominence to policy statements, relying 
instead on political-economic variables to interpret Germany’s monetary policy stance.24 As a 
rule, financial markets reported hawkish policy statements, confirming market sentiment 
about the Bundesbank’s credibility on inflation. The picture began to change during the pre-
23 Node (3 2 14)
24 The disregard of this aspect by the monthly reports o f Goldman Sachs puts the overall result close to the 
significance threshold, despite the reporting of Bundesbank statements by the FT and Salomon Brothers. This is
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’Grand-Gaffe’ weakness episode, when markets increasingly saw the Bundesbank taking a 
dovish attitude in its public statements (Table 7.4). This, given stubbornly high inflation in 
Germany, was taken as an indicator for defeatism emerging in the Bundesbank council in 
response to internal and external pressures. Analysts were firstly concerned with external 
constraints, posing the classic Bundesbank dilemma between internal and external stability.
Table 7.4:
Hawkish Bundesbank statements
(as percentage o f all Bundesbank statements)25
DM -Weakness Episodes Pre-Danish Referendum Pre-‘Grande Gaffe’
FT 85% 100% 68%
SB 88% 100% 66%
GS 100% - -
due to the more long-term view taken by Goldman Sachs, which paid attention to Bundesbank policy without 
highlighting the ’’news” o f Bundesbank statements.
25 Node ( 3 2 1 4 1 )
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7.3.2. International Variables
7.3.2.I. The D-Mark/US Dollar Cross
Chart 7.6: Market sentiment Germany:
DM-$ interest rate differential: expected narrowing
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode) 26
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International developments outside the EU-EMS region have been o f the highest significance 
for market sentiment towards the Bundesbank strategy and the D-mark.27 However, this 
concern revolved almost exclusively around the D-mark - US dollar relationship (see Chart
7.3).28
The marginal statistical importance of Russia in particular is astounding given the post-Soviet 
political and economic turmoil in Russia between 1991 and 1993, and the specific 
vulnerability o f Germany to these events. Markets took account o f this vulnerability as a
26 Node ( 4 1 1 3  2).
27 Percentage o f text units referring to D-mark weakness taking account of international developments outside 
the EU (see International Index Tree, excluding 4.3.; (Not in this Chapter)): FT: 95%; Salomon Brothers: 85%; 
Goldman Sachs: 100%.
28 Non-US international developments outside the EU (Node 4 2; 4 4; 4 5) fall well below the significance 
threshold for each crisis episodes. The aggregate figures for all DM-crisis episodes are:
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factor undermining the D-mark only in the two instances when economic and political 
tension boiled over in acute political crisis in April 1992 and March 1993. Attention to Russia 
in this ad hoc, event-driven fashion was considered by financial markets as sufficient, 
although analysts were aware of the importance of developments in Russia for the standing of 
the D-mark. A more systematic analysis of the risks to the D-mark emanating from Russia 
would have been costly and probably of limited practical value, given the state of flux of 
Russian politics in 1992/93.
Throughout the 1992/93 period, financial markets were preoccupied with the development of 
the dollar towards the D-mark. The short-term interest differential between the USA and 
Germany was systematically covered, with persistent hopes for a US recovery and a 
consequent narrowing of the interest rate differential being disappointed several times (see 
Chart 7.6). The consequent fluctuations in market sentiment towards the dollar crucially 
influenced the standing of the mark in the markets. The extraordinary importance of US 
developments for the D-mark in financial markets confirms that financial markets were aware 
that the leadership role of the Bundesbank within the ERM was constrained by the 
international role of US monetary policy in the international monetary system. The neglect of 
the dollar exchange rate by the US monetary authorities in 1992/93 had a destabilising impact 
on the ERM, since the asymmetric nature of the system meant that in periods of US-dollar 
weakness the D-mark strengthened against other ERM currencies (see Chart 2.1). Goldman 
Sachs pointed out as early as November 1991: ‘The recent sharp rise in the DM has been the 
main factor behind the recent increase in ERM tensions. ... The DM tends to benefit 
disproportionally, at least initially, from any weakness in the dollar.” (GS, Nov./Dec. 1991, 
6/11,12:2.03).
FT: 16%; SB: 4.5%; GS: 10%.
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In addition, financial markets took into account the constraint imposed on the Bundesbank’s 
domestic room for manoeuvre by the D-mark/dollar exchange rate. Goldman Sachs analysed 
the complex interaction between domestic price stability, ERM stabilisation, D-mark/dollar 
exchange rate under the headline “The Bundesbank Dilemma” in December 1992:
“Economic weakening by itself does not provide sufficient justification for the Bundesbank for a substantial 
change in the stance of its monetary policy. Only when the slow-down is certain to lead to a decline in 
underlying inflation would such a change in policy appear to be appropriate. ... Monetary easing will also have 
to take into account exchange rate developments of the Deutschemark versus the U.S. dollar. A too rapid cut, if 
it leads to a sharp depreciation of the Deutschemark, could lead to a rise in imported inflation.” (GS, 
December/January 1992, 7/11: S.14-S.16)
But why did the D-mark/dollar relationship and the respective interest rate differential 
become such a significant variable only in the 1993 pre-‘Grande Gaffe’ episode? 
Expectations of a stronger dollar and higher US interest rates were fluctuating throughout the 
period investigated. What finally pushed the D-mark/dollar relationship into the limelight was 
not a US recovery or American interest increases per se, but the perception in financial 
markets that the D-mark was losing the attributes of a hard currency representing an 
alternative to the dollar. Instead of dollar weakness being the independent cause for D-mark 
strength, despite German domestic weaknesses, the causality in market sentiment seems to 
have changed in early summer 1993. Now intrinsic D-mark weakness became the cause for 
dollar strength, despite continuously disappointing US economic performance and monetary 
policies. From the international point of view, market participants thought it unlikely that the 
Bundesbank would go for further on monetary easing, since now the credibility o f the D- 
mark in the global context itself was at stake. This becomes clear in the analysis of Goldman 
Sachs, who point out the international vulnerability of the D-mark as a result o f exceptional 
international borrowing to finance massive post-unification budget deficits:
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“A sharp depreciation of the Deutschemark versus the U.S. dollar could slow foreign capital flows into 
Germany as international investors could lose confidence in the Deutschemark. With fewer foreign capital 
inflows, German medium- to long-term credit rates ... could rise and raise the costs of financing investment 
projects” (GS, April 1993, 8/3: S.25)
The importance of the D-mark/dollar relationship in summer 1993 was such that it led to 
speculation that it might affect the intra-European political imperative for the Bundesbank to 
stabilise the ERM and in particular the French franc. This was indicated by Salomon 
Brothers: “If new Deutschemark weakness versus the dollar ... stalls Bundesbank easing, the 
‘franc fort* policy may not survive” (SB 09/07/93: 2).
Given the importance of the D-mark/dollar relationship for market sentiment, it seems 
unlikely for ERM tensions to have escalated into a crisis of such severity without the D-mark 
being boosted throughout 1992/93 by extreme dollar weakness. Markets treated the ERM 
currencies, including the D-mark, consistently in a global rather than a merely regional 
context, underlining the intrinsic weaknesses of a merely regional key currency system in a 
globalised financial system. In 1993, when uncertainty about the Bundesbank policy stance 
escalated, the focus on the D-mark-dollar relationship operated as a short-cut to avoid a 
systematic domestic structural analysis. Regardless of the possible structural weaknesses, 
uncertainty about domestic constraints faced by the Bundesbank was overcome by assuming 
that the external stabilisation against the dollar was of such importance to warrant it 
becoming an overriding priority in German policy making.
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7.3.2.2. EMU Problems and ERM Tensions
Chart 7.7: M arket sentiment Germany:
Expectations of Bundesbank to defend the French Franc
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)29
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Regional EMS and EMU related considerations played a less important role in market 
sentiment, compared to the D-mark/dollar relationship and to domestic economic and 
structural variables (see Chart 7.4). Markets were mainly concerned about whether the strong 
German commitment to EMU would lead the Bundesbank to stabilise the ERM. In contrast to 
Britain and France, political backing for EMU was never a serious issue.30 Markets 
acknowledged the pro-European integration consensus in German party politics and 
dismissed a Euro-sceptic populist challenge to the Maastricht Treaty via a referendum for 
constitutional reasons:
“German support for close European political and social union remains firm, and the leading parties are 
supportive o f the [Maastricht] Treaty... Furthermore, despite o f loose talk o f a ‘groundswell’ o f anti-Treaty 
sentiment, German law does not provide for the use of a referendum. ... It is highly unlikely that German 
parliamentarians would risk isolation implied by a rejection o f the Treaty.” (SB 05/06/92: 3)
29 Node (3 4 1 3).
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Against this background the EMU project contributed to market expectations o f Bundesbank 
action to stabilise the ERM, in particular the French franc/D-mark exchange rate, since the 
successful implementation of the Maastricht programme depended on the maintenance of 
exchange rate stability prior to monetary union. Expectations of ERM stabilisation were 
significant for both the DM weakness and DM strength episodes (Table 7.5).
Table 7.5:
Expectations of Bundesbank to stabilise the ERM
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episodes)31
DM-Weakness Episodes DM-Strength Episodes
FT 8% 11%
SB 23% 31%
GS 50% 29%
Two results stand out: first, the majority of market comments regarding Bundesbank 
stabilisation o f the ERM concern the French franc and secondly, as far as weakness 
episodes are concerned, stabilisation expectations were confined exclusively to the pre- 
’Grande Gaffe’ episode (see Chart 7.7).
The first feature indicates that financial markets did recognise the specific importance of 
stabilisation of the French currency for Germany’s high politics o f European integration. 
Stabilisation was pushed for especially by the German chancellery, against the narrow 
domestic economic interests of the Bundesbank. Financial market participants were aware o f 
this constellation, and thus implicitly o f the susceptibility o f the Bundesbank to political
30 The domestic politics o f EMU (Node 3 4 11) was insignificant for all investigated episodes. The score for all 
D-mark weakness episodes was FT: 0%; SB: 0%, GS: 20%.
31 Node (3 4 1 2).
32 Units expecting FF stabilisation by the Bundesbank, as percentage o f  all units expecting ERM stabilisation: 
For DM-strength episodes: FT: 91%; SB: 52%; GS: 100%. For DM- weakness episodes: FT: 83%; SB: 70%; 
GS: 60%.
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pressure, as growing expectations of a ‘mini-EMU’ between France and Germany in early 
1993 demonstrate:
“Any announced ‘fixing’ of the Ffr/DM rate, without bands, would probably be perceived by market 
participants as a politically-imposed decision by Bonn and Paris rather than one made with the total agreement 
of the Bundesbank.” (GS, March 1993, 8/2: 1.07).
As for the concentration of market sentiment expecting ERM-French franc stabilisation 
during the pre-‘Grand Gaffe’ episode of the first half of 1993, the question is why markets 
should have expected the Bundesbank policy to soften in favour of external stabilisation, 
when the D-mark was already going through a phase of weakness in the ERM. Markets 
normally expected the Bundesbank to act in support of exchange rate stability in phases of D- 
mark strength, which put the ERM and especially the franc under strain, not D-mark 
weakness.
The explanation seems to be that after a year of “Schlingerkurs”, in which the Bundesbank 
gave priority to external stabilisation in situations of French franc distress and to domestic 
stabilisation in periods of ERM stability, in spring 1993 the pendulum was seen to have 
finally moved in favour of consistent relaxation of German monetary policy regardless of 
external weakness. The consolidation of market sentiment after a year of uncertainty was 
triggered by the Bundesbank’s discount rate cut of 4 February 1993 after months of interest 
rate stability and despite continuously high inflation (see Chart 2.2 and 2.4). The cut was, 
according to the FT, “hailed as another indication that the Bundesbank is determined not to 
see the ERM break up” (FT 05/02/93: 23). Salomon Brothers concluded: “The Bundesbank 
has demonstrated that preserving stability within the ERM core has high priority -  probably 
higher than most market participants had assumed” (SB 05/02/92: 1).
Two factors combined to underpin expectations of further ERM stabilisation despite a 
weakening of the D-mark. Firstly the usual recognition of ERM high politics: financial 
markets were concerned about the outcome of the French parliamentary elections in March 
1993, and the Bundesbank was seen to mitigate lingering ERM pressure through pre-emptive 
monetary easing. Alison Cottrell of Midland Global Markets was quoted in the FT saying: 
“The Bundesbank is buying time until after the French elections” (FT 05/02/93: 23). 
Secondly, and more importantly, the step-by-step lowering o f official German interest rates 
from February onwards was interpreted as final confirmation that the German economy was 
in such a poor state that the Bundesbank had to give in to domestic pressures for monetary 
stimulation. Consequently Salomon Brothers commented two days before the first round of 
the French general elections: “The Bundesbank is playing both a domestic and an external 
audience. ... The timing of the Bundesbank moves indicate that they have been intended to 
ease ERM tensions as well as to temper pessimism about the outlook for the German 
economy” (SB 19/03/93: 2).
The feeling of uncertainty about the Bundesbank’s course returned in summer 1993 when, 
after the ‘Grande Gaffe’, the central bank failed to come to the support of the French franc. It 
took market participants until the end of July to conclude that the Bundesbank had been able 
to reassert its tough stance. As late as mid-July the FT reported:
“Mr Brian Hilliard, international economist at Societe Generate Strauss Turnbull in London, said that ultimately 
the existing parities would survive. ‘What is happening is a scare, not a fatal blow,’ he commented. ‘The fact 
that the Bundesbank did not reduce rates yesterday morning may led many people to write off further German 
moves to help the franc,’ he added. ‘But there is plenty more they can do to help the French. The Bundesbank’s 
commitment to support the franc is total.’ On the other side of the spectrum was Mr Neil McKinnon of Citibank 
London: ‘The absence of the Bundesbank rate move puts another nail in the coffin of the ERM.’ “ (FT 16/07/93: 
25)
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To sum up, market participants took the broader political realities of European monetary 
policy into account consistently. They were acutely aware that the reality o f international 
monetary and financial interdependence was of crucial importance for Bundesbank policy 
making, despite the official emphasis by the central bank itself on the priority of domestic 
objectives. The oscillation of the D-mark exchange rate between strength and weakness in the 
period investigated is crucially due to the changing interpretation of the Bundesbank 
dilemma. The volatility of market sentiment thus reflected the actual “Schlingerkurs” in the 
central bank’s policy signals. Given the appearance of Bundesbank inconsistency, the policy- 
driven analysis ultimately failed to determine what factors shaped Bundesbank policy moves 
in the long run, and uncertainty prevailed. The pragmatic attitude of financial markets to rely 
on the policy communications of the German central bank, which had proved sufficient in 
normal times of unquestioned Bundesbank credibility, became ineffective in the specific 
conditions in post unification Germany. Bundesbank policy statements and decisions were, in 
these conditions, poor indicators by which to understand the state of the German stability 
consensus.
351
7.3.3. Domestic Variables:
7.3.3.I. The Bundesbank: Monetary Policy, Disinflation and Sustainability
Chart 7.8: Market sentiment Germany: French decoupling from DM-anchor
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)33
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Chart 7.9: M arket sentiment Germany: Expectations of recession
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)34
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Chart 7.10: M arket sentiment Germany: 
Rising unemployment (expectations and fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)35
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Chart 7.11: Market sentiment Germany: Rising inflation (fact)
(as percentage of text units coded at respective episode)36
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The credibility o f the Bundesbank depended to a large extent on its capability to sustain a 
disinflationary monetary policy stance in order to bring excessive post-unification inflation
35 Node (3 1 1 5 2) and (3 1 2 5 2)
36 Node ( 3 1 2 1 2 )
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rates back to ‘normal’ German levels. Despite resilient inflation, from February 1993 
onwards the Bundesbank embarked on a path o f monetary easing through successive small 
interest cuts until the end of the year (see Chart 2.4 and 2.2). Financial markets reacted to this 
policy shift by losing confidence in the Bundesbank’s capacity to defend the D-mark’s hard 
currency status, as is indicated by both market sentiment towards sustainability o f disinflation 
(Table 7.6) and growing expectations of a decoupling of the French interest rates from 
Bundesbank dictate (Chart 7.8). It took financial markets until the pre-‘Grande-Gaffe’ 
episode to take the problem of domestic sustainability seriously, resulting in the D-mark 
confidence crisis o f May/June 1993, indicated by short-term interest rate movements (see 
Chart 7.2).
Table 7.6:
Market sentiment Germany: Bundesbank tight monetary policy domestically 
unsustainable
\3 7
DM -Weakness Episodes DM-Strength Episodes Pre-Danish Referendum Pre-‘Grande Gaffe’
FT 1% 0% 0% 1%
SB 5% 6% 0% 10%
GS 40% 29% 40% 50%
Bundesbank Monetary Policy and ‘Fundamentals ’
How exactly did economic variables contribute to the pre-Grand Gaffe confidence crisis of
the D-mark and why did confidence finally break down in May/June 1993? Firstly, the 
influence of Germany’s ‘fundamentals’ on markets has to be investigated. The country’s 
balance of payments deteriorated in the wake of re-unification, signalled by the current 
account moving into deficit in 1991 (see Chart 2.5). The economic fundamentals which 
concerned financial markets were not the balance of payments position, as the first generation
37 Node (3 4 1 5).
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crisis model would imply.38 What mattered was the constellation of inflation and growth 
relative to other European countries. To quote Goldman Sachs: “The D-mark’s fall from 
favour probably reflected renewed scrutiny of economic fundamentals in individual 
countries. ... In terms of both growth and inflation, fundamentals in west Germany are, and 
will probably continue to be, unfavourable relative to other continental Europe countries” 
(GS June 1993, 8/6: 2.03). A limited, but systematic analysis of fundamentals concentrating 
on only those variables that mattered for the D-mark’s anchor status in the ERM, sufficed for 
financial market participants.
Bundesbank Monetary Policy and Stagflation
The loosening of monetary policy in the first half of 1993 was interpreted by markets as the
central bank’s recognition that its monetary policy course had become domestically 
unsustainable, signifying its failure. Consistently concerned about Germany’s high inflation 
rates, market participants began to question the efficacy of tight monetary policy in delivering 
low inflation through a stabilisation crisis in the German economy (see Chart 7.11). In 
particular during the pre-‘Grande Gaffe’ weakness episode they diagnosed the problem of 
stagflation: of a deadlocked economy, caught in a pattern of tight monetary policy, which was 
unable to defeat stubborn inflation, but undermining the sustainability of its policy by 
imposing intolerable costs in terms of negative growth and unemployment (see Charts 2.4, 
2.7 and 2.8). The concerns about the costs of unsuccessful disinflation are reflected in the 
growing attention markets paid to these two variables. Expectations of a continued recession 
reached a significant peak in the pre-‘Grand Gaffe’ weakness episode (see Chart 7.9). The 
picture is even more dramatic for unemployment for this episode in contrast to the normal 
relative neglect of this outcome of disinflation (see Chart 7.10). As Salomon Brothers pointed 
out on 12 March 1993, rising unemployment played a crucial role in market expectations
38 For all investigated episodes the balance of payments variable falls well below the significance level.
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assuming a prolonged recession: “One key factor that points to a deeper, broader, and more 
persistent recession in west Germany is the accelerating loss of jobs” (p. 4).
Against this backdrop it seems to have been only the reputation of the Bundesbank that 
supported the D-mark until May 1993. A comment by Goldman Sachs from March 1993 is 
significant in this context:
“It is quite difficult to understand the relative attraction of the D-Mark. ... Perhaps it is the underlying 
credibility of the Bundesbank ... Whatever it is, we find it difficult to believe that it will outweigh the negatives 
of a declining economy ... on-going fiscal difficulties and socio-economic frictions. ... These latter factors will 
intensify and lead to downward pressure [on the D-Mark].” (GS April 1993, 8/3:1.05-1.06)
Markets remained uncertain about their assessment of the Bundesbank until as late as May. 
On the one hand they continued to rely on the convention that the central bank was resolved 
to fight inflation through high interest rates:
“The Bundesbank’s intrinsic credibility and a stubborn inflation rate are probably all that stands between the D- 
Mark’s present level and a more comprehensive weakness.” (GS, May 1993, 8/5: S.02)
On the other hand, they began to wonder whether this strategy had not become counter­
productive, putting the capability of the Bundesbank itself in question:
“Given the depth of the recession, an excessive delay in rates cuts could backfire by reducing market 
confidence in the economy and the currency, thereby leaving the Bundesbank on a tightrope.” (SB 28/05/93: 5)
Market sentiment seems to have finally been tilted against the D-mark by a leading market 
player, George Soros, speaking out on 09 June 1993. The relevance of his comments is clear 
from the FT report:
“The D-Mark weakened against the dollar and most European currencies yesterday after dealers were impressed 
by a comment from Mr George Soros, the foreign exchange operator, that the German currency was in the 
throes of long-tem weakness, writes James Blitz. The timing of Mr. Soros’ comments, in yesterday’s Times, 
helped to concentrate minds on the fertile issue of the D-Mark’s potential weakness. ... The potential weakness 
of the D-Mark clearly worries the Bundesbank. The repo rate ... was yesterday left unchanged. ... A battle is 
developing between a market that wants to sell the D-Mark and a central bank that wants its value to be 
maintained.” (FT 10/06/93: 33)
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Financial market participants seem to have taken these comments as a trigger to finally make 
up their mind about the capabilities of the Bundesbank.
There have been few attempts to come to grips with the problem of uncertainty by analysing 
the structural weaknesses in the wider social and political underpinnings of Bundesbank 
policies. However, financial markets were aware of these problems: “ ...the Bundesbank 
faces a difficult challenge... . The recession thus far only is heightening financial market 
participants’ concern that Germany faces sustained structural problems” (SB 21/05/93: 2). 
Only Goldman Sachs, in its in-depth reports, put the problems of the Bundesbank into its 
wider structural dimension, probably because they were undertaking the most in-depth and 
reflective analysis of the three samples:
“What is needed to reduce inflation and lay the ground for economic recovery is a restoration of the social 
consensus that allowed west Germany low-inflationary growth during most of the post-war period. Although 
there are hopes for fiscal consolidation and a more conciliatory stance of the unions in next year’s wage round, 
we remain sceptical.” (GS, June 1993, 8/6 :3.05)
As a rule, financial markets relied mainly on a systematic analysis of key economic variables 
as proxy indicators to come to terms with the structural sustainability of Bundesbank 
disinflation. This analysis was supplemented by past experience and conventions about the 
Bundesbank reputation. When this approach failed to resolve uncertainty, market participants 
took the short-cut of relying, in an ad-hoc fashion, on the view of a leading market 
participant, which shifted market sentiment against the D-mark until the trend was reversed 
by another comment by a key figure, this time the French finance minister.
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7.3.3.2. Domestic Economic Variables Constraining Bundesbank Monetary Policy
In April 1993 Goldman Sachs, in a special section on “Cyclical Weakness and Structural
Frictions in the German Economy” stated that at the centre of market concerns about the D- 
mark lay the “realisation that the German political system has not been able to respond 
adequately to the economic challenges of German unification” (GS, April 1993, 8/3: S.01). 
Critical was “the inability of the government, the employers, and the unions, to make the 
necessary corrections to unsustainable policies” in deficit spending and wage setting, leaving 
the Bundesbank to deal with the inflationary consequences (GS, April 1993, 8/3: S.20). 
Consequently, financial markets were systematically concerned about whether the 
government would be able and willing to cut the federal deficit and whether unions and 
employers could return to non-inflationary wage settlements. Concerns about fiscal 
profligacy dovetailed with elections concerns, demonstrating financial awareness of the 
political business cycle. Only when the Bundesbank seemed to lack the determination to 
counter policy weakness in the fiscal and wage area with a tough anti-inflationary stance, did 
markets take limited account of the institutional structures determining monetary, fiscal and 
wage policy outcomes.
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Chart 7.12: Market sentiment Germany:
Fiscal deficit and fiscal policy (expectations and fact)
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)39
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Chart 7.13: Market sentiment Germany:
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Chart 7.14: Market sentiment Germany: Election concerns (expectations and fact)
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)41
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Fiscal Policy
Public deficits and the related fiscal policies o f government are a key variable in market 
sentiment.42 As Chart 7.14 indicates, Germany’s budgetary performance was significant for 
all three sources throughout the whole ERM crisis, especially for Goldman Sachs, which 
covered budgetary and fiscal policy issues systematically in each report. In contrast to other 
ERM countries, the attention to inflationary deficit spending did not translate directly into 
worries about the sustainability of a hard currency strategy, but was filtered by the 
Bundesbank as key intervening variable.
Markets assumed that the Bundesbank would respond to the inability of the German 
government to bring inflationary deficit spending under control by continuing its restrictive 
monetary policy. This offered the prospect not only of high and rising nominal and real 
interest rates, but also ultimately of restoring price stability. Thus, as a general rule, market 
participants reacted to bad news on budget deficits by pushing the D-mark up, and vice versa.
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Only when the Bundesbank’s credibility to maintain disinflationary policies came under 
scrutiny in late spring 1993, did the German fiscal mess undermine confidence in the D-mark.
This pattern can be explained by changing market expectations concerning the Bundesbank 
response to fiscal policy developments. Until summer 1993 the paradoxical pattern high 
deficits = high interest rates = strong D-mark (and vice versa) was prevalent in market 
sentiment. Consequently, D-mark weakness in early 1992 is partly explained by expectations 
that the deficit would come down, leading to a softening of Bundesbank monetary policy. By 
March 1992 these hopes had evaporated. When fiscal consolidation failed, market sentiment 
shifted back in favour of the D-mark even before the Danish referendum:
“The thrust of fiscal and monetary policy, and the link between them, has proved to be among the more reliable 
indicators of an exchange rate’s path.... Germany has had the ... mix of tight monetary and loose fiscal policy. 
This is unambiguously good for the D-Mark as it tends to produce high interest rates and a robust economy.” 
(GS May 1992,7/5: 1.09)
This paradox was further confirmed when speculations for a successful conclusion of the 
“solidarity pact” on fiscal and wage restraint drove the D-mark down in autumn 1992 and 
winter 1993.
But the pattern changed around March 1993 when the belatedly concluded solidarity pact was 
perceived as insufficient. Fiscal policy was seen to be in greater disarray than ever before, but 
now the Bundesbank began to show signs of inconsistency against the backdrop of a 
deepening recession and growing political discontent with its strategy. With the central bank 
now lowering interest rates in spite of still rising inflation, fiscal problems were finally 
acknowledged as a negative factor for the D-mark:
41 Nodes (3 3 1 1 2), (3 3 2 1 2).
42 For the German General Government Fiscal deficit, see Chart 2.3.
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“The latest Bundesbank moves will not inspire market confidence. The unusual nature of the latest series of 
Bundesbank’s policy decisions hints at painfully reached policy compromises. After the disappointing 
achievements of the recently agreed solidarity pact with respect to fiscal consolidation -  and the latest warning 
from Finance Minister Theo Waigel that economic weakness was going to boost the Federal deficit above 
budget targets -doubts likely will grow about how successfully German policymakers are meeting the daunting 
challenges that they face.” (SB 23/04/93: 2)
Against this background Goldman Sachs asserted that “the D-Mark is no longer perceived as 
‘guaranteed* to remain ‘stable’ or to revalue in the ERM.” (GS May 1993, 8/5:1.09).
The credibility of Bundesbank policy, despite its formal independence, was in the pre- 
‘Grande-Gaffe’ weakness episode thus highly dependent on sound fiscal policy making. Once 
tight monetary policy was seen not only as helpless against inflationary government 
spending, but even more as counterproductive by contributing to economic recession, 
markets lost confidence in the Bundesbank’s willingness and ability to continue its tough 
stance. But market sentiment swung back behind the D-mark when, in response to the French 
challenge to the D-mark anchor status, the Bundesbank demonstrated that it still had the 
capacity to reassert the priority of domestic monetary stability despite the wider German 
economic malaise.
These mood swings of financial market participants, shadowing the “Schlingerkurs” o f the 
Bundesbank, demonstrate, on the one hand, that markets where aware that the efficacy o f the 
central bank was conditional on wider sound economic policies. On the other hand they 
demonstrate a lack o f expectational stability, hinting at poor structural awareness. If markets 
had better understood how strongly the support for a strong Bundesbank was anchored in the 
wider German political economy, they might have been less prone to be alarmed by its short­
term weakness.
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Wages
Table 7.7:
Germany: Wage bargaining and industrial action 1992/1993___________________________
Wage Round 1992:
January - February 1992: Steelworkers (IG Metall).
2 February: Revised pay offer accepted (wage increase of 6.35%), after having balloted in favour of strike 
action at end of January.
February -  April 1992: Banking Industry (BHI Union).
4 February: BHI begins balloting over strike action (demand wage increases in excess of 10%. Employers: 
5%). 4 April: Banking wage dispute settled (5.4% wage increase)
March-April 1992: Public Sector (OTV Public Sector Union).
27 April -  11 May: industrial action by public sector workers (first since 1974): demand pay rise of 9.5%.
11 May: Settlement with pay increase of 5.4%, well above April inflation of 4.6%.
April-May 1992: Metal Industry (Manufacturing) (IG Metall).
29 April: Lightning strikes, 9.5% wage increase demand). May: Settlement at 5.4%, sets benchmark for rest 
of German private sector (printing, construction)
Wage Round 1993:
December 1992 -  February 1993: Steel (IG Metall) and Public Sector (OTV)
4 February: Public sector pay settlement (modest pay rise of 3%, well below 1992 inflation rate). Sets
benchmark for remaining west German wage rounds.
March-April 1993: pay dispute oxer equalisation o f east German wages with west Germany (IG Metal)
26-28 April: East German steel workers vote in favour of industrial action (26% pay rise to bring wages in 
line with west)
3- 23 May: East German metal and steel workers strike. Dispute settled with agreement on wage increases 
to provide for parity between east and west in 1996 (rather than 1994, as provided for by original 
agreement).
Source: Keesing’s Record of World Events, 1992/1993
West German wages rose steeply in response to the deficit financed unification boom, with 
increases culminating in the first half of 1993 as a result of high pay settlements in the 1992 
wage round (see Chart 2.9). East German wage increases were considerably higher, since 
unions here were able to push through wage equalisation for mid 1996, starting from a very 
low level compared to western Germany. Not surprisingly these wage developments were of 
major concern to market participants, since they posed a threat to the attempts by the 
Bundesbank to bring inflation under control. Furthermore, drastic wage increases in the wage 
bargaining rounds for western Germany in spring 1992 and in eastern Germany in spring 
1993 were forced through by strikes, or at least the threat of industrial action (see Table 7.7), 
pointing at an erosion of the social consensus underpinning Germany’s stability culture.
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Overall financial market attention of negative wage bargaining developments was 
significantly associated with D-mark weakness episodes (see Chart 7.13). High levels of 
concern during the pre-Danish referendum weakness episode are explained by the importance 
of the 1992 comprehensive west German wage round, which resulted in wage push inflation. 
The eastern German wage dispute of early 1993, although less significant for overall German 
inflation, inflicted disproportionate damage on market confidence in the D-mark, due to the 
antagonistic attitude of the unions in this dispute.
Compared to the effect of fiscal profligacy on market sentiment, wage increases resulted 
more directly in negative sentiment towards the D-mark. The key here is that wage increases 
were pushed through by unusual union militancy. The role of strikes in ultimately turning 
wage increases into bad news, despite expectations of Bundesbank interest rate increases in 
response, is well documented in the FT for the spring wage round of 1992, coinciding with 
the pre-Danish referendum weakness episode:
“Some economists feared that the 6.4 per cent mark would be used as a basis for the next round of pay talks, due 
to begin this week. Such a move would eliminate any remaining hopes for an easing of German monetary 
policy. ‘People are changing their minds about the course of German rates,’ said Dr Mark Austin, an economist 
with HongKong Bank” (FT 05/02/92: 27).
But two months later the FT concludes that:
“The German currency is suffering in the wake of Germany’s worst industrial unrest for 18 years” (FT 
29/04/92: 39).
The concern of markets about industrial action was even more pronounced during the pre- 
‘Grande-GafTe’ weakness episode, when the militancy o f IG Metall, Germany’s most 
powerful union, pushing for rapid wage parity between East and West, raised fears of a 
“worrisome breakdown of social consensus” (SB 19/02/93: 4). The FT explained the “D- 
Mark’s intrinsic weakness” by the “fresh support for strike action” for the IG Metall (FT 
11/05/93: 27). The erosion of confidence in German wage bargaining is indicated by
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Goldman Sachs, who, even after the moderate benchmark west German IG Metall settlement 
of February 1993, suggested that “with slower growth, income distribution struggles are 
likely to intensify as unions will resist a sustained slow-down in wage growth” (GS, April 
1993, 8/3: S.23).
This gloomy assessment of the state of the German stability culture in industrial relations in 
spring 1993 was a major factor contributing to the impression in financial markets that the 
Bundesbank was losing control. The fact that financial market participants did not simply off­
set concerns about wage increases against positive prospects for Bundesbank tightening, but 
were deeply concerned about strike action demonstrates structural awareness about the 
embeddedness of Bundesbank efficacy in moderate and cooperative trade union behaviour. 
However, the extent of gloom in 1993 in the face of significant wage moderation in the key 
benchmark agreement raises questions about the institutional understanding of Germany’s 
comprehensive wage bargaining system by market participants.
Elections
Political developments in Germany mattered little for market participants except in respect of 
elections.43 As indicated by Chart 7.14, even election concerns only became significant 
during the pre-‘Grande Gaffe* weakness episode, when Goldman Sachs and Salomon 
Brothers took heightened interest in domestic political developments.44 Markets mainly 
viewed elections, whether actual or prospective, as negative for the prospects of the D-mark 
(100% for Goldman Sachs and FT, 73% for Salomon Brothers), worrying about both actual
43 For example during the pre-‘Grande Gaffe’ episode 90% of comments on domestic politics by Goldman 
Sachs and 91% by Salomon Brothers were on German elections.
44 The FT’s political comments fell well below the significance threshold throughout 1992/93, with only 
occasional ad hoc political comments.
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election results in 1992/93 and forthcoming elections in 1994.45 As far as the reaction to 
election results in 1992/93 goes, it was the rise of extremist, mainly far right parties that 
contributed to D-mark weakness, since it was seen to indicate the progressive erosion of the 
social basis for continued disinflation. As Goldman Sachs put it when commenting on the rise 
of extremist parties: “voters express their dissatisfaction with rising unemployment and high 
real interest rates.” (GS April 1993, 8/3: 2.03)
The shift towards extremism made a return to sound fiscal management by government less 
likely, putting the disinflationary strategy of the Bundesbank at risk. But even more than the 
election results of 1993 the forthcoming general election of 1994 worried market participants 
who feared political business cycle behaviour by government. As early as April 1993 
Salomon Brothers wrote that “...the inertia of election-year politics make doubtful any 
notable additional progress on reducing structural fiscal imbalances in 1993 and 1994” 
(SB23/04/93: 2-6).
The culmination of electoral concerns during the pre-‘Grand Gaffe* crisis can therefore be 
explained by a combination of devastating poll results 1993 for the Kohl government up to 
March (indicating how unpopular disinflation and the still insufficient tax increases and 
spending cuts to finance reunification were with the electorate) and darkening the prospects 
for the political business cycle before the 1994 general election.
Markets showed little concern for the possibility of a social democratic victory in the general 
election. Obviously, they did not expect the German political system to deliver on necessary 
consolidation regardless of which of the main parties would dominate the next coalition
45 In 1992 and 1993 only state (Lander) and local elections took place. 1992: state elections in Baden 
Wurtteniberg and Schleswig-Holstein in April; 1993: local elections in Hesse in March, state elections in
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government. This indicates some structural understanding o f the complex fragmented 
German political system by markets, with its inbuilt tendency towards inertia. But it also 
signals a misunderstanding of the ability of the system to deliver through broadly based 
compromise as it did with fiscal consolidation from 1994 onwards.46
Hamburg in September. In contrast 19 elections on the municipal, state, national and European level were 
scheduled for 1994, plus the critical general elections set to take place on 23 October.
46 See Appendix, Table 2.
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7.3.4. Domestic Structures
Chart 7.15: M arket sentiment Germany:
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Chart 7.17: M arket sentiment Germany: Expectations of falling official interest rates
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)4
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Chart 7.19: M arket sentiment Germany: Domestic structures: Government
(as percentage o f text units coded at respective episode)51
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Domestic structures influenced market sentiment to a considerably higher degree in the case 
o f Germany, compared to Britain and France (see Charts 7.15, 6.22, and 5.19). The high 
degree of attention indicates the specific importance market participants attributed to the 
domestic structural backing of Germany’s hard currency strategy, which, in difference to 
other ERM countries, allowed for relative international monetary policy-making autonomy. 
Clearly, the institutional position of the Bundesbank was most influential, with the degree of 
attention to the broader financial structure, the wage bargaining structure and the government 
structure reflecting market concerns about the central bank’s capacity to implement tight 
monetary policy (see Chart 7.15).
The fact that the wage bargaining structure and the government structure take close second 
and third place indicates that market participants were attentive mainly to those structures 
which were indicating cracks in the wider structural underpinnings o f the central bank. This
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is indirectly confirmed by the insignificance of the wider financial structure and the 
irrelevance of other domestic structures not strongly related to the success of Germany’s hard 
currency strategy.52
The relative neglect of the wider financial-industrial structures by financial markets is 
remarkable given their theoretical importance for the policy capacity of the Bundesbank. 
Market analysis occasionally mentioned the financial profile of the private sector, i.e. the role 
of bank lending in household and firm balance sheets and the structure of government bond 
market, all indicating sustainable amounts of leverage.
The lack of interest can firstly be explained by the long-term, solid nature of the German 
private financial structure. This had become conventional knowledge in financial markets and 
was taken for granted as long as an occasional look into debt exposure showed few problems. 
Bank lending and balance sheet indicators, combined with conventions on financial structural 
robustness, served as a pragmatic short-cut to avoid a systematic institutional analysis of 
Germany’s bank-industry relationship, in spite of its critical importance for the societal 
embeddedness of the Bundesbank. Secondly, market disinterest was linked to the character of 
Germany’s monetary transmission mechanism which sheltered borrowers from the immediate 
effects of official interest rate increases. This allowed the Bundesbank to send out strong anti- 
inflationary signals without being overly constrained by the credit structure. In July/August 
1992 Goldman Sachs concluded that, given Germany’s weak monetary transmission 
mechanism, Bundesbank discount rate changes were “unlikely to have anything but a 
marginal impact on credit growth”. Nevertheless, interest increases were seen as useful in
52 Only Goldman Sachs discussed an eclectic array of other institutions occasionally, for example the tax and 
pension system, without any broader conclusions relevant to the sustainability of Bundesbank policy.
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order to “reaffirm the Bundesbank’s anti-inflationary credentials” (GS, July/August 1992, 
7/8: 1.09). The power of Bundesbank policies was thus very much located in the realm of 
psychology, in sending out credible signals rather than in its technical operation within 
Germany’s financial structure.
The awareness of the psychological deterrence aspect of Bundesbank policy-making indicates 
an implicit, deep understanding of the functional role of the Bundesbank in Germany’s 
stability culture, rooted not so much in systematic analysis of the wider financial structure, 
but in historical experience.
7.3.4.I. The Bundesbank
The institutional position of the Bundesbank in Germany’s political and economic system is 
clearly the most significant structural variable influencing market sentiment. Structural 
attention is more pronounced in phases of D-mark weakness, when the Bundesbank’s role as 
guarantor of a strong mark came under scrutiny. It peaks during the pre-‘Grande Gaffe’ 
episode, when credibility of the central bank itself was at stake (see Chart 7.16). Financial 
market participants were above all concerned about the underpinnings of Bundesbank 
independence. They realised that the Bundesbank was caught up in a persistent struggle to 
defend its credibility as an independent institution, trying to assert itself against domestic and 
international political pressures.
Throughout the period investigated the Bundesbank failed to bring inflation under control. 
Nevertheless, financial markets were, towards summer 1993, increasingly expecting a 
loosening of monetary policy in response to internal and external pressure, contrary to the 
Bundesbank’s own stated policy objectives (Chart 7.17). These expectations were fuelled by
53 Attention to the non-Bundesbank financial structure stays well below the significance threshold (Node 3 5 1
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growing concerns about the erosion of the domestic post-war political and social consensus, 
incorporating labour, employers and government, which formed the structural foundation for 
the unchallenged legal status of the Bundesbank. Fears that legal independence might be 
restrained were voiced in this context:
“Recent widespread domestic and international criticism of the Bundesbank -  including the latest call by IG 
Metall union leader Franz Steinkuehler to limit Bundesbank independence -  should encourage [Bundesbank] 
policymakers to seek a lower profile.” (SB 14/08/92:4)
Furthermore, the markets realised how much the Bundesbank’s own thinking was not simply 
dominated by price stability, but also by concerns as to whether its strategy benefited German 
industry. This may suggest market awareness of the influence o f industry on central bank 
decision-making through the banking system. In spring 1993, in the face of stagflation, 
Goldman Sachs concluded that “with little or no hope for a fundamental correction of fiscal 
and east German wage policies, the Bundesbank probably realised that continuation of a 
rigorous non-accommodating monetary policy could only further weaken German industry” 
(GS May 1993, 8/5: 3.05). This assessment implies that financial markets were aware that the 
effectiveness of the central bank’s anti-inflationary policy stance for the German economy, 
the bedrock of its reputation, was conditional on complementary policies by government and 
labour market institutions.
Bundesbank independence was also questioned by market participants when regarding its 
position in the ERM. Firstly, markets knew that Bundesbank independence was constrained 
here not only de facto, but also de jure, in particular by the Basle-Nyborg agreement’s 
requirement for intramarginal intervention in defence of the ERM grid (SB 23/11/92: 2). 
More importantly, market participants assumed that the political importance of the ERM, in 
particular in view of EMU, would translate into effective domestic political leverage over the
2). For all DM-weakness episodes the FT complete ignores these structures, and they are only mentioned in 5% 
of Salomon Brothers briefings, and 30% of Goldman Sachs reports.
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Bundesbank by government. As early as autumn 1992, Goldman Sachs saw the 
Bundesbank’s independence compromised by ERM politics: “The interest rate cut in the 
wake of the Lira devaluation ... created serious doubts about the independence of the 
Bundesbank from political interference at home” (GS, October 1992, 7/9: 3.05). In spring 
1993 this worries culminated in growing fears that German and French high politics would 
lead to a government imposed fixing of the French franc/D-mark exchange rate, adding to 
earlier instances in which the Bundesbank autonomy was overridden by high politics:
“Such a commitment may take the shine off the Bundesbank’s hard-won and long standing inflation-fighting 
credibility. As such, any announced fixing of the Ffr/DM rate would be perceived by market participants as a 
politically-imposed decision by Bonn and Paris rather than one made with total agreement o f the Bundesbank 
(This would be similar to the “imposed” exchange rate between the Ostmark and D-mark, or the political refusal 
to allow the D-mark to have been revalued in early 1991). Consequently the D-Mark would weaken on the 
foreign exchanges.” (GS, March 1993, 8/2: 1.08).
Against this backdrop, financial markets started to closely scrutinise the behaviour of the 
central bank for any signs of inconsistency signalling a crisis o f what Goldman Sachs had 
described as “the central bank’s intrinsic credibility” (GS, May 1993, 8/5: 1.05; S.07). As 
early as December 1992/January 1993 Goldman Sachs detected “seemingly erratic moves” in 
Bundesbank interest rate policies, reflecting domestic and external pressures for monetary 
loosening (7/11: 1.07). In April 1993, after the Bundesbank rate cut of 18 April, Salomon 
Brothers noted the move as a sign of the unified institutional stance of the bank’s policy­
making body breaking up under political pressure from both Chancellor Kohl and Prime 
Minister Balladur to stabilise the franc.
“The unusual nature o f the latest series o f the Bundesbank’s policy decisions hints at painfully reached policy 
compromises. ... The implicit picture o f dissension within the Bundesbank’s Central council cannot be 
comforting to markets in the long run” (SB 23/04/93: 2).
The growing sentiment that the Bundesbank’s autonomy was increasingly constrained by 
ERM politics culminated during the pre-‘Grande Gaffe’ weakness episode, when markets
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started to abandon the consensus that the central bank would always put domestic price 
stability first:
“Most important, the Bundesbank remains willing to act beyond purely domestic considerations to preserve the 
franc’s participation in the ERM.... In our view, these arguments for flexibility will outweigh the usual case for 
caution still being stressed within Germany.” (SB 16/07/93: 5)
Escalating market uncertainty about the political underpinnings of the Bundesbank came to 
an end when the central bank proved its capability by refusing to bail out the French franc in 
July 1993. This signalled to financial markets that the German social consensus could still be 
mobilised to back its autonomy when it came to defence of the D-mark as hard currency. 
Market credibility not only of the bank and the D-mark, but of the whole German socio­
economic structural coherence returned, signalling market understanding for the role of the 
central bank as the linchpin of the German system.. As ‘one London-based trader’ opined at 
this point, not even a cut in German rates would be enough to avert a French franc crisis: 
“this is about confidence in two economies, not the level of interest rates” (FT 13/07/93: 27).
Thus, although financial market participants rarely commented on the institutional status of 
the Bundesbank, they were well aware of the broader structural conditions for effective 
central bank independence. The de facto position o f the Bundesbank in the German system 
influenced market participants whenever the conventions on the Bundesbank’s intrinsic 
credibility came under strain in the face of mounting domestic and external pressures. 
Nevertheless a systematic analysis of the state of specific socio-economic constellation, 
especially in the financial structure that backed autonomous Bundesbank policy making, was 
not undertaken. The analysis remained eclectic and ad hoc, driven by policy decisions. 
Consequently structural considerations as such were inconclusive, adding to, rather than 
diminishing uncertainty in financial markets about the future development of the D-mark
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exchange rate. In the end it was Bundesbank policy steps which removed these uncertainties, 
a demonstration of the predominance of the influence of direct policy outcome variables as 
surrogates for consolidated structural opinions.
7.3.4.2. Wage Bargaining Structures
Wage bargaining structures were of great importance to the Bundesbank’s capability to 
deliver price stability. Although the collective bargaining structure typical of west Germany 
was extended to include the east by the Kohl administration, in line with its centrist ‘social 
market* policies, wage settlements became excessive for German standards in both 1992 and 
1993 (see Table 7.4). As a result, financial markets should have paid attention to whether 
Germany’s comprehensive wage bargaining system still had the capacity to deliver on low 
inflation under the pressures of reunification. Market participants did indeed start looking 
more closely at the performance and development of Germany’s wage bargaining structure, 
as is indicated by the significant occurrence of related comments (Chart 7.18).54 Structural 
considerations were related to uncertainty about the efficiency of the Bundesbank in fighting 
inflation, as the particular attention during D-mark weakness episodes indicates.
Market commentators showed awareness of the complexities typical of the German wage 
bargaining system. They considered Germany’s regional pay deals in detail (SB 04/12/92: 5; 
GS, April 1992, 7/4: 3.05), paying specific attention to the crucial public sector and metal 
industry negotiations in the annual wage rounds which were recognised as setting a 
benchmark for the overall system (GS, May 1992, 7/5: 1.06; SB 07/02/92: 3). Political 
decisions and developments were interpreted for their effect on the bargaining position of 
union wage negotiators (SB 03/01/92: 2). The long, drawn out negotiation and bargaining
54 The more in depth the analysis, the more attention is paid to structural issues: whereas the FT pays scant 
attention to wage bargaining structures, Goldman Sachs’ comprehensive monthly reports score highly.
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procedures, typical of the German system, were grudgingly accepted as inherent to a structure 
which was expected to deliver modest settlements (SB 29/01/93: 4).
Market expectations of wage restraint are also furthered by the hope that Bundesbank “moral 
suasion” would work on union power (GS, June 1992, 7/6: 3.05). This hope was based on the 
assessment that unions were susceptible to real exchange rate movements. Salomon Brothers, 
for example, analysed that with labour costs in Germany rising at a faster pace than those of 
Germany’s principal trading partners, and with the Bundesbank indicating that a depreciation 
of the D-mark would not be tolerated, ‘union wage pressures are likely to moderate’ (SB 
28/02/92: 3).
Beyond these occasional insights, analysts were clearly aware of the fact that Germany’s 
trade union power, institutionalised in a system of nation-wide collective bargaining, would 
only result in wage settlements conducive to the Bundesbank’s price stability objective if the 
unions were willing to play their part in the famed German social stability culture. When 
strike action spread across the whole of Germany in 1992/93, led by the IG Metall, the union 
at the centre of the German comprehensive bargaining system, Salomon Brothers voiced 
“market doubts about the strength of Germany’s social contract”, concluding that “such 
anxieties could weaken the Deutschemark” (SB 08/04/93: 4). Goldman Sachs went further by 
pointing out that under the specific conditions of eastern integration facilitated by massive 
public transfers, the German system of collective labour market management, extended to the 
east, backfired:
“By encouraging east Germans to bid up their wages quickly -  and relying on institutional barriers to wage 
competition between east and west -  German labour unions succeeded ... in suspending the working of market 
forces” (GS, April 1993, 8/3: S.19).
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With the unions seen to be operating outside the social consensus, market analysts started to 
look into the efficacy of their encompassing organisational power for the Bundesbank’s 
stability strategy under the conditions created by unification, with uncertain outcomes. 
Salomon Brothers simply concluded that the German system was the key reason for stubborn 
inflation, but predicted that that the system of collective bargaining might be crumbling under 
the pressures of recession and unemployment in east Germany. Consequently they welcomed 
increasingly confrontational labour relations, hoping that inflation would fall because of the 
“employers’ willingness to cancel the 1991 [comprehensive] agreement -  a first in post-war 
collective bargaining” (SB 08/04/93: 4).
Goldman Sachs provided a more differentiating analysis of the prospects for changes in 
labour market structures, and, as a result, came to a more ambiguous conclusion about the 
future of the German wage bargaining structures and their long term role in providing the 
conditions for price stability. They considered a break-up of the existing structures to be 
highly unlikely, given that this would put the consensus seeking system of German economic 
policy-making itself at risk:
“The Government has tried to press unions into a more restrained wage policy for east Germany by threatening 
to change labour market regulation giving unions and employers’ organisations de-facto monopoly power to set 
wages. ... The Government has suggested to ‘open-up’ these regulations by allowing east German companies in 
economic difficulties to opt out of generally agreed wage contracts, provided both management and staff agree. 
Since the Government’s proposal would undermine the unions’ power to negotiate wages that are binding for all 
employees, they have strongly resisted and made their participation in a ’solidarity pact’ conditional upon the 
Government’s dropping the envisaged new regulation.” (GS December 1992/January 1993, 7/11: S.19)
Accepting the structural inertia of the German wage bargaining system they concluded that
only a renewed incorporation of the unions into the stability culture would provide a solution,
but remained sceptical about the time scale:
“What is needed to reduce inflation and lay the ground for economic recovery is a restoration of the social 
consensus that allowed west Germany low-inflationary growth during most of the post-war period.” Although 
there are hopes for ... a more conciliatory stance of the unions in next year’s wage round, we remain sceptical” 
(GS, June 1993, 8/6: 3.05).
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Overall, the analysis of the wage bargaining structure is typical of the bounded rationality 
employed by market analysts. Firstly, there was some eclectic general awareness of the 
structure of the German wage bargaining system in line with the analysis put forward by 
rationalist institutionalism. An example of this is Salomon Brother’s understanding of the 
aspect pointed out by Hall and Franzese (1998), that Bundesbank and unions engage in a 
policy dialogue promoting cooperative behaviour. Secondly, market participants turned 
pragmatically to structural evaluations only when the two direct indicators for the capacity of 
the German system, wage setting agreements and industrial unrest, set the alarm bells ringing. 
This policy outcome driven, ad hoc analysis was then unable to deliver conclusive 
assessments as not only to whether deteriorating German industrial relations did or did not 
indicate longer term structural inefficiency, but also as to whether comprehensive wage 
bargaining was in a terminal crisis. As in the case of the Bundesbank, confidence in the 
German wage bargaining system was restored ex post, after the key policy outcome variables 
had indicated a return to wage moderation and peaceful social dialogue in the course of 
1993/94. Hence the limited structural analysis in financial markets contributed to the 
volatility of market sentiment towards the D-mark during 1993.
7.3.4.3. Government Structures
Government structures were significant for the formation of financial market sentiment, but 
focused narrowly on fiscal consolidation. It critically depended on the ability of the federal 
government to get the respective measures approved by the legislature, giving prominence to 
the issue of a specific German version of ‘divided government’ within the political 
institutional structure. Due to Germany’s federal structure, the problems of the Christian 
Democrat-Free Democrat coalition government originated from the constitutional
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requirement that fiscal legislation requires the approval of the upper house, the Bundesrat. 
This chamber, comprising representatives from state (Lander) governments, was dominated 
in 1992/93 by the Social-Democratic opposition. Consequently, fiscal consolidation could 
only be achieved through a compromise solution, negotiating a burden-sharing agreement for 
fiscal consolidation between the federal and state fiscal authorities, at the same time 
reconciling the federal government’s spending cuts proposal of with the more moderate ideas 
o f the opposition, which emphasised tax increases. Traditionally, the consensus-seeking 
German political culture had successfully managed to come up with viable compromises in 
support of sound finances. The question for financial markets in 1992/93 was whether a 
successful compromise for fiscal consolidation could be achieved to counter the excesses of 
reunification.
Financial markets took this issue seriously. Government structures were a relevant variable 
influencing market sentiment during the D-mark weakness episodes and in particular during 
the pre-Grande Gaffe episode (see Chart 7.19), but the concern revolved almost exclusively 
around the issue of fiscal consolidation.55 As for other structural variables, the analysis was 
limited to the in depth reporting of Goldman Sachs and Salomon Brothers, with the FT only 
occasionally referring to the issue.
The institutional obstacles to fiscal consolidation were already noted during the pre-Danish 
referendum weakness period in 1992. Salomon Brothers, for example, put it quite clearly:
“The Federal Government’s encouragement to the states and local Governments to limit spending growth to 3% 
appears difficult to enforce: The opposition SPD is leading governments in nine of 16 states, which constitutes 
the majority in the Upper House (Bundesrat) of the Federal Parliament.” (SB 15/05/92: 3)
55 Out of all text units raising the issue of government structures, 82% (FT), 96% (SB), and 80% (GS) discuss 
the prospects for fiscal consolidation and related monetary easing. The other structural aspect mentioned was the 
power of the Federal Constitutional Court to block the Maastricht treaty. The issue fails to gain wider 
importance, since analysts rightly assumed that the court would approve the treaty.
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With the government initiative for a solidarity pact in autumn 1992, the prospects for a 
compromise became more tangible. Financial market attention focused on two issues: firstly, 
the time scale for conclusion of the pact and secondly, the question of burden-sharing of 
fiscal consolidation between federal and state governments. The in-depth reports of Goldman 
Sachs, in particular, came up with a detailed structural analysis o f both aspects. In its March 
1993 issue the timetable for the solidarity pact is presented against a detailed outline of “Who 
meets Whom”, mapping out the complex procedure o f negotiations between the prime 
ministers and finance ministers of the federal states, the federal cabinet and the chancellor, 
and the heads of the majority parties’ parliamentary factions in preparation of a consensus 
package to be presented to both houses of parliament (GS March 1993, 8/2: 1.12). After the 
conclusion of the pact on 13 March 1993, the April issue then gave a similarly detailed 
structural analysis of the system of financial burden-sharing at the level of federal states as 
the key structure influencing the implementation of the compromise (GS April 1993, 8/3: 
S.08).
More important than this detailed technical analysis for the deteriorating market sentiment 
during the pre-‘Grande Gaffe’ episode was the general conclusion that the solidarity pact had 
failed to deliver, interpreted as demonstrating the inefficient, divided nature of the federal 
government system. The pessimistic view taken by Salomon Brothers on renewed proposals 
by government to bring spending under control is typical, stating that
“.... the opposition SPD - which successfully opposed social spending cuts in the solidarity negotiations and 
enjoys a blocking majority in the Upper House (Bundesrat) -  already is objecting to the renewed proposals. 
Thus, a new agreement on social spending appears to be unlikely before the late-1994 parliamentary elections.” 
(SB 28/05/93: 5).
In conclusion, the importance of divided government structures for the capacity of the 
political system to deliver, as emphasised by rationalist institutionalism (e.g. Simmons 1994,
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Milner 1997), was recognised by financial markets with regard to the prospects of fiscal 
consolidation in Germany. However, this structural awareness was narrow, shallow and ad 
hoc. It focused almost exclusively on the confrontation between the two chambers of 
parliament concerning the solidarity pact. Despite detailed technical analysis, the underlying 
bargaining mechanisms, which produced a shared understanding of the need to restore a 
sound fiscal position, were poorly understood. As a consequence, markets failed to grasp that 
the solidarity pact of March 1993 did indeed signal the establishment of a consensus for 
medium-term budgetary consolidation. Instead, market participants relied on the lack of 
tangible immediate spending cuts as a proxy indicator by which to gauge the capacity of the 
government to come to grips with the deficit. The result was excessive pessimism towards 
summer 1993.
A wider analytical focus, which could have taken into account the positive effect of the 
fragmented structure of Germany’s governmental system on Bundesbank policy-making 
autonomy, as suggested by rationalist institutionalism, is missing. Such a focus might have 
mitigated the pre-‘Grande Gaffe’ gloom and furthermore avoided the mistake of 
underestimating the Bundesbank’s ultimate capability to reassert itself.
7.4. Conclusion
Structural-institutional variables mattered for financial market participants in the case of 
Germany as factors influencing the credibility of the Bundesbank as a guarantor of strong 
mark, backed by low inflation. When Bundesbank policies appeared to be increasingly 
ambiguous in this respect in 1993, market participants turned their attentions to the political 
reality of Bundesbank independence. This entailed not only growing awareness of domestic 
and international constraints on, and challenges to Bundesbank independence, but also of the
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embeddedness of Bundesbank autonomy in the broader structures constituting the German 
political economy.
In accordance with the findings of rationalist institutionalism, markets recognised that the 
effectiveness of German central banking, the crucial factor behind D-mark credibility, was 
dependent not just on constitutional independence, but also on the capability of divided 
government and the comprehensive wage bargaining structures to produce non-inflationary 
fiscal and wage policy outcomes. German monetary policy autonomy was rightly understood 
in market sentiment as being dependent on whether these structures functioned in accordance 
with the German stability culture. This structural awareness of market participants in the 
German case compares positively not only with the almost complete lack o f such awareness 
in the case of sterling, but also with the less coherent structural analysis in the case o f France. 
Similar to the French case, greater structural sensitivity by market participants, compared to 
Britain, can be explained by boundedly rational stochastic learning from the experience of the 
September 1992 crisis. But this does not explain the differences in structural awareness 
between Germany and France, since their respective confidence problems were closely 
intertwined over the course of 1993. Market awareness of and ultimately confidence in the 
structural underpinnings of Bundesbank stability policies was not so much the result of 
structural evaluation over 1992/93 having been deeper than it had been in the case o f France, 
but of markets having paid for decades special attention to the domestic determinants of the 
strength of the ERM anchor currency, resulting in a legacy of historical experience of the 
capabilities of the German monetary policy regime.
However, this structural awareness did little to reduce the growing feeling o f uncertainty 
about the prospects of German monetary policy and the D-mark in the ERM, which
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permeated market sentiment towards summer 1993. On the contrary, by understanding that 
Bundesbank independence was conditional on the wider political and structural environment 
o f central bank policy making, the feeling of uncertainty increased.
Why did structural awareness increase uncertainty, instead of reducing it? The reason seems 
to be that this awareness was not based on consistent, systematic analysis of the complex 
interaction between different agents, constrained by specific interdependent structures within 
the German regime. Although better than in the case of the French franc, structural awareness 
was still essentially ad hoc, superficial and narrow. Although the sense that Germany 
underwent a regime crisis challenged the conventions prevalent in markets concerning the 
autonomy of the Bundesbank, rooted in Germany’s stability culture, it did not lead to a 
systematic institutional analysis of how fragile this culture had actually become. The 
pragmatic approach of market reasoning to rely first of all on clear policy outcome variables 
as an indicator of institutional strength or weakness failed to produce stable expectations 
about Germany’s long-term institutional solidity. Instead, institutional uncertainty and over­
reliance on a short-term deterioration of policy-making outcomes resulted an excessive swing 
in market sentiment from negative to positive in summer 1993.
Motivated by bad news, the eclectic institutional analysis of market participants contributed 
to a feeling that the structural coherence underpinning the Bundesbank’s disinflationary 
stance was disintegrating. Similar to the developments observed in the case o f sterling and 
the French franc, market pressure on the D-mark mounted as traditional structural convention 
came under scrutiny in the first half of 1993. In contrast to the British and French cases, 
belated but decisive action by the central bank in response to the French challenge of the D- 
mark anchor role succeeded almost immediately in restoring market confidence. Although
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this U-turn in market sentiment demonstrated the lack of consolidated systematic structural 
analysis during 1992/93, it also showed how strong the historically grounded underlying 
reputation of the Bundesbank was.
As for Britain and France, the structural dimension of market sentiment in the German case 
supports the expected policy change model. Neither the first generation competitiveness 
model, nor the contingent policy change model are supported by the development of market 
sentiment in the case of the D-mark. Small current account deficits did not raise the prospect 
of a looming balance of payments crisis and the D-mark credibility problems never reached a 
stage, at which they triggered a self-feeding, self-fulfilling run on the currency. Domestic 
structural deliberations, combined with the recognition of the high politics constraints on the 
external front raised expectations of a defeat of the Bundesbank commitment to safeguard the 
currency in Germany’s economic policy-making, putting the anchor position of the D-mark 
in the ERM at risk.
In addition to the second generation expected policy change approach, the analysis of 
Germany confirms the inconsistent policy view. When Bundesbank interest rate decisions 
gave the appearance of growing inconsistency with the Bundesbank’s own commitment to 
price stability, markets started to lose confidence. Since the Bundesbank had a long-term 
reputation for time consistency, its return to a policy consistent with its commitments in 
June/July 1993 was euphorically accepted as restoring the credibility o f the D-mark.
385
Chapter 8:
Conclusion
When, how, why and under which circumstances do financial market participants take 
account of domestic institutions? What does the influence o f domestic institutions 
imply for national economic policy-making autonomy in the age o f international 
finance, and to what extent do the assertions of rationalist institutionalism hold? And 
finally, what are the practical implications of my findings for financial market 
analysts and politicians?
The findings of my thesis can be summarised as follows: firstly, although market 
participants, when taking account of domestic structures, do so in a broadly rational 
manner, their analysis is insufficient to produce robust conclusions. Market rationality 
is bounded, leading to inefficient market outcomes manifested in unstable institutional 
expectations and lack of robustness in institutional analysis. Secondly, this leaves 
market sentiment with a high degree of uncertainty about the structural underpinnings 
of political exchange rate commitments, allowing considerable room for national 
policy-making autonomy through strategic interaction between national policymakers 
and international financial market participants, contrary to the assertions of the 
orthodox globalisation thesis. Thirdly, the practical nature o f decision-making by 
financial market participants has not been recognised by rationalist institutionalism. In 
the following I will expand on these three key findings, and finish with some 
suggestions as to what they might imply for policymakers and investors.
My study shows that the institutional conclusions of rationalist institutionalism are 
confirmed by financial market behaviour in so far as domestic institutions that matter
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for the time consistency of a strong currency commitment can affect the credibility of 
currencies in international financial markets. As the cases of France and Germany in 
particular have shown, international financial markets did take account of some of the 
institutions that were identified by my analysis in Chapter Three as critically 
important for time consistency of the respective currency commitment. Although 
these institutions are pivotal in the universality of abstract institutionalist models, 
market participants paid closer attention to them not because of their abstract 
theoretical insights, but because they featured prominently in the current political- 
economic affairs surrounding the volatility in the ERM in 1992/93. The assertions of 
rationalist institutionalism that the central bank’s institutional design, the wider 
financial structure, the government structure and the wage bargaining structure in 
particular matter for the time consistency of monetary policy were confirmed for 
exchange rate policy making in the main developed capitalist democracies in western 
Europe in 1992/93. However, market participants only recognised this in an 
inconsistent fashion.
Market analysts focused in a selective manner on domestic institutions. In the case of 
Britain they reflected almost exclusively on the exceptional vulnerability of 
households and corporations to disinflation in Britain’s liberal market economy; in the 
case of Germany, the focus lay on the autonomy of the Bundesbank especially in the 
functional context of the wage bargaining structure, demonstrating understanding of 
the pivotal role of the German central bank for safeguarding the strong D-mark and 
eclectic awareness of some of the factors constituting its broader institutional 
embeddedness in Germany’s coordinated market economy; and in the case of France, 
on the political and financial structures, as two key components for the sustainability
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of the franc fo rt in the country’s etatist -  centralist economy. These variations in 
institutional emphasis for each country by investors indicate that market participants 
sensed that the efficacy of individual domestic institutions is dependent on the nation- 
specific wider structural conditions that determine their operation in practice rather 
than on their formal constitutional design, although they were unable to follow up this 
awareness by robust analysis. This is confirmed by market behaviour in recent 
currency crises, where market sentiment reflected a wide range of country specific 
structural concerns in assessing the capabilities of governments and central banks to 
maintain monetary policy commitments, but failed to overcome overall institutional 
uncertainty.1
Institutional attention was strongest for all three currencies in response to mounting 
uncertainty about the political time consistency of the strong currency commitment. 
Conversely, market participants paid little attention to domestic institutions in 
situations of calm in the ERM and in phases of tension when the political capacity to 
adjust was of little relevance. As depicted in Chart 8.1, domestic institutions mattered 
little when competitiveness concerns about a country’s balance of payments 
sustainability, emphasised by the first generation crisis model, dominated markets, 
normally in the early phases of a confidence crisis. Markets then relied on the clear 
and unambiguous key economic variables indicating the balance of payments 
position. Only when market attention shifted to the political sustainability concerns 
pointed out by the second generation expected policy change model, acknowledging 
that improved competitiveness due to disinflation came at the cost of falling output
1 When the credibility of the respective currencies was at stake, market sentiment was influenced by, 
among other structural concerns, the role of organised labour in Brazil, the de facto veto power of the 
military in Turkey, the bank-industry relationship in South Korea, regional disparities in Mexico, and 
organised crime in Russia.
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and rising unemployment, did domestic institutional concerns gain in importance. 
Finally, once market participants had concluded that because of institutional fragility 
the time consistency of the exchange rate commitment was vulnerable to speculative 
attack, institutional reasoning ceased. Market sentiment was then dominated by self- 
fulfilling speculative herding, as predicted by the contingent policy change crisis 
model.
Institutional factors thus played a role in market participants forming exceptions about 
possible monetary policy changes, in line with the assertions of rationalist 
institutionalism about political sustainability. Furthermore, my empirical study of the 
ERM crisis provides empirical support for the causal explanations of the second 
generation crisis model, but also indicates that its proponents should go further to 
comprehensively integrate the possibility that a much wider range of country-specific 
institutional factors might selectively influence market sentiment.2
Although this behaviour indicates that markets understood that policymakers had to 
rely on robust social and economic structures, capable of sustaining prolonged 
disinflationary monetary policy measures, the pragmatic approach to institutional 
analysis risks analytical ad hoccery and inconsistency. By including institutional 
aspects into their deliberations only in moments o f heightened monetary policy 
uncertainty, research departments of banks managed to do with limited institutional 
research capacity, but failed to build solid sociological expertise as the basis for a 
robust analysis of the domestic structural context of monetary policy making.
2 In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the second generation model and its derivatives have 
developed a stronger institutional dimension, but only by mainly taking domestic financial structures 
into account.
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Chart 8.1: Market attention to domestic institutions
Market
Attention
Economic fundamentals concerns Political sustainability concerns Herding
What kind of rationality did market participants apply towards domestic institutions? 
The rational pattern of market analysis was characterised not by optimising, 
systematic rational calculation, but by bounded rational behaviour. Most importantly, 
market participants relied on what Simon called “sociological assumptions” to 
determine what domestic institutions mattered and how they mattered (see Simon 
1997: 282). Market analysts attempted to overcome uncertainty about the 
functionality of domestic institutions to support the government’s exchange rate 
strategy commitment by drawing on conventions, commonly held beliefs and attitudes 
towards the characteristics of domestic institutional arrangements, rather than by 
systematically evaluating these arrangements against possible alternatives. This lack 
of “scientific” evaluation is demonstrated by the fact that market analysts never relied 
upon academic literature about institutions. This behaviour implies the satisficing 
nature of market reasoning under the daily stresses of decision-making in a currency- 
trading environment with limited analytical capacity specialised on domestic
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structures. Although pragmatic in the prevailing circumstances, it resulted in “too late, 
too much” volatility and critical misjudgements in monetary policy forecasting 
particularly in the case of France and Germany.
As predicted by bounded rationality theory, satisficing arguments replaced optimising 
rationality in all three cases. Market participants used conventions as mental shortcuts 
to make decisions about the robustness of domestic institutions, with the real work 
done not by systematic institutional analysis, but by ad hoc auxiliary assumptions. In 
the case of Britain, conventions about the stability of majoritarian single chamber 
unified government substituted for sophisticated analysis, confirmed by the superficial 
and ad hoc interpretation of election results and a naive acceptance o f government 
rhetoric. In the case of France, conventions about the political rootedness of the franc 
fort strategy in the country’s dirigiste administrative and financial structure were 
unstable because they did not rely on rigorous structural investigation. Instead 
financial markets took the ability of the French political class to elicit Bundesbank 
support for the franc fort as a substitute for the capability of the political system to 
sustain disinflation. In the case of Germany, financial markets ultimately backed the 
Bundesbank’s strong currency commitment not because they had come to a 
conclusive assessment of the severity of the structural tensions in Germany’s stability 
culture, but because of the mythical reputation of the Bundesbank. Markets relied 
mainly on Bundesbank statements and interest rate decisions as auxiliary indicators 
for structural capability, changing their mind in an ad hoc fashion following mixed 
central bank signals.
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In the case of both the French franc and sterling political signalling and rhetoric by 
policy makers of both the follower and the leader country mattered greatly for market 
sentiment. It was possible for both France and Britain to borrow credibility by 
exploiting market participants’ susceptibility to strong currency rhetoric as long as the 
Bundesbank cooperated by not discrediting this rhetoric by statements and signals to 
the contrary. Rationalist approaches, by overemphasising investors’ capabilities for 
rigorous institutional analysis, fail to explain how over time perceptions of time 
consistency can be maintained and conventions reinforced through political 
statements and credibility be “borrowed” through the symbolic act of a currency peg, 
despite questionable domestic institutional foundations.
In addition, the satisficing pragmatic nature of market participants’ bounded 
rationality is reflected in their selective and ad hoc attention to domestic structures. 
Firstly, markets were narrow in their choice of structures for closer attention, focusing 
exclusively on those structures which showed obvious strains in regard of the 
sustainability of disinflation. In Britain this was the financial structure, with markets 
neglecting the equally important, but less obvious problems in the political structure. 
In Germany the important role of the bank-industry relationship for the Bundesbank’s 
hegemonic position in the German economic policy regime was neglected, because it 
did not pose sustainability concerns, at the risk of underestimating the structural 
backup the Bundesbank could rely upon in a moment of critical decision making after 
the French ‘Grande Gaffe’.
Attention to the narrow set of domestic structures was ad hoc, often following the 
electoral cycle. The price of this behaviour was either a lack of understanding of the
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long term embeddedness of the monetary policy strategy of governments in domestic 
structures, regardless of electioneering, as in the case of Germany and France, or, 
conversely, a neglect of structural inconsistencies with the exchange rate strategy in 
periods where the government did not have to face the electorate in the medium term, 
as in the case of Britain after April 1992.
Finally, market participants showed themselves capable of stochastic learning, as 
suggested by bounded rationality theory. Market participants did learn from practical 
experience of domestic institutional capability over the course of a specific currency 
crisis, as in the case of the resilience of the French financial structure to interest rate 
increases. This learning took place in incremental fashion to take greater notice of 
domestic structures from one currency crisis to the next. Structural awareness grew 
from the 1992 sterling crisis to the 1993 problems of the French franc and the D- 
mark, after the ejection of the pound from the ERM had proved an unexpected 
structural vulnerability of the UK currency commitment. But this learning was 
stochastic in so far as it did not consist in systematic optimising analysis of experience 
with domestic structures. Instead, the ad hoc formation of new conventions or greater 
attention to existing conventions satisficed. Market participants pragmatically adapted 
to changing circumstances by assuming that past experience would be a guide to 
future structural performance, as a surrogate for rigorous analysis as to whether these 
experiences could be generalised.
Stochastic learning from experience, contradicting the standard reasoning issued by 
market analysts themselves that ‘past performance’ is no guide to ‘future 
performance’, represents a good case for the pros and cons of bounded rationality.
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Institutional structures indeed evolve historically along path dependent lines and 
rarely undergo revolutionary change, supporting the practical case for relying on past 
experience when forming future expectations, in particular if  optimising rational 
analysis is unrealistic. However, the case of the D-mark indicates the problems 
inherent to such an approach, if  it is not backed up by continuous robust structural 
analysis. In Germany, market sentiment suffered from inertia, denying the possibility 
of a fundamental structural break for too long after reunification, only to react in ad 
hoc fashion once structural conventions could no longer be reconciled with 
deteriorating outcomes of Bundesbank monetary policy. Furthermore, the German 
central bank could exploit the inertia of institutional market sentiment to regain 
credibility despite severe structural strains. Market confidence in the workings of the 
German monetary regime, resulting from long historical experience of the domestic 
factors underpinning the ERM key currency, was restored at the cost of France, 
which, as a follower country, lacked such a deeply entrenched positive institutional 
track record. As a result market sentiment reinforced the hierarchical structure of the 
ERM. Germany was spared from a speculative attack as the ultimate test o f structural 
resilience, whereas France’s attempts to build credibility were devastated by a 
potentially self-fulfilling speculative crisis that thwarted its leadership ambitions. 
Sociological assumptions, grounded in traditional conventions and past experience, 
rather than consistent critical reassessment of these images in the light of recent 
political-economic developments, can thus be self-fulfilling.
Bounded rational analysis was not robust enough to overcome market uncertainty 
about the time consistency of strong currency commitments. When financial market 
participants focused on domestic structures in reaction to uncertainty about the
political sustainability of disinflation, they confined their analysis to what was good 
enough in the short term. Confirming Odell’s (2001) assertions on bounded rational 
behaviour, market participants failed to apply stable analytical criteria in regard of 
domestic institutions, but adopted different outlooks when changing circumstances 
created uncertainty about the validity of conventional views. The result was 
superficial conclusions about institutional vulnerability that satisficed in the short run, 
at the cost of forming consistent and robust expectations. If the institutional analysis 
of market participants had produced more robust results, it should have allowed for 
the transformation of uncertainty in the face of institutional ambiguities into 
institutional risk, thus stabilising market sentiment. Instead, as illustrated by the 
evolution of market sentiment in all three cases, structural concerns alternated with 
phases of market euphoria, in which structural stresses were generally dismissed.
The weak and opportunistic nature of the boundedly rational approach market 
analysis took towards domestic institutions led to bandwagon effects which differed 
from rational herding, which would have been the result of robust and conclusive 
institutional analysis indicating the existence of multiple equilibria. In both the cases 
of Britain and France, herding was triggered by policy inconsistencies against the 
background of heightened uncertainty as a result of weak and ultimately inconclusive 
institutional analysis. As, in particular, the case of Salomon Brothers’ analysis o f the 
credibility of the franc fort demonstrated, isolated market participants’ nonconformist 
institutional conclusions lacked the robustness to withstand the general trend in 
market sentiment. In the German case, weak insights into the structural crisis o f the 
German monetary policy regime were easily swept away when the conventions on the
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institutional strength of the Bundesbank, arrived at not through systematic analysis, 
but historical experience, were confirmed by decisive monetary policy action.
What theoretical and practical conclusions can be drawn from my analysis? In view of 
these findings, Mosley’s (2000) “strong but narrow” thesis on the influence of 
macroeconomic variables on market sentiment can be supplemented by a “narrow and 
weak” hypothesis for the influence of domestic institutions, given the selective 
attention of market participants to domestic structures and the lack of robust stable 
conclusions. My empirical analysis has confirmed that financial market sentiment is 
indeed strongly influenced by only a narrow set of macroeconomic and political 
variables, including the balance of payments, inflation, GDP growth, monetary policy 
decisions, key exchange rate crosses and, on the political side, election forecasts and 
results. In addition, markets selected one or two country specific key structures for 
closer investigation from a narrow set of institutional variables, including the 
institutional position of the central bank, the wider financial structure, the wage 
bargaining structure and the government structure. But the few structures selected for 
attention influenced market sentiment only in conjunction with more direct strong 
indicators of possible political time consistency problems as inconsistent, weak 
monetary policy decisions.
Willett’s (2000) “too much, too late” hypothesis on investor behaviour in currency 
crisis is by and large supported by my empirical case studies. Institutional analysis 
was only belatedly undertaken in response to mounting uncertainty, as in the case of 
Britain. Conventional views on domestic institutions prevailing at critical junctures
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tended to reinforce market uncertainty, thus amplifying mood swings, as 
demonstrated by the market rally behind the Bundesbank in summer 1993.
What does my finding that market reasoning is boundedly rational and pragmatic, 
rather than optimising and systematic, say about rationalist institutionalism, and its 
critique of the globalisation thesis? As to the latter aspect, broad assertions by 
proponents of the globalisation thesis that international finance is imposing 
“embedded financial orthodoxy” on governments (Cemy 1993), constraining not only 
monetary policy making autonomy, but also the ability of policymakers to pursue 
Keynesian-style counter-cyclical deficit spending, have not been confirmed by my 
analysis. Financial market sentiment took a pragmatic attitude to rising fiscal deficits 
in circumstances of disinflationary monetary policy in defence o f the exchange rate. 
The assessment that these deficits were in the short run not inflationary, but would 
improve the political sustainability of the exchange rate commitment was satisfactory 
enough for market participants to disregard the possibility of long run inflationary 
outcomes or solvency problems. Contrary to orthodox liberal views this suggests that 
fiscal Keynesianism can actually stabilise market expectations.
Beyond this aspect, my findings suggest that, contrary to the orthodox globalisation
thesis, the influence of domestic structures on market sentiment allows for a
considerable degree of practical national monetary policy-making autonomy.
Contrary to rationalist institutionalist suggestions, this practical room for manoeuvre
does not stem from market participants taking a fully rational account of institutions,
but from them taking a bounded rational, pragmatic attitude. If market participants
3 This aspect of my empirical analysis of the evolution of market sentiment supports the statistical 
findings of Garrett (1998) on die continuous possibility of social democratic deficit spending under 
conditions of international capital mobility.
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had been capable of systematic and rigorous optimising analysis of the domestic 
structural constraints that governments face, their foresight on the structural time 
consistency of monetary policy commitments would have resulted in only currencies 
with strong institutional underpinnings enjoying market credibility. Governments with 
weak credibility would have had little choice but to devalue under the pressure of self- 
fulfilling speculative attacks during which market participants, fully aware of 
domestic structural fragility, would have demanded self-defeating risk premia. 
Governments with strong institutions that would have been fully acknowledged by 
financial markets would in practice have had little incentive to renege on their 
currency commitments, despite theoretically having the strategic choice to devalue.
However, since the assessment of domestic institutions by bounded rational markets 
did not arrive at robust conclusions about the structural underpinnings o f a strong 
currency strategy, it left room for markets and governments to enter into a strategic 
game about time consistency, in which uncertain assertions about institutional 
strength and vulnerability played a critical part. On the one hand, governments could 
combine market credibility with considerable monetary policy autonomy even in 
situations of institutional vulnerability by exploiting conventions on institutional 
strength. On the other hand, markets did threaten to punish superficially inconsistent 
policy moves with a full scale speculative attack, even if a deeper systematic analysis 
would have indicated the long term consistency o f domestic structures with the 
governments exchange rate strategy.
The former situation is demonstrated by the case of Britain and Germany in the ERM 
crisis. The UK government temporarily managed to manipulate market participants to
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believe that cutting official interest rates below those of the anchor currency was a 
sign of strength, by exploiting market conventions on the stability o f majority 
government and only limited and ad hoc awareness of problems in the financial 
structure. In Germany the mythical reputation of the Bundesbank allowed during a 
considerable period for the loosening of monetary policy in the face o f unbroken 
inflationary pressures and signs of systemic structural fragility, without causing an 
outright credibility crisis of the D-mark. The fact that the Bundesbank could exploit 
its reputation to fend off the French challenge for ERM leadership demonstrates how 
conventional views of domestic structures by market participants granted 
policymakers considerable monetary policy making autonomy not only domestically, 
but also for pursuing international strategic monetary policy objectives towards other 
governments.
France finally represents a case of the risks coming from bounded market rationality. 
Although the French ‘Grande Gaffe’ challenge was undertaken not only from an 
economic fundamentals position superior to that of Germany, but also within the 
context of strong structural underpinnings of the franc fort, institutional awareness in 
financial markets was not robust enough to hold out against the strong historical track 
record of German institutions pertaining to the hard currency strategy. The result was 
the speculative attack on the franc of summer 1993. Market participants accepted the 
strong structural underpinnings of the franc fort only ex post, after French 
policymakers had sustained the peg in the face of speculative pressure despite room 
for reflation after the widening of the ERM fluctuation bands at the beginning of 
August. Whereas the Bundesbank seems to have been aware that in practice historical 
experience would be decisive for market participants when it came to judging the
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credibility of domestic structures, the French authorities seem to have taken a more 
abstract rationalist view of market behaviour. They hoped that market participants 
would comprehend that the logic of competitive disinflation had become the defining 
rationale of the French political-economic regime. The French ‘Grande Gaffe’ thus 
clearly illustrates the risks policymakers take by strategically playing on abstract 
structural awareness of financial markets to assert monetary policy autonomy.
What do these results imply for rationalist institutionalism as a theory? My analysis 
shows that its ambiguities with regard to the relevance of domestic institutions for the 
credibility of exchange rate commitments stem from its failure to understand bounded 
rational market behaviour. Only because market sentiment in practice was happy to 
do with satisficing structural deliberations, rather than attempting to optimise, national 
policymakers could enter into a strategic game with international financial markets 
market sentiment with the realistic expectation of maintaining relative monetary 
policy-making autonomy. Rationalist institutionalists are correct in so far as they 
point out against the globalisation thesis that domestic institutions interfere with the 
constraint global finance imposes on national policy autonomy. But contrary to 
rationalist institutionalist suggestions, markets only ponder institutional factors in a 
partial way, up to a point that is satisficing under given information asymmetries and 
computational constraints. It is because of this behaviour that a strategic game 
between domestically constrained policymakers and institutionally aware financial 
market participants about national monetary policy-making autonomy can take place.
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Rationalist institutionalism failed to clarify the exact circumstances of this interaction, 
because of its excessively abstract rationalist assumptions on market efficiency. These 
narrow assumptions have the advantage of allowing for rigorous scientific empirical 
analysis, but at the price of neglecting the procedural and contextual nature of 
practical decision-making by market participants. My empirical analysis shows that it 
is possible to undertake a disciplined qualitative longitudinal analysis of market 
sentiment for a single historical cluster of currency crises through focused and 
structured comparison. This approach, exploring the possibility of “bounded 
rationality institutionalism”, provides a necessary corrective to the parsimonious 
scientific rigour of rationalist institutionalism. It produces empirically more valid 
conclusions about the behaviour of market agents confronted with the complex 
workings of specific domestic regimes, without giving up the assumption that this 
behaviour is driven by the rationale of individual utility maximisation.
What do my findings imply for practitioners? How could market analysis by investors 
and international monetary policy making by politicians be improved? Despite the 
limitations of bounded rationality, its ad hoccery and superficiality, boundedly 
rational investor behaviour is distinguished by a realistic approach to the assessment 
of domestic economic regimes. This is because markets look at the institutions critical 
for exchange rate policies in the context of changing circumstances and the historical 
track record, to come to a conclusion which is satisficing for a specific moment. 
Although this procedure is unsystematic and influenced by conventions, the pragmatic 
approach can potentially result in realistic approximations of complex institutional 
circumstances, if  markets draw on solid evaluation of socio-historical evidence.
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In contrast, fully rational optimising behaviour is impractical for investors, given 
incomplete information, excessive search costs and limited computational capacity. In 
the practice of foreign exchange trading it is impossible to disaggregate the 
institutional complexities of national variations of capitalism in specific situations in 
order to measure them against ideal-typical constructs, deduced from rational choice 
modelling. Hence, although it is possible to point out the weaknesses of a boundedly 
rational approach towards domestic institutions by confronting it with an ideal of 
rigorous and optimising rational choice analysis, in practice such analysis does not 
represent a viable alternative. Market analysis would have made fewer mistakes if it 
had been more thorough, but it is heroic to assume that markets are capable of 
adopting an optimising full rational choice approach to achieve such thoroughness.
Since there exists no practical reasonable alternative to boundedly rational analysis 
for market participants, this analysis itself has to be improved to contain institutional 
uncertainty in market sentiment. To reduce ad hoccery, superficiality and eclecticism, 
boundedly rational institutional analysis should expand on the advantages coming 
with its contextual, historical and interpretative approach. Given that it is practical 
experience and not abstract analysis which assists such concrete understanding, 
international financial market agents should build and rely more on domestic 
knowledge and long-term experience of local practitioners. Furthermore, investment 
banks should hire more political scientists and political economists, whose expertise 
lies with the qualitative analysis of the political and social life of a country. This 
would bring a more robust sociological interpretation of domestic structures into 
country risk assessment, to augment the quantitative approach o f country analysts 
who are economists by training. Such a quantitative/qualitative approach seems to
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have been attempted rudimentarily by some banks, who employed political analysts to 
assess the risks political conditions posed in severely indebted developing countries in 
the late 1970s (Gibson 1996: 301). However, my investigation of how financial 
market reports are compiled found that country analysis is still an exclusive domain of 
economists, at least for the case of major industrialised countries. My thesis indicates 
that investment banks should integrate specialists in comparative political economy 
into their country analysis teams to exploit their expertise on the structural variations 
of capitalism for a better assessment of the time consistency of monetary policy 
commitments. Banks might have extensive knowledge of the performance of major 
developed economies and follow these countries current political affairs, but currently 
they suffer from a limited understanding of their domestic structural complexities.
Politicians should first of all realise that strong currency rhetoric and verbal 
commitments to exchange stability, although providing a temporary reassurance to 
markets about the time consistency of these commitments, will not suffice if the 
domestic costs of maintaining external stability mount over prolonged periods. 
Furthermore, greater transparency of financial and governance structures and 
accountability of these institutions is not enough to assure smooth integration with 
international finance, if these institutional arrangements are not consistent with the 
societal preferences for internal and external currency stability, reflecting the wider 
political-economic characteristics of a country. It is not so much through the adoption 
o f abstract best practice solutions, but through domestic structures that are suited for 
the specific national variety of capitalism, that market participants will be reassured 
that monetary policy commitments do enjoy broad societal acceptance.
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Appendix Table 1: 
A Political Economic Chronology of the 1992/93 ERM Crisis
1991
April G Regional elections: government looses majority in Bundesrat
May G Bundesbank President Pohl resigns after conflict with government
July G Bundesrat rejects tax increases
Autumn F Scandals weaken PM Edith Cresson
17 Oct F Banque de France cuts intervention rate unilaterally
14-15 Nov FIN Finish markka devalued by 14%
19 Nov USA $ at 8-month low against DM
25 Nov ERM Tensions , realignment speculation before Maastricht Treaty
27 Nov Scan Nordic currency crisis starts
11 Dec EC Successful conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty
Dec RUS Political instability
19 Dec G Buba increases discount rate by 0.5% to 8%
20 Dec USA Fed cuts discount rate by 1% to 3.5%
27 Dec RUS President Gorbatchev resigns as president of the SU
1992
04 Feb SP Spain removes remaining capital controls
11 March UK Date for general election announced (09 April 92)
02 April F Beregevoy replaces Cresson as new PM
04 April G Heavy losses for the ruling coalition in important regional elections
05 April I Parliamentary elections in Italy: Democracia Christiana looses majority
06 April P Escudo enters the ERM at +/- 6% band
09 April UK General elections: Conservative majority government confirmed (21 seat 
majority)
06 May UK Bank of England cuts Bank rate unilaterally by 0.5%
07 May F Banque de France increases official rates unilaterally
08 May G Start of public sector strikes resulting in high wage settlements
02 June USA Fed cuts discount rate to 3%
02 June DK Danish referendum rejects Maastricht Treaty
03 June F Referendum on Maastricht Treaty announced for 20 September 92
05 June I Bank of Italy increases official interest rates
18 June IR Resounding approval of Maastricht Treaty in Irish referendum
16 July G Buba raises discount rate by 0.75% to 8.75%, Lombard rate steady
23 July SP Central bank increases official interest rates
03 Aug I Bank of Italy lowers discount rate unilaterally by 0.5%
11 Aug ERM/
USA
Massive concerted intervention by central banks in support of the US $, led 
by Fed, to stop the fall of the $
27 Aug ERM Record intervention in support of £ fails to lift £ from ERM floor
28 Aug ERM ItL falls below ERM floor
03 Sep UK Britain borrows ECUlObn in DM to augment reserves
04 Sep I Bank of Italy increases discount rate sharply by 1.75%
05-06 Sep ERM Bath meeting of EC officials on ERM crisis inconclusive
06 Sep G Ruling coalition fails to agree upon tax increases
08 Sep G Chancellor Kohl announces more massive transfers to east Germany
08 Sep Scan Finnish markka floated, Swedish Riksbank raises interest rates to 75%
10-11 Sep ERM Heavy intervention by Buba and Bank of Italy fails to support ItL
12-13 Sep ERM Germany and Italy announce 7% ItL devaluation and Buba rate cut
14 Sep G Buba cuts discount rate by 0.5% to 8.25%, Lombard rate by o.25%
15 Sep ERM ItL falls below new parity, £ and peseta under pressure
16 Sep UK/
ERM
“Black Wednesday”: Bank of England raises Bank Rate to 12% and 
announces further increase to 15%; £ falls below ERM floor despite heavy 
intervention; Britain suspends ERM membership and rescinds second rate 
rise, Swedish Riksbank raises rates to 500%
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1992 (cont.)
16-14 Sep ERM “Battle for the French franc
17 Sep I Lira suspended from ERM
17 Sep UK Bank of England lowers Bank rate to 10%
19 Sep UK Britain announces that £ will not return to EMS until it is reformed
20 Sep F French referendum endorses Maastricht Treaty by a narrow margin
21 Sep F/G Banque de France and Buba intervene to support FFr
22 Sep ERM FFr, peseta, escudo weak; Ir punt falls below ERM floor despite intervention
23 Sep ERM Intramarginal intervention by Buba and Banque de France to support FFr; 
Banque de France raises official interest rates to by 2.5% to 13%; Spain 
imposes capital controls
24 Sep IR Ireland imposes capital controls
02 Oct G No cut in key Buba interest rates, but repo rate lowered
15 Oct G No Buba rate cuts, against expectations
29 Oct G Buba again fails to cut official interest rates
29 Oct F Banque de France lowers official interest rates unilaterally
03-31 Oct ERM Gradual lowering of official interest rates in most crisis-hit ERM countries, 
but rates remain above pre-crisis levels.
03 Nov USA Presidential elections: Clinton replaces Bush Sen.
12 Nov F Banque de France cuts official interest rates unilaterally, FFr strenghtens
19 Nov S Swedish krona floated
22 Nov SP/P Peseta and escudo devalued by 6%, Spain rescinds capital controls
23 Nov ERM/
N
Norwegian, Irish and, Spanish Central Banks increase official interest rates
26 Nov G Buba keeps official interest rates stable, despite new ERM tensions
03 Nov G/F Intramarginal intervention by Buba to support FFr
Dec ERM IMF calls for substantial German interest rate reductions
03-28 Dec ERM/
Scan
Continued market pressure against FFr, Danish krone, punt,; official interest 
rates lowered in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries
10 Dec N Norwegian krone floated
10 Dec G Buba keeps rates stable, but announces it will raise M3 for 1993
13 Dec EU Edinburgh summit adopts growth initiative and grants Denmark binding 
exemptions from Maastricht Treaty: Maastricht Treaty project saved
16 Dec P Portugal rescinds capital controls
17 Dec F PM Beregovoy reaffirm existing FFr/DM parity as “inviolable”
1993
05 Jan F/G Joint intervention by Banque de France and Buba to support FFr; Banque de 
France raises overnight interest rates
06 Jan IR Central bank increases official interest rates to 50%
07 Jan G Buba cuts repo rate, but keeps key official rates steady
08 Jan IR Central bank increases official interest rates to 100%
12-16 Jan ERM Several central banks, including the Irish central bank, lower official rates
28 Jan IR Central bank increases official interest rates back to 100%
30 Jan IR Irish punt devalued by 20%
01 Feb DK Central bank raises official rates, pushing overnight rate above 100%
04 Feb G Buba lowers discount rate by 0.25% to 8.25% and Lombard rate by 0.5% to 
9%
05 Feb F Banque de France lowers official interest rates
05 March G Buba lowers repo rate
10 March ERM Central banks in Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium lower official interest 
rates
13 March G “Solidarity Pact” agreed
18 March G Buba lowers discount rate again by 0.5% to 7.5%, Lombard unchanged
21 March F First round of French parliamentary elections: conservative victory likely
22 March RUS Yeltsin declares direct rule in Russia, political instability until 25 April
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1993 (cont.)
27/28 March F Second round of parliamentary elections: new centre-right coalition 
government (RPR/UDF: PM Balladur), ‘cohabitation’ with socialist 
President Mitterrand
09 April F PM Balladur announces steps towards Banque de France independence
13 April SP Spain schedules elections for 7 June
13 April F Banque de France lowers official interest rates
19 April F Banque de France lowers official interest rates
22 April G Buba lowers discount rate to by 0.25% to 7.25% and Lombard rate by 0.5% 
to 8.5%
23 April ERM Concerted intervention to support the Spanish peseta
May G Metal sector strikes in east Germany
06 May F/G Buba keeps rate steady, but Banque de France lowers official interest rates
13 May SP/P Peseta and escudo devalued by 8% and 6.5%, respectively
13 May F Banque de France lowers official interest rates
18 May DK Second Danish referendum endorses Maastricht Treaty
24 May F Balladur government announces job creation programme
25 May F Banque de France lowers official interest rates
09 June G Soros speaks of “fundamental and long-term” DM weakness
14 June F Banque de France lowers official interest rates
16 June F Phillipe Seguin, PRP president of the National Assembly, attacks franc fort 
strategy as “social Munich”; demands drastic interest rate cuts to fight 
unemployment
21 June F Banque de France lowers official interest rates
22/23 June IR/SP Central banks lower official interest rates
24 June F “Le Grande Gaffe”: French economics minister Alphandery convenes 
Franco-German meeting to plan concerted interest rate cuts, but German 
finance minister Waigel cancels meeting
24 June DK Central bank lowers official interest rates
End June G Ruling coalition agrees upon big social spending cuts
01 July G Buba lowers discount rate bu 0.5% to 6.75% and Lombard rate to 8.25%
02 July F Banque de France lowers official interest rates
09 July F Banque de France intervenes to support the FFr
12 July G/F FFR falls close to ERM floor; German finance minister pledges support; 
Buba says it has intervened to support the FFR
15 July G Buba leaves official interest rates unchanged
16 July ERM Concerted central bank intervention to support the Danish krone
22 July ERM FFr, Danish krone, peseta, escudo under pressure; uncertainty about outcome 
of next Buba council meeting; Banque de France raises official interest rates; 
Buba intervenes to support the FFr.
28 July G Buba lowers repo rate
29 July G/
ERM
Buba lowers Lombard rate by 0.5% to 7.75%, but does not change discount 
rate; market disappointment; central bank intervention to support Belgian 
franc, Danish krone, FFr, peseta, escudo has little effect
30 July ERM Belgian franc, FFr, Danish krone fall below ERM floor; massive intervention 
by Buba to support FFr
31 July- 
01 Aug
ERM EC finance ministers and central bank governors exam measures to cope with 
the crisis; decide to widen ERM band from +/-2.25% to +/-15%, effective 
from 02 August
09-23 Aug F Banque de France lowers overnight lending rate five times, by total of 
2.25%, but leaves 5-10 day rate unchanged
09 Sep G/F Buba lowers discount and Lombard rates to 6.25% and 7.25%, respectively; 
Banque de France lowers 5-10 day rate from 10% to 7.75%, but leaves 
intervention rate at 6.75%.
08 Dec F FFr rises above its old narrow band ERM floor
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Sources:
IMF (1993: 42-47)
Kenen(1995: 152-155)
Financial Times: Foreign Exchanges.
Salomon Brothers: Economic & Market Analysis: International Market Roundup 
Goldman Sachs: The International Economic Analyst
Abbreviations:
DK Denmark
ERM European Exchange Rate Mechanism
EC European Community
F France
FIN Finland
G Germany
I Italy
IR Ireland
P Portugal
R USSR/Russia
S Sweden
Scan Scandinavia
SP Spain
UK United Kingdom
USA United States
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Appendix Table 2: Main Economic Indicators
France Germany UK USA
Real GDP 1988 4.2 3.7 5.2 4.2
1989 4.3 3.6 2.1 3.5
1990 2.6 5.7 0.6 1.7
1991 1.1 5.0 -1.5 -0.2
1992 1.4 2.2 0.1 3.3
1993 -1.0 -1.1 2.3 2.4
1994 1.8 2.3 4.4 4.0
Output Gaps 1988 -0.8 -0.3 5.6 1.3
1989 0.9 0.5 5.2 2.0
1990 1.2 2.8 3.1 0.9
1991 0.3 2.1 -0.9 -1.8
1992 0.0 1.7 -2.8 -1.1
1993 -2.3 -1.0 -2.8 -1.4
1994 -2.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4
Unemployment Ratesa 1988 9.8 6.2 8.7 5.5
1989 9.3 5.6 7.3 5.3
1990 9.0 4.8 7.1 5.6
1991 9.5 4.2 8.9 6.8
1992 10.4 4.5 10.0 7.5
1993 11.7 7.9 10.5 6.9
1994 12.3 8.4 9.6 6.1
Consumer Prices 1988 2.7 1.3 4.9 4.1
1989 3.5 2.8 7.8 4.8
1990 3.6 2.7 9.5 5.4
1991 3.2 3.6 5.9 4.2
1992 2.4 5.1 3.7 3.0
1993 2.1 4.4 1.6 3.0
1994 1.7 2.8 2.5 2.6
Public Sector Deficitb 1988 -1.7 -2.1 0.6 -3.6
1989 -1.2 0.1 0.9 -3.2
1990 -1.6 -2.0 -1.5 -4.3
1991 -2.2 -2.9 -2.8 -5.0
1992 -4.2 -2.5 -6.5 -5.9
1993 -6.0 -3.2 -8.0 -5.0
1994 -5.6 -2.5 -6.8 -3.6
Current Accountc 1988 -0.5 4.4 -3.8 -2.4
1989 -0.5 4.8 -4.6 -1.8
1990 -0.8 3.2 -3.6 -1.4
1991 -0.5 -1.0 -1.4 0.1
1992 0.4 -0.7 -1.7 -0.8
1993 0.8 -0.5 -1.7 -1.3
1994 0.5 -1.1 -0.2 -1.7
* Standardised Unemployment Rates. Prior to 1993 data refers to Western Germany. 
b General Government Fiscal Balances, as percentage of GDP. 
c As percentage of GDP
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 66, Dec. 1999, Statistical Annex
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Appendix Table 3: Index Tree
The tree structure gives the index-number for each node, followed by its descriptive 
title, followed by the number of text units coded at these nodes for each of three texts 
in the sample. The first figure gives the numbers of Goldman Sachs texts coded, the 
second figure the number of Salomon Brothers texts, and the third the number of 
Financial Times texts, so that the parenthesis giving these statistics reads 
(GS/SB/FT). If no texts have been coded it is indicated by a dash (-).
(l)Britain (-/-/-)
(1 l)economic performance (-/-/-)
(11 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(111 l)inflation- money supply etc. (-/-/-)
(1111 l)down (9/18/5)
(1111 2)up {-1212)
(111 2)public deficit/debt (2/6/2)
(111 3)Balance of Payments-competitiveness (4/5/3) 
(111 4)GDP and related indicators (-/-/-)
( 1114  l)up (3/4/4)
(1 1 1 4 2)down (5/11/5)
(111 5)unemployment (-/-/-)
(1115  l)down (1/-/1)
(1115  2)up (5/4/4)
(111 6)”fundamentals” (-/l/l)
(1 1 1 7)other (-/-/-)
(1 1 2)facts (-/-/-)
(112 l)inflation -  money supply etc. (-/-/-)
(112 1 l)down (5/7/5)
(112 1 2)up (-/2/3)
(112 2)public deficit/debt (3/2/4)
(112 3)Balance of Payments -  competitiveness (3/7/-) 
(112 4)GDP and related indicators (-/-/-)
(112 4 l)up (-/-/2)
(1 1 2 42)down (6/4/15)
(112 5)unemployment (-/-/-)
(112 5 l)down (-/-/-)
(1 1 2 5 2)up (3/3/3)
(112 6)”fundamentals” (1/-/2)
(1 1 2 7)other (-/-/-)
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(1 2)economic policy (-/-/-)
(12 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(12 1 l)monetary policy (-/-/-)
(12 11 l)official interest rates up (1/4/7)
(12 11 2)official interest rates down (5/13/21) 
(12 11 3)official interest rates steady (1/5/12) 
(12 11 4)official interest rates uncertain (-/2/21) 
(12 11 5)intervention (1/2/28)
(12 11 6)reserves (-/-/I)
(12 11 7)decoupling (-/-/-)
(12 1 2)fiscal policy (4/3/3)
(12 1 3)wage bargaining (-/-/-)
(12 13 l)positive (-/6/-)
(12 13 2)negative (-/-/-)
(12 1 4)Bundesbank statements (-/-/-)
(12 14 l)hawkish (2/21/62)
(12 142)soft (-/3/13)
(12 14 3)other (1/14/38)
(1 2 15)other (-/-/-)
(1 2 2)facts (-/-/-)
(12 2 l)monetary policy (-/-/-)
(12 2 1 l)official interest rates up (-/l/l)
(12 2 1 2)official interest rates down (2/1/9)
(12 2 1 3)official interest rates steady (2/-/3)
(12 2 1 4)official interest rates uncertain (-/-/-)
(12 2 1 5 intervention (-/-/21)
(12 2 1 6)reserves (-/1/6)
(1 2 2 2)fiscal policy (2/-/3)
(1 2 2 3)wage bargaining (-/-/-)
(1 2 2 3 l)positive (-/4/-)
(1 2 2 3 2)negative (-/-/-)
(1 2 2 4)other (-/-/-)
(1 3)politics (-/-/-)
(13 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(13 1 Selections (-/-/-)
(13 11 l)positive {-1-19)
(13 11 2)negative (1/4/38)
(13 11 3)other (1/7/7)
(13 1 2)other (-/-/2)
(1 3 2)fact (-/-/-)
(13 2 Selections (-/-/-)
(13 2 1 l)positive (1/1/5)
(13 2 1 2)negative (-/l/-)
(13 2 1 3)other (3/1/-)
(1 3 2 2)other(-/-/2)
429
(1 4)EMS-EMU (-/-/-)
(14 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(14 1 1)EMU politics (backbenchers) (2/-/1)
(14 1 2)ERM strategy (commitment; move to narrow band) 
(9/14/31)
(14 1 3)Franco-German axis (-/-/-)
(14 1 4)contagion (-/-/-)
(14 1 5)sustainability (5/4/14)
(1 4 16)other (-/-/-)
(1 4 2)Fact (-/-/-)
(14 2 1)EMU stance (public-politicians) (-/-/l)
(14 2 2)ERM strategy (-/1/18)
(14 2 3)Franco-German axis (-/-/-)
(14 2 4)contagion (-/l/-)
(14 2 5)other (-/-/l)
(1 5)domestic structures (-/-/-)
(15 l)financial structures (-/-/-)
(15 1 l)central bank (-/l/-)
(15 1 2)fmancial structures (non-CB) (4/14/4)
(15 2)wage bargaining structures (-/-/-)
(1 5 3)govemment structures (1/1/5)
(1 5 4)other (-/4/-)
(1 6)exchange-rate (-/-/-)
(16 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(1 6 1 l)up (4/11/17)
(1 6 1 2)down (3/14/56)
(16 1 3)steady (1/4/-)
(16 1 4)uncertain (-/l 5/25)
(1 6 15)other (-/-/l)
(1 6 2)fact (-/-/-)
(16 2 l)up (-/2/61)
(1 6 2 2)down (4/8/103)
(1 6 2 3)steady (-/-/69)
(1 6 2 4)other (-/-/-)
(1 7) crisis episodes (-/-/-)
(17 l)pre-Maastricht crisis episode (1/4/18)
(17 2)post-Maastricht crisis episode (1/4/18)
(1 7 3)pre-election crisis episode (1/5/33)
(17 4)”Black Wednesday” crisis episode (2/15/89)
430
(2)France (-/-/-)
(2 l)economic performance (-/-/-)
(2 1 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(2 11 l)inflation -  money supply etc. (-/-/-)
(2111 l)down (17/34/-)
(2111 2)up (-/-/-)
(2 11 2)public deficit/debt (3/15/-)
(2 11 3)Balance of Payments -  competitiveness (9/11/-) 
(2 11 4)GDP and related indicators (-/-/-)
(21 14  l)up (-/10/1)
(2 1 1 4 2)down (15/37/3)
(2 11 5)unemployment (-/-/-)
(2115 l)down (1/-/-)
(2115  2)up (13/15/2)
(2 11 6)”fundamentals” (2/-/1)
(2 1 1 7)other (-/-/-)
(2 1 2)facts
(2 12 l)inflation-money supply etc. (-/-/-)
(2121 l)down (11/6/6)
(2121 2)up (-/2/1)
(2 12 2)public deficit/debt (4/6/-)
(2 12 3)Balance of Payments -  competitiveness (9/12/9) 
(2 12 4)GDP and related indicators (-/-/-)
(2124  l)up (2/5/1)
(2 1 242)down(l 1/28/9)
(2 12 5)unemployment (-/-/-)
(2125 l)down (-/-/l)
(2 1 252)up (11/16/4)
(2 12 6)”fundamentals” (-/-/-)
(2 12 7)other (-/1/4)
431
(2 2)economic policy (-/-/-)
(2 2 l)expectations (-/-/-)
(2 2 1 l)monetary policy (-/-/-)
(2211 l)official interest rates up (3/12/9) 
(2211 2)official interest rates down (6/24/40) 
(2211 3)official interest rates steady (3/11/6) 
(2211 4)official interest rates uncertain (-/2/5) 
(2211 5)intervention (1/4/13)
(2211 6)reserves (2/-/2)
(2211 7)decoupling (2/6/26)
(2 2 1 2)fiscal policy (5/28/1)
(2 2 1 3)wage bargaining (-/-/-)
(2213 l)positive (2/10/-)
(22 1 3 2)negative (-/l/-)
(2 2 1 4)Bundesbank statements (-/-/-)
(2 2 1 4 l)hawkish (2/18/40)
(22 14 2)soft (-/3/9)
(22 143)other (1/12/25)
(2 2 1 5)other (1/-/-)
(2 2 2)facts (-/-/-)
(2 2 2 l)monetary policy (-/-/-)
(222 1 l)official interest rates up (1/3/8)
(222 1 2)official interest rates down (2/8/25) 
(222 1 3)official interest rates steady (-/-/l 6) 
(222 1 4)official interest rates uncertain (-/-/-) 
(222 1 5 ^ intervention (-/-/43)
(222 1 6)reserves (1/-/3)
(2 2 2 2)fiscal policy (3/3/1)
(2 2 2 3)wage bargaining (-/-/-)
(2223 l)positive (-/l 2/1)
(2223 2)negative (-/1/2)
(2 2 2 4)other (-/l/l)
(2 3)politics (-/-/-)
(2 3 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(2 3 1 l)elections (-/-/-)
(2311 l)positive (-/5/2)
(2311 2)negative (7/15/13)
(2311 3)other (3/10/4)
(2 3 12)other (2/7/10)
(2 3 2)fact (-/-/-)
(2 3 2 Selections (-/-/-)
(23 2 1 l)positive (2/2/3)
(232 1 2)negative (2/2/4)
(232 1 2)other (1/1/2)
(2 3 2 2)other (1/6/9)
432
(2 4)EMS-EMU (-/-/-)
(2 4 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(2 4 1 1)EMU politics (public-politicians) (6/13/11)
(2 4 1 2)ERM strategy {franc fort; commitment to ERM 
parity) (11/57/43)
(2 4 1 3)Franco-German axis (Buba defence of the FFr) 
(5/14/37)
(2 4 1 4)contagion (1/2/7)
(2 4 1 5)sustainability (11/30/31)
(2 4 1 6)other (1/-/3)
(2 4 2)Fact
(2 4 2 1)EMU stance (public-politicians) (1/2/3)
(2 4 2 2)ERM strategy {franc fori) (2/2/2)
(2 4 2 3)Franco-German axis (Buba defence of the FFr)(-/-/-) 
(2 4 2 4)contagion (3/-/1)
(2 4 2 5)other (-/-/-)
(2 5)domcstic structures (-/-/-)
(2 5 l)financial structures (-/-/-)
(2 5 1 l)central bank (1/2/3)
(2 5 1 2)financial structures (non-CB) (2/10/15)
(2 5 2)wage bargaining structures (-/8/-)
(2 5 3)govemment structures (4/21/3)
(2 5 4)other (1/13/-)
(2 6)exchange-rate (-/-/-)
(2 6 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(2 6 1 l)up (2/15/52)
(2 6 1 2)down (3/5/49)
(2 6 1 3)steady (1/14/11)
(2 6 1 4)uncertain (5/24/38)
(2 6 1 5)other (-/-/-)
(2 6 2)fact (-/-/-)
(2 6 2 l)up (1/4/107)
(2 6 2 2)down (3/7/87)
(2 6 2 3)steady (-/-/53)
(2 6 2 3)other (-/-/-)
(2 7)crisis episodes (-/-/-)
(2 7 l)Maastricht Treaty weakness episode (2/8/40)
(2 7 2)Danish-French referendum crisis episode (2/17/99)
(2 7 3)Swedish krona crisis episode (1/5/35)
(2 7 4)pre-election crisis episode (3/10/57)
(2 7 5)”Grande Gaffe” crisis episode (1/6/32)
433
(3)Germany (-/-/-)
(3 l)economic performance (-/-/-)
(3 1 l)expectations (-/-/-)
(3 11 l)inflation-money supply etc. (-/-/-)
(83111  l)down (14/55/18)
( 83111  2)up (2/10/43)
(3 11 2)public deficit/debt (12/16/3)
(3 11 3)Balance of Payments -  competitiveness (9/5/-) 
(3 11 4)GDP and related indicators (-/-/-)
( 3114  l)up (2/2/2)
( 3114  2)down (15/60/25)
(3 11 5)unemployment (-/-/-)
(3115 l)down (1/1/-)
(3115  2)up (8/12/-)
(3 11 6)”fundamentals” (1/1/2)
(3 1 1 7)other (-/2/13)
(3 1 2)facts (-/-/-)
(3 12 l)inflation -  money supply etc. (-/-/-)
(3121 l)down (1/2/11)
(3121 2)up (13/34/43)
(3 12 2)public deficit/debt (9/9/6)
(3 12 3)Balance of Payments -  competitiveness (2/5/2) 
(3 12 4)GDP and related indicators (-/-/-)
(31 24  l)up (4/2/1)
(3 1 24 2)down (5/29/37)
(3 12 5)unemployment (-/-/-)
(3125 l)down (-/-/l)
(3 1 25 2)up (4/8/2)
(3 12 6)”fimdamentals” (5/7/5)
(3 1 2 7)other (1/1/4)
434
(3 2)economic policy (-/-/-)
(3 2 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(3 2 1 l)monetary policy (Bundesbank)
(3211 l)official interest rates up (3/12/46) 
(3211 2)official interest rates down (7/40/100) 
(3211 3)official interest rates steady (8/26/87) 
(3211 4)official interest rates uncertain (-/1/39) 
(3211 5)intervention (3/4/29)
(3211 6)reserves (-/-/-)
(3211 7)decoupling (-/-/-)
(3 2 1 2)fiscal policy (17/36/15)
(3 2 1 3)wage bargaining (-/-/-)
(3213 l)positive (10/33/4)
(3 2 1 3 2)negative (2/12/26)
(3 2 1 4)Bundesbank statements (-/-/-)
( 3214  l)hawkish (2/21/73)
(32 14 2)soft (-/3/18)
(3 2 143)other (1/14/47)
(3 2 1 5)other (5/3/10)
(3 2 2)facts (-/-/-)
(3 2 2 l)monetary policy (Bundesbank) (-/-/-)
(322 1 l)official interest rates up (3/2/2)
(322 1 2)official interest rates down (6/8/25)
(3 22 1 3)official interest rates steady (-/4/38) 
(322 1 4)official interest rates uncertain (-/-/-) 
(322 1 5)intervention (2/1/32)
(3 22 1 6)reserves (-/-/-)
(3 2 2 2)fiscal policy (5/2/4)
(3 2 2 3)wage bargaining (-/-/-)
(3 223 l)positive (2/13/9)
(3 223 2)negative (5/15/14)
(3 2 2 4)other (3/-/-)
(3 3)politics (-/-/-)
(3 3 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(3 3 1 Selections (-/-/-)
(3311 l)positive (-/-/-)
(3311 2)negative (3/5/-)
(3311 3)other (1/8/-)
(3 3 12)other(-/l/2)
(3 3 2)fact (-/-/-)
(3 3 2 Selections (-/-/-)
(3 3 2 1 l)positive (-/-/-)
(3 3 2 1 2)negative (2/-/2)
(3 3 2 1 3)other (-/-/I)
(3 3 2 2)other (-/1/3)
435
(3 4)EMS-EMU (-/-/-)
(3 4 1 Expectations (-/-/-)
(3 4 1 1)EMU politics (public-politicians) (4/3/1)
(3 4 1 2)ERM strategy (action to stabilise ERM) (7/17/18)
(3 4 1 3)Franco-German axis (Buba defence of the FFr) 
(5/14/37)
(3 4 1 4)contagion (-/-/-)
(3 4 1 5)sustainability of Bundesbank disinflation for 
Germany (6/5/2)
(3 4 1 6)other(-/2/-)
(3 4 2)Fact (-/-/-)
(3 4 2 1)EMU stance (public-politicians) (-/l/-)
(3 4 2 2)ERM strategy (action to stabilise ERM) (-/2/11)
(3 4 2 3)Franco-German axis (Buba defence of the FFr)(-/-/-) 
(3 4 2 4)contagion (-/-/-)
(3 4 2 5)other (-/-/-)
(3 5)domestic structures (-/-/-)
(3 5 l)financial structures (-/-/-)
(3 5 1 l)central bank (11/19/11)
(3 5 1 2)financial structures (non-CB) (5/3/1)
(3 5 2)wage bargaining structures (10/20/9)
(3 5 3)govemment structures (8/23/10)
(3 5 4)other (8/15/-)
(3 6)exchange-rate (-/-/-)
(3 6 l)expectations (-/-/-)
(3 6 1 l)up (2/26/83)
(3 6 1 2)down (5/23/61)
(3 6 1 3)steady (-/2/6)
(3 6 1 4)uncertain (1/10/26)
(3 6 1 5)other (1/-/-)
(3 6 2)fact (-/-/-)
(3 6 2 l)up (6/11/162)
(3 6 2 2)down (-/5/123)
(3 6 2 3)steady (-/-/69)
(3 6 2 4)other (-/-/-)
(3 7)weakness episodes (-/-/-)
(3 7 l)pre-Danish referendum weakness episode (5/21/112) 
(3 7 2)post-French referendum weakness episode (1/3/18)
(3 7 3)pre-“Grande Gaffe” weakness episode (4/21/116)
436
(4)international developments (-/-/-)
(4 1)USA (-/-/-)
(4 1 l)Monetary Policy (-/-/-)
(4 11 1 Expectations (15/22/144)
(4 1 12)fact (3/1/25)
(4 11 3)expectations on interest rate differential Germany- 
US (-/-/-)
(4113  1)widening or steadily high (2/3/37) 
(4113  2)narrowing (8/8/17)
(4 1 1 3 2)other(3/-/9)
(4 1 2)other economic variables (14/31/341)
(4 1 3)US $ (-/-/-)
(4 13 1)$ expectations (-/-/-)
(4131 l)positive-up (12/31/91)
(4131 2)negative-down (3/17/70)
(4131 3)steady (-/3/6)
(4131 4)uncertain (2/13/61)
(4131 5)other (-/-/10)
(4 1 3 2)$ facts (-/-/-)
( 4132  l)positive-up (5/4/171)
(4 1 3 2 2)negative-down (4/6/170)
(4 1 32 3)steady (-/1/78)
(4 1 32 4)other (-/-/l)
(4 1 4)other (6/15/53)
(4 2)Russia (-/-/-)
(4 2 l)economic (-/1/10)
(4 2 2)political (-/1/21)
(4 2 3)other (2/-/-)
437
(4 3)EU (-/-/-)
(4 3 l)Netherlands (3/5/24)
(4 3 2)Portugal (2/1/48)
(4 3 3)Ireland (3/-/54)
(4 3 4)Italy (3/10/60)
(4 3 5)Spain (9/15/160)
(4 3 6)Belgium (-/5/25)
(4 3 8)ERM tension-crisis (-/-/-)
(4 3 8 l)(expected) realignment/ speculative pressure (-/-/-) 
(43 8 1 l)Britain (2/7/18)
(43 8 1 2)France (4/11/31)
(43 8 1 3)Italy (3/3/18)
(43 8 1 4)Germany (revaluation) {61-11)
(43 8 1 5)expectations increase in general (4/12/46) 
(43 8 1 6)other (3/15/52)
(4 3 8 2)expectations recede (-/-/-)
(43 82 l)Britain (1/2/-)
(43 82 2)France (3/14/21)
(43 8 2 3)Italy (-/-/-)
(43 82 4)Germany (revaluation) (-/-/-)
(43 82 5)Expectations recede in general (5/4/50) 
(43 82 6)other (2/-/16)
(4 3 9) French referendum (9/27/57)
(4 3 10)Danish referendum (8/13/69)
(4 3 1 l)”hard core” mini-EMU (4/12/6)
(4 3 12)other (-/-/-)
(4 4)yen (5/18/183)
(4 5)other (2/6/90)
(5)other (-/-/-)
